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This dissertation examines a successful example of reconciliation between former 
enemies after civil war: South Carolina’s reintegration of Loyalists.  At the end of a 
bruising guerilla civil war, South Carolina’s legislature, with the full support of the 
citizens, passed legislation confiscating the property of many prominent Loyalists and 
banishing them from the state, and putting an official imprimatur on the extralegal 
expulsion of others.  Yet within two years, the General Assembly pardoned and 
readmitted the majority of proscribed Loyalists, despite some anti-Loyalist rioting. 
This dissertation reincorporates Loyalists into the fabric of the new nation as 
subjects of discussion and historical actors, rather than absent people who posed no 
problem for the making of a new republic.  For both South Carolina legislators and 
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ordinary South Carolinians, discussions of honor, conduct, loyalty, Republicanism, and 
citizenship did not take place in a conceptual vacuum, but were shaped by discussions 
about and with former Loyalists who sought to take their places in this new experiment.  
South Carolinians’ understanding of citizenship and belonging was shaped by both their 
wartime experience with civil war and their decision to reincorporate many Loyalists into 
the body politic. 
What actually makes reconciliation?  In South Carolina’s case, it was a 
combination of official government action through the main branch of government (the 
legislature), the influential and persuasive voices of a few individuals who could 
encourage public opinion, and the individual and neighborhood decisions of many 
hundreds of individuals who decided that reintegrating most, though not all, of the former 
Loyalists into their communities was more important than pursuing revenge and 
punishment.  South Carolina’s move towards reconciliation worked because there was 
support from below.  
South Carolinians continued carefully to manage public discussions of 
Revolutionary conflict for generations in order to maintain peaceful relations, 
reintegrating Loyalist descendants into the elite while avoiding any recognition of their 
heritage. 
This dissertation depends on extensive legislative records, including Loyalist 
petitions, as well as executive documents, family letters, church records, and newspapers 




This dissertation examines a successful example of reconciliation between former 
enemies after civil war.  Noted historian John Shy once questioned “how a national polity 
so successful, and a society so relatively peaceful, could emerge from a war so full of bad 
behavior, including perhaps a fifth of the population actively treasonous (that is, loyal to 
Crown)….”1  This work provides an answer. 
South Carolinians successfully ‘buried the hatchet,’ moving from measures to 
exclude Loyalists and expel them from the state to incorporating them, protecting their 
property and persons, and reintegrating them into the fabric of everyday life.  If you were 
predicting what group would offer clemency to Loyalists, it would not have been South 
Carolinians, since they experienced the extremes of civil war during the American 
Revolution.  South Carolina was unique in that it was the only place where in whole 
districts Loyalists outnumbered Patriots.  Yet, the General Assembly and ordinary South 
Carolinians united to create a stronger body politic by facing head-on the problem of 
former enemies living amongst them.  
Scholars are now rediscovering the extent of violence in the American 
Revolution.  While it has always been understood as a war, the focus on the years before 
the Revolution, and on the early campaigns in the New England colonies, have obscured 
 
1 John Shy, A People Numerous & Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American 
Independence, rev. ed. (Ann Arbor, Mich. 1990) 23. 
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violence from the dominant narrative of the Revolution.  On the one hand, a generation 
interested in rediscovering the voices of everyday people have alternately glorified the 
crowd actions of Boston’s and Philadelphia’s Sons of Liberty, or explained crowd actions 
as so controlled that what must have been terrifying displays of threatened violence to 
those unlucky enough to face the rage of the crowds, like Andrew Oliver, became sedate 
expressions of political norms.  E. P. Thompson’s starving English crowds, transfered 
through American historiography, become the well-controlled agents of political change.  
In our evocative descriptions of ritualized violence against property, we had lost the ways 
in which the violence could be very real.2 
On the other hand, the conventional narrative of the Revolutionary war focuses on 
the campaign for New England and then for the Middle Colonies.  While many of these 
campiagns were very destructive of life, the full brutality of repeated guerilla warfare by 
American militias was not clear until the campaign for the South, when men like Francis 
Marion (the Swamp Fox) and Thomas Sumpter (the Gamecock), along with many lesser 
known figures, turned the logic of Native American warfare, developed over two 
centuries in the American colonies, to war with British regulars and Loyalist militias and 
civilians.  The result was a campaign of intimidation and a scorched-earth policy that 
ruined lives as well as taking many lives in a senseless orgy of bloodletting.  Militias and 
barely organized small bands tortured and murdered men in woods and along roads.   
Countless homes were destroyed.  In the interior of the Carolinas, it became impossible to 
 
2 Examples include Wayne E. Lee, Crowds and Soldiers in Revolutionary North Carolina: The Culture of 
Violence in Riot and War (Gainesville, Fla., 2001), Pauline Maier, "Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority 
in Eighteenth-Century America," William and Mary Quarterly 3rd. ser., 27 (1970): 3-35, Dirk Hoerder, 
"Boston Leaders and Boston Crowds, 1765-1776," in Beyond the American Revolution: Explorations in the 
History of American Radicalism, ed. Alfred Fabian Young (DeKalb, Ill., 1993).  For the article that started 
it all, see E.P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” Past and 
Present, No. 50 (Feb., 1971) 76-136. 
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simply be a bystander.  Instead, desperate people were sucked into the war despite a 
general desire to avoid trouble.  In contrast to the New England frontier, where a woman 
like Martha Ballard might rarely even notice the war impinging on her daily life, women 
in the Carolinas and Georgia were unable to live lives unaffected by the war in daily and 
intimate ways.3 
Civilians were exposed to what they perceived as unacceptable violence.  While 
home invasions happened in all colonies, they became routine in many parts of the South.  
At the same time, soldiers in the Southern militia campaigns were exposed to new threats 
as well.  Within weeks of the surrender at Charleston, troops began to refuse to accept 
surrender attempts.  Soldiers on both sides quickly realized that in most battles, their 
options were to fight or die, as surrender was not an option.  Even in the cases where 
European rules of warfare prevailed and soldiers accepted the white flag of surrender, 
again and again militia members murdered prisoners of war in the day or two following 
the battle.  Soldiers were well aware of this practice, heightening the fear. 
It is vital to put the violence of the American Revolution back into the way we 
understand the period of the war, but also of the new nation.  Instead of a bloodless battle 
of ideas about liberty and representative government, the Revolution was a complicated 
dance between ideology for some and violence and civil war for many.  Reclaiming the 
violence of the Revolution also highlights the difficulties of the early national period in a 
new way.  It is not enough to critic the Articles of Confederation as inadequate to a strong 
national government, for instance.  We must also remember that for many Americans, 
and perhaps most Americans in the South, the Revolution in hearts and minds did not 
 
3 Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, A Midwife’s Tale: The Life of Martha Ballard, Based on Her Diary, 1785-1812 
(New York, 1991). 
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convert them into ideological proponents of liberty and equality.  For them, the true 
mental Revolution was their (sometimes continuing) adjustment to violence, and often 
capricious violence.  Civil wars are profoundly destructive to the bonds of trust that make 
societies work.  An already fragile society, with tentative government structures and 
widespread populations, many far out of the reach of many daily government structures, 
also had to cope with the reality of strained relations and shattered confidence in each 
other, thanks to the pains of war.  Many Americans were at least as concerned with the 
issue of how to reestablish critical social trust as were concerned with how to establish a 
strong national government.  In the aftermath of civil war, rebuilding society took 
precedence. 
I address the issue of legislative reconciliation between Loyalists and Patriots in 
the context of the larger cultural healing, both between enemies and within individual 
lives.  Even victorious Patriots, such as Henry Laurens, had to deal with their own large 
emotional traumas from the war, and that trauma made reconciliation of any kind 
especially difficult.  It is important to end the erasure of our violent Revolutionary past, a 
past probably forgotten because the startling success of the American state has blinded us 
to the fragility of that experiment, and the lasting effects on people who, while winning 
much, had also suffered much. 
In addition, this work joins other recent writers to remind scholars that loyalty in 
war, even by combatants, is not only about conventional politics, but expresses personal 
loyalties to family and community.  Many South Carolina loyalists understood their 
actions in terms of loyalty to neighborhood and community, and there were clear 
neighborhood-based ties that brought entire areas into volunteer militias on each side.  
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While religious and ethnic ties could also shape such loyalties, in a world governed by 
personal relations, personal loyalties, not political ideology, governed the choices of a 
majority of the combatants.  It is important to remember that the Revolution may have 
started in ways that we can identify as driven by ideological loyalities, but it certainly 
didn’t end that way. 
Therefore, I begin with a consideration of the war itself as a civil war in South 
Carolina.  The brutality and lawlessness of the war, especially in the backcountry, 
profoundly shaped the hopes and dreams of its participants.  While the American 
Revolution could be fierce everywhere, contemporary historians agree with the judgment 
of those generals of the Southern theater that the war in the Southern backcountry was the 
fiercest civil conflict of the war.  General Greene (commanding the Continental Army in 
the Southern Theater) famously lamented that “the Whigs and Tories pursue each other 
with the most relent[less] Fury killing and destroying each other wherever they meet.”4  
In just one example, one man of the backcountry: 
after the slaughter was over, [he] traversed the ground, where lay the dead and the 
dying, his former neighbours and old acquaintances, and as he saw signs of life in 
any of them, he run his sword through and dispatched them.  Those already dead, 
he stabbed again. And where others seemingly without life, and who were pierced 
by his sword, gave involuntary convulsions from the pain, to these he gave new 
wounds.5   
 
The violence was both endemic and done to personal friends and acquaintances. 
While not replicating an extensive literature on the Southern campaign, I focus on 
actual violations of the European rules of war and the reaction to these uses of violence 
among the Loyalist and Patriot population.  Participants on both sides turned to attacking 
 
4 Nathanael Greene to General Robert Howe, Dec. 29, 1780, Richard K. Showman, ed., The Papers of 
General Nathanael Greene, 13 vols. (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976) 7: 17. 
5 Aedanus Burke to South Carolina Governor, Charleston, Dec. 14, 1784, Aedanus Burke Papers, SCL. 
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and destroying homes, threatening women, torturing soldiers and suspected spies, 
refusing surrender (and therefore butchering troops), and murdering prisoners of war. 
Is there any war in which neither side has complained that their opponents have 
violated the rules of war?  In this civil conflict, accusations of atrocities were not only a 
recruiting tool, but also a way in which each side was able to understand their 
experiences.  Yet the rhetoric of wartime atrocities in fact outstripped both the actual 
atrocities (of which there were plenty) and the rules of war in practice in both the 
European and American theater.  Atrocities there certainly were, but the rhetoric went far 
beyond the actual evidence.  Given the conduct of war in the North American colonies, 
most of these acts seem brutal but hardly novel.  Yet South Carolinians complained 
vociferously in the face of these violations, upset that tactics used against Native 
Americans were now being turned against white colonists by other white colonists.  
Further, participants on both sides recognized that these tactics violated fraying social 
connections that South Carolinians were trying to maintain in the face of civil war. 
 The second part of the puzzle is the immediate post-war reconciliation.  In order 
to address this, I consider the ways in which South Carolinians used government policies 
to shape reconciliation in the 1780s (Chapters Two, Three, and Four.)  Governmental 
action was necessary to ensure state-wide response, to remove the power of decision from 
local vigilante justice, and to assert the power of the newly independent state over the 
lives and property of those within its borders.  Colonial assemblies were jealous of their 
power, and the brand-new state assemblies inherited that interest in protecting their rights 
and perogatives, and added it to their concern for establishing the power of the legislature 
in a newly independent government.   
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While most reconciliation efforts in today’s world follow the example of South 
Africa, in which the national government gives its imprimatur to a system of 
reconciliation in order to give the process necessary authority, colonial South Carolina 
followed a very different strategy, in which local decision-making dominated and the 
state government gave its imprimature to the proceedings as much to solidify their own 
power as to ensure the legitimacy of the clemency. 
The petition series of the General Assembly, on which my analysis depends, also 
offers a most moving and evocative access to the voices of Loyalists and their Patriot 
supporters.  In the process of making their best case for legislative clemency, Loyalists 
and their supporters spoke about the war, their personal stakes in the war, their own 
losses, and their feelings on citizenship, neighborliness, the connections that society 
requires, and the importance of locality and identity in constructing society.  By and 
large, Loyalists and Patriots agreed on the fundamental outlines of honorable belonging 
and societal ties, differing only on whether specific Loyalists had acted in accord with 
these shared understandings.  
In 1782, when the General Assembly passed the Confiscation Act regulating the 
status of Loyalists by singling out some Loyalists for punishment, South Carolina was 
still at war.  While the surrender at Yorktown had removed one source of British troops, 
skirmishing continued until the British evacuated at the end of 1782.  In the meantime, 
the General Assembly met under the protection of the Continental Army of the South.  
While still under threat, they concentrated on laying the groundwork for a stable and 
prosperous independent state.  Representatives also lobbied on behalf of their friends, and 
sought to destroy their enemies. 
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 In order to secure these aims, the legislature took a page from the British 
occupiers and confiscated the estates of former Loyalists (as did, in one form or another, 
every state.)  Confiscation took both estates and citizenship, banishing Loyalists from the 
state, and leaving dependent family members with minimal state support.  In other cases, 
the Assembly amerced (took a one-time tax of 12% of the total value of the estate) from 
the Loyalists but guaranteed their citizenship, sometimes with limitations on voting 
rights.  Only people prominent enough to have held an officer-level commission in the 
military or civilian occupation were named by these official acts.  People of lower social 
status (who in eighteenth-century parlance, were not able to freely choose such 
affiliations) were not punished by the state. Within these parameters, personal 
relationships and reputation helped decide which Loyalists would be placed on the lists, 
and who would be spared. 
 Despite the seeming harshness of this legislation, in fact the General Assembly 
consistently used a series of carrots and sticks to get Loyalists to recommit to the state 
and to South Carolina society.  Beginning with Governor Rutledge’s Proclamation of 
1781, which allowed Loyalists to return and reclaim their citizenship and standing in 
return for six months military service, the General Assembly tried to reclaim many 
Loyalists who were willing to put themselves forward and show themselves willing to 
undertake the active duties that citizenship required.  Christopher Gadsden, Aedanus 
Burke, General Nathaniel Greene, and General Francis Marion provided critical 
leadership for those who favored clemency to Loyalists as an overarching policy. 
The 1782 Confiscation list officially left no way open for those named on that list 
to change their fate.  However, there was a long history of petitioning in Anglo-American 
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thought and practice, and Loyalists seized on it to advance their hopes for clemency.  At 
the same time, all but the most Tory-baiting legislators expected that with the passage of 
time, the Assembly would consider appeals from at least a few “mislabeled” individuals 
and their families.  At least two enterprising Loyalists began petitioning while the J1782 
Assembly was still debating the terms of the original Confiscation Act!  The wave of 
appeals in 1783 and 1784 from 70% of the Loyalists named by the Confiscation Act 
buried the legislature in work appraising individual Loyalist claims in detail through 
petitions and hearings, dominating the time and concerns of the most powerful branch of 
state government in the crucial post-war years.  If for no other reason, we should take the 
problem of reconciliation with Loyalists seriously because South Carolinians took it 
seriously—seeing Loyalists and their relationship with the new state as a central concern 
of reestablishing independent government. 
In 1784, a mere two years after the original Confiscation Act, the General 
Assembly passed a general clemency act that removed a majority of proscribed Loyalists 
from confiscation, usually leaving them with a small amercement instead.  What is 
remarkable is the number of people who were offered relief and how quickly South 
Carolinians were able to be so generous to former enemies. 
What did a typical Loyalist petitioner look like, and what made him successful?  
A typical petitioner was a male Loyalist who had served the British after Charleston’s 
occupation in 1780.  These men took military and civilian posts in the occupational 
administration, but used their offices to uphold community safety rather than advance 
British aims for controlling South Carolina.  If they led Loyalist militia groups, they 
required infrequent musters, never took troops into battle, and restrained others from 
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using force to harass local Patriots.  If they worked in civilian justice posts, they tried to 
avoid arresting or harassing people for supporting America’s drive for independence.  
Again and again, Loyalists and their supporters testified to continuing support for the 
needs of the local community.  Most successful applicants had significant and outspoken 
support from Patriot neighbors, including supporting petitions from neighbors willing to 
testify to Loyalist good character and fitness for citizenship.  Successful petitioners also 
produced character witnesses for committee hearings—men willing and able to appear 
before a legislative committee in Charleston.  Local support was crucial in convincing the 
General Assembly to extend clemency to an individual.  While such local support 
reassured leaders that hated former Loyalists would not be readmitted to the state only to 
be murdered by angry mobs, it also speaks to the continuing importance of local behavior 
in defining citizenship for early Americans.  Petitioners and their supporters repeatedly 
defined citizenship in terms of neighborliness—care and attention to the day to day tasks 
of local support and connection that, undertaken over years of residence, testified to the 
good character and honor of men, which made them trustworthy and dependable citizens. 
Even in cases that provoked debate, the General Assembly proved eager to find a 
way to reincorporate people into the community.  In cases where initial petitions by men 
were turned down, their wives and daughters often petitioned for their dower and 
inheritance rights.  Often, the assembly returned the estates to the female family members 
while continuing the banishment of the male Tories.  They could and sometimes did 
choose to ignore dower rights, so I argue that they often used female property rights as a 
way to return property to families (and through them to male descendants) even when 
they did not feel they could allow certain individuals to return to the state. 
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 Legislative clemency is only part of the answer, however.  While the General 
Assembly did not want to move out ahead of the populace, they still sought evidence that 
the broader populace was willing to offer toleration, and eventually reconciliation to 
these former enemies.  As historians, we also want to capture the more subtle textures of 
everyday, face to face reconciliation.  How, in effect, did South Carolinians move from 
hatred, to clemency, to reconciliation? 
Aedanus Burke, a judge and legislator, became the lonely extreme voice calling 
out in the wilderness for complete forgiveness, reasoning that anti-Tory legislation was 
destructive to the legal and moral framework of society and only likely to personally 
embitter people who would otherwise be loyal South Carolinians.  Christopher Gadsden 
joined him in protesting the Confiscation Act publicly, while offering a more palatable 
middle way that allowed for punishing a few unreedeemable Loyalists with confiscation 
to quell people’s ardor for revenge, while readmitting most on favorable terms.  Gadsden 
was willing to create a limited citizenship for some white male Loyalists, allowing them 
to live in South Carolina and retain their property while being excluded from political 
life.  These forces for moderation were sometimes drowned out by organized artisan 
crowd actions, in which Charleston mobs threatened and whipped a few hated Loyalists.  
While the crowd actions certainly made a few individuals feel insecure indeed, such 
limited actions largely worked to release the anger and tension in the wake of the 
Revolution. 
 Similiarly, the intensive discussion of Loyalists and their proper post-war fate, as 
enacted in state newspapers, suggests that most Patriot South Carolinians harbored a 
sizable reservoir of hate.  They gloried in descriptions of Tory suffering—laughing to 
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read of Tories suffering, or their first crops in Nova Scotia failing.  Yet, they also read of 
other states overturning confiscations and accepting Loyalists.  In the end, just like with 
crowd actions, public discussions of Loyalism served as an escape valve for war tension, 
allowing people to work off steam rhetorically, in order to accept many Loyalists back 
into the society.  In practice, churches and charitably-minded voluntary organizations 
accepted Loyalists into their ranks.  When South Carolinians rebuilt their state, they 
rebuilt it with Loyalist contributions. 
 Often, after violent civil conflict, simmering hostilities boil over into 
confrontation for generations.  South Carolina avoided this fate by masterfully managing 
public discussions of Loyalism in the next six decades in order to avoid stirring up old 
memories—and it worked very well.  Public commemorative activity at battlefields and 
Independence Day celebrations avoided mentioning Loyalists and civil war until the 
1850s, at which point speakers imagined that there were no descendants of Loyalists in 
their audiences.  Meanwhile, the children of prominent Loyalists went on to have 
political careers and reap public honors.  Loyalist grandchildren were attracted to historic 
preservation activities as a way to write themselves into the story of South Carolina, 
despite their own knowledge of their Loyalist ancestry.  Ann Pamela Cunningham moved 
from defending her Loyalist forefathers to preserving Mount Vernon for the nation.  
In conclusion, I use South Carolina to explore the way the untold story of how the 
effects of violence in the American Revolution still led to a successful choice to 
reincorporate Loyalists into the new body politic, giving many Loyalist men full 
citizenship and even political office.  For those who succeeded, they achieved such 
stability that their children and grandchildren were able to lead lives free from stigma, 
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even becoming leaders in politics, religious life, and historic preservation.  From such 
unpromising material (the destruction of large swaths of the state, divided population, 
atrocities, violence, and death), South Carolinians shaped a post-war society that was fair 






“THEY PURSUE EACH OTHER WITH AS MUCH RELENTLESS 
FURY AS BEASTS OF PREY”: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AS 
CIVIL WAR IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1775-1783 
Moses Hall needed a new hat.  A ruthless “blackjack” had stolen his, and while he 
rode towards battle, he scooped up the first hat he saw, which was lying next to a corpse.  
Without flinching, he scooped up the hat, but decided there was too much blood on the 
hat to be comfortable for wearing.  Putting the first hat down, Hall looked for a second 
hat, and found one still attached to the head of a dead Loyalist.  Taking the hat, he rode 
off towards battle.  Luckily for him, a friend intercepted him and warned him that his hat 
had a “Tory sign” on it designed to identify the wearer as a Loyalist to other Loyalist 
troops.  Hall of course removed that hat and saw the casual sign—a “red strap passing 
over the crown.”  In the casualness of his approach, we see a battle-hardened soldier, but 
also a Carolinian who had learned to hate the enemy so much that he treated him with 
casual disrespect.  Yet at the same time, locals were loose in self-identification (without 
uniforms) as to use identifying marks that Hall didn’t even notice at first.  In this small 
incident we have signs of the larger civil war in the Carolinas.1 
 
1 Moses Hall Veteran’s Pension Application, John C. Dann, The Revolution Remembered: Eyewitness 
Accounts of the War for Independence (Chicago, 1980) 204. 
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In this chapter, I show that South Carolina experienced a genuine civil war during 
the American Revolution.  Without recreating the voluminous literature on the 
Revolution in the South, I will focus on a few key moments and engagements during the 
Revolution that point to critical features of the burgeoning civil war.  Further, perhaps 
paradoxically, I will show that while there was a genuine civil war filled with bad 
behavior, the rhetoric of brutality went beyond actual practice.  People complained about 
things that did not actually happen, and also complained bitterly about actions that were 
well within established Anglo-American ways of war.  Military leaders and civilians 
alike often lost sight of the line between rhetoric and reality.  In order to understand the 
reasons South Carolinians were relatively generous to defeated Loyalists, it helps to 
understand that the rhetoric of atrocities was blown way out of proportion during the war 
itself.2 
 
2 A brief survey of the literature on the war in the South might include: Russell Frank Weigley, The 
Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780-1782 (Columbia, S.C., 1970), Edward J. Cashin, The 
King's Ranger: Thomas Brown and the American Revolution on the Southern Frontier (Athens, Ga., 1989), 
Edward J. Cashin, William Bartram and the American Revolution on the Southern Frontier (Columbia, 
S.C., 2000), David K. Wilson, The Southern Strategy: Britain's Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia, 
1775-1780 (Columbia, S.C., 2005), Jeffrey J. Crow and Larry E. Tise, eds., The Southern Experience in the 
American Revolution (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1978), John Richard Alden, The South in the Revolution, 1763-
1789 (Baton Rouge, La., 1957), John Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American 
Revolution in the Carolinas (New York, 1997), Robert Scott Davis, "Loyalist Trials and Ninety Six in 
1779," South Carolina Historical Magazine 80 (1979): 172-81, Walter Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats: The 
Southern Conflict That Turned the Tide of the American Revolution (New York, 2001), John W. Gordon, 
South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History (Columbia, S.C., 2003), Don 
Higginbotham, "Reflections on the War of Independence, Modern Guerilla Warfare, and the War in 
Vietnam," in Arms and Independence: The Military Character of the American Revolution, ed. Ronald 
Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, Va., 1984)., Ronald Hoffman, Thad W. Tate, and Peter J. 
Albert, eds., An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry During the American Revolution (Charlottesville, 
Va., 1985), Henry Lumpkin, From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South 
(Columbia, S.C., 1981), Jerome J. Nadelhaft, The Disorders of War: The Revolution in South Carolina, 1st 
ed. (Orono, Me., 1981), John S. Pancake, This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 
1780-1782 (University, Ala., 1985).  Some books are devoted to single battles, such as: Carl P. Borick, A 
Gallant Defense: The Siege of Charleston, 1780 (Columbia, S.C., 2003), Hank Messick, King's Mountain: 
The Epic of the Blue Ridge "Mountain Men" In the American Revolution (Boston, 1976), and perhaps most 
illustriously, Lawrence E. Babits, A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998), 
which explained the surprising American victory.  Of course, King’s Mountain also wove a spell over 
historian Lyman Draper, who spent decades collecting materials for his eventual volume.  Lyman Copeland 
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South Carolina had never been the most stable of the eighteenth-century colonial 
societies.  Faced with a black majority in the Lowcountry, and a restive, large and well-
organized Native American population to the west, South Carolina politics, and practical 
planning, revolved around ensuring a white majority in the state.  Charleston’s 
aristocratic elite controlled politics before the Seven Years War, often giving scant regard 
to the needs of the backcountry.  (The backcountry is typically defined as a product of 
both geography and culture.  Technically, the South Carolina backcountry begins at the 
point the inland rivers hit falls, making navigation difficult.  At this point, the landscape 
also gives way from swamps and sandy soil to pine trees.)  While South Carolina was the 
wealthiest colony on the eve of the American Revolution, life in the backcountry was 
rough, and very few men owned more than a few slaves. 
The backcountry itself had only been settled for a generation on the eve of the 
Revolution, and some areas had only filled in the previous decade.  White settlers came 
from Pennsylvania down the wagon trail, and up from the harbor at Charleston.  These 
areas were often predominantly Scots-Irish (and Presbyterian), although religious and 
ethnic minorities of all sorts settled in the Carolina backcountry.  Isolated geographically 
and culturally from Charleston, the men and women who lived in the backcountry hated 
(or at least distrusted) the Lowcountry ruling elite far more than the imperial 
administration, and they initially viewed the Revolution through that prism of distrust. 
Even before the Revolution, the backcountry was roiled by rioting and political 
confrontation during the South Carolina Regulator Movement.  In both North and South 
Carolina, Regulators sought to control rampant backcountry crime and discipline 
                                                                                                                                            
Draper, King's Mountain and Its Heroes: History of the Battle of King's Mountain, October 7th, 1780 
(Cincinnati, Ohio, 1881). 
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marauders.  In North Carolina, the Regulation turned into a genuinely populist rebellion 
against state authority (albeit one that ended very badly for the Regulators).  In South 
Carolina, it became a chance for the rising backcountry elite to demonstrate their fitness 
for power, and their shared priorities with the Charleston elite.  Nonetheless, the 
Regulation produced years of unrest in the backcountry, and several former Regulators 
did become Loyalists in the Revolution.3 
Whigs and Tories Drew Blood in the Backcountry, 1775-1776 
 Indications of potential trouble in the Carolinas came quickly upon the beginning 
of armed conflict in America, and South Carolina’s turn would come soon enough.  
British officials throughout the war were overly optimistic about the strength of 
Loyalist support, and they usually identified the American South as a potential 
stronghold of such support.  They were not entirely wrong, but they also 
misunderstood the nature of that support.  As they would discover, Americans 
preferred not to pay taxes or fight, and the number of upstanding citizens who were 
interested in long campaigning was quite small.  (The number of people interested in 
plunder, unsurprisingly, was higher.)  While the successful defense of Sullivan’s 
Island (defending Charleston harbor) cheered South Carolinians, other events were 
much more unsettling. 
 
3 Richard Maxwell Brown, The South Carolina Regulators (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), Marjoleine Kars, 
Breaking Loose Together: The Regulator Rebellion in Pre-Revolutionary North Carolina (Chapel Hill, 
N.C., 2002), Rachel N. Klein, Unification of a Slave State: The Rise of the Planter Class in the South 
Carolina Backcountry, 1760-1808 (Chapel Hill, 1990). 
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 Even before North Carolina’s Loyalists fought local Patriots at the Battle of 
Moore’s Creek Bridge, South Carolina Whigs and Tories had an initial showdown 
that indicated the potential for trouble in the backcountry.  And across the colonies, 
early armed battles, with or without British regulars, prompted harsher measures to 
identify and control those who did not support the new Patriot government.  In all the 
thirteen colonies, the Committees of Safety became the transitional government after 
the outbreak of hostilities.  As such, they were responsible for ensuring political 
conformity.  In order to ensure peace and quiet, the South Carolina Committee of 
Safety elected to send representatives into the backcountry to discover local support 
for the mostly Lowcountry Patriots.  The goals was to identify and report on who 
showed signs of implacable opposition, and to encourage those aligned with the 
Patriots to stop wavering and become more active.  As such, it was both a persuasive 
mission and an attempt to show force.  As an attempt to strong-arm the backcountry 
into accepting independence, the mission failed. 
At the same time in Charleston, the strong fervor for independence caused real 
distress to the local disaffected.  One poor Loyalist received a “decent tarring and 
feathering, for one insolent speech he had made.”  He was paraded from house to house, 
the mob tarrying in front of the houses of other suspected Loyalists.  Finally, they made 
the poor man drink to the Patriot cause, and offered to “charge the grog to the account of 
Lord North.”4 
Fueling the unrest were two problems.  One, persistent rumors indicated a 
Cherokee war, with the support of the British.  Patriot leaders hoped to use the threat 
 
4 Timothy to Drayton, Charlestown, Aug. 13, 1775, Robert Wilson Gibbes, Documentary History of the 
American Revolution, 3 vols. (New York, 1971) 139. 
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of Native American war to the west to bind backcountry settlers to the American 
cause.  Second, the royal governor of South Carolina was caught writing Loyalist 
leaders in the interior to persuade them to raise militias and lead them in a preemptive 
strike against the nascent Patriot forces.  For both of these reasons, the Charleston 
Committee of Safety ordered representatives west.  These men were deputized to 
raise Patriot forces and to undermine the position of the Loyalist leaders, but not to 
force a confrontation. 
The de facto leader of this group was William Henry Drayton, an ambitious 
man in his thirties known for his oratorical skills.  His compatriots on the mission 
were William Tennent, the grandson of William Tennent of Log College fame and so 
vocally Patriot that he was known as the “Firebrand Parson,” and Oliver Hart, a 
Baptist minister.  The Committee hoped that sending a Presbyterian and a Baptist 
minister would help persuade backcountry residents, who were largely followers of 
those two persuasions.  All three men set out for the backcountry, but they traveled 
separately, to better cover the vast geographic area.  Drayton chose to take the most 
difficult areas himself, including the area between the Broad and Saluda Rivers, and 
the town of Ninety Six, both of which were Loyalist strongholds.5 
 The mission had limited success.  In areas without powerful Loyalist leaders, 
Drayton managed to persuade many men to sign the Associations, and even to take up 
arms when called.  In other areas, backcountry residents made it clear that they just 
 
5 Keith Krawczynski, William Henry Drayton: South Carolina Revolutionary Patriot (Baton Rouge, La., 
2001) 155-62.  Chapter 7 of this book is an excellent account of the trip into the interior.  Krawczynski 
does a good job in the book in explaining Drayton’s actions in general, which have often puzzled 
historians. Drayton appeared to make a 180 degree change from 1774 to 1775, moving from conservative 
supporter of the King to rabid Whig. 
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wanted to be left alone.  But in areas with strong Loyalist leaders, the effort to 
persuade failed.  Oliver Hart was intimidated by the Loyalists at a meeting at 
Fairforest Baptist Church who proclaimed they were hoping “1,000 Bostonians might 
be kill’d in Battle.”  If this wasn’t bad enough, a local man warned him that there was 
the “greatest appearance of a Civil War” which perhaps only “Providence” could 
spare.  Oliver Hart was so concerned for his personal safety while traveling in these 
Loyalist strongholds that he began to keep his journal in code.6 
 It was left to Drayton to confront an outspoken and powerful triumvirate of 
Loyalist leaders in South Carolina: Colonel Fletchall, Captain Robert Cunningham, 
and Thomas “Burnfoot” Brown.  Thomas Brown was unpersuadable.  Having already 
survived being tortured by Georgia Whigs, he was thirsty for revenge and determined 
to hold his ground.  Robert Cunningham was a well-respected member of the 
community.  By the time Drayton encountered him, he was an outspoken voice for the 
Loyalists, but there is some evidence that he initially took the Loyalist side in a fit of 
pique that the Patriots did not offer him a suitable commission.  Fletchall tried to 
stake out an area of principled neutrality: to take up arms for neither side.  The other 
two would not even agree to this.  Drayton was keenly aware of the danger these 
outspoken leaders could present, telling the Council of Safety that if they allowed 
these leaders to remain free, “we shall be involved in a civil war.”  Drayton believed 
that Loyalist support would quickly disappear if he arrested a few prominent leaders, 
 
6 Krawczynski, Drayton: Patriot 170-72 (all quotes from Oliver Hart and William Drayton).  After this 
journey, Oliver Hart retreated to Charleston and never again engaged in any active part in the war.  
Nonetheless, he was scared of retribution after the fall of Charleston and left South Carolina forever to take 
a church post in New Jersey. 
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while the Council of Safety was more cautious (and more insightful) in understanding 
that the leaders represented broad Loyalist support.  Thankfully, in the first armed 
confrontation between Drayton’s men and the Loyalists, both sides maneuvered 
diplomatically and militarily to avoid conflict.  Drayton noted that peace was better 
than war because fighting would only ‘“la[y] the foundation for lasting animosities” 
between South Carolinians.  Unfortunately, the potential for lasting animosity was 
already being laid.7 
 Drayton and Fletchall signed the Treaty of Ninety Six, which affirmed the 
status quo.  Those who had refused to sign the Association continued to avoid signing 
it.  They promised not to aid the British and to avoid criticizing the new state 
government.  In return, they could live peacefully.  Cunningham and Brown refused 
to recognize the treaty, but some 2000 Loyalist and Patriot members of the militia 
breathed a sigh of relief and returned home.  Each side was able to save face and 
avoid conflict.8   
 So far, it seemed that South Carolinians would be able to avoid bloodshed.  
But the Council of Safety, perhaps emboldened by their earlier success, was 
determined to arrest Robert Cunningham for seditious speech.  Almost 
simultaneously, the Whig authorities decided to try to appease the Cherokees by 
shipping them a thousand pounds of powder.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Loyalists 
 
7 Cashin, King's Ranger 219. The Liberty Boys attacked Thomas Brown in 1775.  Later, he would protest 
that while he did not commit atrocities, he would have been justified on the basis of the treatment he 
received.  Andrew Pickens believed this was why Robert Cunningham “’took to the other side of the 
Question.’” Krawczynski, Drayton: Patriot  158, 176, 182, 187. 
8 John S. Pancake, This Destructive War : The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782 (University, 
AL, 1985) 75.  For a general, if less authoritative, overview of the so-called Snow Campaign, see Robert D. 
Bass, Ninety Six: The Struggle for the South Carolina Back Country (Lexington, S.C., 1978). 
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regarded this as unacceptable provocation and moved to intercept the shipment.  
Patrick Cunningham, Robert’s brother, managed to seize a shipment of powder 
intended for the Cherokees near the time his brother was arrested.  This was like 
waving a red flag in front of a bull.  Loyalist settlers in the backcountry were upset 
and afraid that the Whigs were arming the Native Americans (although the British 
were also trying to recruit Native American tribes).  Enraged Loyalists rose in the 
area between the Saluda and Broad Rivers, and in response Patriot militias also came 
forward.  Cunningham attacked the Whig forces at Ninety Six with vastly superior 
numbers, but the Whigs prevailed.  These forces managed to come to a truce, and the 
Loyalist leaders fled into Cherokee territory, where many were later captured after a 
war against the Cherokee.  This so-called Snow Campaign temporarily settled the 
question of the backcountry’s loyalty, but only by enforcing neutrality.9 
 Col. Richardson, another local leader who was responsible for arresting Fletchall 
and Pearis, claimed them to be “offenders of such a nature that from the active part they 
have taken, it would be dangerous for me (however innocent they may appear before 
you) to let either of them go.”  To satisfy both military necessity and the Revolutionary 
enthusiasm for compacts and other written affirmations of support, Richardson also 
required Loyalist leaders, including the Cunninghams, to “sign an instrument of writing, 
which they did willingly with fear and trembling, by which they forfeit their estates, real 
and personal, if they ever take up arms against, or disquiet the peace and tranquility of the 
 
9  Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History 29-31.  Pancake, Destructive 
War  76. For just one example of frenzied communication between Tennent and Charleston, see Tennent to 
the Council of Safety in Savannah, St. Matthew’s Parish, Sept. 10, 1775, Gibbes, Documentary History of 
the American Revolution 169. Tennent claimed that Loyalists openly boasted “that they are furnished with 
ammunition and that even artillery are at their service.” 
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good people of this state.”  Even in 1775, Loyalists were threatened with confiscation.  
Having once shown a decided (armed) preference for the British, Loyalists were 
threatened with personal ruin if they either armed again, or even too vocally expressed 
Loyalist feelings.10 
 Richardson sent at least eighteen men to the prison in Charleston, and a look at 
their names is revealing.  The early arrestees included prominent leaders, but also a 
number of men known as former Regulators (often dubbed Scopholites, after a local 
bandit and Regulator target).  William Hunt was noted as a “Scopholite Captain, Ninety-
Six, Mulatto,” and Captain Jones was also a Scopholite captain and “Colored.”  Low 
social standing marked men as potentially disaffected to the Lowcountry elite, and 
probably did steer men into the arms of backcountry Loyalism.  Other arrestees included 
a militia captain “said to murder a prisoner” and another who while “an old man” was 
“bloody.”  Another was confidently “deemed a bad man by both parties” although in 
reality that designation was very much in the eye of the beholder.11 
 Moses Kirkland, who in later years would lead a Loyalist militia and find himself 
subject to confiscation and banishment (and would never find clemency), tried to explain 
why he refused to sign the compact, though he would not take up arms.  Six of his horses 
had been seized and sold over his head, which alarmed him, but then one man threatened 
him that if he did not come out for militia duty he would “not be Suffered to Live in any 
part of America.”  While loyal to the king, he expressed great distaste for civil war—
 
10 Col. Richardson to Laurens, Camp Liberty Hill, Dec. 16, 1775, Col. Richardson to Henry Laurens, 
Congarees, Jan. 2, 1776, Gibbes, Documentary History of the American Revolution 241, 247. 
11 Richardson to the Council of Safety, Congarees, Jan. 2, 1776, “Prisoners Sent to Charlestown”, Gibbes, 
Documentary History of the American Revolution 250-52.  The Regulator Movement in South Carolina 
united dispossed free whites and blacks, in a movement that harkened back to Bacon’s Rebellion.  The 
mixed-race nature of the assault on planter authority made it especially threatening. 
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distaste that was widely shared on the Loyalist side.  He didn’t want to “take up Arms” 
on either side, but since his “Relations and Best friends in the Government” were loyal, 
he was willing to join them so long as he could avoid any “Shedding…blood.”12 
 Ninety Six District, the source of armed Loyalist strength in this uprising, was 
chastened by the Cherokee War.  One Patriot military commander assured Charleston 
leaders that “Ninety-Six is now a frontier. Plantations lie desolate, and hopeful crops are 
going to ruin.”  Without relief, “famine will overspread our beautiful country.”  But the 
effort seemed worth it, as the “dread” of further Native American warfare would “deter” 
future uprisings against the new state government.  And the Snow Campaign did assure 
peace for several years, and most disaffected leaders did not lift a finger to help the 
British subdue Charleston, only taking the Loyalist side when armed conflict began in 
earnest in the backcountry.13  
 The first blood had been spilled in the backcountry.  The possibility for civil 
war was now apparent.  Had anyone realized it, certain themes of the backcountry 
civil war had been previewed in this incident, most especailly the potential for civil 
war. 
 
12 Moses Kirkland to Henry Laurens, Gaol at Philadelphia, Jan. 11, 1776, Gibbes, Documentary History of 
the American Revolution 254. 
13 James Creswell to W. H. Drayton, Ninety Six, Aug. 22, 1776, Gibbes, Documentary History of the 
American Revolution 30-31. 
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The Interim Years: 1776-1780 
 South Carolina saw relative quiet after the brief engagements of 1775.  The 
imprisoned men were released, and the war largely avoided the South.  The Loyalists 
of the interior had not changed their minds, but in the absence of any fighting they 
were content to stay out of it.  Thomas Fletchall, after all, had been willing to assure 
the Whigs during the negotiations for the Treaty of Ninety Six that he would remain 
peaceful and take up arms for neither side.  
 Further, the example of the Battle of Moore’s Creek Bridge in North Carolina 
did not encourage South Carolina Loyalists to rise.  In North Carolina, Loyalists 
answered the royal governor’s call for troops and fought a bloody engagement at Moore’s 
Creek Bridge in 1776.  When the Highland Scots troops lost at Moore’s Creek, enraged 
and emboldened Whigs combed the countryside enforcing political conformity through 
plunder and terror.  Flora MacDonald, the wife of one of the Moore’s Creek military 
leaders and the unofficial ceremonial mascot of the North Carolina Scots, wrote that she 
was “dayly oppressed with straggling partys of plunderers…and night robbers.”  As 
would so often be the case in the civil war in the backcountry, these robbers wanted 
her money, as well as to terrify her.  After the Highland Scots were defeated, many 
spent years hiding in the swamps, unable to return to their homes safely—certainly 
not a precedent South Carolina Loyalists, a largely non-ideological bunch, wanted to 
follow.14 
 
14 Flora MacDonald as quoted in C. Brian Kelly, "Branded as a Rebel in Scotland, Flora Macdonald 
Became Embroiled in Another Rebellion in America," Military History 14, no. 3 (1997): 82.  For more 
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 The South Carolinians also successfully repulsed a British invasion attempt at 
the Battle of Sullivan’s Island in June 1776.  This victory saved South Carolina from 
serious battle with the British for four years.  It also cheered South Carolina Patriots, 
who began celebrating the anniversary of the victory at Sullivan’s Island as Palmetto 
Day the next year, and still celebrate the holiday today. 
 Revolutionary intrigues also provoked a Native American war between the 
Cherokees, aided by Loyalist agents, and the Patriot South Carolinians.  This too was 
a mistake, as the terrified residents of the backcountry were once again caught in their 
nightmare.  Further, the Cherokees made no real distinction between Whig and 
Loyalist-identified backcountry settlers, attacking indiscriminately.  The war amply 
demonstrated the usual atrocities on both sides, culminating with the destruction of 
several Cherokee towns and the removal of Cherokees from South Carolina.  By the 
end of 1776, peace had settled on South Carolina. 
 But it was an uneasy peace.  Men who had stuck their neck out for the Loyalist 
cause were marked for persecution.  In concert with other American states, South 
Carolinians moved to enforce political conformity and suppress dissent through 
legislative action (backed by militia force).  In 1776, the General Assembly passed an 
act to “prevent sedition” in an effort to avoid “civil dissensions and animosities.”  
Taking up arms against the state, or giving intelligence against the state, was now an 
offense subject to death, as a treasonous act.  North Carolina similarly defined treason 
at length and made it a capital offense.  Any Loyalist convicted under the sedition law 
                                                                                                                                            
detailed information on the battle of Moore’s Creek Bridge and the resulting actions of Whigs, see Hugh F. 
Rankin, "The Moore's Creek Bridge Campaign, 1776," North Carolina Historical Review 30, no. 1 (1953): 
33-60. Buchanan, Road to Guilford Courthouse 5. 
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suffered estate confiscation, and individual Patriots could seek reimbursement for 
losses such as plunder from Loyalist estates (if they could prove that the said Loyalist 
was involved in the loss.)15 
 In 1777, the General Assembly passed an act requiring an oath of allegiance 
from all adult males, and reaffirmed it in 1778.  The oath or affirmation of allegiance 
(the General Assembly did accommodate the Quaker resistance to oath-taking 
explicitly in the law) required that a man “bear true faith and allegiance to the State of 
South Carolina, and will faithfully support, maintain and defend the same against 
George the Third.”  Men like Fletchall and the Cunninghams certainly could not 
pledge to take up arms against Britain in good faith, nor abjure their birth allegiance 
to the English monarch.  The oath of allegiance was meant to force men out of 
neutrality, expecting that the large majority would take the oath, and therefore be 
bound more closely to the Patriot cause.  Further, those who refused the oath 
identified themselves as Loyalists, and could then be monitored and controlled.  (It is 
unlikely that Whig leaders were under any illusions that men who took the oath could 
actually be depended on to take up arms.  That would be the ultimate triumph of hope 
over experience.)16 
 Men who took the oath were furnished with certificates of proof, which they 
could be periodically required to produce to prove their allegiance.  Oath 
 
15 Act. No. 1017 “An Act to Prevent Sedition and Punish Insurgents and Disturbers of the Public Peace,” 
Thomas Cooper and David J. McCord, eds., Statutes at Large of South Carolina, 10 vols. (Columbia, S.C., 
1836-1841) 1: 343-46.  DeMond, N.C. Loyalists 154-55.  Despite reserving the right to arm slaves, South 
Carolinians never did, seeing the problems of arming slaves as insurmountable.  Towards the end of the 
war, John Laurens repeatedly pushed a plan to arm a slave regiment to supplement waning Patriot forces, 
but he faced outspoken opposition. 
16 “Act Enforcing an Assurance of Allegiance and Fidelity to the State” March 28, 1778, Cooper and 
McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 1: 147-151. 
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administrators were required to keep a register of everyone who took the oath, and 
everyone who did not, either by sickness or refusal.  Copies of this list were sent to 
the sheriff yearly on Independence Day, so that he could harass those who had not 
taken the oath.  Further, those who refused to take the oath were strongly encouraged 
to leave South Carolina.  Non-oath takers were not allowed to follow their professions 
or buy or sell property.  This restriction had little effect on backcountry Loyalists, 
who were largely agriculturalists, but was rather a direct attack on merchants and 
artisans in Charleston who refused to take the oath who chose to leave were allowed 
to dispose of their property at leisure. 
In a clear attack on the Loyalists as a group, the oath also required that the 
oath-taker report “all plots and conspiracies that shall come to my knowledge against 
the said State, or any other of the United States of America.”  While this does reflect a 
healthy fear of military intrigue, it also suggests an attempt to create a police state, in 
which neighbors were encouraged to report on each other as a fundamental 
requirement of citizenship. 
When the British regained control, they also enforced oaths against the 
population.  Moses Hall, a Patriot militiaman from North Carolina, recalled his militia 
going to break up such an effort.  “Hearing that a number of persons were going 
through the country administering oaths of allegiance to [the] British cause” he and 
other volunteers pursued them for miles.  All of this was before the British even 
gained control of Charleston!17 
 
17 Moses Hall Pension Application, Dann, The Revolution Remembered: Eyewitness Accounts of the War 
for Independence  199. 
 29 
 Property arrangements for fleeing Loyalists could get very complicated, 
especially when they depended on friends who later took British protection.  Henry 
Peronneau, a resident of Charleston, left after refusing to take the oath of abjuration.  
He appointed two other men of Loyalist sympathies, but not under the same 
proscriptions to sell his property.  Shortly thereafter, one of his two executors also 
fled the state.  His remaining executor, Dr. Alexander Garden, was more circumspect 
in his beliefs and statements, but signed the address welcoming the British to 
Charleston and congratulating them on their victory.  After the war, he fled to 
England, where he died.  Henry Peronneau, on the other hand, returned to South 
Carolina and petitioned the General Assembly in 1783 to remove him from the 
confiscation list, which was successful.  He died in South Carolina under 
amercement, and even that was lifted from his widow.18 
 The legislative record also shows a certain unseemly haste to confiscate 
Loyalist property.  Col. John Thomas and Ezekiel Polk were so quick to sell Richard 
Pearis’s property that they inadvertently sold several other people’s property as well.  
The situation was so messy that the General Assembly passed an act in 1778 just to 
clean up the disaster.19 
 
18 Act. No. 1129 “An Ordinance to Impower Doctor Alexander Garden to Sell the Estate of Henry 
Peronneau, Esq,” Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 1: 485.  For more on the two executors and 
their post-war fates, see Committee Reports of the General Assembly, General Assembly Papers, SCDAH; 
Alexander Garden, 1783-248, Henry Peronneau, 1788-52, Petitions to the General Assembly (GA 
Petitions), SCDAH. 
19 Act No. 1080 “An Act to Indemnify Col. John Thomas and Ezekiel Polk, for Seizing, Selling and 
Disposing of the Effects of Richard Pearis; and For Other Purposes Therein Mentioned,” Cooper and 
McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 1: 425-26.  Sufferings (Testimony) of Richard Pearis, Aug. 22, 1783, and 
supporting testimony from Malcolm Brown, June 17, 1786, Richard Pearis Loyalist Claims, 43/64, SCHS, 
originals in the Public Record Office. 
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 Many South Carolinians simply ignored the oath of allegiance and abjuration.  
Despite the strong wording of the acts, it is clear that there was rampant disregard for 
the oath.  In both October 1778 and February 1779, the General Assembly passed acts 
to extend the time limit for taking the oath, a sure sign that only a minority of adult 
men had bothered to comply.20 
 None of this was unique to South Carolina, of course.  Test acts, as they were 
called, were enacted in all the states.  Between 1776 and 1779, all states moved to 
identify and control Loyalists, and oaths of allegiance and abjuration were the 
foremost tool for so doing.  Oaths were popular with both sides for controlling the 
population; the British also used them in areas they controlled.21 
 The frustrated British began to plan a southern campaign in 1778.  With little 
success in actually ending the war in the North, and with increasing international 
complications, the British were looking for a different, more promising front in 
America.  After all, the British were able to capture every major American city, and 
yet were unable to win the war.  Taking the wrong lesson from the armed struggles of 
Southerners in 1775-1776, the British decided that taking the Southern colonies 
would be easy because a majority of the population would be eager to see British 
authority return, and willing to aid the British in subduing their peers.  The British 
always overestimated the degree of Loyalist support they had, and especially the 
eagerness of colonists to fight.  In 1779, James Simpson, a former royal Attorney 
 
20 Act No. 1101 “An Act for Enlarging the Time for Taking the Oath of Allegiance and Fidelity; and for 
Other Purposes Therein Mentioned” and Act No. 1117 “An Act to Give Further Time for Taking the Oath 
of Affirmation of Fidelity and Allegiance to this State,” Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 1: 450-
52, 468-69. 
21 Brown, Good Americans  37. 
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General for South Carolina, was sent into the backcountry to assess the degree of 
Loyalist support.  Simpson’s report would be especially important because unlike 
other British officers, Clinton tended to be dubious about the actual support he could 
expect from Loyalists.  Simpson was supposed to not only discover the “disposition” 
(meaning the preferred allegiance) of the backcountry settlers, but also their 
“resolution” for armed engagement. Simpson reported that there was considerable, 
heated support for the King among the “people from the Back Country of Carolina” 
because they had been so mistreated by the Patriots, and wanted revenge.  As he told 
Germain in 1779, the Loyalists who had come out in 1776 and 1777, or were even 
suspected of Loyalism, “have been the objects of almost unremitting persecution ever 
since.”  Bad feelings existed all around, as men who had supported the Loyalist cause 
in 1775 and then become more Whiggish had “become equally Tyrannical” to the 
Loyalists, creating more hostility.  After touring the backcountry, Simpson was 
convinced that “there is such general resentment raised against most of the individuals 
who have composed the Congresses and Committees in the different Governments, 
and those who have been active in enforcing their Tyrianical Edicts” that a large 
number would gladly rise against the Whig government, given half a chance. 22  
Simpson was actually describing two different kinds of resentment, which he 
was clearly aware of but which Germain may well have missed.  The first was the 
historic resentment of the backcountry residents against the Rice Kings of the 
Lowcountry, who had for generations limited backcountry power and controlled the 
 
22 James Simpson to Germain, New York, Aug. 28, 1779, as reprinted in Alan S. Brown, "James Simpson's 
Reports on the Carolina Loyalists, 1779-1780," Journal of Southern History 21, no. 4 (1955): 513-19, 
especially 514-18. 
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economy in ways harmful to the interior.  Since the early Whig government was very 
much a Rice King product, resentment against the “individuals who have composed 
the Congresses and Committees” was resentment against the elite men leading the 
state, who were largely the same men who had led the state before the Revolution.  
The other resentment was against local Whigs who were “active in enforcing” the 
wishes of the Lowcountry Whigs.  These Whigs were singled out for their 
“tyrannical” behavior in using their power to enforce at least the appearance of 
loyalty.  Simpson dryly noted that the backcountry residents had become “most 
violent in their enmity to those by whom they had been oppressed.”  He left unsaid 
what they were likely to do in their rage if given the chance, although he did note that 
they asked to be supplied with arms and ammunition.  Simpson was certainly 
reassured by the level and enthusiasm of the support he saw, although he admitted he 
had not spoken to many families.  Still, he was impressed not only by their words, but 
by the fact that so many openly welcomed him and his men, even though such aid 
was not “consistent with prudence—for which several are now Confined in Gaol and 
Prison ships at Charles Town” and others were plundered after he left.  On the basis 
of this report, and the dance of optimism and need, the British made plans to invade 
the South, starting with Savannah.  Desperate for any new way to win the war, the 
British ignored the warning in Simpson’s report about the “sanguine disposition” of 
the Loyalists, anxious for revenge.23 
 But with hindsight, we can see the seeds of civil war in the backcountry in 
Simpson’s report.  Backcountry Loyalists had suffered plunder and enforced 
 
23 Brown, "Simpson's Reports," 516-18. 
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conformity for years as a result of their support for the British.  When they had the 
chance to turn the tables on both backcountry Whigs and Lowcountry Rice Kings, 
they intended to take it. 
 James Simpson said nothing about it at the time.  But in his second report from 
the backcountry, sent a mere four days after the Americans had surrendered at 
Charleston, he was less optimistic.  He had to admit that the Loyalists were “not so 
numerous as I expected.”  Those who were in evidence chiefly spoke of revenge 
against South Carolina Whigs.   
 
Elated with their present Triumph, and resentful for their past Injuries, they are 
clamourous for retributive Justice, and affirm that the Province will never be 
settled in Peace until those People whose persecuting spirit hath caused such 
calamities to their fellow subjects shall receive the punishment their Iniquities 
deserve.24 
 
James Simpson was now worried about the usefulness of allies who were more intent 
on “retributive Justice” than military aims.  Further, the British were planning to offer 
generous terms to the South Carolinians in the hopes that Patriots would be convinced 
to give up the war and live peacefully, without the British having to commit large 
numbers of troops to control a restive civilian population.  Loyalist anger could easily 
upset this plan if Loyalists persecuted Whigs in return. 
 The British were pleased to capture Charleston, and planned on sizable 
military support from South Carolina Loyalists to help them capture the rest of the 
South.  They were doomed to disappointment. 
 
24 James Simpson to Henry Clinton, Charles Town, May 15, 1780, as printed in Brown, “Simpson’s 
Reports,” 519. 
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Charleston Falls: Loyalists Plunder the Lowcountry  
 In 1776, the British had attempted to take Charleston directly.  At the battle of 
Sullivan’s Island, they were defeated soundly and painfully.  They would not make 
the same mistake again.  Instead, they plotted an elaborate series of maneuvers to 
allow them to gradually command leading positions outside of Charleston and then 
lay siege to the city.  The battle depended on both naval acumen in negotiating the 
swampy passages of the Lowcountry and the army’s ability to gain and hold the Sea 
Islands in their quest up the coast from Savannah (which had fallen in 1779) to 
Charleston.  Because of this strategy, the battle for Charleston may also be seen as a 
larger campaign.  From the perspective of this story of civil war and reconciliation, 
the most important part of this story is two-fold.  First, Charleston fell to the British, 
setting the occupation of the state in motion and the ensuing civil war.  In the post-
war history of the state, all legislation and thought divided the Revolutionary history 
of the state into before Charleston and after Charleston.  Second, while it was mild 
compared to what came next, features of the battle for the Sea Islands presaged 
themes of the war for the backcountry. 
 The battle for Charleston was far more civilized than anything that would 
follow.  British military planning largely followed classic eighteenth-century 
preparations for siege.  Much of the battle depended on the British navy’s careful 
maneuvering up the channels of the Lowcountry islands and the trench building in 
preparation for the siege.   
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The small amount of beef the Americans managed to obtain for the garrison 
turned out to be rotten.  Once the garrison was cut off from the surrounding areas, 
they could no longer obtain the meat that was so plentiful outside of town.  By the 
beginning of May, meat rations were half the usual amount, and a few days later the 
meat ran out entirely.  One disconsolate soldier remarked that there were ‘”Hungry 
guts in the Garrison.”  Charleston would surrender within days.  Meat was not the 
only reason, but it helped strip most Charlestonians of any desire to fight on.  At least 
some locals suspected sabotage.  James Mackey, a Charleston cooper, was employed 
to pack meat for the siege.  He apparently “bragged off after the British had possession 
of the Town” that “he behaved in such a manner as to spoil all the meat,” thereby helping 
end the siege earlier.  He and David Tayler were both accused after the war of trying to 
sabotage the provisions for the siege.  Mackey was perhaps prideful in his boasting, or 
simply trying to curry favor with the British while they were in control.25 
 Other than that one indication of Loyalist sabotage, the siege at Charleston was a 
fairly standard battle.  After all, a siege was the military attempt to avoid a bloodbath, or 
what historian John Buchanan calls “the awful alternative of a fortified place being 
carried by assault, with its attendant butchery.”  European military tradition decreed that 
a fortified place could honorably surrender after repulsing one attack.  Should a city not 
be able to hold out until reinforced, such surrender was acceptable without bloodletting.26 
 The British navy had outmaneuvered the Americans and made it to a good 
position commanding Charleston harbor, the first secret to breaking the city’s defenses.  
 
25 Borick, Gallant Defense 200.  Vinegood for No. 59 James Mackey, No. 122 David Taylor, Testimonies 
and Notes, Petitions for Relief from Confiscation 1783-1784, General Assembly Free Conference 
Committee, General Assembly Papers, S 165035, SCDAH. 
26 Buchanan, Road to Guilford Courthouse 55. 
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They proceeded to build trenches, as was standard in such warfare.  Resistance led to 
fierce, brutal hand to hand combat between small parties late at night, in fighting military 
historian John Gordon has compared to the “no-man’s land battles that would later be 
fought in World War I.”  On March 30, 1780, after building trenches, the British moved 
their armaments within firing range of the city.  They then proceeded to lay siege to the 
city for more than a month.  The forces gradually got closer, and Clinton finally became 
impatient.  He fired on the city itself on May 11, setting houses on fire with the shot.  
This property damage terrified the civilians and increased the pressure on General 
Lincoln’s defenders to end the now hopeless resistance.  After furious firing, the 
Americans surrendered on May 12, 1780.  Lincoln was able to negotiate some honor for 
the surrendering troops, who marched out of the defeated city with music and drums, but 
without their colors.  The British were interested in reduction, not punishment, and they 
correspondingly allowed men in the militia to return to their homes under parole.  Of 
course, as one Hessian officer dryly noted, the British also paroled the militia because 
they didn’t want to have to feed them.  The Continental soldiers (from the Carolinas and 
Virginia) became prisoners.  The British then tried to convince them to change 
allegiances and join the British army.  Overall, while it was of course humiliating to 
surrender, much worse could have happened.  The British were prepared to be 
magnanimous in victory.27 
 Carl Borick, who has written an exhaustive account of the attack on Charleston, 
argues that despite its seemingly orderly nature, it too had signs of what was to come in 
the South Carolina civil war.  Clinton was firmly against plunder and sought to use his 
 
27 Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History 80, 83-86.  Captain Ewald 
noted that this “economy” was likely to come back to haunt the army. Borick, Gallant Defense 229-30. 
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power to control his troops, avoiding the traditional depredations of war.  He did not want 
to give the civilian population any incentive to turn against him.  However, there was a 
limit to what he could do, and how far he was willing to antagonize his own troops in 
order to maintain stability.  He did not enforce such prohibitions on his troops occupying 
the South Carolina Sea Islands in preparation for the final siege at Charleston.  Instead, 
he declared unoccupied property to be forfeit under the assumption that if the owner had 
fled, he must be with the American forces.  (This too stimulated resentment since many 
had simply fled before the British advance.)  He issued a proclamation allowing his 
troops to seize “all such Valuable Property as shall be found belonging to any person in 
Rebellion” for the armies’ use.  Quickly, the local population turned against the British 
invaders.  One astute captain noted that they ‘“hated us from the bottom of their hearts 
because we carried off’ their belongings.”  Part of the problem was simply that the British 
had to eat, and therefore depended on provisioning from the surrounding area.  This 
naturally excited resentment among the local population.  Troops were supposed to 
distinguish between Patriots, Tories, and unaffiliated civilians, but often did not bother.  
One widow insisted that she was not associated with either side, but she was still 
plundered by British troops.  A Lowcountry man who had refused to serve as a pilot for 
the British navy was plundered in revenge, and his plantation “laid waste.”28 
 Despite all the complaining, plunder was an unavoidable part of war.  Troops had 
to live off the land in large part, and therefore needed fresh meat and produce from the 
areas in which they were stationed.  The line between outright appropriation and 
acceptable provisioning was thin at best.  Civilians were infuriated no matter what.  Nor 
were many people happy about having large numbers of semi-disciplined troops in the 
 
28 Borick, Gallant Defense  60, 99-100. 
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area.  Further, the earlier five years of the war had taught all Americans, not merely those 
who had already been in the path of war, what war could do to hearth and home.  In 
particular, women were well aware of the possibility of rape arising from war.  Certain 
units already had the reputation as prolific rapists.  Tarleton’s Legion, raised from New 
York Loyalists, was infamous.  His presence in the Lowcountry certainly encouraged 
women in the area to flee when possible.  Eliza Wilkinson, a young woman living outside 
Charleston, worried about young women whose fathers could not remove them.  She had 
heard not only the “most terrible accounts of the actions of the British troops at the 
northward,” but also that when troops entered Georgia they “used the inhabitants cruelly, 
paying no respect to age or sex.”29 
 Observers on all sides did note the particular ferocity of Loyalist regiments, no 
matter what American state they were actually from.  Brigadier General James Paterson, 
a British commander, was in charge of troops that were largely American Loyalists.  For 
both strategic reasons and those of revenge, they were as likely simply to destroy 
property as take it for their own purposes, especially livestock.  One lieutenant (who 
served under Patrick Ferguson, and therefore with a Loyalist regiment) commented that 
in order to “do his King and country justice” the troops “destroy[ed] furniture, br[oke] 
windows, etc.” as they passed through.  Major Andre, who had formulated an attack on 
plunder for Clinton while serving as his aide, wrote especially disapprovingly of the kind 
of soldier who would plunder for the “wanton pleasure of Spoil” only to “throw [it] aside 
an hour” later.  Loyalist troops showed themselves to contain plenty of these men as soon 
as they arrived in South Carolina.  John Lewis Gervais warned his friend Henry Laurens 
that the “Ennemy certainly behaved very ill at Mepkin [Laurens’s plantation],” breaking 
 
29 Caroline Gilman, ed., Letters of Eliza Wilkinson (New York, 1969) 10-12. 
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open “every trunk” and “carried off every thing they could carry without a Cart.”  
Further, his “poor” overseer was stripped of his watch, shirt and even his stockings, left 
half-naked by the troops.  (While the watch had real value, the troops probably enjoyed 
the humiliation in forcing the man to take off his clothes, leaving him half-naked in front 
of his wife and the slaves he was responsible for overseeing.)  To further the insult, they 
took his wife’s shoes as well, although a fast moving army probably had little use for 
women’s shoes.  In the same neighborhood, they even took children’s clothes from Mary 
Motte.  Gervais reported that she “took a little Baby in her Lap_ & begged to leave its 
Cloath” which they were not willing to do.  Instead, they told her “they wishd they had 
the Father, they wd. rip his damnd rebel heart out.”  Almost shuddering as he relayed this 
information, Gervais ended by exulting that his wife had gone ahead.  Of course, it is 
human nature to exaggerate, and there is always a possibility that some of these claims 
are embroidered considerably.  Nonetheless, it seems clear that both sides understood the 
power of plunder to also humiliate the opponent.  Americans noticed that British and 
Loyalist forces were harshest towards the homesteads and wives of men serving in the 
American army, which was not accidental.30 
 In these examples from the Lowcountry, we can see that plunder was for 
psychological pleasure as well as simple need, and was practiced as a weapon of terror 
against the civilian population.  Psychological warfare works best when participants 
expect a reasonable chance of the worst outcome, but without certainity (i.e. terrible 
things happen often enought to convince the population that threats are real, but at times 
individual leaders do not perform terrible acts.)  South Carolina’s war conformed to this 
 
30 Draper, King's Mountain 488.  Borick, Gallant Defense 98, 152.  John Lewis Gervais to Henry Laurens, 
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standard, meaning sometimes plunder moved into humiliation and outright destruction 
(and often enough to make everyone afraid of such an outcome).  There were also 
allegations of rape and physical assaults on women.  Unsurprisingly, given the unit’s 
prior reputation, these allegations center on a few men from Tarleton’s Legion.  Henry 
McDonaugh attacked one woman with his sword and tried to rape her, but she managed 
to stop him.  He gave up, but not before liberating a jug of rum on his way out.  They 
then went to another house, where they succeeded in raping a woman, and then ‘”almost 
strangled her.”  The two men were caught and court-martialed, by an extremely angry 
British commander, Patrick Ferguson, but the damage was done.  Further, while the 
British commanders did try to rein in such behavior, they allowed small raiding parties to 
continue, making it likely that such actions could occur.  To be fair, it is important to 
mention that Tarleton himself had no sympathy with rapists, and wanted to hang the 
offender immediately.  (The fact that this particular rapist attacked Loyalist women didn’t 
help.)31 
 In the aftermath of the reduction of Charleston, most of the Patriot militia from 
outside the area took their paroles and set off with four days’ provisions to see them 
home.  At least one observer realized this leniency might have consequences.  Captain 
Ewald was “convinced that most of these people will have guns in their hands again 
within a short time.”  He was right, but not necessarily for the reasons he supposed.  
Charlestonians took protection from the British.  In late May, Clinton happily wrote, 
“over 1,500 have already been here with their arms, desiring to join us.”  Most of the 
“rebel grandees” were also seeking British protection.  Rawlins Lowndes explained, after 
 
31 Borick, Gallant Defense 153.  For a spirited, if not entirely convincing, defense of Tarleton, but one that 
puts him in his proper context as a disciplined British officer, see Anthony J. Scott, Brutal Virtue: The Myth 
and Reality of Banastre Tarleton (Bowie, Md., 2002). 
 41 
complaining of his losses from plunder, that a man “used hitherto to all the Comforts and 
Conveniences of Life, and now…in the most necessary Exigency” would  simply have to 
seek protection, as he could not live under these conditions.  Even such famous (and 
hotheaded) partisan leaders as Andrew Pickens and Andrew Williamson accepted paroles 
and headed back home.  South Carolinians accepted British protection for two main 
reasons.  One, there was little else most could reasonably do.  The British controlled the 
major city, and lots of men had helped defend the city, and therefore had to surrender as 
soldiers.  In order to go home, they had to agree to terms.   Second, the British offered 
generous parole terms.  Paroled persons were “secure…from being molested in their 
property by the British troops.”  While accepting a parole required not fighting further for 
the American cause, the parole did not require active participation on the British side 
either.  In effect, paroles guaranteed neutrality.  Thousands of South Carolinians were 
sure they could simply accept paroles and sit out the rest of the war, and were happy to 
do so honorably.  A small minority of prominent Patriot leaders became prisoners of war, 
but the vast majority found themselves comfortably settled.  Prisoners of war were 
housed on prison ships in the harbor, or sent to St. Augustine.32 
 Sir Henry Clinton, having accomplished the reduction of Charleston, hastened to 
secure his hold over the hinterlands.  He was supremely confident that in capturing 
Charleston, he had conquered “both the Carolinas” and ensured British success with one 
of their biggest victories of the war.  Having become convinced that there were plenty of 
Loyalists in the backcountry ready to rise up and join the victorious British troops, he 
turned his attention to preparing an administration for South Carolina, so that he could go 
 
32 Borick, Gallant Defense 230-32, 252.  Clinton to William Phillips, May 25, 1780. Clinton Papers, 
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back to New York and leave his subordinate, Lord Cornwallis, in his place.  In 
preparation for his departure, he issued two proclamations, one alone and one with 
Arbuthnot, the naval commander.  They were issued on May 22, 1780, and then a week 
and a half later on June 1, 1780.  The May 22, 1780 proclamation tried to persuade South 
Carolinians to declare for the King.  The proclamation warned anyone who harassed 
Loyalists or British troops would face the confiscation of their estate and probably court 
martial.  But if rebellious South Carolinians would “immediately return to their 
allegiance” they would find “Mercy and forgiveness.”  However, the forgiveness was not 
available to “those who are polluted with the Blood of their Fellow Citizens, most 
wantonly and inhumanly shed…”  This line appears to have been added to assuage 
Loyalist leaders, who had been persecuted for the last five years at the hands of the now 
defeated Patriots.  This might have given Clinton pause had he really thought about it.  
The Loyalists were itching for the chance at payback.33 
 Clinton gave it to them by organizing local Loyalist militias to help pacify the 
interior.  He allowed those with families to form local militias, and single men were 
called to travel away from home, but not further than North Carolina or Georgia.  These 
Loyalists were drawn from outside Charleston, meaning they were disproportionately 
from the backcountry.  (Clinton, no fool, was not yet ready to trust those against whom 
he had been fighting for months.)  Further, in order to assure the loyalty of these troops, 
Clinton organized them under officers of long-known and proven loyalties.34 
 By the beginning of June, Clinton was ready to return to New York, cheered by 
Tarleton’s victory at the Waxhaws (which is discussed in more detail in the next section).  
 
33 Borick, Gallant Defense 230-33, including quotes from the May 22 and June 1, 1780 Proclamations. 
34 Borick, Gallant Defense 235. 
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Before leaving, he issued one last proclamation that fatally revised his earlier position.  
On June 3, 1780, days after his more favorable command, he decided that neutrality from 
the defeated was not enough.  The terms of the paroles and the previous proclamations 
had allowed men to simply stay home for the rest of the war.  The June 3 proclamation 
changed the rules.  Arguing that “it is fit and proper that all persons should take an active 
part in Settling and Securing his Majesty’s government,” he required all paroled prisoners 
to take up arms against their fellow Americans in support of the King.  Those who failed 
to take up arms as ordered would be considered “Enemies and Rebels…and treated 
accordingly.”  This would turn out to be an enormous mistake.  It did encourage some to 
take the oath of allegiance who would not otherwise have done so, but many more instead 
broke their paroles and enlisted on the Patriot side.  Americans argued that legally they 
were not even breaking parole, since they had accepted paroles under a set of legal 
circumstances no longer at play.  As Wayne Lee has noted of the war in North Carolina, 
some men considered the parole binding, and went out of their way to avoid breaking it.  
Others considered it largely negotiable, and broke it with ease.  Parole-breaking was 
regarded as a serious matter, but in this particular case, Clinton had largely voided the 
earlier parole by stating that those who did not come back and bear arms would be 
considered rebels.  It was a different case than later in the war.35  
Even those who were not particularly interested in either cause were faced with an 
unpalatable choice.  As Carl Borick has pointed out, the rumors of British mistreatment 
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of Americans, spread from the North and fueled by British behavior on the Sea Islands 
during the conquest of Charleston, gave South Carolinians every reason to mistrust 
British promises of protection for their lives and property.  Under the circumstances, 
many undecided people chose the American side under the assumption that the British 
could not or would not protect them under any circumstances.  Clinton sailed away 
before the deadline under this last proclamation, leaving Cornwallis with the fall-out 
from his mistake.  The fall-out would be considerable.  Lord Rawdon quickly complained 
to Cornwallis “that unfortunate Proclamation of the 3rd of June has had very unfavorable 
consequences.  The majority of the Inhabitants in the Frontier Districts, tho’ ill disposed 
to us, from circumstances were not actually up in arms against us.”  After the 
proclamation, “nine out of ten of them are now embodied on the part of the Rebels.”36 
 
36 Borick, Gallant Defense  242.  Lord Rawdon to Lord Cornwallis, July 7, 1780, Michael C. Scoggins, The 
Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry May-July 1780 
(Charleston, S.C., 2005) 196-97. 
 45 
You Must Fight to the Death: The Logic of Buford’s Massacre and Tarleton’s 
Quarter 
Clinton helped touch off a civil war in South Carolina with his negation of 
neutrality, but as we have seen, Loyalists and Patriots were itching to take revenge on 
each other.  The Lowcountry campaign showed that the British were willing to use 
plunder and psychological terror to control the civilian population.  Given these two 
trends, perhaps it was inevitable that the civil war in the Carolinas would quickly dissolve 
into military rules that more closely resembled the norms of Native American warfare 
than European war.37 
After taking Charleston, the British raced to consolidate their control over the 
colony, trying to quickly overawe the interior.  Colonel Banastre Tarleton was sent to 
confront the last group of Continental soldiers in the state, in order to secure British 
victory.  Those Continentals (of the Virginia Line), commanded by Colonel Alexander 
Buford, were fleeing from an earlier engagement with Tarleton’s forces (Loyalists from 
northern states), racing for North Carolina in order to save the troops and reinvigorate the 
American army.  Having never made it to Charleston, they very much wanted to avoid 
surrendering.  Tarleton was equally committed to destroying this last remaining force. 
Buford’s Massacre occurred on May 29, 1780, less than three weeks after the 
main American forces had surrendered at Charlestown.  After an extremely rapid march 
of 150 miles in 54 hours, Tarleton’s force of New York-area Loyalists caught Buford’s 
Virginia Patriots near Waxhaw Presbyterian Church, on the border with North Carolina.  
 
37 For a much longer explanation of the rules of war at play in colonial America for Native American 
warfare, a wonderful source is John E. Ferling, A Wilderness of Miseries: War and Warriors in Early 
America (Westport, Conn., 1980).  See also Higginbotham, "Reflections on the War of Independence." 
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What happened next is the subject of heated dispute.  Once firing began, the Patriot 
forces were rapidly overwhelmed.  Worse yet, both sides were so close that no one could 
fire, and the fighting was hand-to-hand combat with bayonets.  As such, the fighting was 
brutal, and the American forces were not well prepared.  Evidence of this includes the 
frank assessment of one officer that the dead and wounded had an “average” of 16 
wounds “to each man.”  Within a few minutes, at least part of the American line tried to 
surrender, raising a white flag.  At about the same time, at least according to his later 
(self-serving) memoir, Tarleton’s horse was shot out beneath him.  The Legion could no 
longer see Tarleton, so they panicked, and continued firing on the American forces 
despite several attempts to raise the white flag of surrender.  Americans, needless to say, 
charged Tarleton and his Legion with deliberately refusing to allow surrender.  In later 
accounts, even one British writer felt that “the virtue of humanity was totally forgot.”  
Tarleton reported to Cornwallis that he had “Cut 170 Off’rs and Men to pieces, ” and the 
American losses were sizable: 113 killed, 150 wounded, and 53 prisoners, or about 80% 
of the Americans engaged in the battle.38 
Military historians have raced to defend Banastre Tarleton against his nineteenth-
century sobriquet “Bloody Tarleton” or “Bloody Ban.”  Anthony Scotti defends 
Tarleton’s men by explaining that the Americans may not have fully understood the 
European rules of war, by which if they turned down an offer of surrender under 
honorable terms they would accept death as the consequence of such “rash” behavior.  
Other historians, striving to show how many of the tales of atrocities could not have been 
 
38 J. Tracy Power, "'the Virtue of Humanity Was Totally Forgot': Buford's Massacre, May 29, 1780," The 
South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine 93, no. 1 (1992): 5-14, especially 9-10, including a 
quote from Charles Stedman from his history of the American war, and Banastre Tarleton to Cornwallis.  
Pancake, Destructive War 70-71. 
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true, echo Scotti.  But in the rush to explain why Buford’s Massacre happened with 
explanations of slips, mistakes, misunderstandings, and fallen men, we have obscured the 
reasons why it happened and why it mattered so much to South Carolinians during the 
war and afterwards.39 
There is merit to these explanations, and I certainly have no reason to doubt them.  
But these explanations seek to understand Buford’s Massacre as a true beginning to the 
viciousness of the cycle of retribution in the Carolina backcountry.  In this conception, 
the mistakes of war led to the appearance of an uncontrolled slaughter, which then 
created a vicious cycle in which surrender became impossible.  But I suggest Buford’s 
Massacre was almost inevitable.  The logic for such events had already been laid.  It was 
probably too much to expect that Whigs and Tories who had spent the last five years 
sniping at each other to treat each other well.  The logic of civil war had already been laid 
by the Whigs’ relentless pursuit and harassment of Tories during the five years before the 
war came to South Carolina in earnest.  It was laid in the use of partisan forces by both 
the Tories and the Whigs.  It was laid in 1775 when Loyalist leaders such as Patrick and 
Robert Cunningham were forced to flee into Cherokee country for safety. 
Buford’s Massacre, while extreme, points to another rapidly evolving feature of 
the war in the Carolinas.  It became a “war of the militias,” where Patriot and Loyalist 
militias drawn from the state, and the South more generally, engaged each other in a 
series of guerilla fights.  The militias depended on a style of warfare that had developed 
on the frontier, privileging dawn or dusk raids dependent on surprise.  With limited 
 
39 Banastre Tarleton’s written summons to Buford offered terms, but told him that if he was “rash enough 
to reject them, the blood shall be upon your head.”  Tarleton repeated this in his memoirs.  Power, 
"Buford's Massacre," , especially 7.  A less sympathetic account of Tarleton can be found in Robert D. 
Bass, The Green Dragoon: The Lives of Banastre Tarleton and Mary Robinson (New York, 1957). 
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visibility, small troop numbers, and the dependence on ambush, it was almost inevitable 
that death tolls would rise, and that taking prisoners, or even seeing white surrender flags, 
would be difficult.  The militias did rely on norms of violence and wartime behavior that 
restricted what they could honorably do on the field of battle, but with increasing rage, 
and pressure, those norms were superseded by another tradition: the tradition of 
retribution.  Threatening retribution had long been an acceptable way to control unwanted 
behavior, but the pressures of civil war toppled Americans into applying what one 
historian has dubbed the “law of retaliation”: compulsory and expected retaliation, such 
that each side justified all actions, and expected to routinely violate the rules of war 
because the other side did it first.  Further inflaming everyone was the presence of gangs 
of bandits, loosely identified with the Loyalist side, but actually interested only in 
personal plunder.  Each side tended to blame their opponents for these actions.  Of 
course, Buford’s Massacre itself involved Continental soldiers, but the mindset of each 
side was already in place.40 
The Patriot militia’s customary role during the previous five years was to enforce 
the appearance of political conformity and to control the disaffected.  In their pursuit of 
that goal, they became accustomed to entering houses, harshly questioning people, and 
otherwise pursuing individuals, not armies.  Unsurprisingly, they brought these habits 
with them to partisan warfare, targeting the homes and families of the disaffected.41 
 
40 Lee, Crowds and Soldiers 176-77.  The phrase “law of retaliation” is used by Harold E. Selesky, 
"Colonial America," in The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World, ed. Michael 
Howard, George J. Andrepoulous, and Mark R. Shulman (New Haven, Conn., 1994).  I encountered it in 
Lee’s work. 
41 Jeffrey J. Crow, "Liberty Men and Loyalists: Disorder and Disaffection in the North Carolina 
Backcountry," in An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry During the American Revolution, ed. Ronald 
Hoffman, Thad W. Tate, and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, Va., 1985).  Clyde R. Ferguson, "Functions of 
the Partisan-Militia in the South, During the American Revolution: An Interpretation," in The 
Revolutionary War in the South: Power, Conflict, and Leadership, ed. W. Robert Higgins (Durham, N.C., 
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 Certainly, Buford’s Massacre became the rallying cry in the Carolina 
backcountry, and in at least two different later engagements (King’s Mountain, discussed 
below, and Haw’s River), the American forces specifically invoked Buford’s Massacre to 
encourage and justify cutting down Loyalists who tried to surrender.  “Give them 
Buford’s play” and “Tarleton’s Quarter” (meaning no quarter at all) became rallying cries 
for militiamen determined to retaliate.  Thankfully for the progress of the war, at a time 
when victory seemed unobtainable, a small engagement in the backcountry between 
Loyalists and Whigs gave hope to many. 
 Walter Edgar uses the engagement at Brattonsville (Huck’s Defeat) as the central 
way to show the brutality of the civil war raging in the backcountry.  His book revolves 
around this small skirmish because it encapsulates bigger themes at work in the rhetoric 
of guerilla warfare in the backcountry, especially the fratricidal nature of the war there. 
 Brattonsville was the tiny hamlet neighborhood centered on William Bratton’s 
plantation.  William Bratton was himself a substantial landowner by the standards of the 
area.  And while his home was built with logs, he was the only man in the area who had 
glazed windows rather than wooden shutters.  Brattonsville is in York County, South 
Carolina, or what was then known as the New Acquisition District, near Charlotte, North 
Carolina.42 
 Cornwallis had authorized the attack on the area, since the mill also functioned as 
a source of shot for the Whigs.  Huck’s men had free rein to eat corn and burn the rest of 
the crop, but Cornwallis, as was his wont, “strictly” forbade “any act of cruelty to their 
                                                                                                                                            
1979).  A. Roger Ekirch, "Whig Authority and Public Order in Backcountry North Carolina, 1776-1783," in 
An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry During the American Revolution, ed. Ronald Hoffman, Thad 
W. Tate, and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, Va., 1985).  Lee, Crowds and Soldiers . 
42 Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats 39.  Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield 
History 89-90.  
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wives & children.”  As we will see, Huck’s men partly ignored those recommendations.  
The day before the battle, Captain Huck moved to surprise the families of two prominent 
Patriot leaders in the New Acquisition District, which had the distinction of being the 
only entire district in which virtually no one took the oath of protection.  (This claim is at 
least partly true, but was burnished too much by locals in the nineteenth century to be 
entirely believable.  Nonetheless, very few men from the New Acquisition District were 
listed on post-war records of those who had fled the state.)  Huck first surprised the 
family of Captain John McClure.    McClure was not home, but Huck did catch his son 
and son-in-law melting down pewter dishes into bullets.  This was a violation of any 
standard of neutrality.  Further, both men were adults.  (This incident is actually the 
source for the scene in The Patriot, where the young men become young boys melting 
down toy soldiers.)  Both men were arrested and put under guard, to be hanged at sunrise 
the next day.  Next, the troops moved down the road to the Bratton plantation, where 
Bratton’s wife and young son had been warned of the approach.  She faced them down 
from her front porch, apparently trying to protect her home.  Her insolence did not go 
unnoticed, according to family legend.  A Loyalist grabbed a reaping hook from the wall 
and held it at her neck, threatening to kill her if she did not tell where her husband was.  
This incident has been read as an example of threatened atrocity.  “Gentlemanly” it 
certainly was not, but threatening women to reveal their husbands’ whereabouts was 
certainly within the acceptable bounds of war.  Further, it does not follow that the threat, 
however frightening, intended any follow-through.  Unfortunately, Mrs. Bratton did 
understand the rules of engagement, and unrepentantly told the soldiers her husband was 
with Thomas Sumter’s army.43 
 
43 Lord Cornwallis to  Lieutenant Colonel Turnbull, June 16, 1780, as reprinted in Scoggins, Day It Rained 
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 The British commander imprisoned the young men, and told them they would be 
hanged at daybreak.  Mrs. Bratton was locked upstairs, and the Loyalists camped in the 
house and yard for the night.  Someone sneaked out (family accounts disagree on exactly 
who that was) and under the cover of darkness rode several miles, finding the partisan 
camp where Bratton himself and his men were hiding.  As John Buchanan notes, it was 
incredibly unwise that Huck “failed to keep note of the whereabouts of the people he had 
plundered that day.”  They prepared to surprise the Loyalists at dawn (a typical guerilla 
strategy) and were able to use the advantage of surprise to overcome Huck’s forces, 
killing many.  Captain Huck himself was killed, and only twelve dragoons and twelve 
militiamen survived.44 
 While the battle itself was not of great importance, its psychological effect was 
huge.  At a moment when it looked like the British could solidly control the state after the 
reduction of Charleston and Buford’s Massacre, Huck’s Defeat gave the Patriots hope.  In 
the aftermath of the battle, Whigs flocked to join Thomas Sumter’s men, committing to 
militia duty.  Even the British recognized Huck’s Defeat was a bad sign.  Cornwallis 
wrote the Ninety Six commander to be watchful, stating that the defeat “has given me 
great uneasiness.”45 
 Huck’s Defeat also showcases family divisions in the war.  Edward Lacey was a 
commander with William Bratton’s forces, and an outspoken Whig.  His aged father was 
a diehard Loyalist, while his brother was a Loyalist militiaman under Captain Huck.  The 
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night before the battle, Lacey and his men camped at Lacey’s home, where his father was 
also living.  His father was caught trying to escape from the house in order to warn the 
Loyalist forces.  Lacey had to tie his father to the bed and post a guard on him for the rest 
of the night.  And in some ways, Lacey’s father was lucky.  Had he not been a close 
blood relative and obviously aged, he could have been summarily executed.  Neighbors 
also opposed neighbors, and for some it was the first time they discovered who their 
enemies really were.  One Whig veteran later recalled killing several “acquaintances and 
men I have never suspected of toryism.”46 
 Huck’s Defeat also was an early expression of viciousness in the civil war 
fighting.  Bratton’s young son, who spent much of the battle tied up in a corn crib, later 
remembered that his father and his men took pleasure in hacking a wounded Loyalist to 
death after the battle.47 
 Throughout the summer and early fall, the backcountry, and increasingly the 
Lowcountry, saw numerous small skirmishes between partisan detachments.  Between 
Huck’s Defeat in July and King’s Mountain in October, there were at least twenty-two 
such engagements in South Carolina, of which seventeen were in the backcountry.  
Partisan engagements were the only good news in the Southern theater, as General Gates 
had managed to lose a second American army of Continentals to British forces at the 
battle of Camden on August 16, 1780.48 
 
46 Buchanan, Road to Guilford Courthouse 114.  Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats 80.  George Neely, Federal 
Pension Application S4613, as excerpted in Scoggins, Day It Rained Militia 174-75. 
47 Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats 84.  McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1775-
1780 . 
48 Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History 92-94.  Edgar, Partisans 
and Redcoats 89. 
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 Reassuringly for the Whig cause, General Francis Marion and his militia men, 
operating in the Lowcountry, began to break Loyalist support along the Pee Dee River 
with a series of victories, including at Blue Savannah and Black Mingo Creek.  Almost a 
month after King’s Mountain, Marion had a large victory at Tearcoat Swamp.  Once 
again, he showed how he won the nickname the ‘Swamp Fox,’ winning and capturing 
much needed horses and arms before melting back into the swamps, to choose his next 
engagement.49 
King’s Mountain: The Logic of No Quarter Finds Expression 
 As John Pancake so charmingly puts it, “The irregular forces on both sides fought 
the crucial battle of King’s Mountain while Lord Cornwallis was less than thirty miles 
away in a haze of ignorance and General Gates was 150 miles away in a blanket of 
indifference.”  King’s Mountain, unlike many of the partisan engagements, is a famous 
battle.  It is famous because the American troops managed to actually win, defeating 
Patrick Ferguson, a popular British leader.  King’s Mountain itself was rather a large hill 
on the border between North and South Carolina, in York County, South Carolina (near 
Charlotte).50 
 King’s Mountain was a turning point in the partisan war, because it was such a 
crushing defeat for the Loyalists that it further emboldened the Patriots militarily, but also 
in their efforts to harass and crush local opposition.  The disaster at King’s Mountain 
 
49 Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History 105, 110-11, 117-19. 
50 Pancake, Destructive War 108. 
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guaranteed that most men of Loyalist sympathies who had not already made the decision 
to take up arms would not join the militia after this defeat. 
 Kings Mountain was distinctive as a major battle fought entirely by partisan 
forces raised in America.  The only British person on the field that day was the 
commander of the Loyalists, Patrick Ferguson.  Otherwise, it was Loyalist versus Patriot.  
Patrick Ferguson was a respected and feared commander who had spent the past few 
months touring the far western portions of the Carolinas in search of new recruits for the 
Loyalist forces.  Further, he was to solidify British control over the interior, and use his 
forces to intimidate the “disaffected” sufficiently to stop them from harassing local Tories 
or joining the Patriot forces.  In short, he was both a recruiter and a controller of the far 
west.  In his efforts to “overawe[]” the disaffected, his troops plundered and attacked 
their way across the Blue Ridge Mountains.  What to the British commanders in 
Charleston was a program of armed persuasion became, 300 miles west, a program of 
terror.  Ferguson further incited Carolina Whigs with his public proclamation in late 
September 1780 threatening to “hang their [Patriot] leaders and lay their country waste 
with fire and sword.”  Since his troops were already so doing, it hardly seemed an empty 
threat.  Further, as John Pancake has noted, at the time Ferguson issued this incendiary 
threat, he could reach the Over Mountain men’s homes and families in a two-day march.  
The Over Mountain men, formerly residents of Georgia and the Carolinas who had 
moved to what is today East Tennessee at the beginning of the Revolution, responded to 
the threat, and decided to engage Ferguson and his men.  Ferguson, for his part, was 
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leading Loyalist troops drawn from both New York and the surrounding local areas.  
King’s Mountain would indeed be a battle defining a civil war.51 
 Patrick Ferguson might have more sensibly avoided the battle entirely and raced 
to meet Cornwallis’s troops, who were camped nearby.  For reasons historians still argue 
about, instead he chose his (seriously flawed) ground and waited for the American 
partisan forces to come to him.  Ferguson further inflamed the Whigs by issuing a direct 
challenge: with braggadocio he swore that once he had established himself on Kings 
Mountain, “God almighty himself could not drive him from it.”  Walter Edgar has made a 
lot of this challenge, seeing it as a direct affront to the religious sensibilities of the 
Scotch-Irish Presbyterians, but I think it was simply a general taunt to the Whigs.52 
 The fighting was largely hand-to-hand combat.  In such close conditions, it was 
hard to tell each side apart, especially since very few of the soldiers were actually in 
uniform.  This closeness gave rise to easy confusion, and troops had to go to some 
lengths to tell each other apart on the battlefield.  In the chaos of war, it was easy to get 
confused.  Whigs had a verbal countersign (which I discuss later) to mark them, but as an 
additional precaution, Whigs put paper in their hats to mark themselves, and the Loyalists 
put twigs in theirs.53   
Most men dealt in a world of imperfect information.  While on the most local 
level, many knew or suspected the allegiance of others by late 1780, since colonists of all 
persuasions were both Loyalists and Patriots, telling each other apart sometimes became 
 
51 Pancake, Destructive War  116-17. 
52 Pancake, Destructive War 118.  Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats 116-20. 
53 Draper, King's Mountain 270.  Such improvised signs were common.  Moses Hall, a North Carolina 
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a major problem.  In a civil war, the discomfort of realizing the enemy looks and sounds 
like you must have been palpable.  At times, it was also hair-raising.  Joseph Kerr was a 
life-long cripple from Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, on the border with South 
Carolina’s New Acquisition District, where he also had kin.  He became a spy for the 
Patriots as early as 1778, during a period of routine skirmishing.  By the time of the civil 
war in the Carolina backcountry, he was an experienced spy.  Again and again he used 
his physical disabilities as a cover for his activities, posing as a Loyalist who could not 
serve.  Just before the battle of Huck’s Defeat, he was trying this routine again, when he 
got caught by near neighbors of his who really were Loyalists.  He was “personally 
known to some of the Tories” who promptly denounced him as a “damned rebel spy.”  
Captain Huck threatened to take his life then and there, but perhaps once again swayed by 
his crippled status, chose to merely imprison him until after the battle, leaving him tied in 
the bushes.  Kerr managed to escape, and carried word to the Patriots of the conditions 
and strength of the Tories.54 
Other examples of mistaken and confused identity abound.  James Fergus 
remembered gathering simple intelligence of troop movements.  He and his fellow 
soldiers “pretended to be a party of loyalists from North Carolina coming to join the 
British” and fooled a woman, who happily told them that the Loyalists were “encamped 
about a half mile from us on the bank of the creek; that they were on their way to drive 
the rebels out of the forks and would make us very welcome” and finished by telling 
them her husband was with the Loyalists.  Discrete she was not, but her confusion was 
understandable.  Groups of men did try to find each other all the time before 
 
54 His pension application stated that he “has been a cripple since his infancy, properly termed an invalid, 
and not subject to military duty.” Dann, The Revolution Remembered: Eyewitness Accounts of the War for 
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engagements.  In one horrifyingly telling episode of mistaken identity, Light Horse Henry 
Lee’s dragoons encountered Pyle’s Loyalist militia group.  Lee’s Dragoons wore light 
green jackets that were strikingly similar in coloring to those worn by Tarleton’s Legion, 
a Loyalist force.  Pyle, coming upon the green jackets, rushed up to join what he thought 
were Tarleton’s forces.  Lee’s forces were quicker on the uptake and quickly slaughtered 
the foolish Loyalists, in the event that became known as Pyle’s Massacre.  The example 
also shows yet another episode in which many were slaughtered before the Whigs could 
be persuaded to take prisoners.55 
Several divided families participated in this battle.  Family legend held that 
Thomas Robertson was using a tree for cover when a Loyalist neighbor called out to him 
by name, getting him to poke his head around long enough to be vulnerable to a shot.  
Luckily, it missed him, and he was able to kill his former neighbor.  When his neighbor 
cursed him for killing him, his unsympathetic neighbor Robertson told him, “the devil 
help you.”  Another wounded Loyalist begged his Patriot brother-in-law for help.  His 
brother-in-law contemptuously told him to “look to your friends for help.”  Another 
veteran described the aftermath of the battle, as the victorious Patriots camped within 
hearing range of the dying Loyalists still lying on the field.  Benjamin Sharp remembered 
“pass[ing] the night amid groans and lamentations,” which the Patriots did nothing to 
assuage.  One veteran remembered voices “begging piteously for a little water” but “these 
cries, when emanating from the Tories, were little heeded.”56 
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 To further the theme of civil war, legend had it that two separate pairs of brothers 
killed each other at the Battle of King’s Mountain.  Lyman Draper speculated that one 
such story might be about the Goforth family from Rutherford County, North Carolina.  
Two brothers fought for the Whigs, and two for the Tories, and all four were killed in the 
battle.  Supposedly, two of them were shot so quickly that they died with one eye open 
and one eye closed, expert marksmen to the end.  Legend had it that another North 
Carolinian unknowingly shot his own brother through a firing hole in the tree his brother 
was hiding behind, only discovering who he had killed after the battle.  At least this 
brother felt remorse; he became “almost deranged” upon learning what he had done. 
These stories may be apocryphal, but even as apocryphal stories they relate a deeper truth 
about the partisan war in the Carolinas: it was indeed a brother’s war, in which families 
and friends found themselves on opposite sides.  And, as happens in such wars, some of 
the worst brutalities happened when people found themselves hardening themselves 
against the enemy they knew all too well.  On both sides in the partisan war, the most 
intense hatred was reserved for American against American.57 
 The entire battle took less than an hour.  In that fateful hour, Ferguson’s Loyalist 
troops were destroyed.  Early in the battle, Ferguson and his horse went down, which 
further panicked his men, who realized the battle was going badly.  As waves of Patriot 
forces made it to the summit, the battle became a “desperate melee.”  As in other battles 
in these months, many of the soldiers were unwilling to accept surrender.  Isaac Shelby, a 
Patriot survivor, later suggested that the Patriots were in such confusion themselves 
“continually coming up” and being “scattered in the woods” that they could not stop 
 
57 Draper, King's Mountain 266, 314-15.  This report is based on an anecdote published in the North 
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firing.  But he also admitted that some men had “heard that at Buford’s defeat the British 
had refused quarters…[and] were willing to follow that bad example.”  Other veterans 
remembered that the countersign word going into the battle was “Buford”.  The 
countersign means the word the Patriots used to identify themselves to each other in the 
heat of battle.  Choosing the name of a now infamous (at least in rhetoric) massacre 
before battle as the countersign signaled an otherwise unspoken determination to refuse 
quarter.58   
In the same way Americans would later use “Remember the Alamo” to rally 
troops to greater ferocity, “Buford’s play” or “Buford’s Quarter” was used by Patriot 
forces to muster ferocity.  However, it did also have a specific meaning: to refuse 
surrender.  By choosing “Buford” as the countersign, the Patriot forces made the decision 
not to accept surrenders from the Loyalists.  Shelby admitted as much by mentioning that 
troops were willing to follow the British “bad example.”  This decision was reinforced by 
the fact that the Patriots knew they were in a strong position going into the battle.  
Military historians question why Ferguson made a stand when he was outnumbered and 
near reinforcements, not why the Patriot forces engaged him.  Seizing their chance for 
revenge, Whigs signaled their acceptance of a growing general practice: to refuse quarter.  
James Collins, a veteran of King’s Mountain, reflected that in the battle “death or victory 
was the only way to escape suffering.”59 
 Having made the decision to kill the defeated enemy, Patriot forces moved to act 
on that decision.  Charles Bowen cut down two men who raised the white flag, although a 
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third was final able to get one aloft long enough for enough troops to respond.  Joseph 
Sevier, who was especially enraged by (false) reports that his father had been killed in the 
battle, kept firing on Loyalists trying to surrender.  He reportedly swore that “I’ll keep 
loading and shooting till I kill every son of a b__h of them.”  One veteran testified that 
some troops were ‘“crying out ‘Buford’s play’” as they ignored the white flags of 
surrender.  Col. Shelby had to intervene personally, riding between his men and the 
Loyalists to convince his troops to quit firing.  Casualties were high, but Shelby’s actions 
ended the slaughter, and the Patriots took over 700 Loyalist prisoners.  The existence of 
those prisoners shows that despite the instincts to slaughter, there was a difference of 
opinion about such tactics in the Patriot ranks.  Men with claims to honorable pretensions 
abhorred such behavior, although they were not necessarily merciful people.60 
 In the aftermath of the battle, the Patriots stripped Patrick Ferguson’s body of his 
clothes and possessions.  Later Carolinians tried to claim that his body was actually 
stripped by Tories.  Then, depending on whether you believe the story about urination or 
not, his body was abused.  (Persistent rumors, widely ignored by modern historians, 
suggested that the Over Mountain men all took turns urinating on his still-warm body.)  
Finally, in a mark of some respect, his body was wrapped in an animal skin and buried.  
He alone received this mark of care and attention, which was attributed to his status as a 
British officer.  His Loyalist soldiers who had died in battle were quickly stacked in 
careless piles.  They were covered haphazardly, in a way that did nothing to protect their 
corpses from the humiliation and abuse of serving as feed for animals.  Survivors 
reported “all the hogs in the neighborhood gathered into the place to devour the flesh.”  
For days after the battle, Loyalist families picked through the pile of bodies, looking for 
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their husbands and fathers.  Neither Patriot forces nor local civilians made any attempt to 
properly bury the bodies of their fellow Americans.  Disrespect and weariness combined 
to create a complete lack of regard for human dignity in death.61 
 The aftermath of King’s Mountain also proves another point about the role of 
partisan warfare in the Carolinas.  The Patriot victory encouraged local Whigs, more of 
whom joined the partisan bands in the aftermath of the successful engagement.  On the 
other hand, local Loyalists were visibly discouraged by King’s Mountain.  James Collins, 
a Patriot veteran, remembered that “for a short time every man could visit his home, or 
his neighbor without being afraid,” because local Loyalists were too discouraged to 
plunder and harass the local population.  Collins also noted with pleasure that many who 
had been neutral before the battle “shouldered their guns, and fell in the ranks; some of 
them making good soldiers.”  Lord Rawdon agreed that local Tories were discouraged, 
reporting “the defeat of Major Ferguson had so dispirited this part of the country.”62 
 In King’s Mountain, we can see many of the themes of the war in the 
backcountry.  There were, of course, many more engagements, but these few form an 
outline of important issues in the civil war. 
 As the war slowly turned to the Patriots’ favor, the militia was not slow to seize 
the advantage.  After the Battle of Guilford Courthouse, when the British won a narrow 
victory that largely destroyed their army (a fact many of their officers were painfully 
aware of even at the time), Carolinian Patriots were encouraged to press home their 
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advantage, as a broken British army abandoned much of the Carolinas for Virginia.  
James Collins and his militia group spent the time “ferreting out the Tories, and such as 
had been in the habit of plundering, burning and murdering.”  While he insisted they 
differentiated between those who had been neutral (“pet Tories”) and those who had 
acted against war norms, in fact most Tories found themselves living in fear.  When they 
targeted Loyalists, they pulled down their roofs and dismantled their house and any other 
buildings.  Frightened “fellows, perhaps expecting instant death, would beg hard for life” 
and were promised their lives in return if “they would leave the country, within a 
specified time, and never return.”  Collins felt this was the merciful and just response, 
and reflected happily that he didn’t know of any Loyalist who promised to leave under 
these circumstances who “failed to comply.”  The militia lost no time in clearing the 
country of ideological opposition, although they became more merciful after the war was 
over.  We shall examine the issue of return in later chapters, but it worth considering how 
Collins felt about it years later, as he remembered frightening Loyalists into leaving.  
While some went to Mississippi, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Kentucky, others “became 
good citizens, good neighbors, and men of respectability.”  In later years he saw many 
men he had threatened, but all seemed to fail to recognize him.63 
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The Uses of Wartime Rhetoric in the Carolina Backcountry 
 Finally, the last section of this chapter considers the issue of wartime atrocity and 
atrocity rhetoric more closely.  Propaganda has long been a vital part of war, and 
American Revolutionaries were skilled and enthusiastic manipulators of propaganda long 
before the war made it to the Carolinas.64   
British troops, including Loyalists, came to the Sumter household a few weeks 
after the reduction of Charleston.  Thomas Sumter was a well-known Patriot leader, but 
he had so far remained neutral in the wake of defeat, in the process becoming a recruiting 
target for both sides.  In order to warn him off the Patriot side, but also to use him as an 
example of what happened to foes, the British sent troops to make an example of him.  
When they arrived, they found his crippled wife and housekeeper at his house, but 
Thomas Sumter was nowhere to be found.  Making an example, they set out to destroy 
his house and fields.  The women were on the front porch facing down the assembled 
troops.  First, one Loyalist asked the women for the keys to the house.  In defiance, the 
housekeeper offered up the keys by hurling them as far into the grass as she could.  The 
man was undoubtedly irritated by this show of defiance, but it did not provoke him into 
violence against her.  Instead, the troops spread out and burned the fields, destroyed farm 
implements, and ordered the women to leave the premises.  Mrs. Sumter continued to 
face them down, and the men finally picked her up, chair and all, and deposited her on 
the lawn a safe distance from the house before burning it down.  She and her housekeeper 
sat together watching their home burn to the ground, until only smoke remained. 
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 I tell you this story because it illustrates several features of atrocity rhetoric and 
how it was used in the backcountry struggle to cope with tensions over the rules of war.  
Practically, the attack on Sumter’s house had the entirely predictable consequence of 
bringing him into the war for the Patriots, or as John Pancake put it, he joined with 
“predictable dispatch.”  Rather than discourage him, the attacks on his property 
guaranteed his commitment to the Patriot cause.  The story of his female householders’ 
resistance spread throughout South Carolina, cheering women and encouraging men.  
The story helped recruit militia members to fight under Sumter, and only added to the 
mystique of irascibility that helped earn him the nickname the Gamecock.  Further, the 
story highlights the tension between the rules of war understood by the participants and 
their heated rhetoric of violation.65 
 I will return to the Sumters, but first I want to start unpacking the relationship 
between war atrocity rhetoric and the actual rules of war.  There is a disconnect between 
the rhetoric of war atrocities in the backcountry and the actual conduct of the war.  I do 
not want to deny there were atrocities, for there certainly were.  Loyalists and Patriots 
behaved very badly in the backcountry war, and it was genuinely a civil war where old 
feuds and new hatreds were worked out under the cover of idealistic allegiances.  I 
wouldn’t need to disentangle rhetoric from reality if there was not substance to the 
charges.  Still, just because where there is smoke, there is usually fire, does not change 
the fact that sometimes all that smoke comes from a very small fire. 
 The rhetoric of wartime atrocities in the Carolina backcountry was heated.  There 
certainly was some basis for this rhetoric—as legions of historians have noted, the 
conduct of war in the Southern backcountry was fraught, vicious, and frighteningly 
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fraternal in nature.  The war clearly unnerved civilians and military personnel alike. 
General Greene despaired that the “Whigs and Tories pursue each other with as much 
relentless fury as beasts of prey,” and British officers were no more enthused.  Civilians 
complained bitterly.  Even in the Lowcountry, Eliza Wilkinson was so terrified by rumors 
from Georgia that she wondered how “a nation so famed for humanity…should, in so 
short a time, divest themselves of even the least trace of what they once were.”66  
 Rumors of war crimes and atrocities are a staple of almost every armed conflict, 
and the Revolution was no exception.  In the years before the South became the 
battleground, rumors about the bad behavior of British troops had spread across the 
colonies as part of a broad propaganda campaign.  Rumors of rape were so widespread 
that Lord Rawdon satirized them, commenting that women on Long Island could not 
“step into the bushes to pluck a rose without running the most imminent risk of being 
ravaged, and they are so little accustomed to these vigourous methods they do not bear 
them with the proper resignation, and of consequence we have the most entertaining 
court-martials every day.”  The pump was already primed for propaganda to serve as a 
major force in the backcountry civil war.67 
 However, investigation shows that certain kinds of claims were made over and 
over again in war atrocity rhetoric.  Specifically, claims dwelt on certain actions that 
atrocity rhetoric argued was against the rules of war.  These claims were violations of 
neutrality towards civilians (specifically women, minor children, and aged men), 
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violations of property and the sacredness of the homestead, and violations of the rules of 
battle conduct, specifically the right to an orderly surrender and to survival as a prisoner 
of war.  In all cases, atrocity rhetoric claimed that the British and their Loyalist allies 
were committing unspeakable acts unknown in the annals of war, and unacceptable 
innovations of war.  These were fine allegations for recruiting, but not true.  Let’s briefly 
consider some of these examples.   
The entire mill of atrocity tales focused on threats to women.  In addition to Mrs. 
Sumter being threatened by troops, we return to the story of Martha Bratton at the battle 
of Huck’s Defeat.  As the story circulating the backcountry went (becoming even more 
pronounced by the nineteenth century), in front of thirty some-odd men, one especially 
enraged Loyalist grabbed a reaping hook from her wall and held it against her neck, 
fiercely ordering her to disclose her husband’s whereabouts.  She proudly told this soldier 
that her husband was with Sumter, risking death while not giving him any of the practical 
information he was looking for—where Sumter’s men were currently encamped.  A 
Loyalist officer from Camden intervened, freeing Mrs. Bratton from her predicament, and 
chastising the other man for violating her.  This story came to illustrate the threat against 
women on the homefront at the hands of undisciplined Loyalists.  How dare they threaten 
Mrs. Bratton?  And, the story also came to be a story of female patriotism and fervor, 
staring death in the face in order to protect American liberty and her husband’s safety.  
Or at least, that is what people wanted to get out of the story.  But the story suggests 
something else, something that makes it a story about the creation of atrocity rhetoric 
despite a widely shared understanding of the rules of war.  Martha Bratton stared down 
her attacker and refused to give him what he wanted.  If she was truly frightened for her 
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life, as the story purports, she very well might have behaved differently.  Instead, she was 
saucy, even infuriating.  She stared him down because she knew very well that he could 
not kill her in front of so many witnesses, including officers.  Instead, both of them were 
behaving within accepted grounds.  He may well have been angry, but he was performing 
a theatrical ritual of war.  By threatening her, he hoped to create enough fear in her to get 
her to spill crucial information.  She was in no danger under the circumstances.  It is 
extremely doubtful that any collection of eighteenth-century Anglo-American men would 
have been willing to kill a woman in front of each other, let alone in front of officers, 
whose pretensions to gentility would have been pierced by such action.  Instead, violence 
was part of an effort to intimidate, in hopes that Martha Bratton did not understand these 
realities as well as the troops did. Even in the case of rape, credible allegations in South 
Carolina were lodged against specific members of Tarleton’s Legions in groups of one 
and two.  Further, these men were prosecuted by a shocked officer corps.68   
As we know from the story, Martha Bratton understood the realities of the rules of 
war as well as the soldiers confronting her that morning.  Her intransigence and hostility 
was a product of her assurance of her own safety, not a patriotism courting death.  It was 
her nineteenth-century descendants who, in promoting the story, showed their lack of 
understanding of the actual conduct of war by believing the story.  When we think about 
it this way, we can see that Mrs. Sumter’s refusal to move off her porch, and her 
housekeeper’s angry actions, were also born from this understanding that their persons 
were under no real threat.  Therefore, the women could be saucy and resentful, letting the 
troops know how disgusted they were with what was about to happen—the destruction of 
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their property, including their home—and perhaps, ultimately, to shame soldiers into 
sparing some of their property. 
Even when offering sexual insults, the threat was usually not violent.  Captain 
Huck’s men reportedly taunted Reverend Simpson’s wife by trying on the reverend’s 
clothes, mocking her that they looked better in her husband’s clothes than he did.  They 
then threatened that she would never see her husband alive again.  But while they 
certainly threatened her sensibilities and his life, she was never in danger herself.  And, 
her husband was already out in the field with the Patriots.69 
 Native American warfare in the colonies had perfected the art of large-scale 
destruction of crops and farm implements on both sides as a means to enforce control 
over territory.  Such violence against property, while preserving human life (not a major 
concern in Native American/colonist warfare, admittedly), ensured the destruction of 
families and communities.  The same weapon was now being turned against each other.  
By destroying homesteads and the work of a lifetime, colonists on both sides turned the 
backcountry into a maelstrom while preserving the gentility of the protection of persons.   
Further, as Wayne Lee has pointed out, traditional Anglo-American thought made 
the home itself a sacrosanct area of protection.  In the seventeenth century, New 
Englanders viewed the home as the chief identifiying mark distinguishing them from 
Native Americans and giving them an identity as Europeans, increasing their terror and 
dispair when Native Americans destroyed their houses.  House attacks also had their 
roots in crowd actions in England and America—skimmington-like displays in which 
early Americans targeted houses instead of bodies.  In the case of the Boston crowd in the 
Stamp Act riots, the crowd attacked and demolished the houses of Andrew Oliver and 
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Thomas Hutchinson in a an attack seen as an attack on their persons as well as their 
property.  With these traditions meeting, widespread home attacks in the Revolutionary 
war evoked strong emotions.  While officers such as General Marion denied personal 
responsibility for house burning, seeing it as unacceptable conduct, it was understood as 
one of the real possibilities of war.  People complained about being “turned out of doors,” 
but it took on a polished cadence, which I submit is a dead give-away that they expected 
the action.  It was not an atrocity, but an accepted, if hated, feature of warfare in the 
American colonies.  Nonetheless, it was a feature Patriots were determined to complain 
about, and choose when to see it as legitimate or illegitimate.70 
Officers learned the rules of war from popular manuals, including such classics of 
the genre reprinted in America as The Art of War.  The Chevalier de la Valiere warned in 
his manual that “when the enemies are defeated, and fly full speed, the men must not be 
allowed to stay to plunder” as the enemy could take advantage.  Instead, specific 
companies could be set to plunder, as “there are rules for plundering as well as for 
everything else.”  De la Valiere was much franker on the subject of plunder than most 
military advice writers, who tended to disparage the practice.  All saw it as something to 
be regulated for the good of the army.  Thomas Simes correctly warned that plunder, 
while effective as a tool of “terror” (which was certainly true in the Revolution), 
inevitably made the populace hate the army when “desolation march[ed] before the 
camp.”  Yet much of the official rules of war printed in such manuals avoided certain 
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aspects of the actual conduct of war practiced in the colonies.  On the other hand, plunder 
was a major tool of psychological warfare in the Carolinas, as well as a central part of 
paying and supplying soldiers.  General Greene lamented that his own men were “so 
addicted to plundering, that the Utmost Exertions of the Officers cannot restrain the 
Soldiers.  Nor are the Inhabitants a Whit behind them.”  Plunder was so extensive that 
“the great Bodies of Militia that have been in Service this year employed against the 
Enemy & in quelling the Tories have almost laid waste the Country.”  Greene despaired 
that plunder in the backcountry had moved far beyond provisioning, as locales became so 
used to plunder, and plundered each other for retaliation so often that it seemed “that they 
think of nothing but plundering one another.”  Plunder certainly helped inspire many to 
take up arms largely in self-defense, hoping that an affiliation with one side might at least 
mean only one side would plunder them.71 
In Ninety Six District, where Loyalists outnumbered Patriots, George Park 
complained to his cousin that even after taking British protection, their neighbors “set to 
Rob us taking all our living, horses, Cows, Sheep, Clothing, of all Sorts, money, pewter, 
tins, knives, in fine Everything that sooted them.  Untill we were Stript Naked.”72 
 As we just saw, the first two classes of atrocity charges, those of violations 
against neutrals and of violations against homes, naturally went together, although 
violations against neutrals could happen in other settings.  Moses Hall, a young soldier, 
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remembered years later with horror coming across a sixteen year old boy who “having 
come out to view the British through curiosity, for fear he might give information to our 
troops, they had run him through with a bayonet and left him for dead.  Though able to 
speak, he was mortally wounded.”  Moses Hall treated it as an atrocity that this young 
man had died, as if he were far too young to be a combatant, and was therefore clearly 
out of the fray.  Yet men younger than he did fight in the backcountry war.  Andrew 
Jackson at thirteen was only the most famous example of a young combatant.  If boys of 
twelve and thirteen fought, a boy of sixteen was very much of fighting age.  Once again, 
the rhetoric of atrocity does not match the facts.  Young men who could possibly be 
soldiers should not hang around battlefields expecting no consequences.  The British 
clearly figured this young man as a spy, and we know that all sorts of unlikely figures 
actually did serve as spies in the backcountry, including Joseph Kerr, a crippled man in 
his 20s.73 
 The third kind of atrocity allegation concerned failure to accept surrender and the 
murder of prisoners of war, and here the story becomes muddy.  There were incidents 
where each side refused to accept surrender attempts.  As we saw above in the discussion 
of Buford’s Massacre and King’s Mountain, “Remember Buford” served as a ritual 
invocation encouraging soldiers not to accept surrender.  Having discussed the battle 
above, I now want to consider its use as an atrocity tale.  The story spread throughout the 
Carolinas and certainly helped recruiting efforts in the wake of the defeat at Charleston.  
The story, tying hatred of Banastre Tarleton to hatred for Loyalists (as the Legion was 
comprised of New York and New Jersey Loyalists, and over the course of the coming 
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months slowly filled in with South Carolina volunteers), provided the perfect expression 
of inhumanity in war.  “Give ‘em Buford’s Quarter” became the rallying cry in the 
backcountry.  While the logic of refusing surrender already existed in the backcountry, 
Buford’s Massacre justified such future refusals in the eyes of many Patriots.  The legend 
of Buford’s Massacre became a recruiting tool, but even more it became an excuse to 
refuse surrender in the future, and a teaching tool to explain to each other why they 
should not accept surrender.  We saw the utility of that decision at the Battle of King’s 
Mountain.  Atrocity rhetoric helped ensure that whatever seemed like an atrocity would 
now be excused as reciprocity.  Atrocity rhetoric in fact helped explain and justify what 
were the real rules of war.  As Wayne Lee has pointed out, the very style of militia 
warfare, favoring night or dawn ambushes, made it hard to see and control the fighting, 
and made accepting quarter difficult.  When the militia became used to not taking quarter 
in some settings, they tended to stop accepting quarter in almost all circumstances.  Kings 
Mountain is just one example.  Similarly, William Davie justified taking no prisoners 
during his daybreak ambush of a loyalist unit at Hanging Rock by arguing that the entire 
attack took place “under the eye of the whole British camp” so that “no prisoners could 
be safely taken.”74 
 Buford’s Massacre was also used to justify executing prisoners of war.  In some 
cases in the backcountry, quick courts martial were conducted before the unlucky 
prisoners were hanged in the field.  But Moses Hall, a young soldier, described an 
incident after Pyle’s Massacre when some members of the Patriot militia suddenly went 
from milling around a group of Loyalist prisoners to attacking them after some men 
“cr[ied] out ‘Remember Buford,’ and the prisoners were immediately hewed to pieces 
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with broadswords.”  Hall remembered the incident chiefly because it sickened him so 
much, filling him with “horror” and making him feel “overcome…by a distressing 
gloom.”  This action struck him as an unwarranted atrocity.  Yet, in relating the story, he 
focuses on his own revulsion, but admits he did nothing to stop it.  He also gave no 
indication that anyone else in camp lifted a finger to stop the murders.75 
 Atrocity rhetoric was so attractive in the backcountry war because it fulfilled 
several practical and emotional requirements.  First, it served as a great recruiting tool, 
and encouraged men not only to sign up for a militia tour, but also continue to enlist 
again and again.  William Gipson, one especially angry young man, signed up for 
additional terms of duty in the militia to exact revenge on the Tories who whipped his 
widowed mother, and destroyed their homestead while he was serving his first term of 
duty.  He also used this event to justify later atrocities of his own.  As Gipson’s 
experience suggests, and Moses Hall’s experience with Loyalist prisoners also suggests, 
atrocity rhetoric served to instruct men in the real rules of militia engagement by firing 
them up with the idea that the other side did it first.76 
Many men fought in loosely-organized bands on either side who chiefly operated 
to terrorize the opposing side and to dispense what they considered summary justice.  
Revenge motivated many.  William Gipson spent over two years in such units during the 
war, over five sessions.  His narrative clearly paints the way the cycle of revenge and 
retribution played out.  In 1777, a roving band of Loyalists warned him of the 
consequences of his actions during his first six-month volunteer session.  They “tied up 
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and whipped” his widowed mother, burned the house, and destroyed all the property.  
Gipson did not let this dissuade him from continuing to fight for the Patriots, but it 
certainly embittered him towards the Tories and made him eager for revenge.  Perhaps 
the other lesson was, once the house and the crops were destroyed, what was left to stop 
an embittered man from doing his worst?  In the aftermath of this destruction of “his 
home and patrimony,” Gipson joined “a small party of Whigs who had been more or less 
harassed and inspired by the disaffected.”  Gipson indicates that many militia units were 
formed because of the desire of soldiers to fight with a body of men equally as committed 
to revenge as they were themselves.  Such harassment was “inspir[ation]” to each side, 
giving them new reasons to fight, and new reasons to seek painful revenge, not merely 
advantage.77   
A year later, Gipson and his fellow partisans got their chance for revenge when 
they captured two unlucky Loyalists, Hugh McPherson and Campbell (identified only as 
one of a member of the copious Campbell family).  They quickly dragged the two men, 
whom they captured at an individual’s home in Guilford County, North Carolina 
(backcountry North Carolina), fifteen miles to the Guilford Courthouse (later the scene of 
a pyrrhic victory for Cornwallis) where they convened an indecently hasty court martial.  
McPherson was sentenced to death and “shot in the presence of this applicant.”78  
Campbell was sentenced to torture, specifically “to be spicketed.”[emphasis in original]  
Gipson explained the torture device to the apparently fascinated person preparing his 
application: “that is, he was placed with one foot upon a sharp pin drove in a block, and 
was turned round by one Thomas Archer, to the best of his recollection, until the pin run 
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through his foot.”  Gipson felt moved to explain to his listeners in 1832 Indiana, far 
removed from the Revolution in the Carolinas, that while such torture might seem 
barbaric and inhumane now, in the context of that war it was perfectly understandable. 
 
This applicant cannot forbear to relate that as cruel as this punishment might seem 
to be to those who never witnessed the unrelenting cruelties of the Tories of that 
day, yet he viewed the punishment of those two men with no little satisfaction, as 
they were then supposed to belong to the identical band who inhumanly inflicted 
corporal punishment upon his helpless parent, who had committed no other 
offense than that of earnestly exhorting her sons to be true to the cause of 
American liberty.79 
 
His mother may or may not have actually “exhort[ed] her sons to be true to the cause of 
American liberty,” but her body and possessions had been used as an instrument of social 
control, and that enraged her son.  In his individual case, when he left to fight for the 
Patriots, he gave free rein to his feelings of revenge. 
 Atrocity rhetoric also sustained the home front.  War is hell, and living amidst war 
makes that clear.  Despite all the complaints against plundering, crop destruction and 
house burning, people understood that these were the inevitable consequences of war.  
Nonetheless, they were discouraging and infuriating to people actually subject to them.  
Therefore, atrocity rhetoric served two purposes in mustering enthusiasm on the home 
front.  One purpose is that complaining about practices that were rampant but acceptable 
under the rules of war made people feel better—call it cathartic release.  Think back to 
the story of the Sumters at the beginning of this section.  Other women who lost their 
homes could at least be cheered that even Mrs. Sumter had suffered the same thing.  
There was solidarity in sacrifice in the backcountry war. 
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 Finally, atrocity rhetoric served to work out terrific anxiety about the unsettling 
nature of American warfare.  American colonials had spent two centuries developing a 
very brutal, nasty, and personal method of warfare with the Native Americans. 
Backcountry settlers were used to, if not resigned to, the terror of frontier war with 
Native Americans.  But the Revolution unleashed these methods of fighting on a wide 
swath of the population of the Carolinas.  Further, now instead of blaming Native 
Americans for barbarity, Americans were left with the psychic trauma of violence 
committed by each other.  Atrocity rhetoric was a way to grapple with the complex 
feelings that arose from this painful reality.80 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the Revolution was a civil war full of bad behavior.  The norms of 
Native American warfare were violated on each side by militias fed by local enlistments, 
all aware that losing would mean the loss of their lives, and complete ruin for their 
families.  While each side was aware of norms of warfare, as Wayne Lee has shown, the 
logic of retaliation also had strong cultural backing.  Further, the logic of retaliation 
extended to both militia activity in enforcing control, and battlefield activity.  Each side 
grew increasingly hardened to denying quarter, and even to (unsanctioned) murder of 
prisoners.  Militia tactics helped ensure these travesties, as ambushes in low light made it 
difficult to see much at all. 
 
80 Ferling, Wilderness of Miseries . 
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 South Carolinians suffered much.  In 1780, in the thick of the guerilla war in the 
South, approximately two thirds (65%) of the Patriot casulties were on South Carolina 
soil, and an astounding 90% of the wounded survivors got their battle scars in South 
Carolina.  Overall, South Carolina alone acccounted for at least 18% of the Patriot battle 
deaths throughout the Revolution, and more than 30% of the wounded.  These estimates 
are very conservative, since they don’t include the many tiny skirmishes, nor do they 
include Loyalists.81 
 We don’t know the total economic value of the destruction of property—the sheer 
value of the crops and houses destroyed, or the number of homes destroyed.  Yet we can 
gain a sense of the devastation in the haunting reports of those who looked around post-
war South Carolina.  Joseph Kershaw complained that British troops had burned “the 
greatest Part of the best Houses” in Camden, while Georgetown District saw almost one 
hundred houses burned in two waves of British fury.  Willian Drayton claimed he could 
follow the British path through the state by following the chimnies, which were all the 
British had left standing. 
 Yet Americans also made much of the ways in which the war didn’t play out like 
a nicely-published war manual.  Propaganda was crucial to the American way of war, and 
the backcountry fighting was no exception.  Both sides, but especially the Patriot side, 
actively used atrocity rhetoric to handle the strains of war.  People who lost their homes 
or goods to plunder and retribution took sustenance in atrocity tales that made their losses 
 
81 Nadelhaft, Disorders of War 61.  Nadelhaft draws on figures compiled by Howard H. Peckham, ed., The 
Toll of Independence: Engagements & Battle Casualties of the American Revolution (Chicago, 1974).  
While much research went into these figures, they are still a ‘best guess,’ as casualty figures are hard to 
find for some of the smaller engagements.  Further, these figures do not include Loyalist casualties, which 
were also considerable. 
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seem common.  Men were trained by atrocity rhetoric to fight longer and harder, in order 
to avenge often imaginary misdeeds. 
 Perhaps the very importance of atrocity rhetoric helped Americans reconcile 
themselves to Loyalists after the war.  While they were very invested in the rhetoric, the 
effort of making it seem real must have sometimes occurred to many.  As long as 
individuals could later be separated from the imaginary image of the British myrmidon, 
they could be forgiven political bad choices.  Men and women who knew that atrocity 
rhetoric was just that—rhetoric—could readjust their ideas after the Revolution to admit 





HEADING OFF TROUBLE: THE CONFISCATION ACT AND THE 
PROBLEM OF POSTWAR NORMALCY, 1782 
 In 1782, after Yorktown but before the formal resolution of the Treaty of Paris, 
the South Carolina General Assembly met to lay the groundwork for the post-war state. 
This particular assembly became known as the Jacksonborough Assembly, which is the 
phrase I will use to designate the 1782 General Assembly meeting and its decisions.  
South Carolinians wanted a resolution of the status of Loyalists.  The state was still in the 
midst of war.  Hatred against Tories ran hot among all sorts of people, from enlisted men 
in the militia, to elite Patriot planters, to women of all ranks.  In the backcountry and 
Lowcountry, people had suffered immensely.  The war had been, and continued to be, 
violent.  Many people did not want their former neighbors to return. Others were hoping 
to personally profit from the travails of the Loyalists. However, more positively, there 
were significant and enduring personal ties between people on both sides.  Wartime 
sometimes drove people to solidify those ties despite the strains.  
 South Carolinians agreed that it was a bad idea to expel all former Loyalists.  
Among other reasons, if they expelled everyone who had ever cooperated with the 
British, they would have to expel most of the state.  But they also agreed that some 
people had made themselves so notorious and obnoxious to their neighbors that they 
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could never be allowed to remain.  Between these two poles was a wide range of possible 
actions.  Legislators were especially concerned with two aspects: ensuring a satisfactory 
final end to the war, and heading off any move among citizens for vigilante justice. 
 In order to secure these aims, the legislature took a page from the British 
occupiers and confiscated Loyalist estates.  The South Carolina legislature, along with 
seven other states, came to the conclusion that they should confiscate the estates of 
certain Loyalists deemed more criminal or incorrigible than most, and banish them from 
the state.  In so doing, they treated Loyalists as traitors, not citizens.  In other cases, they 
would amerce the estates (take a one time tax of 12% from the value of the entire estate) 
and allow Loyalists to remain citizens.  Confiscation and amercement publicly punished 
prominent men who had used their power and authority to help the British cause.  They 
were generally wealthy men, drawn from the merchant, planter, professional, and artisan 
elite.  The General Assembly also moved to create a parallel system of justice for war 
crimes, which would be administered and decided by the restored criminal courts.  As 
they would quickly discover, the devil is in the details. 
 But the final story was not about punishment.  The General Assembly and the 
governors sought to encourage Loyalists to return to the Patriot side.  In 1781, Governor 
Rutledge offered two different public proclamations to persuade Loyalists to leave 
occupied Charleston and serve in the Patriot militia.  The Confiscation and Amercement 
Acts also worked to encourage Loyalists to leave British protection and cast their lot with 
the Americans.  In fact, despite South Carolinians’ rage at Loyalists and the British, they 
proved remarkably tolerant.  Only 400 men, or perhaps 10% of the white people who 
registered to leave Charleston (without even counting those Loyalists who never left), 
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were subject to confiscation or amercement.  South Carolinians, even at the moment 
when feelings were highest, were actually surprisingly tolerant of Loyalists.1 
A British Model: the Sequestration of Patriot Estates 
 The British were the first in the Revolution to use property seizure to punish their 
political and military opponents, following a known European model.  In Charleston, 
Lord Cornwallis ordered the sequestration of over a hundred estates in September 1780, 
including the estates of such prominent Patriots as Christopher Gadsden, Francis Marion, 
Henry Laurens, and Governor John Rutledge.  Sequestration removed estates from their 
owners, but allowed a portion of the estate’s profits for the support of their families, 
though not the proscribed men.  Cornwallis appointed John Cruden, a Loyalist from 
Wilmington, North Carolina, as the chief commissioner of sequestered estates.  Bryan 
Cape, a Charleston merchant, was appointed the deputy commissioner.  Unsurprisingly, 
Bryan Cape was named in the Confiscation Act in return for his acceptance of this 
particular commission.  Other members of the Lowcountry establishment filled out the 
ranks of sequestered estate administrators.  While these men often proved to be 
competent estate managers, they also were hated symbols of British authority and 
despotism to those whose estates were sequestered.  While later petitions for clemency 
would show that South Carolinians preferred local administrators to British-imposed 
 
1 These figures are based on the British commander’s counts of those who registered to leave Charleston on 
British convoys in the summer of 1782.  Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution  
254. 
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officials, they did not extend this general preference to administrators of sequestered 
estates.  These Commissioners of Sequestered Estates became prime candidates for 
confiscation themselves when the tide of war turned against them.  Since many members 
of the Jacksonborough Assembly had been subject to sequestration, this is not surprising.2  
Sequestered estates were worked to support and feed the British troops, so 
Patriots were aware that their land and their slaves were supporting the war effort against 
them.  Jerome Nadelhaft has suggested that at least sequestered estates were protected 
from plunder and despoliation, because the British had every reason to keep the estate 
productive.  If this was the case, it was small comfort to outraged Patriots, who were well 
aware how much they had lost, and were afraid of what they would find when they saw 
their properties again.  Further, they alleged that the British had stolen their slaves for 
personal profit.  (As Sylvia Frey and others have shown, South Carolina slaves used these 
opportunities to liberate themselves.)  Further, there was substance to these claims.  
Again and again during the war, the British took slaves owned by Patriots, sometimes 
offering them freedom, but sometimes simply capturing such slaves and selling them into 
other British possessions like Jamaica.  British evacuation from Charleston was held up 
for several months due to a dispute between British and American commanders over 
slave property.3 
 The British had also banished prominent Patriots from Charleston.  Sixty-five 
prominent Patriot leaders were exiled to St. Augustine, where they spent several 
 
2 Walter Edgar, South Carolina: A History (Columbia, S.C., 1998) 238.  Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists 
in the American Revolution 236.  For a more detailed take on the sequestration administration and its 
consequences, see Jeffrey J. Crow, "What Price Loyalism? The Case of John Cruden, Commissioner of 
Sequestered Estates," North Carolina Historical Review 58 (1981): 215-33.  I will explain what I mean by 
a local preference for self-chosen leadership under occupation at more length in Chapters Three and Four. 
3 Nadelhaft, Disorders of War  66.  Sylvia Frey, Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary 
Age (Princeton, N.J., 1991).  Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution 242-44. 
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miserable months.  Christopher Gadsden was perhaps the most famous of the St. 
Augustine exiles.  They were eventually exchanged, but were still banished from South 
Carolina.  In an additional insult, their wives and children were also banished from South 
Carolina.  Most of the exiles and their families retreated to Philadelphia.4 
 South Carolina legislators were also no doubt aware that sequestration had been 
used in other colonies by the British, and that during the war other states had used 
sequestration as a model for denying Loyalists the use of their properties during the war.  
Massachusetts, for example, sequestered some estates, putting off final disposition of 
Loyalist estates while British troops were still in the area.  Georgia Patriots, usually 
confined in the same prisons as South Carolinians, also faced sequestration of their 
property.  In all cases, sequestration effaced the line between permanent confiscation and 
temporary deprivation, allowing each side to intend to make the arrangement permanent 
while holding out the idea that the arrangement could be changed.5 
 Sequestration and exile offered potential models for dealing with Loyalists.  The 
1782 General Assembly members had themselves suffered from each of these fates.   In 
just one example, Henry Hughes, a member of the House of Representatives for St. 
James Santee in 1782, had his own estate sequestered by the British during the war. 
George Flagg, a delegate from St. James Goose Creek, had spent much of the war as an 
exile in St. Augustine.  There was also a certain poetic justice in turning the situation 
around and doing to the Loyalists what the British had done to the Patriots.6    
 
4 Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution  195. 
5 David E. Maas, The Return of the Massachusetts Loyalists (New York, 1989) 250-55.  Robert S. Lambert, 
"The Confiscation of Loyalist Property in Georgia, 1782-1786," William and Mary Quarterly 3rd. ser., 20, 
no. 1 (1963): 80-94. 
6 Walter B. Edgar and N. Louise  Bailey, eds., Biographical Directory of the South Carolina House of 
Representatives, 4 vols. (Columbia, S.C., 1977) 3: 235-36, 356-57. 
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 After the Confiscation Acts were passed, Henry Laurens defended them to a 
British friend by reminding him that “America will plead example; wherever Britain 
conquered or imaginarily conquered she sequestered, confiscated plundered & what she 
would not carry off, Savage-like she destroyed.”  By turning to a scorched-earth policy, 
the British had ensured that Loyalists would be treated in the same way that the Patriots 
had been under British occupation.  They had destroyed property, but also planned to 
“pay the Expence [of war], & the National debt out of forfeited Estates.”  Now, the South 
Carolinians would turn the tables by using Loyalist estates to pay back the war debt, just 
as the British had planned to use Patriot estates.7 
 The British had provided a model for dealing with internal enemies when they 
sequestered estates and sent politically sensitive prisoners of war to St. Augustine, safely 
away from the colony.  Further, they provided moral justification for victorious South 
Carolinians to act similarly to Loyalists.  Sequestration was a part of war administration 
before the Revolution, but its use in South Carolina cemented it as a tool to punish 
recalcitrant internal enemies. 
 
7 Henry Laurens to Richard Champion, Nantes, August 10, 1782, David R. Chesnutt and C. James Taylor, 
ed., The Papers of Henry Laurens, 16 vols. (Columbia, S.C.) 15: 561. 
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“the Bill for disposing of Certain Estates and banishing Certain persons”: The 
South Carolina Confiscation Act of 17828 
 On January 18, 1782, Governor John Rutledge formally addressed the South 
Carolina General Assembly.  For Rutledge personally, it was a triumphant moment.  
Rutledge had been forced to flee the state somewhat ignominiously when it became clear 
that the British would take Charleston.  Now free and at the head of a new independent 
state legislature, he thoroughly enjoyed the moment with a long welcoming address 
laying out the needs of the new state, while carefully deferring (as much as a proud man 
could) to the prerogatives of the Assembly.9 
With unhidden pleasure in his tone, Governor Rutledge gave his lengthy address 
both to the legislators and the general public, rushing to publish his remarks to bolster 
public morale and paint himself as a far-sighted thinker.  After waiting eagerly for the 
Assembly to finally reach a quorum, he opened with a reminder of the “Calamities of 
War,” especially the “Wanton and Savage manner” in which the British and Loyalists had 
prosecuted the war.  (All of these phrases literally come from the first sentence.)  
Rehearsing a history of Southern, and especially South Carolinian, heroism during the 
harshest phase of the war, Rutledge bolstered the high emotions of a victorious people.  
 
8 A. S. Salley, ed., Journal of the Senate of South Carolina January 8, 1782--February 26, 1782 
(Columbia, S.C., 1941) 83, among other places.  This was the provisional title of the confiscation act as 
read three times in the House of Representatives.  It then became Act. No. 1153, “An Act for Disposing of 
Certain Estates, and Banishing Certain Persons, Therein Mentioned,” Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of 
S.C.  4: 516-23, 6: 629-32, hereinafter referred to as the Confiscation Act. 
9 Daniel J. McDonough, Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens: The Parallel Lives of Two American 
Patriots (Sellingsgrove, U.K., 2000) 243.  For more on post-war opening addresses to the legislature in 
South Carolina, and the importance of them in ensuring harmonious, workable relationships between the 
governors and the legislature, see Christopher F. Lee, "The Transformation of the Executive in Post-
Revolutionary South Carolina," South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine 93, no. 2 (1992): 
85-100.  Lee, I should note, makes the point that John Rutledge was a wartime governor, not a post-war 
governor, and begins the crux of his analysis with John Matthew’s address to the General Assembly in 
January 1783. 
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After lengthy remarks on the history of the war in South Carolina, the brutality of British 
and Loyalist conduct towards South Carolinians, and the current state of military affairs, 
Governor Rutledge offered his suggestions of legislative action.  Action against Loyalists 
was at the top of the list, and Rutledge called for a specific set of policy directives for 
dealing with Loyalists.10   
 Opening the discussion on the fate of Loyalists, Rutledge suggested: 
Another important matter for your deliberation, is the conduct of our Citizens as 
Voluntarily avowing their allegiance, and even glorifying in their professions of 
Loyalty and attachment to his Britannick Majesty, have offered their 
Congratulations on the Success of his Arms, prayed to be embodied as Royal 
Militia accepted Commissions in his Service, or endeavored to Subvert our 
Constitution, & re-establish his power in its’ stead,--Of those who have return’d 
to this State in defiance of a Law, by which such Return was declared to be a 
Capital Offence, and have abetted the British Interest, and of such whose behavior 
has been so reprehensible that Justice and Policy forbid their free readmission to 
the rights and Privileges of Citizens.11 
 
In so doing, Rutledge not only called for punishing Loyalists, but also suggested very 
particular categories to guide the Assembly in their deliberations.  Further, he gave a 
reason for those distinctions: the Assembly should single out those individuals who 
“Voluntarily avow[ed] their allegiance,” meaning they chose Loyalism.  This was a 
complicated question, of course, as many of these people simply sought the best 
accommodation possible with the British after the independent state government fell.  
Still, despite the fact that this was a difficult category to defend in the context of 
individual choices, Rutledge signaled early that legislators and the public should and did 
 
10 A. S. Salley, ed., Journal of the House of Representatives of South Carolina, January 8, 1782-February 
26, 1782 (Columbia, S.C., 1916) 10-12.  For much more on John Rutledge’s political career, including his 
sizable missteps, see James Haw, John and Edward Rutledge of South Carolina (Athens, Ga., 1997). 
11 Salley, House J. 1782 12.  Versions are also available in The Governor’s Messages (Rutledge 
Administration, Jan. 18, 1782) SCDAH, and published as John Rutledge, The Speech of His Excellency 
John Rutledge, Esquire, Governor and Commander in Chief of the State of South-Carolina, to the General 
Assembly, Met at Jacksonburgh, on Friday the 18th Day of January, 1782 (Jacksonborough, S.C., 1782). 
(Early American Imprints Series) 
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draw distinctions between active involvement in the British cause of reducing South 
Carolina, and passive accommodation with occupation or outright Patriotism.  For men, 
put bluntly, this was the difference between active and passive citizenship in war, a 
concept I will elaborate at greater length later.  Rutledge was not the only voice calling 
for official sanctions against Loyalists, but he used his authority to argue for 
classifications that targeted certain actions and classes of people, and gave a wider theory 
of citizenship and duty to explain these distinctions.  He enunciated a theory of 
unforgiveable conduct during war (voluntarily abdicating South Carolina citizenship, 
including the duty men owed the state) that explained why and how the Assembly should 
work. 
Let’s break down these specific categories of people.  The crime that underlay 
everything from “voluntarily avowing their allegiance,” “offering congratulations on the 
Success of his Arms,” and “pray[ing] to be embodied as Royal Militia” was that these 
men used their public reputation to support the British cause.  Rutledge argued that those 
who used their good names to help the British “Artfuly seduce[]” other South Carolinians 
to join them should be signaled out for punishment.  The purpose of these public 
addresses was to convince wavering Patriots to give up and accept British protection.  In 
the depths of despair after the fall of Charleston, accommodation was common.  Signing 
a congratulatory address to the British conquerors expressing warm wishes for the 
occupation was a step too far.12 
John Rutledge’s classification focused on prominent men drawn from the elite 
ranks of society.  By focusing on men who had taken officer-level commissions in 
military forces or the civil administration of occupation, he eliminated most ordinary 
 
12 Salley, House J. 1782 11. 
 88 
South Carolinians from those official deliberations.  He also ensured that those Loyalists 
singled out for punishment were those who had been most public in their support of the 
British.   In arguing for the inclusion of those who “accepted Commissions in his 
Service,” Rutledge lumped together holders of civil and military commissions.  Those 
who had taken civil commissions, rather than being less culpable than those who had 
served as militia officers, had subverted the state constitution, and therefore the health of 
the nation, by serving in the civil administration.  By so publicly acting for British 
government, they had signaled affiliation with the Loyalist cause at a time when South 
Carolina’s fortunes were at their lowest ebb.  Therefore, they too needed to be punished 
and excluded as citizens. 
Next, consider “those who have return’d to this State in defiance of a Law, by 
which such Return was declared to be a Capital Offence.”  Rutledge here meant Loyalists 
who had taken an early and active part for the British before the events of 1780.  These 
Loyalists had been forced to flee the state, and had been forbidden by law to return.  
When fortunes changed, some of them returned to occupied Charleston and served the 
British forces.  (Others from the early group never returned to South Carolina.)   Finally, 
he added a catch-all category for those “such whose behavior has been so reprehensible 
that Justice and Policy forbid their free readmission to the rights and Privileges of 
Citizens.”  Rutledge was here speaking of anyone, regardless of rank or specific 
commission (or lack thereof) who had engaged in open plundering, violent harassment, or 
murder during the conduct of war.  In a war where both allegations of atrocities and 
actual bad behavior were not hard to find, men with wide-ranging reputations for such 
behavior were not welcome in the newly independent state.   
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Unfortunately, the very nature of what behavior did violate honorable conduct 
was a fraught subject.  Men on both sides of the conflict had participated in activities that 
violated the exclusions Rutledge had drawn in his proclamation.  House burning, which 
was one such exclusion, was a deliberate policy of both sides in their efforts to control 
opposition.  Plundering was widespread, and difficult to prove.  Several Patriot militia 
leaders had also plundered extensively, sometimes notoriously so.  Thomas Sumter’s 
troops were such prolific plunderers that they caused a public outcry.  Yet the General 
Assembly hoped to avoid too much public discussion of those uncomfortable facts.  In 
addition, as members of the elite, they shared an implicit definition of Toryism, in which 
a few elite men chose Loyalism from principle or weakness, while legions of lesser men, 
lacking that economic independence that was the marker of gentleman status, were 
swayed by the lust for gain.  These men were Loyalists because it offered a good chance 
for plunder (or so the reasoning went).  Rutledge pointed to what kind of men he believed 
were often Loyalists earlier in his address when he reminded legislators that the British 
had employed “Indians, Slaves, and desperate Banditti of the most profligate characters” 
[emphasis added] to prosecute their war.13 
 Governor Rutledge also made explicit the calculations behind considerations of 
the status of Loyalists.  In the governor’s mind, but also in the minds of many citizens, 
these Loyalists were such men whom “Justice and policy forbid their free readmission to 
the rights and Privileges of Citizens.”  Citizenship was the hard-bought reward for the 
war.  Citizens of a fragile new state needed to be reliable, upright persons, and by so 
 
13 Salley, House J. 1782 10.  This line about “desperate banditti” both characterized the way many thought 
about Loyalist military leaders and offered a possible escape.  Gentlemen who had taken protection and 
acted honorably could not be construed as desperate banditti.  This sets up the claims for honor in the 
petitions of Loyalists, who sought to show that they were not the desperate banditti of lore. 
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crassly falling to the knees before invading British forces and taking their side, Loyalists 
had proved themselves to be unworthy.  Therefore, they must be excluded from 
citizenship in order to ensure a safe, prosperous and stable South Carolina.  “Justice and 
policy” also demanded that the government make a public example of such men. 
 Governor Rutledge not only demanded public punishment, but also questioned 
what the proper balance between punishment and clemency for Loyalists should be.  
Congratulating South Carolinians on their generosity of spirit thus far, he noted that “the 
Extraordinary Lenity of this State has been remarkably conspicuous.”  Rutledge gloried 
that “…we have forbore to take even the Profits of the Estates Of our most implacable 
enemies.”  But now, in need of money, and anticipating final victory, John Rutledge 
thought the time had come for the “forfeiture and appropriation of their Property.”  As an 
accomplished orator, Rutledge urged the General Assembly to remember that many 
Patriot citizens had lost life and property—Patriot anger must be assuaged.  Rutledge 
pointedly reminded the Assembly that “…many of our firmest Friends have been 
reduced, for their inflexible Attachment to the Cause of their Country, from Opulence to 
inconceivable Distress, and if the Enemy’s Will and power had prevailed, would have 
been doomed to Indigence and Beggary.”  The “firmest friends,” like General Marion, 
had not wavered after the fall of Charleston.  They had shown an “inflexible attachment” 
that stood in marked contrast to the flexibility of Whigs who took British protection and 
went from supporting the American cause to signing congratulatory addresses to the 
British conquerors.  Of course, Rutledge was also smoothing out the many shades of grey 
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with adroit oratory.  Claims of justice required that people on the losing side pay for the 
pains of the winners.14  
Governor Rutledge also anticipated the difficult question of how to treat 
Loyalists’ dependants.  If the legislature chose to confiscate the property of Loyalists, 
their families would be vulnerable.  But if it allowed them to keep family property, male 
Loyalists could potentially reclaim their properties at a later date, or have their wives sell 
the property and join them abroad, bringing the proceeds to cushion the transition to a 
new life.  How should competing goals be realized—the protection of women and 
chidlren and the punishment of male Loyalists?  Rutledge argued that provision would 
have to be made.  “It will redound to the reputation of this State, to provide becoming 
support, for the families of those whom you may deprive of their Property.”15  As 
gentlemen, they should protect other men’s dependants, while depriving their families of 
the greater part of their wealth. 
 After Rutledge so thoroughly laid out a plan for consideration, the General 
Assembly went through a lengthy process to determine its own strategy.  Largely 
adopting the categories and assumptions that Rutledge proposed, the Jacksonborough 
Assembly enacted a Confiscation Act on February 26, 1782.  The final legislation 
defended itself through a lengthy preamble that channeled Rutledge’s words opening the 
Assembly.  While other states also had acts designed to punish Loyalists, South 
Carolinians still felt it necessary to explain why they moved against Loyalists.  They 
praised themselves for the great control the state showed in having “forborne even to 
 
14 Salley, House J. 1782 13. 
15 Salley, House J. 1782 13. 
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sequester the profits arising from the estates of British subjects, the enemy,” but rapidly 
moved on to confiscate those very estates.16 
 The Confiscation Act had several audiences and purposes.  The primary audience 
was South Carolinians of all ranks.  The General Assembly needed to “solve” the 
problem of the Loyalists in order to firmly assert their own authority.  The legislators did 
genuinely want to punish the Loyalists, but they also needed to be seen as an effective 
legal body that was able to take charge in the state.  While the actual work of the General 
Assembly was closed, it was no secret.  Newspapers carried all the news they could find. 
The armed forces, which were still active and in which large numbers of South Carolina 
men were still enrolled, were involved in the preparations for the General Assembly, 
comprised the majority of the members of the Assembly, and large numbers of them were 
guarding the Jacksonborough Assembly.  All of them were audiences.  Loyalists were 
another audience.  The Royal Gazette reported the lists of proscribed names in the 
confiscation act.17 
 The preamble to the Confiscation Act told a long and pitiable history of British 
infamy against South Carolina, justifying their actions by reiterating the history of British 
sequestration.  South Carolina legislators pointedly reminded Loyalists and Britons that 
the British had first made it legal to confiscate Patriot property in 1775 as a means to 
subvert American aims.  They also bitterly reminded the targets of the legislation that:  
the enemy, in violation of the most solemn capitulations and public engagements, 
by which the property of individuals was secured to them, seized upon, 
 
16 Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 4: 516-23. This compulsion to justify was hardly unique to the 
Confiscation Act.  Instead, like the lengthy defenses in the beginning of the Declaration of Independence, 
these defenses seem part and parcel of the Revolutionary mindset. 
17 Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution 240.  Mar. 20, 27, 1782, Royal Gazette. 
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sequestered, and applied to their own use….and have committed the most wanton 
and wilful waste of property…to a very considerable amount.”18   
 
British plunder, while matched tit for tat by American plundering, was invoked as a 
justification for all acts of revenge.   
The most intense rhetorical anger was directed at the British for executing Col. 
Hayne.  His case was the example of British perfidy towards Americans that justified the 
Confiscation Act.  While never mentioned by name, his case was extensively explained 
in the Preamble: 
and from the general tenor of the enemy’s conduct, in their wilful and wanton 
waste and destruction of property as aforesaid, committing to a cruel 
imprisonment, and even hanging, and otherwise putting to death in cold blood, 
and an ignominious manner, many good citizens who had surrendered as 
prisoners of war.19 
 
The entire lengthy argument about the reasons behind the Confiscation Act served to 
justify the step of confiscating property, which suggests that both supporters and 
opponents of the bill shared a sense of unease about the legality of such a move, even if 
they were divided on the morality and practical necessity of it.  They were so careful to 
muster not only a moral argument in favor of confiscation (meant to persuade citizens) 
but a legal argument to support taking property. 
 Despite misgivings, the Jacksonborough Assembly concluded after the lengthy 
recital of wrongs done them that “public justice and policy” demanded confiscation and 
banishment because to “afford protection any longer to the property of British subjects” 
would controvert public justice.  Confiscation, in short, was a policy begun by the British 
 
18 Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 4: 516-17. 
19 Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 4: 517.  For a more detailed history of the death of Hayne, see 
David K. Bowden, The Execution of Isaac Hayne (Lexington, S.C., 1977). 
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with great lust, and followed by the South Carolina General Assembly out of a desire for 
public justice, or so they claimed.20   
The Confiscation Act closely followed Governor Rutledge’s categories, dividing 
the list of names into six categories, each with an explanation of why those individuals 
were singled out for punishment.  Certain individuals could potentially belong in more 
than one category, but the Act assigned each person to one.  The six categories went in 
rough order from least to most criminally culpable, just as Rutledge had finished with 
those who were “so reprehensible.”  In the Act, the first list was British citizens who held 
South Carolina property, and the final (sixth) list was composed of people whose actions 
were considered so hateful that their crimes were not explained, but were persons simply 
deemed “inveterate enemies.”21 
The first list was composed of people who were “known to be subjects of his 
Britannic Majesty.”  In practice, these sixty-three people, properties, and merchant firms 
were British citizens not resident in America (absentee landlords).    They were not 
necessarily criminal themselves, but they were absentee landlords.  The General 
Assembly did not bother to explain its rationale, perhaps because while cruel, such action 
only confiscated investment property not tied to people most knew well.  The only well-
known members were merchant firms, whose holdings were confiscated largely to protect 
American debtors.  It was certainly the only list that named corporate entities as well as 
 
20 Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 4: 517.   
21 When the original editor of the compilation of historic codes treated the Confiscation Act, he chose to 
publish both the Confiscation Act and the Amercement Act without the list of names.  The next editor 
rather snippily suggested, “the Editor had no discretion to make any such omission.”  He was concerned 
that the omission of those names could affect people researching court cases, but I am amused that the 
original editor (Thomas Cooper) missed the point of the act.  While they explained themselves eloquently, 
the heart of the public message was in this long list of names in the act, named in public so that everyone 
who saw or heard of the act could check that their enemies had been punished.  The names were published 
as Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 6: 629-32.  Confiscation Act quote from Cooper and McCord, 
eds., Statutes of S.C. 4: 518.  Salley, House J. 1782 12-13. 
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legal individuals.  The fact that corporate entities such as trading firms were organized 
under this classification suggests that absentee property holders were considered fair 
game because they lacked the protections of American citizenship.  Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney, a supporter of confiscation and Jacksonborough Assembly member, argued a 
year later in his capacity as an attorney for one deceased absentee (and minor son) that 
the General Assembly included many estates because “it was not known who were the 
Heirs or Devisees,” and it was easier to restore property later than to allow “our Enemies” 
to get their hands on the property for lack of care.  More to the point, perhaps, the 
absentees were in a poor position to fight confiscation.22 
The second list was composed of people who were so “desirous of evincing their 
attachment to the king of Great Britain, [that they] congratulated Sir Henry Clinton and 
Mariot Arbuthnot, Esquire, on the reduction of [Charleston] fortress.”  The third list 
confiscated land from people who, upon the fall of Charleston, publicly petitioned for 
positions in the royal militia, signaling their willingness to take up arms for the King (and 
against their fellow South Carolinians).  The fourth list specified those who had signed 
congratulation to Earl Cornwallis on his success in conquering Camden, and by that, the 
interior.  This Act characterized those who had signed such addresses as “so lost to the 
feelings of humanity” and so “thoroughly attached to the British interest” that they were 
willing to put their names to a document whose purpose was public persuasion.  The 
Addressors, as they were called, were so harshly treated because they had used their 
names to help the British muster support.  Thousands of men took allegiance oaths in the 
 
22 Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 4: 517.  Charles Cotesworth Pinckney on behalf of Mrs. Burn, 
Widow of John Burn, Feb. 26, 1783, Petitions Received by Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, Folder 5, 
Box 5, Misc. Papers Relating to Claims on Estates, Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, Comptroller 
General Papers, S 126170, SCDAH. 
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aftermath of the fall and took protection.  But only some signed the official welcoming 
addresses.  Robert Lambert called the signers “marked men.”23  The primary crime of 
men in all three categories was to publicly support the British efforts with their names.  
These men used their power and influence on behalf of the British at a moment when the 
Americans were at their weakest.  Practically, they also made their identities as Loyalists 
visible to everyone, leaving a record of their actions that was readily available to the 
Jacksonborough Assembly.   
Public appearance and character was important to eighteenth-century Americans, 
with a sense of palpable urgency hard to recapture now.  Merchants, for instance, worried 
that business failures, even those caused by currency shifts, commodity price swings, and 
other market actions, would be regarded as personal character flaws.  They accused each 
other of moral failures, and of being unable to live up to the ideals of manly self-mastery.  
A “blot” on a man’s character reduced him from equality with other men, making the 
avoidance of disclosure very important.  Real men were expected to step up to the plate 
in troubled times—the best proof of real virtue.  Self-sacrifice was part of the code of 
honorable citizenship.  Loyalists had failed at all the above.  Personal reputation also 
depended on men continually proving that they could rise above the temptations of 
personal interest to act on behalf of the entire society.  It was this quality that underlay 
the logic of patriarchalism, and therefore society.  Well-off and professional men who 
should have understood the necessity of resisting personal self-interest in their public 
 
23 Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution  95. 
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roles as citizens had instead massively failed—lending their names to the destruction of 
their own government on behalf of their own self-interest.24 
Further, this insistence on the importance of personal reputation in oath-taking 
and signing addresses speaks to the eighteenth-century American insistence on a politics 
of personal, face-to-face relations.  In a world where voting was by public voice 
affirmation at local gathering places, public political reputation was paramount.  Even the 
act of signing a document was freighted with meaning—guaranteeing a contract, for 
instance.  Personal reputation, as evidenced by public actions including public oaths, 
voting patterns, factional identification (however inappropriate under the norms of 
eighteenth-century political philosophy), and the dangerously shifting sands of public 
perception based on convenience, opinion, personal mannerism, dress, and deportment, 
was the essence of a man.25 
Nearer to home, and particular to the Revolution, Charleston’s ferment over the 
Stamp Act and subsequent controversies marshaled the importance of public display and 
public oath-taking.  Non-importation agreements provided the example of, and practice 
in, public reputation and allegiance, including signing such agreements, to an 
 
24 Toby L. Ditz, "Shipwrecked; or Masculinity Imperiled: Mercantile Representations of Failure and the 
Gendered Self in Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia," Journal of American History 81, no. 1 (1994): 51-80, 
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of the performativity of everyday life, see Jean Christophe Agnew, Worlds Apart: The Market and the 
Theater in Anglo-American Thought, 1550-1750 (Cambridge, U.K., 1986), and for a different take on the 
chief components of the construction of merchant identity, see Phyllis Whitman Hunter, Purchasing 
Identity in the Atlantic World: Massachusetts Merchants, 1670-1780 (Ithaca, N.Y., 2001). Ruth H. Bloch, 
"The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America," Signs 13, no. 1, Women and the Political 
Process in the United States (1987): 37-58, especially 43.  Jacob Katz Cogan, "The Reynolds Affair and the 
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25 For one example of voting practices in early America, see Richard R. Beeman, The Evolution of the 
Southern Backcountry: A Case Study of Lunenburg County, Virginia, 1746-1832 (Philadelphia, 1984).  For 
an interesting take on how the threads of personality and political attributes came together, see Patricia U. 
Bonomi, The Lord Cornbury Scandal: The Politics of Reputation in British America (Chapel Hill, N.C., 
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increasingly broad swath of the male population.  Well-off artisans were drawn into the 
circle of those whose public affirmations of support were necessary and valuable.26 
Moving back to the confiscation categories, the fifth list was comprised of people 
who “still hold, or have held, commissions under his Britannic majesty, and are now with 
the enemy.”  These were people who held prominent, officer-level positions in the royal 
militias or in the civil occupational administration. The military leaders on this list, such 
as Andrew, Robert, Patrick, William and John Cunningham, had used their positions to 
terrify people and enforce political conformity—i.e. force people to maintain an outward 
show of loyalty to Britain.  While it might seem that people who took positions in the 
civil administration were less culpable or offensive, they also held positions of great 
influence, which they used to harass Patriot leaders.  In just one (previous) example, 
Brian Cape landed on list no. 5 for his role as a commissioner of sequestered estates.  
Presumably, the General Assembly concluded that turnabout was fair play.  Further, in 
justification of severely punishing these men, the act pointedly reminded that these 
offenses had been “declared to be capital” by the earlier sedition act.27 
Finally, the sixth list, with the fewest names, were people who were considered to 
be the most publicly egregious supporters of the British.  The legislature argued that these 
persons “have not only voluntarily allowed their allegiance to his Britannic majesty, but 
 
26 Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness and the Origins of the 
American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial 
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49-55, 59-63. 
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theater, see Crow, "Liberty Men and Loyalists."  Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 4: 519.  The 
Sedition Act, Act No. 1017, “An Act to Prevent Sedition and Punish Insurgents and Disturbers of the 
Public Peace,” Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 1: 343-46.  These harsh terms were reiterated in 
Act. No. 1115, “An Ordinance to Empower the Governor or Commander-in-Chief of this State” to ensure 
quick trials for those suspected of sedition or insurrection.  Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 1: 
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by the general tenor of their conduct manifested their attachment to the British 
government, and proved themselves inveterate enemies of this State.”  People on list six 
were singled out for harsher treatment than any other group.  According to the earlier 
sedition act, the offenses of those Loyalists were capital crimes.  However, the state 
really had no interest after the war in executing these people.  They wanted to “extend to 
those persons as much mercy as may be consistent with justice to the public” and avoid 
“sanguinary measures,” so they specifically exempted persons on lists 2-5 from 
execution.  Figures on list 1, since they were residents of England during the war, were 
not subject to capital penalties.  The people on list 6 were pointedly excluded from 
measures that changed Loyalism from a capital crime to a banishable offense.  Their lives 
were still legally forfeit if they dared show their faces in the state.  As people judged 
“inveterate enemies” to South Carolina, the General Assembly had already judged that 
they were beyond any redemption as citizens.   In practice, these distinctions carried one 
important consequence: while all confiscees were ordered out of South Carolina, the lack 
of a death provision for some of them opened the door to efforts to return. 
Finally, the publication of the names of Loyalists, regardless of the order in which 
they were arranged, was the major aim of the Confiscation Act.  By passing and 
publishing the Confiscation Act, the Assembly made a public statement about how 
Loyalists would be treated.  The published list reassured the public that some Loyalists 
would be punished.  It explained why some people were singled out (and others not).  It 
offered tangible proof in the number of names that some prominent individuals would 
suffer retribution for their wartime actions.  The public nature of the list allowed every 
person with a particular grudge to check if his or her enemy was on that list. 
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South Carolina was certainly not the only state to enact confiscation and 
banishment legislation.  During the war, especially in the early years, many states passed 
test acts to force Loyalists to take oaths of allegiance and abjuration.  The Continental 
Congress strongly encouraged confiscation legislation in November 1777, following loud 
suggestions by Thomas Paine and others.  By separate legislation or within the same act, 
many states also provided for banishing Loyalists who would not take the oath, and 
confiscating their estates.  North Carolina passed a wartime confiscation act in April 1777 
that defined treason (including military help to the British), required an oath of 
allegiance, and provided for the confiscation of the estates of traitors.  In 1778, the 
legislature made confiscation the punishment for anyone evading or refusing the oath, 
although in practice far fewer North Carolinians eventually faced confiscation.  
Pennsylvania passed a confiscation law in 1778, as encouraged by the Continental 
Congress.  (The Congress felt it was a wise policy to drive out determined Loyalists and 
use their property to pay for the war effort.)  Only thirteen men were named in this 
confiscation act, but unlike the later South Carolina law, Pennsylvania provided a 
mechanism for identifying more Loyalists as the war progressed.  Errant oath-takers were 
to be prosecuted by the Supreme Executive Council, enshrining the principle of trials for 
accused Loyalists (unlike in South Carolina, which provided no such provision).  
Practically, Pennsylvania also adopted this more flexible system to deal with wartime 
exigencies, and prosecute Loyalists as they became threats to the war effort.  In practice, 
Pennsylvania’s system sounded stricter than it actually was.  Overall, through a series of 
proclamations by Committees of Safety and the official state government, Pennsylvania 
ended up subjecting 453 people to official confiscation.28 
 
28 Brown, Good Americans  127.  DeMond, N.C. Loyalists  155-58.  Anne M. Ousterhout, A State Divided: 
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Georgia followed the path most similar to that of South Carolina, probably 
because the two shared very similar wartime experiences.  Despite the waggish comment 
by Sir James Wright (the last royal governor of the colony) that Georgia would have 
avoided joining the war if only the Savannah River (the boundary with South Carolina) 
had been less “narrow,” Georgia did join in the war, and suffered the fall of her major 
city and capital, and vicious guerilla warfare across the sate, much as did her northern 
neighbor.  Georgia passed a preliminary wartime confiscation act in 1778 that named 117 
people for treason, mandating confiscation and banishment as the punishment.  The act 
was at least partially enforced before the British took Savannah, but obviously lapsed 
while the British controlled the state.  With British withdrawal, Georgia joined South 
Carolina in passing a comprehensive confiscation and banishment act naming 277 
people.29 
As merciful husbands and fathers, and as taxpayers, the South Carolina General 
Assembly members considered what to do with the dependent women and children who 
would lose their support if these men were deprived of their estates.  Gov. Rutledge had 
called for the Assembly to consider their fate, and in the final act they did.  The 
Commissioners of Forfeited Estates were empowered to “make such provision for the 
temporary support of such of the families….as shall appear to the said commissioners, or 
a majority of them, necessary” while arranging the sale of the estates.  In some cases, 
these families would be allowed to remain on the properties while a sale was arranged.  
In order to avoid long-term support obligations that might burden the state or put the 
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titles of confiscated estates at risk (and therefore depress their sales prices), the support 
due these families was time-limited until the disposition of the estate.  The General 
Assembly promised to consider in 1783 or 1784 “what final provision” should be made 
for dependant families.  They would not leave women and children to starve while final 
arrangements were negotiated, but they also needed to sell estates as quickly as possible 
to pay war debts.  Taxpayers would be spared supporting the dependants of men who had 
opposed American independence. 
The General Assembly were not just generous, however, but practical.  If they had 
indulged their rage by turning women and minor children off estates without any way to 
eat, they would not only have seemed like very poor men, but they would have only 
ensured that individuals would be forced to support these people.  Gentlemen, including 
many members of the General Assembly, would have quickly found these families, 
formerly associated with them in elaborate kin networks and local circles, camped on 
their doorsteps begging for support.  As people with claims to gentility, in many cases 
they would have been unable to turn these Loyalist families away.  By making the estates 
pay for their basic expenses they avoided having to personally support Loyalist families.  
They could control the level of expenses that Loyalist families were allowed, so that they 
were not in the streets, but also were not supported in the manner to which they had 
become accustomed.    They were neither starving, nor of their former status.30 
By way of comparison, other states that passed earlier confiscation acts were 
generally more generous to wives and children.  In Virginia, according to one Loyalist, 
his property and that of other male Loyalists was instantly given to wives and children as 
 
30 Mark Kann gives a wonderful exploration of academic thinking in recent years on the link between 
eighteenth-century masculinity, political citizenship, and the importance of the father and husband roles in 
Kann, Republic of Men 3-4, 79-104. 
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“if the Father was dead.”  In practice, this law gave wives full control during the war, but 
legally wives had ownership but not control, as the property was sequestered until the end 
of the war.  North Carolina’s 1778 confiscation legislation allowed women and minor 
children to hold property as if they had inherited it under intestate rules, much like 
Virginia.  Yet in November 1779, when it became clear the British intended to take the 
South, they tightened confiscation considerably, including further restricting how much 
property women and minor children were entitled to.  Under the new law, women would 
only receive one third of their rights under the previous law, in addition to a modest 
allowance for minor children.  This might mean a woman was entitled to her traditional 
dower right (usually a lifetime right to the income from one third of the property), but it 
seems to mean she was entitled to one ninth of the property.  Either way, it is evidence of 
increasing harshness towards Loyalist dependents as the war dragged on.31 
The Confiscation Act established an infrastructure to manage the sales of Loyalist 
property.  All real and personal estates held by persons named in the Act were “vested in 
five commissioners” who were elected by both houses of the General Assembly.  These 
commissioners were charged with selling off all property at public auction as quickly as 
possible.  The act arranged financing terms, allowed five years of credit for purchasers, 
provided for a standard interest rate, and provided that credit would be arranged through 
bonds, secured by other land in the state, for the purchase.  The commissioners were to be 
compensated by the forfeited estates, rather than the (tiny) state treasury.  Under the act, 
they were entitled to a one percent commission on the estates “in lieu of all demands 
against the public.” This was a standard method of paying public officials in the colonies, 
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as it took away the responsibility for paying salaries from the state.  This pay system also 
functioned as an incentive system, since commissioner pay depended on receiving the 
highest prices possible for all property, and encouraged prompt attention to duties, since 
timely pay depended on timely sales.32 
The credit arrangements allowed people to buy land through a combination of 
upfront payments and bonds payable over five years.  While this meant that the new 
government could not immediately get their hands on the entire amount, it was a more 
practical method of financing such land sales.  Other states arranged similar payment 
plans, allowing financing over time and often accepting state certificates, soldier’s pay 
scrip, and depreciating state currency.33   
South Carolina, like other colonies, had a history of land troubles, especially in 
frontier areas.  Large absentee landlords held huge tracts of land in the midlands and 
upcountry that they did not work themselves.  Access to land, or more precisely, to good 
titles, was a flash point before the Revolution in the backcountry.  In this light, it is not 
surprising that the Confiscation Act also tried to govern the disposition of Loyalist estates 
in order to limit the size of any individual tract and to encourage wider landholding.  To 
try to increase such opportunities, the act required that the commissioners divide all lands 
into tracts between 200 and 500 acres, even if the original tract was much larger.  By so 
doing, the Assembly argued they could “prevent the increase of the number of large and 
dangerous monopolizers of land.”  South Carolina legislators had every reason to 
encourage wide distribution of landholding in the backcountry, since the area functioned 
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 105 
as the guarantor of a white majority population.  The Lowcountry had a black majority, 
so in order to remain a white majority state, the General Assembly sought to encourage 
white farmers in the uplands.  The relevant section explicitly acknowledged this problem, 
arguing the restrictions on land tracts were to “increase as much as may be the number of 
white inhabitants.”34 
While South Carolina’s aristocrats controlled their desire for easy pickings due to 
both a fear of a black majority and the increasing presence of artisans and middling sorts 
in the General Assembly itself, other states also required land to be sold in small tracts 
and on easy credit.  Early this century, J. Franklin Jameson argued that legislators 
intended to use confiscated estate sales to democratize landholding across America, 
bringing new men into the stability and citizenship land ownership provided.  There is 
ample evidence that the intention was there, but subsequent investigations on landholding 
in New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts failed to find that confiscated estate sales 
democratized landownership in any way.  The same people who already owned land 
bought more land, roughly in proportion to the amount they already owned.  In short, 
wealthy men speculated, striving men acquired a little, and those who didn’t own land did 
not acquire a stake through confiscated estates.  Limited investigations in South 
Carolina’s records reveal no evidence that South Carolina did any differently, and a brief 
glance through the records of slave sales in the confiscated estates shows a familiar list of 
purchasers, often purchasing ten slaves at one sale.  Restrictions were well-intentioned, 
but did not change fundamental land ownership patterns in South Carolina.35 
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Savvy Loyalists had anticipated possible confiscation, and tried to arrange to sell 
or transfer their property to protect it from such acts.  The General Assembly was well 
aware of these maneuvers and wrote the Confiscation Act accordingly.  Any property 
sold after Charleston’s fall to the British in May 1780 was not recognized as a valid 
transaction, and that property, regardless of whose name was on the title, was confiscated 
as the property of the Loyalist.  Other land transactions that occurred before the fall of 
Charleston but after July 4, 1776 were subject to heavy scrutiny before they would be 
accepted as valid sales.  In North Carolina, one enterprising Loyalist prepared to leave the 
state after an earlier, wartime confiscation act in 1777.  He arranged to deed his property 
to his daughter while on board his outgoing ship.  When he was handed an undated deed, 
he “hesitated and said he would look at the copy of a bill…for confiscating the property 
of all persons of his description.”  After perusing the bill (which he had on him), “he 
chose that the deed should bear the date on the 11th of the same month, being the day he 
arrived in the harbour of Newbern.”  His attempt to circumvent North Carolina’s 
confiscation act by strategically pre-dating a deed later ended up in court, but his attempt 
to circumvent confiscation laws was hardly unusual.36 
Banishment was both a punishment for individual Loyalists and a way to control 
the state.  The General Assembly wanted to get rid of people they considered treasonous 
troublemakers, and make sure they could never become a fifth column, undermining 
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fragile independence.  At the time the act was passed, most of the proscribed Loyalists 
were cowering in Charleston, and legal banishment was meant to speed them on their 
way out.  In order to put teeth in the banishment order, the confiscation act provided that 
persons named in the act who stayed after passage, or who returned, would be jailed and 
then forcibly transported to some British-held territory.  In order to stop people from 
trying to return again and again, the law provided that Loyalists who returned again after 
transportation would be killed without benefit of clergy.37 
In conclusion, the Confiscation Act of 1782 drew up six lists of Loyalists, 
including individuals and corporations, whose South Carolina property, both real and 
personal, was confiscated.  Those individuals were also banished from the state forever.  
Each category explained why the person had been so punished, and the banished persons 
were distinguished by their public advocacy of Loyalism in 1780-1781, including signing 
congratulatory addresses and taking commissions in the militia and civil occupational 
administration.  Those who were chosen were therefore men of some substance, who had 
held officer-level positions, and whose signature on public acts was deemed noteworthy.  
The act provided no recourse or trial for accused Loyalists.  Property was to be sold 
quickly, under generous financing terms, to purchasers at public auctions.   Loyalists’ 
wives and minor children who remained in South Carolina were entitled to basic 
maintenance, but nothing more.  Banished Loyalists were warned that if they tried to 
stay, they would be transported, and repeat offenders killed. 
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Below the Surface of the Confiscation Act: Wartime Exigencies and the Need for 
Both Carrots and Sticks for Dealing with Loyalists 
Wags say you should never watch sausage or legislation being made.  On the face 
of it, the Confiscation Act of 1782 was harsh and definitive.  However, by unearthing the 
long process of enacting legislative confiscation, we can see it was a far more generous 
and multi-faceted process than the final act indicates. 
Even before Governor Rutledge called for general elections to create the 
Jacksonborough Assembly of 1782, he made and published two proclamations intended 
to persuade Loyalists to rejoin the American side.  At all times, South Carolina 
government officials used a system of inducements (carrots) and punishments (sticks) to 
persuade as many wavering Loyalist supporters as possible to rejoin the American side.  
This system evolved in an ad hoc way, but clearly always intended to persuade as well as 
punish. 
 In order to understand why this might be, it is necessary to understand that this 
was a result not only of mercy, but also of cold-hearted practicality.  After the British 
surrender at Yorktown, Loyalists could see that the tide had turned, and the British 
position in America was weak at best.  Yet it was not at all clear to either side that the 
war was truly over.  Not only was there no peace treaty, but Patriot Americans were 
convinced the British would try to conquer again.  Governor Rutledge argued to the 
legislature that it was “probable  [Britain] will not only endeavor to keep possession of 
our Capital but make another attempt to subjugate the Country.”38  South Carolinians still 
did not occupy their largest city and state capital of Charleston, which was firmly in 
 
38 Salley, House J. 1782 21. 
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British hands.  In addition, Patriot forces still struggled to control the Lowcountry, and 
skirmished on a regular basis.  Colonel John Laurens, son of Henry Laurens and leader of 
a spy ring, was killed in routine skirmishing in August of 1782, for example.  General 
Nathanael Greene, commander of the Continentals in the Southern theater, was 
convinced that the British intended to keep Charleston as a permanent outpost, and would 
only sign a peace treaty that allowed them to keep all the property they held at the time 
the treaty was finalized.  Despite the pain and sacrifices of the eight-year war, it was 
almost unthinkable to the victors that the British army and navy, the mightiest in the 
world, would give up their own colonies.39 
 In garrison towns towards the end of the war, authorities on both sides ran out the 
families of the opposing side.  One Patriot wrote the South Carolina Continental 
Congress representative that the Wilmington, North Carolina authorities “sent out the 
wives and families of those who had not joined them.”  South Carolinians were therefore 
justified, he suggested, in “collecting the wives & families of the Tories to send in return, 
&c. &c.” Military officials on both sides were trying to secure the towns against the 
transmission of evidence and goods that porous borders allowed.  Such forced evictions 
also deliberately increased the pressure on the opposing side by sending waves of 
panicked displaced persons into the opposing camps, where the other side had to relocate 
them.  Maddeningly for those evicted, they could no longer protect their property from 
plunder.   As an effort to secure garrison towns from the transmission of information and 
goods, it failed miserably.  Aedanus Burke laughed at how the commandant at 
 
39 While the skirmish John Laurens was killed in was fairly routine, his own actions in it were not.  Instead, 
he made foolhardy moves, displaying his customary bravery but also his customary brashness. 
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Charlestown “winks at a little traffick carried on by our people.”  But it certainly 
increased pressure on the Loyalists.40 
 Governor Rutledge was very hostile to Loyalists.  In August 1781, he encouraged 
General Marion to refuse entry to Loyalists seeking to return to the Patriot side.  He did 
not believe they were sincere in anything but a desire to save their own necks.  He also 
forbade Loyalist-associated women who had gone to Charleston to return to their 
plantations, all in an effort to control the flow of information.  Further increasing the 
pressure on South Carolina Loyalists, Rutledge ordered South Carolina officers to 
prepare lists of Loyalists from each district in preparation for efforts at confiscation.  Yet, 
he also offered an official proclamation offering clemency to select Loyalists who were 
willing to meet his conditions.  After consultation with most of his Privy Council, he 
decided to offer one chance for Loyalists to return to their allegiance in the aftermath of 
the Battle of Eutaw Springs.  His proclamation was issued September 27, 1781, and 
spread through printed handbills distributed by the army.41   
The proclamation offered clemency to Loyalists who had “borne arms” or given 
their allegiance to the British and were, at the time of the proclamation, either in 
Charleston or “lurking or concealing themselves in secret places in any Part of the State.”    
These Loyalists would be forgiven their efforts against their fellow South Carolinians in 
return for serving as privates in the South Carolina militia for six months, and their wives 
and children could leave Charleston and live “without molestation” on their properties.  
 
40 Aedanus Burke to Arthur Middleton, Petersburgh, Nov. 18, 1781, Aedanus Burke to Arthur Middleton, 
Jacksonborough, Jan. 25, 1782, Joseph W. Barnwell, ed., "Correspondence of Hon. Arthur Middleton, 
Signer of the Declaration of Independence," South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine 26, no. 
4 (Oct. 1925): 183-213, especially 191. 
41 James Haw, John & Edward Rutledge of South Carolina (Athens, G.A., 1997) 159.  Governor Rutledge 
instructed General Marion and others to see that the proclamation was “properly circulated.” Gov. Rutledge 
to General Marion, Sept. 26, 1781, Gibbes, Documentary History of the American Revolution  175. 
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Loyalists were given thirty days to make up their minds and cross back into Patriot lines 
if they wished to take the offer.   The proclamation specifically exempted from pardon 
persons who were proscribed by laws predating the 1780 surrender at Charleston, persons 
who had signed the congratulatory addresses to either Cornwallis or Clinton, those who 
held civil and military commissions with the British, and those unspecified Loyalists 
deemed to be guilty of “infamous” conduct—all of which later became categories of 
confiscees in the Confiscation Act. 
Practically, the proclamation was intended to increase troop strength to prepare to 
defend the state and drive the British out of Charleston.  In addition, it was meant to scare 
Loyalists into returning, describing them as “unhappy men” who had “relied on false and 
specious hopes” and been “flattered with vain expectations.”  Rutledge was quick to 
argue that the offer of pardon was undertaken from a position of strength, not as 
“timidity.”  He offered the Loyalists a choice:  
either to return to their allegiance and with their families be restored to the favor 
of their country and to their possessions, or to abandon their properties in this 
State forever and go with their wives and children whither, for what purpose, on 
whom to depend, or how to submit they know not, most probably to experience in 
some strange and distant land all the miseries and horrors of beggary, sickness 
and despair.42 
 
Rutledge sought to sweeten the bait by reminding Loyalists how unpalatable their future 
chances might be.   He assured them that this proclamation was a one-time chance that 
would “never be renewed.”  He sought to encourage as many Loyalists as possible to 
return immediately.  Finally, he offered returnees redemption as “valuable members of 
the community.”43  
 
42 Gibbes, Documentary History of the American Revolution 176-78. 
43 Robert Wilson Gibbes, Documentary History of the American Revolution, Eyewitness Accounts of the 
American Revolution. Series Iii. ([New York], 1971) 177-78. 
 112 
Governor Rutledge’s strategy worked well.  Aedanus Burke confidently told a 
friend that “above one hundred of their adherents (the inhabts. Of Chas. Town & the 
Country) have deserted over to us, and more are daily coming over their Lines.”  While 
there was officially a thirty-day deadline, in fact refugees trickled into American outposts 
up to the Jacksonborough Assembly.  In the two months before the Jacksonborough 
Assembly met, Loyalists felt intense pressure to take the proclamation before it was too 
late—hence why Burke reported more than a hundred Loyalists had returned in January 
1782.44 
 Governor Rutledge had offered the Loyalists a carrot—now it was time for the 
stick.  More importantly, it was vital to call a new General Assembly, restarting civilian 
government after years of enemy occupation.  Governor John Rutledge had been 
functioning as the entire civil government of South Carolina for several years, including 
years in exile.  Before Charleston fell, he fled somewhat ignominiously, leaving 
Christopher Gadsden to be arrested in his stead.  After the surrender at Yorktown, he 
made his way back to South Carolina, as General Greene was able to hold South Carolina 
territory.  Arriving in August 1781, he desired to reestablish civil government quickly, as 
he felt it ‘“would have a great Effect, on our Affairs.’”  As much as he enjoyed wielding 
power (and he had been strongly disciplined earlier for his autocratic tendencies), he 
understood that legislative power was the key to legitimacy in the post-Revolutionary 
world.  Having fought a war for direct representational government, Americans were not 
willing to accept a strong executive.  Jealous leaders were far more likely to support 
 
44 Aedanus Burke to Arthur Middleton, Jacksonborough, Jan. 25, 1782. Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Oct. 
1925," 191. 
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legislative decisions that they had a part in creating, and voters had been conditioned to 
expect real representation on concrete local interests.45   
 Actually holding elections, however, presented problems.  Several prominent 
South Carolina Patriots were still in Philadelphia after their imprisonment in St. 
Augustine.  John Rutledge wanted them to be able to vote, but more importantly, to serve 
in the upcoming legislature.  An even more ticklish issue was ensuring the safety of 
elections, and the ability of all South Carolina citizens to cast their votes.  Since the 
British still held about a third of the state, many citizens could not vote, and British 
troops and Loyalist raiding parties could make the election very unsafe if they wanted to. 
Rutledge called for elections in November 1781 to be held December 17 and 18, 1781, 
after Generals Greene and Marion were able to control more of the state and slowly box 
the British into Charleston.  In this call for elections the Privy Council, whose members 
had slowly arrived throughout the fall and winter of 1781, joined him.   
 Given the fact that there were few votes from Charleston and parts of the 
Lowcountry (there was an attempt to allow Patriots to vote for Charleston parishes at safe 
polling places), the Assembly that was elected, unlike any before 1782, had low 
representation from the Lowcountry and sizable representation from the backcountry.  
Only seven of the nineteen senators represented Charleston District—which was 
previously unheard of.  Charleston representatives had to be careful as well, as they were 
elected by very few voters.  Embarrassingly, St. Andrew’s parish sent six representatives 
and one senator, elected by a grand total of four voters—fewer than the elected officials.  
Charleston had fifteen voters total, who elected thirty representatives and two senators.  
 
45 Haw, Rutledge 160.  Lee, "Transformation of the Executive,"  
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The General Assembly that would decide how to treat Loyalists would be heavily drawn 
from those areas that had suffered the most during the war.46 
 In his call for elections, Governor Rutledge specifically excluded Loyalists from 
voting or serving in the new General Assembly.  While this might seem obvious, it was 
not uncontested.  This decision also meant that some districts were at a disadvantage, as 
they were majority Loyalist districts and most of their more prominent citizens, the usual 
choices for legislative bodies, were prohibited from service. A few months after the 
election, one Assembly member recalled that “the numbers thus excluded were 
considerable in some parishes, and they murmured exceedingly for a few days.”47  This is 
a very interesting comment because it suggests that for many Loyalists, it was not 
obvious or appropriate that they should be excluded from voting for or serving in the 
South Carolina legislature.  It is startling that Loyalists would even think that they might 
be allowed to serve in the General Assembly.  It was the first sign that Loyalists did not 
concur that they had committed treason, and were thereby stripped of their citizenship.  In 
the months and years to come, South Carolina Loyalists would continue to vigorously 
protest anything that suggested they were anything but full-fledged citizens. 
 Having been duly elected, the legislators chosen to this historic assembly began 
trickling into the small town of Jacksonborough in early January 1782.  Governor 
Rutledge opened the meeting on the 18th by triumphantly proclaiming that “the Enemy, 
compelled to surrender or evacuate every post which they held in the Country, are 
 
46 Traditionally, Charleston District alone controlled the legislature, and they were far less powerful in this 
Assembly.  Jerome J. Nadelhaft, "'the Snarls of Invidious Animals': The Democratization of Revolutionary 
South Carolina," in Sovereign States in an Age of Uncertainty, ed. Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert 
(Charlottesville, Va., 1981). 72. 
47 Aedanus Burke to Arthur Middleton, Jacksonborough, Jan. 25, 1782. Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Oct. 
1925,"  193. 
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obliged to take refuge under the Walls of Charles Town, and on Islands in its vicinity.” 
This triumphant address was an optimistic way to state a less happy reality: while Patriots 
controlled the backcountry, Charleston was still in British hands.  This General Assembly 
could not fairly claim to represent the entire geographic whole.  A true wartime assembly, 
they were protected by Patriot troops, many of whom also served in the Assembly.  
Further, paying the troops was a pressing issue for the new state government, as hungry 
men eat (and plunder to get food if necessary).48 
 While there had been another wartime assembly, this assembly was still facing 
new realities as yet undigested by the state’s political elite.  Revolutionary mobilization 
brought new people into public life, and they gained representation in Revolutionary 
assemblies.  Francis Kinloch shuddered that “butchers, bakers, [and] blacksmiths” now 
served as representatives.  It was such an expansion of political authority for people who 
had never had it before that John Rutledge, an aristocrat to his toes, vetoed the 1778 
constitution.  Many members of the Jacksonborough Assembly were novices, and 
although they were sometimes hesitant to speak on the floor, they did not hesitate to vote 
against the well-spoken Lowcountry elite.  The Revolutionary and post-war assemblies 
had 30% of their members from an average background, and another 40% were born 
outside of South Carolina and were of humble beginnings, breaking the pre-
Revolutionary power of the Charleston elite definitively.49 
 Previous assemblies had met in Charleston, but since it was still occupied, the 
Assembly had to find another meeting location.  Governor Rutledge wanted to hold the 
 
48 Salley, ed., Senate J. 1782 7. 
49 Francis Kinloch to John Laurens, quoted in Nadelhaft, "'the Snarls of Invidious Animals': The 
Democratization of Revolutionary South Carolina."  68, 70, 75.  Jackson Turner Main, Political Parties 
before the Constitution (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1973) 271-73.  One word of caution—these composition figures 
are based on the 1787-88 legislature. 
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Assembly in Camden, since it was geographically central, and therefore convenient for 
many delegates.  It was also far from Charleston, and therefore far from the main British 
camp.  Camden’s Revolutionary reputation was also attractive, as it was the site of a 
major battle.  However, General Greene was not sure he could protect Camden 
adequately, and recommended the small town of Jacksonborough, some thirty-six miles 
inland from Charleston, as a safer alternative.  Rutledge was swayed by this practical 
consideration, since he was relying on Greene to protect the General Assembly from any 
British attempts to break up the meeting and arrest the legislators.  Greene recommended 
Jacksonborough because he was already nearby.  He moved his headquarters to Round O, 
outside of the small settlement at Jacksonborough, and prepared to protect the Assembly 
while also continuing his military campaign.   Since the legislature was forced to meet in 
temporary conditions, there was no official building to hold them.  This General 
Assembly had none of the official trappings of power—no mahogany chairs, no stately 
buildings, and, perhaps most disconcertingly, much less comfortable accommodations 
than Charleston could have offered.  The House of Representatives, over seventy-five 
strong, met in the Masonic Lodge.  The Senate, a smaller body, took two rooms in a local 
tavern for their meeting space.  When both houses needed to meet together, they all 
crammed into the Lodge.  It was not a setting that encouraged feelings of post-war 
normalcy in the legislators.   Instead, it must have reminded them again of everything 
they had lost in the struggle, and how unsure South Carolina’s future still was.  Many of 
the legislators were military officers.  By day, they debated civil policy.  At night, they 
retired to their usual military accommodations.  Civilian legislators took over the local 
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tavern, or sought accommodations with local families.  The small settlement was far from 
able to house so many people.  It must have been uncomfortable.50 
 The Jacksonborough Assembly, in short, was a wartime legislature.  South 
Carolinians still relied on an active duty army to protect their legislature from occupying 
forces thirty-six miles down the road.  Their concerns were those of a people still at war.  
How were they to provide for troops?  Pay those troops? Limit the economic damage of 
inflation and the ills of paper currency?  Their concern with regulating the status of 
Loyalists must be viewed in this light.  How were they to ensure that the war ended and 
South Carolina had a stable, prosperous future?  They could not ignore the presence of 
enemies, who had retreated to Charleston but might very well expect to stay.  Nor would 
their fellow South Carolinians let them forget their responsibilities.   
Sitting amongst the men gathered on opening day were legislators who had lost 
significant wealth though the war.  Colonel Joseph Kershaw was a member of the House 
of Representatives from the backcountry region known as the “District Eastward of the 
Wateree River.”  (He represented Camden.)  Benjamin Kilgore, a Representative from 
the Little River District, had been held prisoner by the British for part of the war, as had 
many other members of the General Assembly.  The pain of war was not something that 
only existed outside of the legislative walls.  Many General Assembly members were 
voted in precisely because of their war records.  Colonel John Laurens was among 
 
50 Salley, ed., Senate J. 1782 5, 142.  A.S. Salley claims that the House of Representatives met in a Masonic 
Lodge based in part on a note in the Senate journal manuscript that they “adjourn to the Lodge Room (the 
Senate House being too small) to receive the House of Representatives.” Salley, ed., Senate J. 1782 142.  
McCrady, writing early in the twentieth century, suggested that they must have met in the courthouse, as 
one of the only buildings in town.  I suggest that it is possible the House of Representatives met in a local 
courthouse and the Senate met in the tavern.  In either case, it was not an arrangement calculated to 
encourage a sense of post-war stability among the members. 
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several officers who were both sitting in the General Assembly and stationed with 
Greene’s troops in the area.   
The General Assembly agreed with Rutledge that punishing Loyalists was one of 
their most important tasks.  Within days of convening, the House of Representatives, 
where most actions began, formed a committee to consider “what Estates in this Country 
are proper subjects of Confiscation and Sequestration, and to what purposes the Profits 
Arising from them may be best applied.”  At this point, they were still modeling on 
British sequestration.  I also note the necessity of passing an act was explicitly linked to 
the need for “profit”—monies to pay pressing state bills.  The original seven-member 
committee was composed of Col. John Laurens, Edward Rutledge, Richard Hutson, John 
Ewing Calhoun, John Owen, John Kean, and John Parkison.  The committee was 
dominated by people who had served long periods as war prisoners, either on the prison 
ships in Charleston harbor or in St. Augustine.  Others had served, and were still serving 
in the South Carolina forces.  Two of the seven were trained lawyers, and therefore 
logical choices to draft important legislation.51   
Edward Rutledge (John Rutledge’s brother) became the chief author of 
confiscation, and worked closely with his brother through his simultaneous seat on the 
Privy Council.  He was one of the major proponents of the move to confiscate Loyalist 
property, in large part because it would shore up the state’s shaky finances.  His choice as 
committee head was an early sign the General Assembly would support John Rutledge’s 
plans.  Edward Rutledge also personally profited from his efforts, as he and his partner 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney purchased two large estates made available by the 
Confiscation Act, adding over 3,500 acres to their holdings.  Rutledge, like many others, 
 
51 Salley, House J. 1782 21. 
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had also paid a price for his Patriot leanings, spending over eleven months as a prisoner 
after Charleston’s fall.52   
 Richard Hutson, like Rutledge, was a lawyer.  He was distinguished enough to be 
voted Lieutenant Governor by the Assembly, as well as placed on the confiscation 
committee.  He served in the Revolutionary militia in the defense of Charleston.  
Afterwards, he was exiled to St. Augustine and the British confiscated his personal 
estates.  In addition, by the end of the war the South Carolina government owed him over 
£100,000.  Because he had loaned so much money to the state for war expenses, his 
personal economic well-being was influenced by the ability of the state to pay him back.  
He was also unlikely to be sympathetic to Loyalists as Isaac Hayne’s brother-in-law.53
 The many Johns were less distinctive, but they also fit the general outlines of the 
committee.  John Owen, who served only one term in the General Assembly, was a 
Charleston merchant who spent time on one of the prison ships in Charleston harbor.  
John Kean, a fellow committee member, had been a prisoner on the same ship as John 
Owen.  John Parkinson from Orangeburgh District represented the backcountry, and was 
elected to a subsequent term but declined.  John Laurens was a military hero and still a 
member of the army during the time he served on the confiscation committee.  His father, 
Henry Laurens, was still a prisoner in London who had been held in the Tower.54 
 The distinguished committee made a partial report the next day (of which there is 
no record), highly recommending enlarging the committee.  The House of 
Representatives agreed with alacrity, expanding the committee to incorporate “a Member 
from each Parish and District.”  This larger committee was more representative of the 
 
52 Edgar and Bailey, eds., Directory S.C. House Rep. 2: 573-74. 
53 Edgar and Bailey, eds., Directory S.C. House Rep. 3: 364-65. 
54 Edgar and Bailey, eds., Directory S.C. House Rep. 3: 393, 529-30, 539. 
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state as a whole, and certainly dramatically expanded backcountry representation from 
one member to a majority of the committee.  It ensured that more people would be 
responsible for the sizable workload involved in sifting through names and evaluating 
reputations.  This decision to expand the committee to include members from every 
district also meant that the House of Representatives believed that local knowledge was 
crucial in determining the nature of Loyalists’ actions.55 
Eighteenth-century assemblies turned to the committee system of lawmaking 
between 1750 and 1790, increasingly utilizing committees to handle the growing 
workload, as assemblies aggregated more power to themselves.  Colonial assemblies 
adopted the use of standing committees from the British House of Commons, but came to 
make far more extensive use of them than the British do to this day.  While upper houses 
shifted considerably in make-up, procedures, and mission during and after the 
Revolution, lower houses continued in well-established ways.  The one major innovation 
was new ways to deal more efficiently and effectively with petitions.  Small select 
committees were used before the war in most areas, and continued to be used in the post-
war years, but quickly became burdensome.  More assemblies moved to standing 
committees to deal with this work.  State assemblies also quickly began to evolve ways 
and means standing committees to deal with the pressure of taxing and spending.56 
 There are no records of committee deliberations, and the only records of the 
considerations of the full general Assembly include only the names of certain individuals 
who became items of contention late in the process.  With these limited kinds of 
discussion, how can we understand the process of creating those acts?  I will illuminate 
 
55 Salley, House J. 1782 22-23. 
56 Ralph Volney Harlow, The History of Legislative Methods in the Period before 1825 (New Haven, 
Conn., 1917) ix, 3, 64, 70, 75. 
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the actual processes in two ways—letters and memoirs of legislators, and speculation 
based on the legislative record considered in the light of supplementary information. 
As we have seen, the Confiscation Act was arranged into six lists, arranged in the 
categories John Rutledge had originally suggested.  Why did the General Assembly 
organize and enact the Confiscation Act as a series of names?  The terms of the general 
debate, and the way in which the committee was originally formed, did not call for such 
lists.  The only reference to lists in letters and notes from participants refers to each 
individual’s list, not categorized lists.  The very existence of these carefully defined 
categories and their written justifications suggest certain debates among the committee in 
charge of creating the legislation.  And, as we will see, it also suggests an involved 
process of discussion and horse-trading amongst the entire General Assembly.  These 
names were the subject of considerable debate: did he deserve this?  What had he done, 
and were there any extenuating circumstances?  Could he be mistaken for someone else 
(and did anyone care)?  Once the legislature itself had determined what offenses merited 
confiscation and banishment, they could organize their own work with lists of names by 
offense.  Further, those lists helped everyone during debate, as individuals moved to 
strike some names and insert others.  Using lists made the process more manageable for 
the legislature itself. 
Aedanus Burke charged that the original list prepared in committee was “about 
seven hundred” and that another 240 were added after initial debate in the full house. His 
is the only estimate of the number of names originally considered.  He might have 
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inflated the number somewhat, as a foe of the confiscation act, but his estimate seems 
reasonable.57 
 Burke, among others, suspected that at least some people were interested in 
personal revenge, not the best interests of the state.  He complained bitterly to Arthur 
Middleton that, “every one gives in a List of his own and the State’s Enemies.”  Further, 
he charged his fellow legislators with passing a confiscation act chiefly with an eye to 
their own potential advantage.  Burke claimed that discussions revolved not around “what 
he has done, as what Estate he has.”  Such charges of personal mercenary instincts were 
not entirely without merit.  Edward Rutledge, a prime proponent of the Confiscation Act, 
himself bought substantial additional property from the sales of confiscated estates.  
However, South Carolina legislators had a less corrupt reason to consider the relative 
value of estates.  They needed to pay substantial war debts, and were depending on the 
profits from confiscated estates to pay.  The total value of confiscated property was a 
matter of concern.  Alexander Garden later told the perhaps apocryphal tale that when 
confiscation was discussed, members of the legislature would listen for certain names, 
calling out “a fat sheep—prick it! Prick it!” when the names of wealthy men were 
called.58 
 Legislators may have had an eye for personal profit, but they were acting under a 
broader imperative.  Enraged Patriots wanted to watch the Loyalists suffer.  Aedanus 
Burke wrote a friend that “the inveterate hatred & spirit of Vengeance wch. they have 
 
57 Aedanus Burke to Arthur Middleton, Jan. 25, 1782, Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Oct. 1925," 192.  For 
more on his vocal opposition to the Confiscation Act, see the rest of this chapter, Chapter Five, and John C. 
Meleney, The Public Life of Aedanus Burke: Revolutionary Republican in Post-Revolutionary South 
Carolina (Columbia, S.C., 1989). 
58 Aedanus Burke to Arthur Middleton, Jacksonborough Jan. 25, 1782, Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Oct. 
1925," , Alexander Garden, Anecdotes of the Revolutionary War in America, with Sketches of Character of 
Persons the Most Distinguished, in the Southern States, for Civil and Military Services (Charleston, S.C., 
1822) 179. 
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excited in the breasts of our Citizens is such as you can form no idea of.  The very 
females talk as familiarly of shedding blood & destroying the Tories as the men do.”  
Burke may have been chiefly horrified that women had sunk as low as men, but his sense 
of the popular sentiment for “destroying the Tories” was accurate.  Burke himself 
admitted the “Love of Revenge natural to the mind of man” at the surrender at Yorktown, 
although he felt the need to restrain that impulse.  Christopher Gadsden, one of the other 
opponents of the Confiscation Act, publicly spurned former friends of his the month 
before the Assembly.  In December 1781, Elias and Thomas Horry, two Lowcountry 
Loyalist brothers, tried to take (late) advantage of Gov. Rutledge’s proclamation by 
leaving Charleston and joining the Patriot forces.  Thomas Horry and Christopher 
Gadsden had once served on the Committee of Correspondence together.  Horry 
evidently expected that Gadsden would greet him warmly, so he and his brother 
approached Gadsden and offered to shake hands.  Instead of a positive reaction, “the little 
Fellow [Gadsden] grew warm & told them he did not shake Hands wth. Rascals.”  When 
Elias Horry, who was surprised by the response, reminded him that they had come to give 
themselves up, Gadsden said that instead of serving the militia they would be “hang’d to 
be sure.”  Apparently they were so worried by this response that they “took fright, 
jumped upon their Horses, & dashed off.”  (They were then forcibly brought back to 
camp.)  Burke heard men and women calling for the blood of Tories.  If even the two 
most vocal opponents of the Confiscation Act expressed such visible outrage, how many 
others must have entered the first assembly bent on expressing that rage?59 
 
59 Aedanus Burke to Arthur Middleton, Jacksonborough Jan. 25, 1782, Aednaus Burke to Arthur 
Middleton, Camp before York, Oct. 16, 1781, Edward Rutledge to Arthur Middleton, Dec. 12, 1781, 
Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Oct. 1925," 187, 191-93, 208. Richard Walsh, ed., The Writings of Christopher 
Gadsden, 1746-1805 (Columbia, S.C., 1966) 195 footnote 3.  Rutledge described the incident at length to 
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 The Jacksonborough Assembly was primarily composed of militia leaders, 
paroled prisoners, and other men who were battle-hardened and had suffered for their 
avowed Patriotism.  Burke described some of his fellow representatives in that assembly 
as especially battle-hardened, and even coarse.  “One of our Members of this present 
Assembly kept a tally of the number of men he has killed on the barrel of his pistol, and 
the notches amount to twenty-five.  I know another who has killed his fourteen, &c. &c.” 
Burke painted a picture of an assembly where people greeted each other by bragging 
about their war exploits.  How much mercy could the Tories really expect from this 
crowd?60 
 Yet, these men were not only brutes and soldiers.  Edward Rutledge described his 
fellow Assembly members as “the Flower of the Country” and was pleased with the 
“Competent Appearance of the House.”  Burke admitted that the assembly was 
“composed of very respectable good men.”61 
 In the debates, Aedanus Burke was one of the leading voices against the 
Confiscation Act.  He had very little backing; he himself admitted “two only are in 
opposition to it in the whole.”  Yet on certain crucial questions, there was unanimity.  
Even Burke, the greatly vocal opponent of the Confiscation Act, thought “the men who 
are the objects of it should never be received into the bosom of this Country.”  He agreed 
with the goal of banishment for offensive Loyalists at this moment, but objected to 
depriving dependent families of property.  He worried that such confiscation would 
                                                                                                                                            
Middleton but identified the party as Gervais, not Gadsden.  However, in later letters he indicated that 
Gadsden was actually the Patriot involved in the incident. 
60 Aedanus Burke to Arthur Middleton, Jacksonborough, Jan. 25, 1782, Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Oct. 
1925," 183-213, 192. 
61 Edward Rutledge to Arthur Middleton, Jacksonborough, Jan. 23, 1782, Aedanus Burke to Arthur 
Middleton, Jacksonborough, Jan. 25, 1782. Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Oct. 1925,"  193, 210. 
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“bring so many families & their children to beggary & ruin, that I most devoutly detest 
it.”  Crying in the wilderness, he also railed that confiscation would make all property 
insecure: “can Property be secure under a numerous democratic Assembly wch undertakes 
to dispose of the Property of the Citizen?” However, his complaints went unheeded, and 
he was certainly out of step with his peers.62 
 Confiscation was part of a series of acts designed to invigorate the ongoing war 
effort.  As discussed above, South Carolina still desperately needed troops to control and 
repel the British.  How generous would they have to be in recruitment bounties to attract 
warm bodies? 
 The answer to the second question turned out to be—rather generous.  The 
General Assembly promised a bounty of a slave per year served for two years of service, 
which Edward Rutledge felt was an “enormous Bounty.”  He hoped that Congress would 
send troops and a fleet to drive the British from Charleston so that South Carolina could 
“save two Negroes out of three.”  Given the need to provide these generous incentives, 
the state needed cash and slaves to pay these bounties—and slaves could come directly 
from confiscated estates, and cash as well.63 
 Within a week, the confiscation committee had already created a list of 700 
names, but reduced the list considerably before bringing it back to the floor.   At some 
point over that weekend, the committee added another 240 names to the list.  At that 
time, the list included several persons who would ultimately be amerced instead, or even 
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be relieved of all penalties, such Daniel Horry and Rawlins Lowndes.  (There is no record 
of the entire list at that point, unfortunately.)64 
 On Monday January 28th, the confiscation committee led a full house debate on 
the current list and wording of the confiscation act.  The House of Representatives agreed 
to the list of names and all but one minor clause of the act’s wording.  There was then a 
weeklong break in which the committee went back into session and revised the act and 
list, although no discussion as to why.  On Thursday Feb. 7th, the House brought in a 
revised list that was whittled to 118 names, much fewer than on previous lists.  During 
the debates to agree on this list of names, the Assembly decided to create a new system of 
graded penalties for Loyalists that allowed them to impose a lesser penalty on some men, 
while not letting them off the hook.  The official motion asked that instead of 
confiscation, amercement (taxation) should be a possibility for “Persons whose conduct 
[is] not considered Sufficiently criminal to merit Confiscation.”  This was the first 
mention of a lesser penalty, and it was quickly adopted.  Its emergence at this point in 
negotiations suggests that it was a compromise measure for disputes about names.  Rather 
than a stark choice between ruination and forgiveness, the House of Representatives 
opened a third option.  Having an option might also have allowed a less contentious 
negotiating process, as each side could give more easily on any particular name. 
 The wording of the motion is also interesting because it suggests a process of 
discussion in both the committee and the full house floor that debated the relative 
criminality of each man’s conduct.  The distinction “sufficiently criminal” alerts us that 
each man’s wartime record was a subject of discussion.  The House members had a 
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mental standard of what actions were criminal enough to merit confiscation and 
banishment, although they did not agree on each individual. 
 At this point, the list (at least as recorded in the minutes) had no order.  It was not 
in alphabetical order and it was not arranged by crime, as the list would be in the final 
version.  Backcountry and lowcountry names were scattered throughout the list.  
However, Edward Rutledge, the primary author of the act, wrote his political ally and 
friend Arthur Middleton the next day.  His letter makes it clear that the list followed Gov. 
John Rutledge’s suggestions for what kind of acts would merit confiscation and 
banishment.  At a time when “we were very deep in Confiscation” he told him 
“the plan stands at present thus—Some British Subjects by Name—Some of the 
Addressors—The Returned Exiles—Some who hold Commissions--& some others who 
have been guilty of extraordinary Offences.” He made it clear that while the categories 
were set, most lists only contain “some” of the men who qualify in each group.  The only 
new group was the “Returned Exiles”:  men who had been forced to leave the state after 
1776, but who returned after the occupation of Charleston.  The returning exiles had been 
exiled by law, and had taken the change in circumstances as a chance to return and 
profit.65 
 Meanwhile, the House of Representatives was drafting and debating other 
legislation that was founded on the assumption that the Confiscation Act would pass, and 
that it would provide sizable monetary gain for the state.  In between the reading of the 
first and second list, the House arranged to supply General Greene’s troops with slave 
labor drawn from slaves owned by Loyalists.  They planned to use 1200 slaves from the 
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confiscated estates for this purpose alone.  The militia recruitment act bound South 
Carolina to pay a sizable bounty in slaves for new recruits.  These slaves would also have 
to come from the confiscated estates.  On the same day as the Senate began debating the 
confiscation act, the House was using profit from the confiscated estates to back notes for 
supplies troops took from South Carolina suppliers.  Isaac Hayne’s heirs attempted to get 
the use of fifty confiscated slaves to rebuild the Iron Works he had part owned in the 
New Acquisition District.  Everyone intended to pay for his pet projects with money from 
Loyalist estates.66 
 The Senate took up confiscation for the first time on February 9th.  As a smaller 
body, the Senate was able to conduct their debates on the Confiscation bill as a body, 
rather than using committees.  Within a week of first introduction of the bill, the Senate 
was debating a very specific schedule of names.  By this time, the list was explicitly 
arranged into six categories covering the categories enshrined in the final Act.  There was 
considerable reorganizing at this point in the negotiations.  The Senate proposed an 
additional 291 names on Feb. 13th.  They also added two crucial additions to the 
governing language.  First, they explicitly made all debts collectible against confiscated 
estates, so that the government would not profit at the expense of individual citizens.  The 
one exception was Loyalists, who were barred from collecting debts from confiscated 
estates.   Second, the Senate added a proviso to dissuade South Carolinians from either 
stealing Loyalist property or helping Loyalists hide their property.  They made it a capital 
felony to “remove aid or assist in the removal of any of the property hereby Confiscated.”  
This had two purposes.  First, slaves were a uniquely portable form of valuable property 
(at least from the perspective of white slaveowners).  Several commanders, most notably 
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Thomas Sumter, had already taken slave property to use in the war effort.  Other South 
Carolinians had caught runaway slaves from Loyalist estates and were keeping them on 
their own property.  It would be temptingly easy to just keep such slaves, rather than turn 
them over to the state.  In fact, after the war, the Governor published multiple appeals 
imploring people to turn in such slaves.  These announcements alternately threatened and 
cajoled South Carolinians into giving up their ill-gotten slave wealth.  The Senate 
anticipated this problem, and sought to control it with this legislative addition.  This 
clause also was directed at relatives and friends of Loyalists named on the lists.  The 
Senate wanted to discourage people from helping Loyalists hide their property so as to 
preserve some value.67 
 The Senate sent the revised bill back to the House, where it quickly became 
apparent to both sides that they would need extensive negotiations to reach compromise.  
However, they tried to negotiate back and forth as full houses, rather than immediately 
creating a joint committee to negotiate the final bill.  Perhaps this was because the subject 
was important and everyone wanted to weigh in on the names as long as there was 
substantial change possible.  The legislature later did appoint a joint committee, but only 
when there were very few issues to iron out, and those issues were clearly identified.  
Meanwhile, the House and the Senate spent several days sending proposed changes back 
and forth daily. 
 The House of Representatives did not object to the language the Senate had 
added, but they did object to the schedule of names.  Throughout the process of debate, it 
was the names, not the language of legislation and penalty, that required hard fought 
compromise.  Both chambers and almost all members were in agreement about the need 
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for a confiscation act.  It was in the lists of individual names that ideological and personal 
debates were fought.  This attention to the names, and the debate around them, shows that 
the main point of the act was indeed listing, classifying, and punishing select individuals. 
Edward Rutledge was insulted by the changes the Senate wanted.  The Senate had 
“increased the List to such an amazing Length & have added so many insignificant 
Characters that it must undergo very great alteration.”  Probably some of those 
“insignificant characters” were men he was trying to protect.  After fighting for several 
days, the house read a new report, and only one name caused controversy this time—John 
Wragg, Christopher Gadsden’s brother-in-law, and a merchant who had personal and 
business ties with most Lowcountry gentlemen.  He was on the list as a signer of the 
congratulatory address to Clinton, but also, and even more damagingly, he had petitioned 
to be in the Royal Militia.  Both of these actions were named offenses in the Confiscation 
Act.  Perhaps the unknown Representative tried to save him because of personal ties, or 
perhaps because he was already an older man during the Revolution, and his health and 
age affected his ability to leave his plantation.  The vote was very close, so Wragg had 
support, but in the end his name stayed on the Confiscation list.  By Feb. 17th, nine days 
before the close of the session, the House and the Senate had come to enough agreement 
on the outlines of the confiscation bill that they established a joint committee to finish the 
negotiation.68 
By the 17th of February, an additional complication had emerged in negotiations. 
On the face of it, the Confiscation Act was intended to punish Loyalists.  It determined 
who could (and could not) be a citizen of the newly independent South Carolina.  But in 
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fact the Confiscation Act, like the two pardon proclamations by Governor Rutledge, also 
functioned as a call to Loyalists to return to the Patriot fold.  The General Assembly 
expected that some Loyalists, whose behavior was beyond the pale, would leave 
whenever the British finally evacuated Charleston.  But others were meant to hear about 
the deliberations at Jacksonborough and consider their own position.  Not every legislator 
felt this way, of course.  Some simply wanted retribution.  But others were well aware of 
the fact that Loyalists in Charleston knew the Jacksonborough assembly was considering 
their names.  Further, some General Assembly members were trying to sway Loyalists 
they knew to come forward while they were still negotiating the Confiscation Act.  
Edward Rutledge and others wrote Charles Drayton, another well-connected fellow, 
during the assembly to do something that would convince others he had finally 
abandoned the neutrality he had claimed to uphold since he took protection from the 
British.  Rutledge disgustedly told Drayton’s brother-in-law that Drayton was “as inactive 
as ever, for which he has been placed on the Sequestration List.  He has been written to 
repeatedly about the Matter, but all to no purpose—He stays at Home, & returns no 
answer.”69   
Drayton might have stayed at home, but not everyone took this as calmly as he 
did.  By the last week and a half of the Assembly, Loyalist petitions began arriving at the 
Assembly, and some were read and debated by committee and the entire body.   A few 
individuals were concerned that they might be mistaken for someone else, and lose their 
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property in that way.  Alexander Garden Jr., the son of a Loyalist, apparently spent the 
entire month and a half of the Assembly buttonholing acquaintances into protecting his 
interests.  He annoyed Rutledge, who described him as “full of Trouble…lest we should 
touch his Plantation at Goosecreek.”  He also tried to save his father’s estate from 
confiscation, but mostly so he could take it.  He formally petitioned the Senate, asking 
that despite his father’s being “ranked among the persons falling under…” the 
confiscation act being debated, in light of his own “invariable attachment” to America, 
the legislature delay the sale of his father’s property.  William Henry Harvey petitioned 
the Senate to give him his brother’s property rather than confiscate it.  He proclaimed his 
own good conduct as a Patriot, and asked that he be given his brother’s estate in lieu of 
his brother’s debts to their father.  Alexander Garden Jr.’s efforts were partially 
successful despite rubbing people the wrong way.  Harvey showed little concern for his 
brother’s fate, but he was determined to do what he could to protect his own wealth.70  
Sarah Steward petitioned the Senate on behalf of her husband, a Loyalist.  
Steward’s name was on the confiscation list at that time, and he was the subject of 
disagreement between the Senate and the House.  She told the Senate that “she is 
informed her Husbands Estate is likely to be Confiscated and himself Banished from this 
State, by a Bill now before this House.”  Clearly, word had spread into Charleston, as she 
was endeavoring to persuade the General Assembly not to confiscate his property.  Given 
that his name was the subject of considerable horse-trading during the session, it is likely 
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that a Steward ally wrote her, encouraging her to come forward to try to bolster efforts to 
keep Steward off the final confiscation list.  In her efforts to persuade the General 
Assembly, she argued that she was already “distress’d” by the war, and would need her 
husband and his property to live after the war.  Further, while not denying that her 
husband was living in England, she suggested that he had “always been a friend to the 
American cause,” he had “befriended many American prisoners,” and that if he was 
“restored to his Country” he would be appropriately grateful.  In the end, her efforts, in 
addition to those of his supporters in the General Assembly, worked.  Charles Augustus 
Steward was amerced 12%, not banished and subjected to confiscation.71 
These petitions provoked a response from both houses of the Assembly.  Each 
side made a motion that would allow a Patriot son, brother, or nephew of a Loyalist 
subject to confiscation to gain title to the otherwise confiscated property if he could show 
that he would otherwise have stood to inherit that property, or would have inherited that 
property if he had not displeased his Loyalist relative and been disinherited for his 
political stance.  In the House of Representatives, this amendment was offered the day 
after Alexander Garden Jr.’s petition was read.   In the Senate, it was introduced two days 
after William Henry Harvey’s petition was read.  In both chambers, the measure failed.  
In the House, the vote was 51 against the amendment, and 36 in favor.  Aedanus Burke 
led the votes in favor of the amendment—probably because he was opposed to the act in 
general, and strove to ensure that the list was as short as possible.  Had the General 
Assembly passed this amendment, relatives might have claimed many of the confiscated 
estates.  This would reduce the money available from confiscated estates to pay state 
debts.  It would also have opened up a very large loophole in the law, which would have 
 
71 Salley, ed., Senate J. 1782 103, 105. 
 134 
allowed many people to come forward claiming estates.  Confiscated estate sales would 
have been subject to great insecurity, as purchasers would not know whether they truly 
had good title.  Such uncertainty would depress prices at auction and discourage potential 
purchasers from buying at all.  In addition to these practical financial problems, this 
amendment would allow relatives to try to save property for Loyalists, and undermine the 
severity of punishment that the act intended.  For all of these reasons, the amendment 
failed in both chambers.72 
Rather than offer a blanket exemption for all Patriot male relatives of Loyalists, 
the General Assembly offered narrowly tailored exemptions for petitioners.  After several 
motions, they agreed to defer the sale of certain estates, largely those addressed by the 
petitioners, until the next meeting of the General Assembly (which, barring any crisis, 
would be January 1783).  The act protected the real estate and the moveables, but not 
slaves.  In that way, even this clemency was narrowly tailored so as to allow the General 
Assembly to use slave labor from these estates.73    
One other petitioner case is particularly instructive in understanding the forces at 
work in confiscation.  Cornelius Dupont, Gideon Dupont Jr.’s brother, petitioned on 
behalf of his nephew to have the estate sale postponed.  While not mentioned in the 
petition, the committee report makes it clear that Cornelius Dupont and his family were 
living on his brother Gideon’s plantation at the time and depended on it to support them.  
The Senate committee reported favorably on his request, suggesting that the estate sale 
should be postponed.  They made this recommendation despite their explicit recognition 
that his petition “militates against the whole Tenor of the Bill now under 
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consideration.”74  The Senate recognized that allowing Cornelius Dupont to use Gideon 
Dupont Jr.’s estate was against the spirit of the Confiscation Act, which sought to raise 
money through confiscated estates and to punish Loyalists by depriving them and their 
families of their wealth.  This is an extraordinary statement.  They were willing to 
undermine their own act in order to protect Cornelius Dupont.  But, I suggest, that is the 
wrong way to consider it.  What makes this statement extraordinary is that it suggests that 
a majority of the General Assembly were more concerned with passing a Confiscation 
Act than actually enforcing its provisions.  The importance of the act was to publicly 
punish Loyalists and to encourage them to come back to the Patriot side.  Despite heavy 
financial need, a majority of legislators were willing to undercut the confiscation bill 
before it was even passed.  They were committed to the bill as an act of symbolic 
retribution that would reassure an anxious and angry population while disciplining 
Loyalists.  As a body, they did not intend for it to stand unmodified, and they did not 
require that it be enforced against all parties. 
In the last week of the legislature, the General Assembly worked to reconcile their 
two versions of the Confiscation Act.  Both governing language and individual names 
were tossed back and forth between chambers.  Sixteen names went back and forth 
between chambers in various iterations, with one house voting to strike and another 
voting to keep.  Charles Augustus Steward, whose wife had petitioned on his behalf, had 
more supporters in the Senate than the House, as the House consistently put him back on 
the list and the Senate kept striking him from the list.  Finally, they compromised by 
moving him to the Amercement Act list instead.  Alexander Rose was in the same 
situation, as the Senate kept trying to remove him from the list.  Unfortunately for Rose, 
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Edward Rutledge, the author of the Confiscation Act, was implacable on the subject, and 
maintained pressure to keep him on the confiscation list.  Rutledge claimed he had not 
“said anything against a single Person I recollect but Alexr. Rose.”  Rose, a Charleston 
merchant, had supplied property to the British for their use during the occupation of 
Charleston, and received handsome rents in return.  His name stayed on the final list, and 
he was subject to confiscation.  As we will see, he was later successful in petitioning to 
be relieved of confiscation and banishment, and ended up regaining his former position in 
Charleston society, despite the enmity of the Rutledge family.75   
The most controversial name between the two houses was William Blake.  In this 
case, the roles of the two houses were reversed, as the Senate was determined to subject 
Blake to confiscation, and House members continued to try to save his citizenship and 
property.  Edward Rutledge was one of Blake’s supporters, as was Arthur Middleton, his 
brother-in-law and one of South Carolina’s delegates to the Continental Congress.  
Edward Rutledge reassured Middleton several times that he was trying to save William 
Blake from confiscation, but that many were against him.  On Feb. 14 he reminded 
Middleton that “I wrote you a few days ago…[and] told you that your friend Blake was in 
the Catalogue of Offenders: his Name is at present left out, but whether he will not be 
again added it is impossible to say.”  Rutledge sought to reassure Middleton, who was far 
away from the action, that he was doing his best to save Blake from the folly of his 
actions, but he warned Middleton that he might not be able to keep Blake from 
confiscation.  In fact, he was right to be worried.  William Blake’s name went back and 
forth, coming down to the final meeting of the joint committee.  On Feb. 22nd, the joint 
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committee met and agreed that the Senate would trade William Blake (meaning they 
would let his name be dropped, and moved to the amercement list) in return for changes 
they sought in the wording of two clauses of the text.  (These specific changes sought to 
protect claimants against confiscated estates.)  Edward Rutledge, as a member of the joint 
committee, presented the changes to the House of Representatives, which agreed and 
passed the act.  Thanks to this effort, he was able to reassure Middleton on the last day of 
the Jacksonborough Assembly that “your old Friend, Billy Blake, has had a very narrow 
escape indeed.”  The Senate “pushed excessive hard” against Blake, and Rutledge felt 
“many things were asserted against him which were not true.”  He also defended the 
amercement, reminding Middleton that while he had protected Blake, Blake had been 
culpable.76 
At the same time as the Assembly was finalizing the names on the confiscation 
list, they were also moving forward on the amercment act.  Having largely finalized the 
names on the Confiscation Act, they were able to finish listing names for the amercement 
act.  As we just saw with William Blake, the amercement list also functioned as a release 
valve for pressure over the final names.  Men like Charles Augustus Steward and Daniel 
Huger, whose names were passed back and forth from list to list, were taken off the 
confiscation schedule in the final week of negotiations and added to the amercement 
schedule.  Even then, the Senate and House went back and forth on several names, 
including Daniel Huger, who was fortunate, as the House finally removed him from 
confiscation and amercement.  Later in this chapter, I consider amercement at great 
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length.  For now, it is worth noting that amercement functioned as a halfway house for 
names in dispute between houses and within houses.77 
Jack P. Greene studied the “quest for power” of Southern colonial legislatures 
through their lower, more democratic houses in the eighteenth century.  South Carolina’s 
colonial House of Commons was used to “ironclad control” over all local and colony 
governance.  Greene argues that while lower houses steadily expanded their prerogatives 
of control, up until the Seven Years’ War, their expansion, and indeed their decisions, 
showed “spontaneity.”  In dealing with Loyalists, South Carolina’s wartime assembly 
would continue to show spontaneity, concerned more with present uses of the legislation 
than longer-term outcomes.  (In this case, two years later seemed to qualify as long-term.)  
This further suggests that most early state legislatures dealt with matters on an ad hoc 
basis.78 
So far, I have discussed legislative action on the confiscation and amercement 
acts, and related them to other acts concerned with financing state expenses and beefing 
up state military preparations.  There were two other acts moving through the General 
Assembly that were also related to confiscation and amercement, and therefore bear 
mentioning.  The General Assembly was trying to restart the court system after the 
disruptions of the war.  The South Carolina court system had long left something to be 
desired, as the Regulation had shown.  The backcountry suffered from a lack of local 
courts.  The South Carolina General Assembly had attempted to expand the local court 
system before the Revolution, but many of the proposed courthouses had never been 
built.  In order to establish post-war order, the General Assembly sought to reestablish the 
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courts, including building a workable system of local criminal and civil courts for the 
backcountry.  This was a thankless task.  Governor John Rutledge and a majority of the 
General Assembly saw the court system as a necessary second part of the effort to 
address Loyalist actions during the war.  In this formulation, the General Assembly could 
pass legislation that addressed certain prominent Loyalists of relatively high status by 
either publicly punishing them, or offering them a blanket pardon.  None of the acts 
offered pardon or shelter from war crimes charges, despite the fact that criminality was 
one of the factors in the Assembly’s debates.  Justice Aedanus Burke was implacably 
opposed to efforts to use the courts to prosecute Loyalists.  I will detail these objections 
more thoroughly in Chapter Five, but it is worth mentioning that there was not unanimity 
on the courts.  South Carolinians accepted the limited nature of the Confiscation Act in 
part because they expected that they could use the court system to prosecute war 
criminals.  In jury trials, they could debate what defined such criminality.  Burke was 
afraid of holding court, because he expected such courts “to be a tool to gratify the fierce 
revenge of the people; For you cd. Not enter a Company that some do not talk of hanging 
many hundreds.”  Governor Mathews, who was elected as Governor Rutledge’s 
replacement during the Jacksonborough Assembly, pushed to open special court sessions 
a few months after Jacksonborough in order to prosecute Loyalists.  Burke commented 
that “Govr. Mathews now wants me to hold a special Court at Orangeburgh for tryal of 
about a hundred Scoffs wch. is the term we have for a Tory.”79  
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In the spirit of extending the olive branch, the Jacksonborough Assembly also 
passed a pardon act meant to apply to most Loyalists.  In the same week the Senate added 
more than two hundred names to the confiscation act, the House and Senate began debate 
on the pardon act.  The Senate insisted that the pardon act explicitly offer no cover to acts 
regarded as impermissibly criminal even in war.  To do this, they added a clause that the 
pardon did not extend to anyone who was accused of crimes such as “Robbery, House 
burning, House breaking or Murder.”  Instead, the Senate called for these men to be 
“subject to trial, condemnation and Execution for the said offenses.”  The House did not 
like the wording, and demanded a joint committee to resolve the issue.  The Senate tried 
to make the pardon act explicitly about military actions, whereas the House kept taking 
the qualifier “Military” out of the legislation.80 
“a due discrimination should be made”: The Amercement Act, Pardons, Voting 
Rights, and Other Forms of Lesser Punishment81 
In its initial considerations, the House of Representatives planned to sequester the 
estates of those who were guilty of less egregious behavior.  In this, they were following 
the example of the British, who had sequestered the estates of prominent Patriots after the 
occupation of Charleston.  Sequestration removed the income of the estate from the 
control of the person facing the punishment, but did not confiscate it.  When the 
                                                                                                                                            
did not want to hold trials, but he had no respect for the men he would have tried.  He was concerned with 
his own reputation, as he did not want to go down in history as a hanging judge. 
80 Salley, Senate J. 1782 95, 97. 
81 Act. No. 1155, “An Act for Amercing Certain Persons Therein Mentioned” (Hereinafter the Amercement 
Act), Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 4: 523-525. 
 141 
committee brought in the first full list of people subject to confiscation, they encouraged 
a motion to amerce (tax) the estates of “Persons whose conduct are not considered 
Sufficiently criminal to merit Confiscation.”  The exact amount of the tax was negotiable, 
and not necessarily going to be the same amount for everyone.  Amercement publicly 
punished some men, contributed to state coffers, but allowed Loyalists to preserve the 
bulk of their estate.  Such personal control was essential to men’s standing as gentlemen 
as well as to their ability to maintain the value of their property.82 
Should every man be subject to the same level of taxation, or should a due 
discrimination be made within the act itself, with different levels of financial pain for 
men whose wartime acts deserved different penalties?  As I have indicated earlier, the 
Amercement Act helped defuse tensions between houses over names on the confiscation 
list.  But as a compromise measure, it also introduced a more nuanced system for dealing 
with Loyalists.  It was no longer an all or nothing question, but one of graded penalties.  
The graded penalties also meant that the amercement act recognized that there were 
relative levels of criminal behavior even amongst men who had made the same public 
actions.  Signatories of the official welcome and congratulation addresses to the British 
found themselves on the confiscation list, the amercement list, and on no list at all.  
Within chambers, the General Assembly was engaged in a spirited discussion of the 
relative crimininality (was an action “Sufficiently criminal”) of each Loyalist. 
The Amercement Act itself explained that a “due discrimination should be made” 
between men who had supported the Patriots in their hour of need and those who had 
instead taken protection and denied men and funds to the failing effort.   But, just like the 
Confiscation Act, the Amercement Act explained that the forty-seven men singled out on 
 
82 Salley, House J. 1782  62. 
 142 
its list were those who while “bearing high and important trusts or commissions” for 
South Carolina, had withdrawn from the Patriot side and accepted British posts and 
protection.  Both acts only went after public figures of some wealth, who used their good 
names to take officer-level positions.  Amercees also had failed to take advantage of the 
mercy proclamations at an early enough date, stubbornly staying “within the lines of the 
enemy.”  They had to be punished as an example to others, for their actions in refusing to 
submit to the authority of the governor meant they showed “contempt” to the “authority 
of the state” and offered “an evil example of society.”  If the crime of men named in the 
Confiscation Act was that they aided the British and lent their reputations to the British 
cause, the crime of men named in the Amercement Act was that they had offered material 
aid to the British and offered a bad example.  They were not considered ideological 
Loyalists, but opportunists.  As a wartime government still trying to reassert its power, 
the General Assembly had to make sure that no one could be seen to be flouting them and 
getting away with it.  However, by choosing to tax these men, but not banish them, the 
Assembly signaled it did not consider them real threats to the new state.  They were to 
pay for their sins, but could ultimately be trusted as citizens.  This was no small concern, 
since much of the justification for the Confiscation Act was that confiscees were 
untrustworthy as citizens and had to be banished for the safety of others.  Yet many men 
who were considered for confiscation were ultimately placed on the amercement lists, 
suggesting that a good portion of those subject to confiscation and banishment were also 
not really regarded as threats.  This also suggests that the Assembly was already open to 
action in later years to separate the confiscees into two categories: readmittable and 
admittable under no circumstances. 
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The General Assembly expected amerced persons to be recalcitrant in paying 
their amercements, and designed the law to force such payments quickly.  All amerced 
men owed 12% of the total value of their estates, both real and personal.  The 
Commissioners of Forfeited Estates were required to inventory the estates of the amerced 
men for the purposes of setting the amercement, and they were the collectors.  Should the 
amerced men not be able to come up with the money to pay their amercements in a 
timely fashion, the Commissioners were to sell as much property as was required to pay 
the amercement due. 
Just as with the Confiscation Act, the General Assembly made provision in the 
Amercement Act to foil attempts to evade such sanctions by transferring property.  Any 
property sales by amerced persons after Sept. 27, 1781 (the date of the first Rutledge 
clemency proclamation) were void.  The Act also provided for the death penalty for any 
persons caught and convicted of embezzling funds or property from amerced estates, in 
an effort (similar to the Confiscation Act) to recoup as much money as possible from 
these estates.  Given the widespread theft of slaves and other moveable property, these 
restrictions were only so useful.  
The Amercement Act also bundled in all those who had “subscribed or paid any 
sum or sums of money towards mounting, arming, or equipping, any troop or troops of 
cavalry or other military force, for the service of his Britannic Majesty, to act against this 
State, or against any other of the United States of America.”  All of these men were 
publicly known, and originally considered for confiscation.  The subscribers, as they 
were known, had not only paid money towards the British war effort, but publicly 
subscribed on widely-published lists.  Subscribers needed to be publicly accused to a 
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local court official, and if one or more “credible witnesses” were willing to step forward 
against the Loyalist, he would become subject to a much stricter amercement.  These 
amercees, unlike all the others, were subject to much more confiscatory 30% tax of the 
total value of their South Carolina real and personal property.  Edward Rutledge bitterly 
suggested of one such man, “he will be amerced 30 per Cent, & justly too.  Indeed I think 
every Man who voluntarily subscribed to raising that Corps deserves Banishment in the 
highest degree.”83 
Of course, by creating a system that encouraged accusations, the General 
Assembly opened a can of worms.  It was bad enough that the 1782 session allowed 
individual legislators the opportunity to ruin their personal enemies through accusations 
of Loyalism.  (Of course, they had to get others to go along with them.  Still, they could 
ensure that their personal enemies who had engaged in Loyalist activities were on the 
Confiscation or Amercement Act lists.)  Now, the General Assembly was opening the 
process of accusation to all South Carolinians who could be considered “credible”.  
While this standard did eliminate blacks and some poor white men, it potentially included 
the vast majority of white men in the state (and sizable numbers of white women).  
Further, the standard did not require multiple witnesses, so the testimony of a single 
witness could potentially be devastating.  While the General Assembly did not go so far 
as to provide a bounty to witnesses, there are other motivations besides outright payment 
that could encourage people to testify, or even give false witness.84 
 
83 Edward Rutledge to Arthur Middleton, Jacksonborough, Feb. 26, 1782, Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Jan. 
1926," 8. 
84 It is not clear how many people actually accused others, partly because the court system continued in 
disarray for some time.  (See Chapter Five for more on the reasons courts did not open quickly.)  What is 
clear from the Commissioners of Forfeited Estates records is that some men were subject to the 30% 
penalty, and the Commissioners made an effort to actually collect that amount.  Those amercements 
declined in later years with the general trend towards forgiveness I discuss in the next two chapters, and 
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Most amercees were subject to the 12% tax, but that percentage was a subject of 
negotiations.  When first considered, the House set the amercement level at ten percent of 
the total value of the estate.  Some senators attempted to reduce the amercement from ten 
percent to five percent, perhaps because they intended confiscation to take precedence.  
This motion was made the same day the Senate dramatically increased the size of the 
confiscation list.  However, five percent seemed far too low for such a penalty, and other 
senators deflected this reduction effort.  The Senate again changed the level of 
amercement later in the session, increasing the pain for Loyalists by moving for a twenty 
percent amercement (closer to the penalty for subscribers).  The final bill compromised 
between the House of Representative’s ten percent suggestion and the Senate’s twenty 
percent suggestion by adopting a twelve percent amercement.  This final resolution kept 
the penalty at a lower level, but was still sizable enough to ensure that amerced Loyalists 
would contribute significantly to the state’s bottom line.85 
Despite these difficulties, amercement seemed fair to many legislators.  They 
calculated that many amerced persons might end up paying less than Patriots had paid 
during the war.  Edward Rutledge suggested that amerced men should be grateful because 
he did “not know one [Patriot] who would not be very glad to have lost no more than 25 
per Centm.” While this figure was inflated (and Edward Rutledge did well for himself 
after the Revolution), it did reflect the reality that sizable numbers of Patriots had risked 
their capital in the war.  Their estates had been plundered.  Many of their slaves had fled.  
The war itself had destroyed land and houses.  Planting seasons were hopelessly out of 
whack.  In this light, a twelve percent amercement to pay war expenses seemed fair 
                                                                                                                                            
seem to have been converted to lower amercement amounts in those later years, in line with the 12% 
generally collected. 
85 Salley, ed., Senate J. 1782 124, 127. 
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indeed.  Generally, legislators justified it as the cost of providing soldier substitutes, 
which Loyalists under protection had not done.   Legislators also believed that some 
Loyalists had joined the British for pecuniary reasons, and the state was well within its 
rights to confiscate such ill-gotten profits.  The General Assembly committee on appeals 
to confiscation later justified maintaining a penalty in James Duncan’s case (a Charleston 
blacksmith) because we “think as he must have made large Profits by his Occupation 
during the British residence here, that he ought to pay Twelve per Cent.”86 
The General Assembly also pursued other ways to define and regulate the status 
of Loyalists.  Governor John Rutledge’s Proclamation had offered pardons to Loyalists 
who rejoined the Patriots and served in the armed forces.  The 1782 Jacksonborough 
Assembly enshrined the pardons into law with the Pardon Act, which defined what kinds 
of wartime behavior were worthy of a full pardon.  In so doing, the General Assembly 
enforced the argument that Loyalism was a treasonous act requiring official pardon.  The 
Pardon Act extended legislative control by insisting that South Carolina’s government 
had the right to determine whether individuals were entitled to citizenship.  Embodying 
the spirit of the 1781 clemency proclamation, it required men to serve nine months active 
duty in the militia in return for the pardon.   For those lucky enough to own property, 
there was also an additional amercement of ten percent.  This penalty was sizable, but 
still symbolically less than the penalties under amercement.  The Commissioners of 
Forfeited Estates were instructed to value these estates and accept payment of the ten 
 
86 Edward Rutledge to Arthur Middleton, Jacksonborough, Feb. 26, 1782, Joseph W. Barnwell, "Middleton 
Corr. Jan. 1926,"  7.  Theodora J. Thompson and Rosa S. Lumpkin, eds., Journals of the House of 
Representatives, 1783-1784 (Columbia, S.C., 1977)221. 
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percent penalty.  Should it not be forthcoming, they were authorized to sell enough 
property to equal the assessed value, just as in the other acts.87 
In the Pardon Act, the legislature did not create a list of names.  Instead, they 
relied on a system in which the militia brigadiers sent in lists of the Loyalists who had 
come back over and were currently serving in their forces.  One reason is that the General 
Assembly did not have this information at the time of their meeting for every force.  
Another reason is that the act gave cover for militia commanders to include men whose 
return they had accepted after the official deadlines.  Men such as General Marion had 
allowed Loyalists to return under their protection after the September and December 
deadlines of 1781.  And, since part of the point of debating these acts was to influence the 
remaining Loyalists, they wished to leave open the possibility that coming out during the 
Assembly might save men from confiscation.  Edward Rutledge noted with a certain wry 
amusement that “since the Confiscation List has made its way into Town” (during the 
session), there had been “several broad Hints from our quondam Enemies wishing that 
we wd. permit they would return to their Countrymen.”  His amusement extended to 
sharing some of those names, especially amused that the “Tooth-Drawing Dr Clitherel” 
hoped to gain pardon.  Despite the legal wording, the reliance on lists provided by 
military commanders months later allowed all of these returnees to come under the 
Pardon Act.  This gave legal cover for commanders who had given their word to such 
 
87 Act No. 1157, “An Act for Pardoning the Persons Therein Described, on the Conditions Therein 
Mentioned”, Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 4: 526-28.  The act specifically pardoned persons 
who had taken the Dec. 17, 1781 or the Sept. 22, 1781 offers from Governor Rutledge.   
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men.  The Pardon Act, by de facto extending the deadlines, also continued the policy of 
encouraging Loyalists to return to the Patriot side.88 
Unlike the Amercement Act, individuals affected by this act were given full 
pardons.  There was one major exception, in the light of the atrocities and violence of the 
Revolution.  The pardon specifically precluded any pardon to “persons who are or may 
be accused of counterfeiting money, plundering, robbery, house-burning, house-breaking, 
or murder.”  Again and again, these offenses were singled out as unpardonable, and 
specifically exempted from any pardon.  Anyone suspected of these offenses could still 
be taken to court and were “subject to trial, condemnation, and execution.”  Plunder, 
murder, arson and stealing are readily recognizable wartime offenses.  Counterfeiting 
may seem surprising, but was also used as a wartime strategy by the Loyalists to 
destabilize the currency. 
The General Assembly specifically exempted actions that they defined as 
unacceptable actions in war.  As the victors, they got to define war crimes.  Citizenship 
was only available to men who had served honorably in war, and were likely to be 
upright citizens after the war.  
The Pardon Act also envisioned that the newly reestablished courts would be used 
as war crimes tribunals.  As we will see, many of the justices of these courts (some of 
whom were members of the Jacksonborough Assembly) were implacably opposed to 
using the criminal justice system to prosecute war issues.  They were not at all convinced 
that citizens could be fair in using the courts to prosecute true war criminals without also 
using the courts to railroad all former Loyalists.   The South Carolina justice system was 
 
88 Edward Rutledge to Arthur Middleton, Jacksonborough, Feb. 14, 1782, Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Jan. 
1926," 5-6. 
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not strong enough to withstand such a potential miscarriage of justice.   However, despite 
prominent jurists’ abhorrence, the General Assembly clearly envisioned a parallel system 
of reconciliation and retribution.  Their arm was a series of official proclamations and 
acts that offered clemency to a select group of Loyalists and punished another group.  
Ordinary South Carolinians could pursue retribution against a larger group of Loyalists 
through the courts.  The Loyalists that the General Assembly addressed were from the 
economic and social elites of the state, as they were pre-selected as men who had held 
prominent posts in the civil and military efforts of the British.  The court system would 
deal with men in lower positions.  It also provided a mechanism for the prosecution of 
those specifically exempted from pardon.  The court system could be employed to allow 
ordinary people to bring forth evidence not readily available to the General Assembly. 
While South Carolina never ultimately used the court system to prosecute 
Loyalists, some other places did.  In Virginia’s eastern shore, though locals usually 
refused to testify in Richmond against local Loyalists in criminal suits designed to 
imprison them; they pursued civil cases for wartime damages against such Loyalists.  
Charges in these cases included false imprisonment, assault, and trespass.  Virginians 
were successful in getting compensation through the civil courts.  Adele Hast concludes 
that damage suits “provided a means for some degree of reconciliation.”  In North 
Carolina, locals also used the criminal courts to pursue Loyalists for wartime killings.   
Margaret Balfour was so angry that David Fanning’s band killed her brother, she moved 
heaven and earth to testify against Frederick Smith, a member of the band, in 1783.  
Despite knowing that Smith had not actively participated in her brother’s murder, she 
testified against him at length.  “My story was so affecting that the court was willing to 
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give me every satisfaction in their power; and in order to do this they broke a little 
through the usual course, for they had the villain tried, condemned, and hung, all in the 
space of the court.”  Further, these courts gave rise to the temptations of lynch law, which 
suited Margaret Balfour just fine.  She happily noted that men in the courtroom hoped the 
jury would find Smith not guilty so “they might have the pleasure of putting the rascal to 
death with their own hands.”  While Mrs. Balfour got a lot of satisfaction out of using the 
courts to pursue vengeance against Loyalists, the story does illustrate why more sober 
South Carolina leaders eventually rejected that solution.89 
“Due discrimination” could be shown in many ways.  Voting rights were one area 
in which the Assembly drew distinctions between good citizens and Loyalists.  
Americans believed that voting was central to any definition of citizenship, and widely 
expanded the franchise during the Revolution and Confederation periods.  Most state 
constitutions deliberately expanded the electorate by sharply lowering property 
requirements.  Some states even experimented with limited female suffrage, or suffrage 
by taxpaying status, or even the rights of free black men to vote, although generally only 
white men who met a minimal standard of property ownership had voting rights.  
Revolutionaries “increasingly viewed an individual who could not vote as 
unrepresented,” and saw the right to vote as central to the reason they fought the war to 
begin with.  But at a time when state constitutions extended voting rights to more 
Americans than had every enjoyed them before, Loyalists were explicitly denied the vote.  
 
89 Hast, Loyalism in Revolutionary Virginia 123-24.  For Margaret Balfour’s letter to her sister-in-law, see 
DeMond, N.C. Loyalists 123. 
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Given the increasing designation of suffrage as the most inherent right of citizenship, this 
meant Loyalists were not regarded as citizens.90 
In addition to the Confiscation, Amercement, and Pardon acts, the Assembly 
passed an act determining who had standing to vote in the upcoming elections for the 
1783 Assembly.  This act was careful to limit the voting rights of former Loyalists.   
Legislators argued that it was “repugnant to, the spirit, intent, and meaning of the 
constitution” that men who had “ withdrawn their allegiance to the State, and borne arms 
with or received protection from [or]… acknowledged themselves subjects of the king of 
Great Britain” should be able to vote for the legislature or serve in the legislature 
themselves.  Voting was an integral part of republican citizenship.  In restricting their 
voting rights, the General Assembly restricted their citizenship, instantly making them 
second-class citizens.   (These voting restrictions were also motivated by political 
partisanship—in this case, a fear that former Loyalist voters could upset the balance of 
power.  Aedanus Burke later accused John Rutledge of manipulating the 1782 Assembly 
in a quest for aristocratic power.)  Nonetheless, while signaling that voting rights were a 
legitimate area of postwar distinction, even restriction, of citizenship, the Jacksonborough 
Assembly followed through on their policy of offering relatively generous pardons to 
Loyalists who crossed back over in response to Governor Rutledge’s 1781 proclamations, 
giving them full voting and office-holding rights.91 
 
90 Marc W. Kruman, Between Authority & Liberty: State Constitution Making in Revolutionary America 
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997) 88-92, 96-97, 98-103, 159-60.  South Carolina was one of four states that adopted 
taxpayer status, not property, as the qualification for men to vote.  This extension of the franchise did split 
voting rights from the right to hold office, at least for religious minorities such as Jews and Catholics.  
Kruman also astutely notes that the extension of the franchise with the provision that men had to take an 
oath of allegiance and abjuration helped sway those who wished to remain neutral into active participation 
on the Patriot side in order to secure the franchise. 
91 Act No. 1147 “An Act for Settling the Qualification of the Electors and Elected, in the Next General 
Assembly,” Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 4: 510-11. 
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Restrictions on voting and office-holding for former Loyalists were common in 
most new American states.  North Carolina’s wartime test acts stripped Loyalists of 
voting rights, office-holding rights, the ability to bring civil suits, purchase or sell land, or 
carry weapons.  Pennsylvania also stripped those who refused oaths of allegiance of 
voting and holding office, as well as selling land and jury service.  New York and 
Connecticut also had similar laws.92 
Restricting voting and office-holding also proved popular in South Carolina. 
Aedanus Burke approved the result, telling a friend that the “Tory dead weight” had been 
removed thanks to Gov. Rutledge’s “good policy in excluding from voting all such 
persons as had not borne arms antecedent to the 27th September.”  This “Tory dead 
weight” had frustrated Charleston leaders in their early Revolutionary efforts, and they 
enjoyed the relative unanimity of purpose they had in 1782.  Even Burke, who opposed 
most of the confiscation efforts, and completely opposed the amercements, did not feel it 
was appropriate to allow Loyalists to vote.  As such, he too opposed full participatory 
citizenship for South Carolina’s Loyalists, arguing it was “madness to allow men to 
influence our Elections who had borne arms against us without giving some Test of their 
attachmt. to us.”  The 1782 act addressed this concern by requiring oaths for returning 
members, and requiring future oaths from Loyalists seeking to vote or serve in the 
Assembly.  This issue went to the heart of trust.  In a republic, men had to be able to trust 
each other’s word.  South Carolina Loyalists had pledged themselves to support the King.  
 
92 DeMond, N.C. Loyalists 156.  Ousterhout, State Divided 161-62.  Siebert, The Loyalists of Pennsylvania 
72, 88, 90.  Siebert indicates these restrictions might have applied to half of male citizens (although that 
estimate seems high).  Further, voting restrictions were not lifted until March 1789.  Oscar Zeichner, "The 
Loyalist Problem in New York after the Revolution," New York History 21, no. 3 (1940): 284-302.  Oscar 
Zeichner, "The Rehabilitation of Loyalists in Connecticut," The New England Quarterly 11, no. 2 (1938): 
308-30. 
 153 
Many had, at various times, promised themselves to both sides.  The entire question of 
loyalty was fraught, and so was any individual’s trustworthiness.  By painting the issue as 
a hard and fast rule, South Carolinians papered over the inherently problematic matter of 
how many of them had swayed at one time or another during the Revolutionary strife.93 
 In conclusion, the Confiscation Act on the surface was about punishment, but 
when we consider the larger frame of the negotiations in the Jacksonborough Assembly 
to fulfill competing priorities, we see that Confiscation was part of a larger strategy to co-
opt and pardon many Loyalists, attracting those without much war action back into the 
American fold. 
Do Not “Chafe the Survivors”: Popular Attitudes Towards the Loyalists, or the 
Mental World of Henry Laurens, South Carolinian and Peace Treaty Negotiator94 
Reconstructing popular attitudes in depth is difficult under the best of 
circumstances, and South Carolina records rarely offer the best of circumstances.  Little 
correspondence for 1782 survives, and the only newspaper was in Loyalist hands.  The 
court system was closed.  Church records are non-existent.  What letters do survive were 
written by a handful of prominent, politically connected South Carolinians in military and 
political positions.  Yet with the correspondence of a few well-placed South Carolina 
elite men, it is possible to reconstruct how at least one swathe of South Carolina elite 
society perceived Loyalists, Loyalist character, and the proper treatment of Loyalists in 
 
93 Aedanus Burke to Arthur Middleton, Jacksonborough, Jan. 25, 1782. Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Oct. 
1925,"  193. 
94 Hamer, ed., Laurens Papers  16: 67-68. 
 154 
the first year after the Jacksonborough Assembly.  Elite letters also preserve what must 
have been only a small amount of the correspondence sent by desperate yet hopeful 
Loyalists to former friends and acquaintances seeking help recovering their citizenship 
and property. 
John Lewis Gervais, a leader in the General Assembly, bitterly complained of his 
own losses in letters to friends in 1782.  In September, he was eagerly awaiting British 
withdrawal from Charleston, but fearful of what he would find.   
They have a great Spleen against me particularly, I believe I am the only one in 
the State, whose whole property they have removed to Charles Town_ horses, 
Cattle & Stock of all Sorts they have either destroyed or carried off from the 
plantation, in a Word they have left me nothing but my Land, which thank God 
they could not carry away. 95   
 
He especially blamed two South Carolina Loyalists, Andrew Williamson and 
Malcolm Brown, for “these kind offices.”  This may help to explain why both men found 
themselves on the Confiscation List.  Andrew Williamson was removed thanks to 
evidence from General Greene that he had spied for the Americans while holding a 
Loyalist commission, but perhaps thanks to Gervais’s implacable opposition, Malcolm 
Brown was subject to confiscation until 1791. 
Friends of Gervais reported that he lost everything to the enemy, escaping with 
clothes and a single horse.  Newly elected Governor John Mathews warned Arthur 
Middleton that “it is said they also burnt your father’s [house]” and possibly “carried off 
all his negroes” during the engagement in which John Laurens was killed.  Ralph Izard 
complained to a friend that he received reports that “my house is in a very ruinous 
condition,” despite, he mused, his “beautiful & elegant plaster” lares (Roman figurine 
 
95 John Lewis Gervais to Henry Laurens, Philadelphia, September 27, 1781, Hamer, ed., Laurens Papers 
16: 16, 31, also 31 footnote 13. 
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portraying a god of the household).  Again and again, people worried about damages to 
their homes and property, reflecting on the very real price they had paid for 
independence.  It was hard to be generous with Loyalists in the face of such genuine 
anxiety and loss.  Slaveholders were especially hard-struck financially and emotionally 
by the loss of most of their slaves.  In the face of such loss, it was especially galling to 
interact with Loyalists who had been spared confiscation, and flaunted themselves.96 
Edward Rutledge was disgusted with the men he and others dubbed the 
“protection Gentry”—those who had been spared confiscation, but had taken British 
protection.  Knowing what a narrow escape some of them had, and how much of their 
luck was due to the interventions of personal friends, he could not help but feel they 
should conduct themselves more adroitly (or at least have the decency to look ashamed.)  
He complained that Charles Drayton continued “as usual” despite his near-miss, and that 
despite the clemency the Assembly showed him he continuing “doing no one thing for 
the good of the state.”  Further, Drayton and his peers were “in the general highly 
offended if they receive the least Slight whatever” yet they refused to do militia duty.  
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney was also irritated with Drayton’s “constant trimming on 
both sides” which was “not an honorable part.”  He reflected that Drayton himself 
seemed to think it was a “sure Game.”97 
Yet one man, whose extensive correspondence is preserved, offers an especially 
revealing look inside the contradictory emotions and attitudes of South Carolinians. 
 
96 John Mathews to Arthur Middleton, Uxbridge, S.C. Aug. 25, 1782, Ralph Izard to Arthur Middleton, 
Philadelphia, May 30, 1783. Joseph W. Barnwell, "Correspondence of Hon. Arthur Middleton," The South 
Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine 27, no. 2 (1926): 51-80, see 71, 78. Henry Laurens to 
Edward Bridgen, Nantes, Aug. 29, 1782, Hamer, ed., Laurens Papers 16: 601. 
97 Edward Rutledge to Arthur Middleton, April 14, 1782, Edward Rutledge 1749-1800 Papers, 43/506, 
SCHS.  Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to Arthur Middleton, Camp near Bacon’s Bridge, April 24, 1782, 
Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Apr. 1926,"  61.   
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When the Confiscation Act passed, Henry Laurens was living in the Tower of London as 
a British prisoner of war, keeping up with the debates and actions of many state 
legislatures through a copious correspondence with his friends.  As a prisoner, he 
suffered heavily for his patriotism, and worried about the extent of his own financial 
losses.  He had an unusual double perspective on the problems of Loyalism, however, 
when he served as an American negotiator for the eventual peace treaty.    
Some of his correspondents were especially well-placed.  His son John Laurens 
was a member of the Jacksonborough Assembly and member of the confiscation 
committee.  (Although by all reports, John Laurens was bored by confiscation and eager 
to get back in the field, and certainly did not write at length in this period).  Other 
frequent correspondents included Benjamin Franklin, John Owen (another member of the 
confiscation committee), and John Lewis Gervais. 
 Laurens often expressed incredible anger at the British and Loyalists for the 
immense destruction the war caused.  From his vantage point in London, he was unsure 
of how much of his wealth was salvageable.  He was particularly likely to express this 
bitterness against British merchants who dunned him, or who sought his help in 
collecting debts from other Americans.  When John Davies, a London merchant, wrote 
him asking about a previous order for fishing nets, Laurens exploded with frustration.  He 
reminded Davies that “now the British forces have plunder’d him of all his property” it 
was ridiculous to ask about such things when he was unsure whether he still had “Fishing 
ponds & other water.”  Further, he tried to shame Davies, suggesting he should be “too 
humane to tantalize me” under the circumstances.  Similarly, when a distant relative 
wrote him asking for financial help, he reminded him that his estates had been “wickedly 
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plundered” and that it was morally deficient to even talk of “making provision, while our 
sources are in the hands of a violent & unjust Enemy.”98 
Laurens also reminded correspondents not to dun other South Carolina Patriots.  
For instance, he counseled his friend Edward Bridgen to avoid dunning John Lewis 
Gervais in 1782, warning him that he should “give a moments breathing time” to the man 
who had lost all of his account books in fleeing Charleston.  “Do not chaff a man 
whom…your Country…I say whom you have injured.”  So pressing an honorable 
American still struggling to reestablish himself would naturally “tend to excite 
resentment.”  This resentment, which Laurens invoked time and time again, was a threat.  
Should Americans become too resentful, they would simply refuse to pay their British 
debts at all.  Laurens used the threat of nonpayment to convince English creditors to 
delay payments.99   
Even when he was not using his losses and uncertainties to avoid creditors, he 
complained bitterly in letter after letter.  When he wrote to William McCulloch in March 
1782, he complained that “every Step of the British troops has been marked with 
barbarity, with cruel Murders Conflagrations, indiscriminate plunderings, Rapes & 
Ravishments.”  He told George Appleby that in 1783 he was in “a state of uncertainty” 
that was “exceedingly disagreeable to a poor Man who has lost 30 or 40 thousand pounds 
sterling.”  His own economic losses were often at the front of his mind when considering 
his own fate and the fates of Loyalists in South Carolina and London.  His bitterness over 
his personal troubles and economic dislocations inevitably colored his perceptions of 
 
98 Henry Laurens to John Davies, London, Feb. 2, 1782, Henry Laurens to William Manning, Nantes, Aug. 
3, 1782, Hamer, ed., Laurens Papers 15: 466, 545. 
99 Henry Laurens to Edward Bridgen, Nantes, August 29, 1782, Hamer, ed., Laurens Papers 15: 601-2. 
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Loyalists.  He dismissed most Loyalists as dishonorable men who had been swayed by 
base motives, not principle.100 
Henry Laurens had greater chance to consider how Loyalists should be treated 
when he joined the negotiation team for the peace treaty.  His letters from this period are 
especially interesting for understanding how he understood Loyalism.  British officials 
were pushing for the Americans to accept Loyalists and restore their property, and the 
British negotiating team were repeatedly instructed not to settle without compensation 
and return for American Loyalists.  In part, the British did this because many Loyalists 
preferred America, despite their losses, to poverty in London.  But the British were also 
hoping that their own treasury could be spared if the Americans could be forced to 
support the Loyalists instead of the British.  The Loyalists in England, of course, were 
desperate for support and angrily reminded the British government that they had lost 
everything in support of Britain, and therefore the British were morally obligated to help 
them now.  Laurens told British merchant and friend Edward Bridgen that the Loyalist 
refuges should be supported by the crown, for “they are yours, maintain them; had they 
honestly remained with us, they would not have been beggars.”  Notice his 
characterization of Loyalists as dishonest.  He further suggested that no one should have 
very much sympathy for the vast majority of Loyalists, “the greater part of whom 
affected to be Loyal upon no other prospect but that of plunder, from no other motive but 
that hope of fattening upon forfeited Estates [meaning Patriot estates].”  Laurens 
suggested that very few Loyalists were honorable men, but instead scoundrels motivated 
only by profit.  Loyalists were base opportunists, not honest men of principle.  Further, 
 
100 Henry Laurens to William McCulloch, Westminster, March 9, 1782, Henry Laurens to George Appleby, 
Bath, Feb. 18, 1783, Hamer, ed., Laurens Papers 15: 471-72, 16: 150. 
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they preyed on others, seeking to “fatten[]” on others’ woes.  Why should anyone 
sympathize?  A further clue to the way Laurens saw the Loyalists is suggested by his 
dismissal of them as largely drawn from the lowest order of society.  He argued at one 
point that “the whole amount of the Estates of those people would not defray one month’s 
Expence of the war, more probably not a week’s.”  In part, this reflected just how costly 
the war was.  But it also indicated a sense that Loyalists were men who were not from the 
gentleman class.  They had become Loyalists in search of personal profit.  It is also 
evidence he was beginning to separate the category ‘Loyalist’ from many of the people 
he actually knew.  Lowcountry gentlemen who found themselves subject to confiscation 
were different from this imaginary, constructed idea of a Loyalist, who better embodied a 
foot soldier not subject to the Confiscation Act (and likely to have fled to Florida or Nova 
Scotia.)101   
Henry Laurens, with the stock figure of the Loyalist in mind, did not expect that 
Loyalists had any right to demand anything from Americans.  He imagined a Loyalist 
trying to make a case for monetary compensation: “I am a Loyalist, I used my utmost 
endeavours to get you all hanged to confiscate your Estates & beggar Your Wives & 
children, pray make a provision for me or let me enjoy my Estate?”  Given how much 
damage Patriots’ estates had suffered (including Laurens’, of course), Laurens was 
simply enraged at the audacity of Loyalists seeking to keep their property.  Still in the 
white heat of war anger, Laurens invoked the suffering of women and children to justify a 
scorched earth policy towards the defeated Loyalists.  Laurens did give himself a back 
 
101 Roberta Tansman Jacobs, "The Treaty and the Tories: The Ideological Reaction to the Return of the 
Loyalists, 1783-1787" (PhD, Cornell University, 1974).  Henry Laurens to Edward Bridgen, Nantes, Aug. 
10, 1782, Hamer, ed., Laurens Papers 15: 555.  Of course, Laurens’ dismissal of Loyalists as people with 
small estates was not true, and if it had been, the General Assembly would not have seen confiscated 
estates as such a great way to pay their bills. 
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door to accept the claims of justice and humanity for a few Loyalists when he admitted to 
an English correspondent there were “a few among the Loyalists whose Cases I shall 
truly commiserate, but the number is very small,” but he had other neighbors in mind 
when he described what most Lowcountry Loyalists really were: those formerly “called a 
good sort of, or, good Men,” who had talked loudly of rebellion when it had been safe, 
but at the moment of decision, when “the day of danger” arrived, they had “shrunk from 
all [their] principles…[and] chose the strongest party.”  To a man who had risked so 
much, this was galling, and he didn’t see how he could be expected to be sympathetic.  
To such cases, Laurens argued he could not “as an honest man say anything in Your 
favour.”  While admitting that a few might be men of political principle and honorable 
action, he equated the vast majority of Loyalists with bandits.  Those who were not 
criminals were men of weak moral standing who comprehended the superiority of 
America’s position, but abandoned principle for their own safety.  With no moral claims 
on America, they could hardly expect to make successful appeals for their property.102 
 He must have had his former South Carolina peers in mind when he told James 
Bourdieu that he should not have too tender a conscience for the loud squawking of the 
Loyalists in England, for many of them had in fact been “stigmatizers and persecutors of 
true Loyalists” who had “changed sides when their fears allarmed them for their persons 
and their little estates.”  Here Laurens’s vilification of the Loyalists rose to new heights 
of anxiety.  He recognized that many South Carolinians who had been Patriots accepted 
British protection after the state was occupied.  In fact, many South Carolinians had little 
practical choice but to seek protection.  They were powerless; even the South Carolina 
governor fled the state.  Laurens turned this fact around, making the previous Patriot 
 
102 Henry Laurens to Edward Bridgen, Nantes, August 10, 1782, Hamer, ed., Laurens Papers 15: 554-555. 
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activities of these men the pathetic acts of bullies always attacking the weakest side.  
Laurens just dripped distaste when he characterized them as little men with “their little 
estates.”  He sneered that his enemy were now saddled with such worthless men.  In 
typically paranoid eighteenth-century language, he characterized them as a “promiscuous 
body of Men dinning you [the British] under the cry of loyalty” but really only looking 
for a handout.103 
Merchants and gentlemen were judged on their personal character by their 
creditworthiness, and one way to really attack another man’s personal character was to 
suggest he was unconcerned with honoring his debts.  Naturally, Laurens also accused 
the Loyalists of being financially unstable.  In persuading merchant Edward Bridgen to 
relax his attempts to recover debts from Laurens’ friend John Lewis Gervais, he argued 
that South Carolina Patriots could not pay their debts because their assets were tied up in 
bonds and notes owed  “chiefly in the name of those worthies called Loyalists” who 
would be unable or unwilling to pay their debts, leaving men like Gervais bankrupt.104 
 Henry Laurens consistently viewed the Loyalists as profoundly different from 
himself.  Despite knowing such men personally, he viewed them with fury, not 
understanding.  Since he and his son had made very different choices, he hated those who 
had taken the easier path, and the idea that he would suffer financially and personally 
while they were made whole was unthinkable. 
His reluctance to see Loyalists as sympathetic figures reached its apogee when he 
underestimated their numbers.  Laurens denied claims that there were large numbers of 
Loyalists in Charleston and New York City awaiting transport away from America.  In 
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discussions in London and Nantes (site of peace treaty negotiations), the British were 
using the figure of 10,000 Loyalists clustered in New York and Charleston awaiting 
transportation to other British areas.  Laurens disputed these numbers, telling Bridgen 
that “there is no such number nor any thing near it.”  Of course, these seem like 
reasonable estimates to contemporary historians.  But, as a Patriot South Carolinian, and 
as a member of the American negotiating team, Laurens had every reason to 
underestimate the number of American Loyalists.105 
 As much as Laurens resisted any attempts to get Americans to pay any costs 
associated with supporting Loyalists, he was also surprised that the British proved so 
unwilling to support them.  He told the Marquis de Lafayette that the British had been 
“shockingly displayed in their treatment of those deluded people called Loyalists in 
America…”  While Laurens felt it was right and just that Americans should confiscate 
the property of Loyalists, he also believed that Britain had an obligation to support such 
men and their families.  The cavalier attitude of Britain made him feel “shock[ed]”.  It 
also put him, and other leaders, in a bad position.  While it was fundamentally Britain’s 
job to support its friends, not America’s, someone would have to make provision for at 
least some of the Loyalists.  This was a standoff, with both the British and Americans 
trying to force the other side to pay for Loyalist support.  As a negotiator, but also as a 
spokesman for the way most Americans felt, Laurens needed to hold the line on any 
possible American financial provisions for Loyalists.  Nor was he alone.  Benjamin 
Franklin, among other Americans, believed Loyalists deserved confiscation and 
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 There is no such number nor any thing near it.”  Henry Laurens to Edward Bridgen, Nantes, Aug. 
10, 1782, Hamer, ed., Laurens Papers 15: 554-55.  Of course, his denials obscured the truth that these were 
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 163 
banishment, and the negotiating team was unified in its ideological, as well as practical, 
resistance to lifting confiscation.106    
This standoff continued as an official issue in the peace negotiations at Nantes.  
When he wrote fellow South Carolinians, he rushed to report on how Loyalists would be 
treated under the peace treaty.  This indicates a high level of concern among South 
Carolinians on whether they would have to make financial provision for Loyalists.  
(Embedded in this anxiety was the separate issue of whether they would have to honor 
their debts.)  As Roberta Jacobs found, Americans were largely united in 1782 and 1783 
in resistance to allowing every Loyalist to return (always allowing the possibility that a 
few could), and the news that the peace treaty might permit such return stirred up riots 
and organized political resistance almost everywhere. 
 Of all the things that the peace treaty covered, in letters to friends, Laurens was 
sure to emphasize treatment of Loyalists.  He told his relative James Laurens that a draft 
of the treaty called for “Congress to recommend to the several States restitution of Estates 
which had been confiscated” but reassured him that he should “observe tis to be a 
recommendation.”(emphasis added)  He was signaling that the compromise was to be 
that the treaty would call for the Americans to restore the estates despite the fact that the 
Americans were not so inclined.  But, since it was a recommendation, and not an order, 
Americans could refuse to play along.   And, as the negotiators, they knew that state 
legislatures were unlikely to relinquish confiscated estates just because the Treaty of 
Paris called on them to do so.  By agreeing to suggest a course of action without requiring 
it, both sides knew it was unlikely to have any influence.  Yet, it allowed both sides to 
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save face.  John Adams laughed to Laurens that “our countrymen love Buck Skins 
Beaver Skins, Tom Cod & Pine Trees too well, to hang their Ministers for accepting 
them, or even for purchasing them by a little too much ‘Reciprocity’ to the Tories.”  As 
John Adams noted, securing the rights of trade was more important than denying Loyalist 
restoration on principle.107 
Americans negotiating the peace treaty were uniformly dismissive of the Loyalists 
in London as a group, and were determined to avoid financial responsibility for them.  
Benjamin Franklin thanked Laurens for his efforts to “say what ought to be said 
respecting the pretended Loyalists.  Setting them in their true light must be of great 
Service.”  Franklin agreed with Laurens that the Loyalists had no “Principle” but instead 
had chosen the stronger side, and sought to “secur[e] Safety with a Chance of Emolument 
& Plunder.”  This view of Loyalists as unsavory characters bent on personal gain, and 
without the sound principles required of republican citizens, was widely shared.  It was 
not unique to South Carolinians.108 
Unsurprisingly, Laurens supported confiscation.  In one letter, he almost shook 
with anger when he told a merchant friend that he should remember it was not 
“unreasonable” to confiscate estates, since “many families in those States have been 
driven into the Woods reduc’d from affluence to the most extreme penury.”  Confiscation 
was the natural outcome of the war.  Yet despite this, he was willing to help some 
individuals appeal their cases.  He correctly anticipated a process of appeal and 
adjustment in the post-war years that would remove some individuals from confiscation, 
while preserving the intent of driving out the most hated Loyalists.  It was in this process 
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of sifting through individual cases where he began to separate his own acquaintances 
from his stock Loyalist figure, and to suspect that others from his class would do the 
same.109 
Henry Laurens’ nephew, Elias Ball of Comingtee, was on the 1782 confiscation 
list.  He wrote Laurens for aid, and Laurens obliged with an offer for his nephew to settle 
Laurens’s lands in Georgia and work them if “the state of Georgia will receive you.”110  
Laurens reassured his attorney that he hoped that “the time is coming when I shall take 
[Elias Ball] again into my arms as a friend” but that until that time came he was content 
to help Ball settle at Laurens’s own expense.  Laurens’ offer was generous, but not 
entirely without self-interest, as Ball could serve as his Georgia overseer, and would 
cultivate all the land with his own slaves, making profits for both men.  Laurens did not 
directly support Ball’s appeal to the South Carolina legislature, however.  While Ball was 
removed from confiscation in 1784, it was not through Laurens’ aid.  Later, Laurens was 
pleased that his nephew at least offered him a personal apology for his actions with the 
British.  Ball “discuss[ed] the matter of [his] political conduct & the part [he] took in the 
late cruel and unjust persecution of your Country” with “reflection.”  Laurens chided him 
that “you had not resolution to persevere in a cause which you had engaged in & knew to 
be righteous.”  Despite his disappointment at Ball’s failure to “persevere,” he felt Ball 
would “become a valuable Citizen” to the state of Georgia.  Why in the world did 
Laurens think that a man, who had proven that, despite his adherence to republican 
principles in theory, he would not “persevere” when times were difficult, would make a 
good citizen?  Part of his reasoning, which provides a window into the minds of many, 
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was a separation between what made a man a good Patriot, and what made him a useful 
member of peacetime society.  Laurens was convinced that Ball would be a good 
plantation manager—a man of business.  His personal life was circumspect.  In all these 
ways he was a good citizen.  Yet his political behavior was deeply upsetting to Laurens.  
With goodwill, Laurens tried to negotiate between these two poles by sending his nephew 
to another state, thereby unloading the problem.111 
 Despite his pronounced distaste for Loyalists, and his approval of confiscation, he 
did agree to help non-relatives with their petitions for the restoration of their confiscated 
estates.  Henry Laurens made some efforts on behalf of his friend and factor Edward 
Bridgen in the face of the North Carolina General Assembly’s Confiscation Act.  
Bridgen’s property in North Carolina was subject to confiscation under a 1779 act that 
confiscated the property of British absentee landlords.  Laurens assured Brigden in June 
1782 that he would “write on that Subject to my friends in Congress & more largely 
respecting your Affairs in North Carolina which I hope will eventually feel the influence 
of Justice stimulated by Gratitude in your favor.”  Still, he supported Bridgen’s claims 
because Bridgen was a British citizen, not a Loyalist.  Bridgen had taken no military part 
in the war, had destroyed no property in America, and had, as the suggestions of 
“Gratitude” imply, made efforts on behalf of the American cause.  Laurens did pursue 
efforts on Bridgen’s part for years, although Bridgen ultimately had his property restored 
thanks to Benjamin Franklin’s intercessions, not Laurens’. 112 
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 Archibald Simpson also maintained a correspondence with Henry Laurens in the 
hopes of help in having his property restored.  He had served as a Presbyterian minister in 
the Lowcountry before returning to Scotland in 1772, and suffered confiscation as a 
British resident.  He wrote Laurens in October 1782 to secure his aid in representing his 
case to the legislature, as part of his general preparations for visiting South Carolina in 
1783 with an eye to restoring his property.113 
Henry Laurens also supplied a character testament for William Blake to travel 
unmolested to South Carolina in order to pursue restoration of his property.  William 
Blake, who shared a name with a well-known Loyalist who was on the Confiscation Act, 
approached Henry Laurens for a testament to his American citizenship for his passage 
back to South Carolina from England, which Laurens was willing to give him.  Blake 
returned to South Carolina and became one of the 1783 petitioners to the General 
Assembly in order to ensure that his citizenship and property did not suffer from his 
absence in England and his unfortunate name.114 
 Henry Laurens encouraged friends and acquaintances to carefully consider the 
timing and tone of their attempts to reclaim their American property.  He told backers of 
Lady Juliana Penn that she should refrain from pressing her suit anytime soon, for fear 
that “chaf[ing] the Survivors” would heighten resentment towards Loyalists and only 
ensure that no one’s property would be restored.  Such Britons should “remember that the 
Minds of the People are sore & many of their Bodies too from Oppression and 
Grievances.  Give them a decent Time for recovery and deliberation.”  If Loyalists 
petitioned too early, they would suggest that they did not have “apparent Confidence in 
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[Americans’] Justice and Consideration,” and that lack of trust would be fatal.  Laurens 
believed that Americans would naturally become more forgiving and less severe with the 
passage of time, and that it behooved petitioners to wait patiently for the right time.  If 
they upset legislators by petitioning too early, they would leave a bad impression and be 
unable to get a better deal later.  Laurens was very astute in understanding that only a few 
short years would make clemency much more palatable, as long as Loyalists conducted 
themselves in ways that were sufficiently modest, apologetic, yet upstanding, to merit 
mercy and inclusion.115 
Laurens also anticipated later changes to the 1782 Confiscation Act in other ways.  
He cautioned his friend Richard Champion to be very cautious in buying confiscated 
estates in South Carolina, because he might purchase an unclear title that would be 
subject to years of litigation.  Champion wanted to immigrate to America, and saw the 
sales of confiscated estates as an advantage.  He never said why, but presumably he 
thought he could obtain more attractive, settled lands for a better price than he could 
under more normal circumstances.  Laurens correctly perceived that estates might be 
subject to legal claims that Champion would then have to pay.  In fact, as South 
Carolinians moved to recognize dower rights in later years for the wives of Loyalist 
exiles, purchasers were forced to pay those dower rights out of their purchases, lessening 
the value of what they had acquired.  Further, the tension with dower rights meant that 
their titles were insecure for years.116 
Henry Laurens correctly anticipated the way confiscation appeals would play out.  
He counseled a friend that the General Assembly would consider appeals, but those 
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appeals would have to be prepared carefully and submitted formally.  Bridgen wanted to 
send messages through friends, in letters like the ones he had written to Laurens.  Henry 
Laurens told him that was a poor way to pursue the return of his property.  Rather than 
rely on the wrong friend, he suggested Bridgen “send a proper message to the House.”  In 
part, Laurens did not want the responsibility of too close involvement, although Bridgen 
was a good friend.  But he also sensed that the Assembly would pursue a formal 
reconsideration and appeals process in the intervening years.  Laurens suggested that the 
Assembly would not want to consider each case separately, but: 
besides it will be highly improper to repeal a Law upon the representation of a 
single letter; Every man has his friends & none of those, whose Estates have been 
justly forfeited, but may find a friend to pen a letter in his favor; let this Matter 
rest till the end of the War, We shall have other similar cases before us, which 
may be considered at the same time & one law if necessary passed for relieving 
the whole & not for a single man instance, which would occasion us a great deal 
of unnecessary trouble, without any real advantage to the parties.”117 
 
We will see in the next two chapters that the General Assembly certainly considered how 
much support a man had, but depended on formal application to the Assembly, in part to 
preserve their own authority.  Laurens also predicted the avalanche of forthcoming 
petitions.  After all, “every man has his friends,” and almost every many could find 
someone to write the legislature.  Further, it would be “highly improper” to depend solely 
on one letter.  The General Assembly needed more evidence.  He also understood that too 
much appearance of partiality would compromise the General Assembly’s standing.  
They needed to guard their reputation jealously. 
Mary Stead, daughter of a Charleston merchant, wrote Laurens seeking help in 
her efforts to reclaim a share of her father’s confiscated Georgia estate.  Her father had 
died in 1776, leaving his estate to his three children.  His lands in Georgia were 
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confiscated in 1782 by the Georgia legislature.  Laurens assured Miss Stead he was 
willing to help her, but tried to reassure her that she should trust the honorable instincts of 
men in the legislature.  He thought that they intended to provide for women like her, the 
“Female Orphan.”    Again, he counseled patience, reminding her that while she sat in 
comfort in England, the “Georgians had been particularly maltreated by the British, but 
will not a moment for Reflexion arrive?  Will not justice arise & command…in behalf of 
Injured Innocence?”  Again and again, Laurens linked the pain caused by the British to 
confiscation, suggesting that when the legislatures had the leisure to consider cases more 
carefully, they would make provision for women and absentee landlords.  His language 
did suggest that he thought that the haste and anger of war had swept people into 
confiscation who would be removed in the interests of “justice” when the fog of war 
lifted and everyone had time for “reflexion.”  In defense of the legislature, he argued they 
had never confiscated property without “necessary & magnanimous reservation.”  But, in 
a practical vein, he also told her family they would have more luck retrieving their 
property by going in person, rather than relying on letters from friends and counselors. 
Despite all the laws passed to get Loyalists to leave, physical presence made a real 
difference in the appeals process.  For families like the Steads, who had been absent 
during the war, committing to America by moving helped to sway the legislature.  This 
was not only a debate about property rights, but also a test of citizenship and belonging.  
Even women whose legal claims to dower and inheritance were persuasive needed to put 
a human face before the legislature.118 
 Henry Laurens was in a unique position to consider the dilemma of how to treat 
Loyalists.  As a member of the peace treaty negotiating team, he had every reason to 
 
118 Henry Laurens to Alice Delancey Izard, Paris, June 5, 1783, Hamer, ed., Laurens Papers 16: 204-05. 
 171 
resist any attempt to restore Loyalist estates.  As a South Carolina Patriot worried about 
his own property, he was keenly aware of the destruction the British and Loyalists had 
caused, and the need to pay it back.  While he was not involved in creating legislative 
confiscation in South Carolina, he supported the idea, and his own beloved son was a 
member of the legislature that enacted it.  Yet as a friend and kinsman, he helped 
numerous individuals affected by confiscation in their efforts to regain their property.  He 
also understood that healing would take time, and that Loyalists had to prepare to give 
grieving Patriots enough time to consider their cases with the benefit of emotional 
distance after intial efforts to reestablish their own society after war. 
 He certainly understood loss.  As he reflectively told one relative, when he started 
preparations for war, he was mourning one son (who died from a fall).  “When I was 
called upon to sign the Preliminaries for Peace I was in deep mourning for that brave 
honest man, that good soldier and good Citizen, that dutiful Son and sincere friend” John 
Laurens.  Yet despite his own tremendous anger and pain, he was able to see his way to 
forgiving certain individuals well-known to him, while hating the idea of a Loyalist.  In 
this, he points the way to understanding how members of the South Carolina General 
Assembly would come to extend clemency to many Loyalists subject to confiscation and 
banishment in a short time.119 
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Conclusion 
 To conclude, the Jacksonborough Assembly passed a comprehensive confiscation 
and banishment act that stripped some 400 South Carolina Loyalists of their property and 
citizenship.  Other states also passed confiscations, but South Carolina’s was harsh.  Yet 
confiscation was only part of the picture.  While the General Assembly overwhelmingly 
agreed with the idea of punishing Loyalists, the details mattered.  Legislators endeavored 
to protect personal friends and relatives, while sometimes pursuing personal enemies.  
After intensive negotiation, the Assembly agreed on a list that singled out men who took 
officer-level commissions or signed public welcome addresses to the conquering British.  
Even this list might be regarded as merciful, for it comprised a small percentage of the 
total Loyalist population. 
 Confiscation, for all that it seems like a post-war activity, was actually shaped by 
the needs of a wartime legislature and a wartime society.  At a time when the British still 
occupied the most important city, South Carolina’s government used a system of carrots 
and sticks to try to persuade “protection men” (those who took protection, but had not 
pursued military activities very strongly, or taken plunder, or killed people off the field of 
battle) to rejoin the Patriot side and contribute money and time to the military effort.  
Confiscees were people who had ignored earlier attempts to get them to return.  The 
General Assembly also pardoned many Loyalists, and subjected others to an amercement, 
as a way of creating a lesser penalty that still allowed Loyalists to have South Carolina 
citizenship. 
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 As harsh as confiscation was, it could have been much worse.  Given how angry 
most Patriot South Carolinians were after surviving a civil war, it was necessary to 
punish someone.  Loyalists had chosen the wrong side in a civil war, and while atrocity 
rhetoric was certainly overheated, both sides committed unspeakable acts towards each 
other.  Under these circumstances, confiscation was unavoidable, and what is surprising 
is the amount of true mercy the South Carolina government showed from the beginning.  
Confiscation makes even more sense when one realizes how broke the state really was, 






LOBBYING FOR FORGIVENESS: THE CULTURE OF 
PETITIONING AND THE MOVE TO NORMALIZATION, 1782-1784 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Jacksonborough Assembly of 1782 
sought a comprehensive legislative solution to the problem of Loyalism.  They passed a 
Confiscation Act and an Amercement Act that together prescribed public punishment for 
approximately 400 Loyalists who had held British officer-level commissions, had spent 
the war in England, had signed congratulatory addresses to the British upon the reduction 
of Charleston, or taken another highly public step in favor of the British.  From the 
official perspective of the Jacksonborough Assembly, South Carolina was done with the 
problem of Loyalism.  Some Loyalists would be punished, branded as traitors.  Others 
would be allowed to remain in the state and remake their lives to the extent possible.  
Those who were banished would have to sail away with the British when they withdrew 
in December 1782.  Men who might undermine the delicate process of building a strong 
independent state and nation were not welcome.  Traitors had given up any legitimate 
claim to citizenship, having abandoned it and abused the honor and virtue that it required. 
 Yet it was clear from the moment the General Assembly passed the acts that it 
was not going to be that simple.  Loyalists were petitioning for clemency before the ink 
was dry.  Others immediately began planning their appeal, lining up supporters and 
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planning what angle might be best suited to winning official favor.  Loyalists who were 
named in the Confiscation and Amercement Acts were not content to be excluded from 
the new state.  While there were certainly Loyalists who did choose to leave (or were 
forced to leave), the overwhelming majority of those named in the Confiscation and 
Amercement Acts chose to petition the General Assembly for clemency.   
Nothing in the 1782 acts had provided for any reconsideration.  Loyalists 
overwhelmingly chose to create an alternative by petitioning the legislature, drawing on 
traditional understandings of petitioning and governmental power in a radically new 
situation.  This chapter will consider the strategies that Loyalists used in creating 
petitions that were likely to persuade later General Assemblies to reconsider the decisions 
made at the Jacksonborough Assembly.  In understanding the strategies of petitioners, we 
will understand the real beliefs about citizenship in the nascent Republic that were widely 
shared by individuals of many ranks, but not enshrined into law.  Facing the issue of 
Loyalism forced South Carolinians to begin legally to define citizenship in a way that 
wrote into law what had been understood. 
“The Confiscation Act Began to Work on Them Some Time Since”: Loyalists React 
to the Confiscation Act, Seeking Palatable Options1 
 Aedanus Burke noted in May 1782, about two months after passage of the 
Confiscation Act, that the “Confiscation Act began to work on them [the Loyalists] some 
time since, and still continues to sweat them considerably.”  Well aware of their 
 
1 Aedanus Burke to Arthur Middleton, May 14, 1782, Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Oct. 1925," , 197. 
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vulnerable position, the Loyalists would “give the world now for an opportunity, even to 
cringe, like Spaniels” in the hopes of securing a place in post-war South Carolina. 
Everywhere the Loyalists looked, signs were grim.  In May 1782, Georgia also passed a 
confiscation law remarkably similar to South Carolina’s.  A total of 277 Georgians were 
stripped of their citizenship and property.  North Carolinians moved to sell confiscated 
property in April 1782.  Archibald MacLaine, a member of the North Carolina Assembly, 
advised his Loyalist son-in-law, George Hooper, of the unstable situation in North 
Carolina while Hooper was living in Charleston.  He advised Hooper that obtaining his 
property was likely to be fraught with difficulty.  Nor was he the only correspondent 
filling Charleston with news worrying Loyalists.2 
 A certain hysteria, and palpable melancholy, filled the Royal Gazette in 1782.  
Published in occupied Charleston, the Loyalist newspaper reported rumors and printed 
letters that helped spread panic.  Loyalists were well aware of the Confiscation Act 
through letters and circulars, but details also appeared in the Loyalist press.  On July 9, 
1782, shortly after Independence Day (not so happy a celebration for Loyalists), 
Charlestonians read that the confiscated property of “gentlemen who have remained firm 
to the engagements they entered into” with the British government had been sold.  By 
implication, many men who had previously taken protection had fled Charleston in recent 
months, seeking an accommodation with the victorious Patriots.  Angry Loyalists might 
have been cheered that “a party of our Dragoons” captured fifty slaves of Elias Ball of 
Wambaw before the Commissioners of Forfeited Estates could sell them, but the entire 
episode also reminded readers that their property would be rapidly auctioned.  Even more 
 
2 Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Oct. 1925," 197.  Robert S. Lambert, "The Confiscation of Loyalist Property 
in Georgia, 1782-1786," The William and Mary Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1963): 80-94, 82.  DeMond, N.C. 
Loyalists  162-66. 
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depressingly, in the late summer and early fall of 1782, the paper began to fill with 
official notices about convoys to St. Augustine.   
Adding to the gloom were advertisements for businesses and homes that Loyalists 
hoped to sell before leaving.  William Carson, who was banished before 1782 and 
therefore was not named on the Confiscation Act, was nevertheless still living in 
Charleston in 1782.  He advertised that he intended to “leave this province with the first 
convoy to Europe or New York” and would consequently need to sell “ALL his 
HOUSEHOLD GOODS and FURNITURE” and a slave trained in the barbering 
profession.  The sale was for “Cash only.”  He did not sell his home, probably because no 
buyer would purchase a confiscated estate from a Loyalist well after the passage of the 
Confiscation Act.  Doing so would certainly be a good way to lose money.  Further, to 
whom was a Loyalist supposed to sell?  Many were leaving, and others were more 
concerned with finding a way to preserve their own property.  Patriot wives could enter 
the city, but men found transit more limited and were more likely to be the purchasers of 
such items.3 
One Patriot spy reported to General Marion that in the last weeks before 
evacuation, “the lamentations of the Poor Going Away almost destitute of every Comfort 
of Life” filled the air as soldiers prepared the city for departure.  Even the spy concluded 
the whole place was a “most Melancholy Scene” in a brief moment of sympathy.4 
 Even during the legislative debates on the Confiscation Act, Loyalists got news in 
Charleston of the process, and began trying to influence it.  Edward Rutledge, one of the 
main architects of confiscation, noted that “since the Confiscation List has made its way 
 
3 April 30, 1782, July 9, 1782, Aug. 13, 1782, Sept. 10, 1782, Royal Gazette. 
4 99/Secret Correspondent to General Marion, Charlestown, Nov. 13, 1782, Peter Horry Collection 
Letterbook, Peter Force Papers 1683-1789, David Library of the American Revolution. 
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into Town (which it did in a few days after the Commtee reported upon it) several broad 
Hints from our quondam Enemies wishing that we wd permit they would return to their 
Countrymen” were sent.  By late April, Rutledge reported that the “Tories in general 
seem heartily tired of their situation.”  More to the point, around 40 had left Charleston 
within days and “returned to their own Homes: where I believe they will be permitted to 
remain if they are peaceably inclined.”  Allowing them to return was not only merciful, 
but gave them a strong presumption of the right to stay permanently.  Rutledge was aware 
of this problem, and did not want men named in the Confiscation Act to be able to take 
advantage of the situation.  In June 1782, persistent rumors suggested the British would 
be evacuating within weeks.  It was not true, but Loyalists in Charleston also believed it.  
They frantically sought accommodation.  Rutledge discouraged men on the confiscation 
list from remaining.  “Several of the Banished declare they are resolved to remain, of 
which neither the Lands or Policy of this State will admit.”  Recognizing that some 
intended to remain no matter what he said, he warned, “I expect my Share of the 
Trouble” should they stay.5 
 At the same time that South Carolinians were strongly discouraging native sons 
who had taken positions with the British from living in the country, they were actively 
encouraging British soldiers to desert.  The problem was with Loyalists, not with all 
members of the British forces. 
 Loyalists were not the only ones who presumed that petitioning would create a 
system for reviewing the decisions of the Jacksonborough Assembly.  Many Patriot 
South Carolinians came to believe the same thing in the second half of 1782.  Henry 
 
5 Edward Rutledge to Arthur Middleton, Jacksonborough, Feb. 14, 1782, Cane Acre April 23, 1782, 
Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Jan. 1926," , 5-6, 14. 
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Laurens counseled one friend to “send a proper message to the House” since with “all 
Parliamentary probability” it would be accepted.  For Laurens, the accepted legitimacy of 
petitioning guaranteed even Loyalist petitioners a hearing.6 
Creating the Petitions 
Having considered why so many Loyalists wanted to appeal to the General 
Assembly, let us consider how they intended to do so.  Loyalist petitioners and their 
attorneys were primarily interested in petitioning as a means to an end.   The majority of 
the petitioners sought to live in the state and keep most of their property for themselves 
and their families.  Under the confiscation law, they would be banished and their estates 
forfeited not only for themselves, but also for their families.  If the act were enforced, it 
meant starting over in a new, usually unknown place, with little or nothing of value to 
pay one’s way and ease the transition.  As the words of one widely reprinted poem 
satirized the Loyalist dilemma: “To go or not to go, that is the question,” and continued 
with the query whether they should brave the unknowns of Nova Scotia or “stay among 
the rebels, /And by our stay rouse up their keenest rage.”  The popularity of the poem 
certainly suggested that the “keenest rage” would make it difficult for Loyalists to secure 
safety and property in the new nation.  Yet despite the departure of some 4,000 black and 
white Loyalists from Charleston, the majority stayed put.  This latter group included 
many of the men named in the Confiscation Act, who played military and civilian leaders 
 
6 For more on petitioning as an early American form of politics, see the next section.  Henry Laurens to 
Edward Bridgen, Bath, Oct. 11, 1782, Hamer, ed., Laurens Papers . 
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against each other in their quest for passes to stay.7 
For some very committed Loyalists, leaving was the only option.  Local ties had 
much to do with this decision, just as we will see it influenced those who stayed.  Some 
Loyalists were warned by their neighbors to leave or be killed.  One John Wigfall wrote 
his friend saying he would come back to the American side and join General Marion’s 
forces if he “could have the least assurance that his Life would not be taken.”  He was 
worried because someone else had sent him a letter threatening that if he returned they 
would “take his Life.”  Christopher Gadsden threatened a former friend that he would be 
“hang’d to be sure.”   This local heat convinced some Loyalists it was not safe ever to 
return.  Accepting the informal trial and conviction by their neighbors, they fled forever.  
(Some refused to do that despite threats.  As we will see in Chapter Five, one man stayed 
after being whipped by a hostile Charleston mob in 1784.)   But for many South 
Carolinians, staying in their homes and regaining their estates was a far more appealing 
option.  Many of these Loyalists were in fact people who had taken British protection 
when they had few choices.  They were not politically committed to Britain.  Several had 
been outspoken Whigs before the occupation of Charleston.  South Carolina was their 
home, and they were willing to work hard to convince the General Assembly and their 
fellow citizens that they were good citizens, not the traitors they were branded.8 
 
7 The Tory’s Soliloquy, widely reprinted in American newspapers in 1783, including the South Carolina 
Gazette.  For the full text, see Catherine S. Crary, ed., The Price of Loyalty: Tory Writings from the 
Revolutionary Era, Bicentennial of the American Revolution (New York, 1973) 391-92.  General Greene 
and General Marion were particularly sympathetic to Loyalists, and issued several passes.  For more on 
this, see Chapter 5. 
8 Benjamin Quark for John Wigfall, Testimonies and Notes, General Assembly Free Conference 
Committee Petitions for Relief from Confiscation 1783-1784, S 165035 (hereinafter “Hearing Testimony”), 
South Carolina Department of Archives and History (hereinafter “SCDAH”).  The story of Gadsden’s 
threatening his former friend spread around South Carolina. Edward Rutledge gleefully reported this 
version in a letter to his friend Arthur Middleton.  Dec. 12, 1781, printed in Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. 
Oct. 1925,"  208. 
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 While some South Carolina Loyalists withdrew and waited years to petition, the 
vast majority of Loyalists named in the official acts submitted petitions to the 1783 
legislature, preparing petitions as the ink was drying on the Confiscation Act.  Of 192 
Loyalists whose petitions are easily located in the original series (as opposed to those 
who are recorded as petitioning in a legislative journal only, or who were recognized in 
later acts but for whom no petition can be found), 138 submitted petitions by the General 
Assembly meeting in 1784, when the Assembly passed an act removing many from 
confiscation.  Put another way, some 70 % of these Loyalists targeted for punishment 
petitioned quickly for clemency.9   
As the 1783 Assembly opening approached, the volume of petitions increased.  In 
just one example, John and Patrick Cunningham’s supporters signed petitions on October 
18, 1782.10  By the end of January 1783 alone, the House of Representatives had 
processed 104 petitions pleading for relief from confiscation and amercement.  Many of 
these people ignored the requirement to leave the state, staying in order to prosecute their 
cases.  In one example, Philip Porcher stayed in his own Lowcountry home from 1782 
until he was removed from the confiscation list in 1784.  In August of 1782, Edward 
Rutledge noted that many merchants had already returned “petitions.”  Others petitioned 
from outside the state, relying on friends to ensure that petitions arrived in time. Still 
others hired lawyers the better to represent their cases in their absence.  London-based 
 
9 GA Petitions.  I also checked my data against Appendix C, Coker, "The Punishment of Revolutionary 
War Loyalists in South Carolina"  503-07.  Several Loyalists were later pardoned, yet there is no record of 
their petitioning.  Perhaps the petitions were lost, or perhaps they simply wrote several legislators without 
any record’s being kept of those transmissions.  In any case, few men did not petition at all. 
10 Petition of the Inhabitants on or near Saluda River in Ninety Six, 1783-87, 1783-89, Petitions to the 
General Assembly, 1782-1866, South Carolina Department of Archives and History.  This petition series 
will subsequently be cited as GA Petitions. 
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merchants Baker and Linwood were among those who hired attorney John Deas to 
represent them.11 
 Petitioning was a well-established political form by the eighteenth century, in 
both the American colonies and England. Petitioning was so embedded in early American 
political life that the right to petition was enshrined in the First Amendment to the 
Constitution (an often forgotten part of the first amendment today.)  In the American 
colonies, the use of petitions was rooted in a tight local link between the petitioners and 
the legislature, in which the legislature had knowledge of the issues raised in petitions.  
For example, eighteenth-century Virginians used petitions to present local needs and 
grievances to the legislature before and after the Revolution.  County divisions, one 
example of an intensely local concern, were begun and decided on the basis of petitions.  
While in colonial assemblies, petitions were the primary way that bills originated, 
petitioners and legislators assumed that people aware of local interests and relationships 
would handle petitions.  Certainly the South Carolina General Assembly followed these 
practices in the post-war period.  In the case of Loyalist legislation, petitions were read 
aloud by a member of the House of Representatives, or less commonly the Senate.  
Petitions were then referred to committee.  Committees always had members from the 
same area as the petitioner, and usually, though not always, were also introduced by a 
local representative.12   
 
11 Stephen Mazyck to Peter Porcher, Charlestown, June 14, 1783. SCHS. Petition Mr. Linwood and 
William Baker, Theodora J. Thompson and Rosa S. Lumpkin, eds., Journals of the House of 
Representatives 1783-1784 (Columbia, S.C., 1977) 82-83.  Edward Rutledge to Arthur Middleton, August 
1782, Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Jan. 1926," 21. 
12 Anita Hodgekiss, "Petitioning and the Empowerment Theory of Practice," The Yale Law Journal 96, no. 
3 (Jan., 1987): 569-92, 569-73.  The relevant clause of the First Amendment protects the right to “petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.”  The right to free speech was closely related to the more 
fundamental right to petition, rather than vice versa. Stephen A. Higginson, "A Short History of the Right 
to Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances," The Yale Law Journal 96, no. 1 (Nov., 1986): 142-
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Further, the Anglo-American right to petition carried with it the duty of legislative 
consideration.  Petitions were not just a request, but commanded the duty of formal 
legislative consideration, including a reading on the floor of the legislature and 
committee action.  In this light, the behavior of Loyalist petitioners makes much more 
sense.  By initiating a petition, they expected that the General Assembly would have to 
consider their case.  Petitioning offered the chance to create a de facto trial for each 
petitioner on his individual case—something they had no other realistic way to 
accomplish.  Petitioners had to shape their petitions to make their case in the best way.  
Certainly petitioners wanted to present themselves in the best light possible, but 
conventions of petitioning made this even more important.  Petitioners expected their 
grievances to be subject to counter testimony, as the “act of petition… ‘call[ed] for due 
witness to be borne against it….’”  In Virginia, petitioners faced the possibility of 
counter-petitions.  Raymond Bailey has termed these dueling petition exchanges a 
“polling device,” and has found that counter-petitions badly hurt the chance of success.  
Petition legally demanded an organized consideration of the grievance, including the 
right to a hearing or trial at which evidence on both sides could be reasonably given.  In 
the early period of each colony, the right to petition effectively functioned as the court 
system.13 
Further, petitioning was a form of public political action that was available to 
people who were otherwise blocked from the political arena.  Americans who could not 
vote could petition their local legislature (at least as long as they could write or find 
                                                                                                                                            
66 157.  Raymond C. Bailey, Popular Influence Upon Public Policy: Petitioning in Eighteenth-Century 
Virginia, Contributions in Legal Studies (Westport, Conn., 1979) 23, 68-84, 166. 
13 Higginson, "Right to Petition,"  143, 148. Higginson refers to this as the “governmental duty to consider 
petitioner’s grievances.” 143, and 143 footnote 2.  Raymond C. Bailey, Popular Influence Upon Public 
Policy: Petitioning in Eighteenth-Century Virginia (Westport, Conn., 1979)31. 
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someone who would write on their behalf).  Colonial assemblies considered petitions 
from slaves, women, Native Americans, and convicted felons.  Especially in the case of 
women and poor men, “the right to petition vested these groups with a minimum form of 
citizenship” and offered a route to political power for those denied the franchise.14   This 
“minimal citizenship” was based on recognition of shared investment in the outcome of 
political processes.  Loyalists were no longer citizens, so petitioning was their only 
securely recognized option to exert political power.  Further, since petitioning carried 
with it “minimum citizenship,” Loyalists’ use of the form created an assertion of 
citizenship, one that they vigorously exploited, as we will see. 
Petitioning was not only available to the dispossessed, but also was utilized by a 
wide cross section of colonial and early national society.  Petitions from poor people 
were not only accepted, but also granted.  One convincing piece of evidence that people 
from lower backgrounds utilized petitions is the use of marks instead of signatures on 
petitions.  While not always indicative of social class, in eighteenth-century Virginia and 
South Carolina, a mark is a good proxy for the limited social standing of some of those 
men making their marks.  South Carolina signatories certainly used marks, usually with 
another writer filling in the full name beside or on top of the mark.15 
Anglo-American petitions were outwardly polite, begging the attention of the 
legislature in formal, deferential language.  Yet, because they carried a positive 
expectation of consideration, they also were demands.  Pre-Revolutionary petitions were 
inherently written in the voice of dependence.  In the Revolutionary period, petitioners, 
 
14 Higginson, "Right to Petition," 153.  Bailey, Popular Influence 6. 
15 Bailey, Popular Influence 41-44.  Just one example of a South Carolina petition with marks should 
suffice: the inhabitants of Fairfield County petitioned for debt relief and the staying of payments.  
Economic distress certainly attracted its share of petitioners of lower economic status.  Three signers used 
marks on that one petition.  Petition of the Inhabitants of Fairfield County, 1788-9, GA Petitions. 
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especially white men with some property, “became less obsequious” in their language 
and demands.  Phrases such as “obedient and faithful Subjects” slowly gave way to 
phrases that incorporated citizenship.  This was especially true in the petitions of 
militiamen and veterans, who demanded action on the basis of their own contributions as 
citizens.  One group of Delaware citizens reminded their legislature of their own 
republican status by petitioning “’the Honorable the REPRESENTATIVES of the 
FREEMEN of the Delaware State.’”  One typical 1780s South Carolina petition seeking 
a new road was addressed to “the Honourable Speaker and the Honorable Members of the 
Senate In the State of South Carolina.”  Address showed respect for republican 
representation, not just status.16 
Yet despite the increasing forthrightness and even stridency in the language of 
post-Revolution petitions, petitions still were “an appeal to the good will of officials” and 
therefore careful to maintain language and claims that were as inoffensive-sounding as 
possible.  Petitioners claimed rights, but made appeals for specific, immediate actions.17  
Colonial assemblies had long used petitioning to expand their own powers.  With the end 
of colonial rule, legislatures no longer had the implicit threat of appeals over their heads 
to the King.  In Virginia, the number of petitions sent to the lower house of the legislature 
increased steadily in the second half of the eighteenth-century, and after the Revolution 
petitions to the executive or council fell drastically, leaving the elected representatives as 
 
16 Ruth Bogin, "Petitioning and the New Moral Economy of Post-Revolutionary America," WMQ 45, no. 3 
(1988): 391-425 420-21.  Petition of the Sundry Inhabitants Residing on the North & Southside of Saludy 
River In Lexington County, 1789-8, GA Petitions.  Petitioning had a long history in Britain as well, and 
was one of the rights guaranteed by British constitutionalism.  Petitioning was a popular response to 
worries about the American Revolution on the British side as well.  For a longer discussion of British 
petitioning and the American Revolution, see James E. Bradley, Popular Politics and the American 
Revolution in England: Petitions, the Crown, and Public Opinion (Macon, Ga., 1986). 
17 Ruth Bogin, "Petitioning and the New Moral Economy of Post-Revolutionary America," William and 
Mary Quarterly 3d. ser., 45, no. 3 (1988): 391-425, 422-23. 
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the most popular forum for adjudicating citizen needs.  The South Carolina General 
Assembly was jealous of its powers and concerned with establishing itself as the central 
authority in the newly independent state.  As such, it faced a dilemma with Loyalist 
petitions.  On the one hand, as the sole authority, the Assembly could safely turn them 
away.  On the other hand, there was strong legal justification and a strong tradition of 
hearing petitions.18 
While ordinary people could and did write their own petitions, it was quite 
common to use a lawyer.  Among petitions submitted to the United States Congress in the 
1790s, many were drafted and presented by attorneys.  Even people of modest means 
hired legal help.  Orange County, New York farmers hired an attorney to petition for 
them in their efforts to be fairly reimbursed for wood seized from them during the war by 
Revolutionary troopmasters.  South Carolinians certainly hired lawyers to help them 
appeal their confiscation.  Petitioners not currently in South Carolina were especially 
likely to need to hire help in marshalling their case.19 
Yet petitioning was a problematic form for Loyalists named on the confiscation 
and amercement lists, despite its long history.  While a non-citizen’s right to petition was 
well recognized, that right was understood to exist because he was a member, however 
marginal, of the same society.  South Carolinians disagreed on whether Loyalists really 
were members of the same society with those entitlements.  Given that confiscated 
Loyalists were legally deemed traitors, it was not clear they had a right to petition.  
Women and African Americans could petition because their lack of political citizenship 
 
18 Higginson, "Right to Petition," 150-51.  See also Greene, Quest for Power 14-16.  Bailey, Popular 
Influence 25. 
19 Jeffrey L. Pasley, "Private Access and Public Power: Gentility and Lobbying in the Early Congress," in 
The House and the Senate in the 1790s: Petitioning, Lobbying, and Institutional Development, ed. Kenneth 
R. Bowling and Donald R. Kennon (Athens, Ohio, 2002). 62. 
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was clearly understood, but white male confiscees were in an entirely different position.  
The duty of the legislature to respond was based on that recognition of shared 
involvement, not just legislative power.  Despite the legitimacy of petitioning as a form, 
the General Assembly would have been within their rights to refuse all Loyalist petitions. 
Loyalist petitioners therefore faced a problem.  The history of petitioning offered 
them models of how to proceed, but did not guarantee that they could fit into those 
models.  Yet the Loyalist petitioners, given the way in which the Confiscation Act had 
been constructed, were overwhelmingly white affluent men (or at least they had been 
affluent before the war).  As such, they were not non-entities, but were used to all the 
prerogatives of citizenship.  How should they approach the legislature?  Should they 
simply assert themselves as they were once wont to do?  Should they approach with even 
more submissive language, in recognition of their chancy position?  Or should they blaze 
confidently forward, asserting their citizenship rights even in the language of their 
petition? 
In fact, what is surprising and noticeable about the petitions of the Loyalists 
seeking to be removed from the Confiscation Act is that despite all the potential reasons 
for them to be more deferential in their language than other petitioners, they were rather 
matter of fact when addressing the legislature.  Richard Bohun Baker merely addressed 
his “humble Petition” to “the Honorable John Lloyd Esquire President and the Members 
of the Honourable the Senate in General Assembly.”20  Almost all petitions in this period 
were cast as “humble petitions.”21  The language of the demands was even less 
 
20 Richard Bohun Baker, 1783-35, GA Petitions. 
21 For example, in 1791 the inhabitants of Fairfield County submitted a “humble petition” to the General 
Assembly arguing against other petitions seeking the closure of the circuit courts.  Petition of the 
Inhabitants of Fairfield County, 1791-25, GA Petitions. 
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deferential.  While the Loyalists were respectful, they also used forthright language.  
Despite the difficulties of their position, they uniformly chose to address the General 
Assembly in the terms other men of their pre-war status would use.  They did not 
recognize an alternative status (as traitors) for themselves, but in the very language of 
their address and demand, they asserted their citizenship. 
Wives and minor children of the men on the Confiscation Act were on firmer 
ground.  They were not deemed traitors.  They held claim to the minimal citizenship that 
the culture of petitioning had always recognized.  As women, they were expected to 
couch their requests in the polite, humbling language that had been popular before 
Revolutionary fervor changed the language of petitioning.  And their petitions to the 
South Carolina Assembly reflected this unproblematic access to the relief of petition.  
The language they used was polite and customary.  Further, their petitions for financial 
support and relief fell into the usual category of women’s petitions: petitions for financial 
support.  They were not making novel requests.22 
Loyalist petitioners subject to the Amercement Act were not considered traitors.  
As citizens, their theoretical access to petitioning as an outlet for their concerns was 
intact.  Even for those amerced Loyalists who were banned from the franchise, they still 
had “minimal citizenship” that supported the right to petition.  For those 47 individuals, 
petitioning was a clear option.  But these men still faced thorny questions about how to 
craft the language of their petition.  Should they recognize their limited stature 
rhetorically, or plunge linguistically ahead in asserting their full equality before the law?  
In practice, Loyalists petitioning for relief from the Confiscation and the Amercement 
Acts adopted forthright language that was deferential only in the ways of other 1780s 
 
22 Bailey, Popular Influence 44. 
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petitions.  The petitioners did not grovel more than other petitioners, either in the 
language of address or in their demands.  They believed in their equality of citizenship, 
and it showed in the very language of their petitions.  We will examine petitions for 
clemency from amercement at more length in Chapter Four. 
 Having addressed these petitions as a group, we must remind ourselves that 
Loyalist petitioning was an individual act.  Loyalists submitted petitions on their own 
behalf.  Supporting petitions spoke in the names of many, but always for one particular 
Loyalist.  In most cases, supporting petitions from “sundry persons” or “the Inhabitants 
of” various parishes seem to have been written by the petitioner or with the consultation 
of the petitioner.  Those petitions also submitted similar types of claims and either 
reiterated information contained in the individual’s petition or provided new kinds of 
claims that were easier for friends to make. Since petitions were generally presented as a 
packet to the General Assembly, with supporting materials included, it is not surprising 
that rather than being spontaneous outpourings of support, they were more often carefully 
marshaled initial applications.  A few petitioners also submitted signed affidavits and 
letters of support as part of their petitions.23 
 Did Loyalist petitioners really think these petitions might work?  Evidence from 
the petitions themselves suggests that petitioners and their networks expected their efforts 
to pressure the General Assembly into further considering each individual case in the 
light of past behavior.  After all, while the value of the property was worth some effort to 
retrieve, why invest the energy in petitioning if such efforts had no reasonable chance of 
success?  The very volume of petitions, which occupied a majority of the legislature’s 
 
23 See for example, Petition of William Burt, 1783-7, GA Petitions, also excerpted in House J. Jan. 22 
1783, p. 17.  William Burt claimed he “has an affidavit to prove the books and papers were taken by Major 
Cochran….” 
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time and energy in 1783, pressured the General Assembly to consider those petitions 
seriously and remit penalties for at least some individuals.  Petitioners used their petitions 
not only to present their case, but also to argue for a hearing or trial in which they could 
present a more complete case.  John Wragg pointedly reminded the House of 
Representatives “he could prove [his claims] if he was allowed a hearing.” John Gaillard 
complained that he had been so unfortunate as to have his property confiscated “without a 
trial.”24   William Burt angrily asserted “every other report prejudicial to his political 
Character he can prove to be void of truth if he is permitted a hearing before a Committee 
of this House.”25  Supporters also called upon the legislature to reconsider. “The Sundry 
Inhabitants of Christ Church Parish,” writing to support Robert J. Murrell, told legislators 
that "they believe him innocent of the charges that induced the late General Assembly to 
put his Name on the Confiscation Act."26  Given that early American petitions carried the 
expectation of legislative investigation, Loyalists signaled that they expected the chance 
to mount a defense. 
Excuses, Excuses: the Paranoid Style of Politics and Loyalist Petitions 
Loyalists also suggested in their petitions that they suffered the punishment of 
confiscation or amercement not because they had really acted inappropriately, but 
because they were the victims of fraud.  Therefore, it was incumbent on the General 
 
24 John Wragg, 1783-83, GA Petitions. 
25 William Burt, 1783-7, GA Petitions. 
26 Sundry Inhabitants of Christ Church Parish in support of Robert J. Murrell, petition excerpted in House J. 
Jan. 25, 1783 p. 39.  
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Assembly to correct the wrongdoing they had suffered.  In this argument, they offer a 
textbook example of the prevalence of conspiracy theories in the mental framework of 
early Americans.27 
William Burt argued that the belief he was South Carolina’s assailant “must be 
owing to erroneous opinions formed from reports of his being an Enemy to America 
which are destitute of foundation.”  Further, he indicated that any reports that he had 
delivered important books to the British Navy in order to curry favor in the immediate 
aftermath of Charleston’s fall were “prejudicial.”  (Apparently, the General Assembly did 
not believe him.  He did not return to South Carolina, although part of his property was 
eventually given to his family.)  Andrew Hibben was convinced he was punished “owing 
to the misrepresentation of Some unkind person, that he is not conscious of any Crime to 
deserve such punishment.”  Thomas Radcliffe Junior thought “if his Conduct had been 
properly represented to the last General Assembly, his Estate would not have been 
Amerced, as he never did one Act prejudicial to the cause of America.”28 
The Jacksonborough Assembly had worked in privacy, and opponents suggested 
that some legislators had used the cover of secrecy to confiscate the property of their own 
personal enemies on trumped-up charges.  Certainly, some legislators agreed that people 
had on occasion given “way to private resentment.”  Now, in peacetime, the General 
 
27 Many historians have noticed the popularity of conspiracy theories in American history.  The most 
famous work is Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays (New 
York, 1965).  In early American history, Gordon Wood has persuasively argued that conspiracy theories 
were not paranoid, but convincing ways of understanding political power.  Gordon S. Wood, "Conspiracy 
and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century," William and Mary Quarterly 3rd. 
ser., 39, no. 3 (1982): 401-41.  Other works include David Brion Davis, The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of 
Un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the Present (Ithaca, N.Y., 1971), David Brion Davis, The 
Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style (Baton Rouge, La., 1970), Jeffrey L. Pasley, "Conspiracy 
Theory and American Exceptionalism from the Revolution to Roswell," in "Sometimes an Art": A 
Symposium in Celebration of Bernard Bailyn's Fifty Years of Teaching and Beyond (Harvard University: 
2000). 
28 William Burt, 1783-7, Andrew Hibben, 1783-34, GA Petitions.  Thomas Radcliffe Jun, Feb. 6, 1783 
Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784  99. 
 192 
Assembly of a free country should hold its deliberations publicly.  Loyalists and their 
supporters expected that they were entitled to public consideration.  Petitioning had 
always encompassed the expectation of a public hearing in response.  Loyalists felt it was 
no more than their due.  Hearings allowed Loyalists to present evidence and character 
witnesses.  They could marshal a more detailed and nuanced case than a two or three 
page petition allowed.29 
Theoretically, this meant that Loyalists without friends in the legislature could 
persuade on the basis of other things.  In practice, having connections among the elites 
who made up the General Assembly helped.  James Gordon told legislators that he would 
“on the Contrary Appeal[] to his Neighbors, to prove the Services he has rendered many 
of them” if given the chance.  Maurice Simmons made the plea for a hearing very clearly, 
saying that “from a long Experience of the Justice and lenity of his Countrymen [he] is 
well convinced that they were not possessed of a true State of his Conduct while in the 
British Lines.”  Simmons claimed “if he were allowed a hearing he will be able to 
Explain his Conduct and Situation (Supported by good Evidences) to the Satisfaction of 
his Countrymen.”  A hearing would allow him to present his case with evidence, whereas 
the Jacksonborough Assembly did not know “the true State of his Conduct” and did not 
examine all available evidence.30    
In the world of eighteenth-century America, these claims had weight and power.  
While the language of petitions was deferential, the charge that a public trial would lead 
to a different fate was explosive.  This was perilously close to reiterating the persistent 
 
29 Edward Rutledge to Arthur Middleton, Jacksonborough, Feb. 6, 1782, Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Jan. 
1926," 3. 
30 James Gordon, 1783-54, GA Petitions.  Maurice Simons, Salley, House J. 1782  135, also in Senate 
Journal (engrossed manuscript) Feb. 15, 1783, South Carolina Department of Archives and History. 
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rumors that some men were listed in the Confiscation Act because they were personal 
enemies of members of the Jacksonborough Assembly, not genuinely problematic 
Loyalists.  The right to a trial was one of the glorious traditional rights of Englishmen 
that American Whiggery had pledged to uphold.  When John Gaillard reminded the 
General Assembly that his property has been taken without the benefit of trial, he accused 
the previous General Assembly of having acted in a way unbecoming a free state under 
the rule of law.  Even Loyalists should be given the benefit of the doubt.  Further, in 
practice Loyalists had been denied the use of the court system.  Legislative fiat, however 
determined, had decided the fates of the men named in the Confiscation and Amercement 
Acts.   Loyalists created a system that showcased their own drive to maintain South 
Carolina citizenship.  By petitioning, they came forward and proactively identified 
themselves as worthy potential citizens.  They showed themselves ready and willing to 
reach accommodation with the state.  
When not denying culpability altogether, Loyalist petitioners tried to explain their 
wartime actions.  Of course, they wanted to put the best face possible on the decisions 
they had made.  Many explained that they had made the decision to become Loyalists for 
practical reasons, not ideological ones.  Some petitioners argued that at least part of the 
reason they had supported the Loyalist cause derived from individual circumstances, 
including physical debility.  Thomas Eustace "being advanced in life, and infirm for 
many Years," took British protection because he was unable to leave Charleston after 
occupation. John Walters Gibbs argued that he had been forced to sign both addresses 
welcoming the British to Charleston by dint of “a bad State of health.”  He further 
indicated that he was unable to cooperate with Governor Rutledge’s proclamation (that 
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allowed Loyalists who left the city to receive official pardons if they left before the 
British withdrew) because “he had lost the use of his limbs by the Gout and 
Rheumatism.”  Doctor Lynah, a younger man, tried to convince the General Assembly 
that a series of riding misadventures required him to stay in Charleston for his health and 
“rendered him incapable (by Bodily infirmities) to take the benefit of his Excellency 
Governor Rutledges Proclamation.” These excuses explained political loyalties as 
secondary to pragmatic concerns.  In citing their age and infirmities, these men argued 
that they did not possess the necessary freedom of action to make the choices that a 
republic demanded of its citizens.  They essentially argued for diminished capacity, and 
accepted appearing pathetic as the price necessary to win back their property.  Republican 
theory did recognize that some men were hindered in their ability to shoulder all the 
burdens of citizenship.  Practically, some Patriots had made similar claims to the British 
authorities during the war, including the posthumously illustrious Isaac Hayne. 31 
Other Loyalists offered not their own health as an excuse, but the insecurity of 
their families.  As good fathers and husbands, how could they abandon their families or 
take steps that would leave them destitute?  Christopher Williman took protection 
because of a “numerous young family.” James Clitherall claimed “That he was obliged to 
remove with his family from the Country to town by reason of Sickness” as a way to 
explain why he moved into occupied Charleston.  Bryan Cape had a “large family and 
 
31 Thomas Eustace, Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784  35.  John Walter Gibbs, 1783-19, 
GA Petitions.  While I find the excuse both comical and pathetic, gout certainly was a trial for many 
gentlemen of the period.  Henry Laurens, the South Carolina Patriot, also complained bitterly of his gout 
attacks.  Laurens complained to his daughter that “the Gout” was a “painful Visitor assailant” that kept him 
a “close prisoner.”  Henry Laurens to Martha Laurens, Ostend, May 18, 1782, David R. Chesnutt and C. 
James Taylor, The Papers of Henry Laurens, 16 vols. (Columbia, S.C.,  2000) 15: 507.  Lynah argued that 
he had two separate falls from his horse that broke his arm, shoulder, and three ribs, since which he “had 
not one weeks perfect Health.” Doctor James Lynah, petition excerpted in Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., 
House J. 1783-1784 47. 
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low Circumstances,” and when “he observed the Country Exposed to the Mercy of 
British forces, that he then took their protection to save his Family and property.”  Cape 
here explicitly linked his seemingly selfish desire to protect his considerable wealth to his 
honorable desire to properly protect his family.  How else could he protect his family if 
he could not assure them a comfortable subsistence?  Other Loyalists also suggested they 
took actions allying themselves with the British in order to provide for their dependants’ 
financial needs.  Both Jacob Deveaux and James Brisbane claimed that they took civil 
commissions under the British occupying administration because they needed a steady 
source of income to support their families.  Brisbane put it most eloquently when he 
suggested "he was obliged to apply to the British for Some place by which he might be 
enabled to Support a Numerous family."  (Brisbane himself, however, was unable to 
convince South Carolinians that this was his true reason for taking the office of sheriff to 
the Charleston police under the occupation.)  One petitioner, Alexander Rose, struck a 
sour note when he admitted that he made common cause with the Loyalists in order “to 
save a large Quantity of Indico.”  He failed to link his economic decisions to any desire to 
protect others.32 
Of course, other men had left their wives alone while they put their own lives on 
the line to fight.  Yet the petitioners had their finger on something: care of dependents 
was important to honorable masculinity.  Men needed to provide for their wives and 
children.  Men who “failed to measure up to marital manhood were unworthy of liberty 
 
32 Christopher Williman, 1783-60, James Clitherall, 1783-189, Bryan Cape, 1783-23, Jacob Deveaux, 
1783-86, James Brisbane, 1783-70, GA Petitions.  Gregory Palmer, Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of 
the American Revolution (Westport, Ct., 1984) 93.  The Committee recommended that “he [James 
Brisbane] had taken the most early opportunity to evince his attachment to the British cause, that he had 
been rewarded for it by being appointed to a lucrative office under the police established in Charles Town, 
that he acted so as to obtain the thanks of that truly honourable Board, and therefore they recommend him 
to remain where he is and enjoy the favours of his beloved masters.” Alexander Rose, petition excerpted in 
Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 15. 
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and citizenship.”  And fatherhood was a central marker of adult status for men.  In 
properly governing vulnerable children incapable of consent, and caring for their moral, 
economic, and emotional needs, adult men showed their understanding of the needs of 
the Republic and their attention to the most important needs of community.33 
These claims can work as maudlin sentimentality or rank whininess at their most 
clumsy, but I do not think that is why many petitioners included such complaints.  One 
reason they did so was a palpable sense of rage and despair at what the war had cost 
them.  Just as many of the Patriot legislators had paid heavily for the war in many 
personal ways, so had the Loyalists.  In short, they proved they were sufficiently 
chastened by losing.  They too were victims as well as actors in the drama of the 
Revolution.  But these complaints served to underscore another point for the Loyalist 
petitioners.  When Charleston fell and South Carolina was subdued, everyone faced a 
choice.  Should they accept British protection and keep it even after the price became 
active involvement in the British occupation?  What they did, anyone might have done.  
They sought to remind their listeners that they could be standing in the Loyalists’ shoes. 
Refreshingly, some petitioners made outright apologies for their actions in taking 
the British side. John Wagner hoped "he may be pardoned the Errors he has Committed." 
William Rees apologized, stating that he “is truly sensible of the Errors he has been guilty 
of.”  David Guerard “acknowledges his fault in taking protection.” Supporters of Richard 
Wayne apologized for him, arguing they were now convinced that he had “express[ed] a 
 
33 Kann, Republic of Men  3, 6, 30.  For a much longer discussion of the link between marital behavior and 
masculine status, see Thomas A. Foster, Sex and the Eighteenth-Century Man: Massachusetts and the 
History of Sexuality in America (Boston, 2006).  Holly Brewer shows the transition from children being 
marked by their status to children being marked by age in her perceptive analysis of the evolution of 
rational consent.  She further shows the importance of fatherhood to new Enlightenment notions of 
patriarchal authority. Holly Brewer, By Birth or Consent: Children, Law, & the Anglo-American Revolution 
in Authority (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2005). 
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Sincere penitence for the part he acted in behalf of the British since the fall of Charles 
Town.” These apologies were lacking in any specifics.  No one apologized for actions 
against neighbors or citizens.  While Guerard apologized for taking protection, he did not 
mention any specific wartime actions. (After all, Guerard was one of eleven people who 
were singled out in the confiscation act as “obnoxious persons” deserving censure.)  No 
one admitted to any war crimes, although the Charleston merchant William Glen came 
close when he argued “That altho’ he might have been Guilty of some Improprieties  [he] 
hopes it does not amount to Criminalities.” These people gambled that a show of remorse 
would put their listeners in the proper frame of mind to offer them clemency.  However, 
only a minority did apologize for their actions in these petitions.  Honesty was not 
necessarily the order of the day.34 
Even fewer admitted a real political preference in their petitions.  Edward 
Fenwick was unusually honest when he admitted that “during the late contest between 
these United States and Great Britain your Petitioner unhappily engaged in the service of 
the latter; in consequence of which he acknowledges that the Resentment of his 
Countrymen hath been justly shewn against him.”35  What is missing in almost all 
petitions is any discussion of political loyalties during the war.  Loyalist petitioners 
scrupulously avoided claiming any preference for the British or the Loyalist persuasion.  
And, while they vocally proclaimed their support for America, they also expressed little 
 
34 John Wagner, Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 15-16.  This petition is also found in 
the Senate engrossed manuscript, but the original is not in the GA Petition series. David Guerard, 1783-71, 
Supporters of Richard Wayne, 1783-369, William Glen, 1783-53, GA Petitions. 
35 Edward Fenwick, Accounts Audited of Claims Arising from the American Revolution, Account No. 
2345, excerpted in Lark Emerson Adams and Rosa Stoney Lumpkin, eds., Journals of the House of 
Representatives 1785-1786 (Columbia, S.C., 1979) 24. 
 198 
political ideology in support of independence.  Petitioners steered clear of discussing 
political philosophy.   
While some Loyalists apologized, others tried to excuse their actions by blaming 
their decisions on bad or false information.  John Harth blamed his decision to sign the 
congratulatory address to Clinton on “his Ignorance and advice of Some who he thought 
his friends.”  Edmund Petrie complained that “having been misled by the artifices of 
designing Men has become the object of the Confiscation Act.”  James Mackey also 
signed the address (for which he faced confiscation and banishment) because of false 
arguments.  He pretended he did not know the true nature of what he signed, because “the 
address was fabricated by artfull & designing men….many persons were invited and 
persuaded to sign the same who were totally ignorant of the Nature or contents thereof,” 
presumably including Mackey.  William Cameron, a Charleston cooper, argued that he 
signed the fatal petition because in his more humble situation, he depended on the advice 
of men who were of higher standing.  “His signing the address, was occasioned by the 
example of Men, he thought more Capable of judging in political affairs than One of his 
narrow understanding.”  All of these men relied on widely shared eighteenth-century 
understandings of political causation, which historians from Richard Hofstadter to 
Gordon Wood have called the “paranoid style.”  They appealed to a shared belief that 
conspiracy lay behind political action, especially such nefarious activities as the British 
occupation.  However, in showing themselves as victims of conspiracy, they also left 
their own wisdom as political actors open to question.  How many times would 
conspirators take them in?36 
 
36 John Harth, 1783-15, Edmund Petrie, 1783-405, GA Petitions.  James Mackey, Jan. 23, 1783,William 
Cameron, Jan. 24, 1783, Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 25, 35.  Gordon S. Wood, 
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Other Loyalists argued that they had not in fact even signed the addresses, but that 
through fraud their names appeared among the signers.  Aaron Loocock complained 
“while on his parole at Camden, some person inserted his name in an Address to Sir 
Henry Clinton, he believes contrary to his Knowledge or Consent.”  Not only did 
Loocock disclaim signing the petition; he pointed out he had not even been in Charleston 
at the time the petition was circulated.  Thomas Buckle went further and accused a 
specific person of committing fraud by signing his name to the welcome without his 
permission.  “His nephew Thomas Buckle Junior did Sign his name to an Address to Sir 
Henry Clinton and Arbuthnot, Contrary to his Knowledge…”  Buckle offered two 
explanations: fraud and potential mistaken identity.  In either case, he did not really sign 
the address, and therefore should be removed from the confiscation list.37 
All of these cases showcase the importance of the paranoid style of politics in 
eighteenth-century political understanding, as it was one major way Loyalists strove to 
explain their actions to otherwise unsympathetic listeners.  Yet these excuses, mired in 
the practical details of ordinary life, priviliged the very real constraints of interpersonal 
relationships that made up the network of dependency obligations that governed the lives 
of seemingly independent men of honor. 
                                                                                                                                            
“Causality and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century,” WMQ, 3rd. ser., 39, no. 
3 (July 1982).  See also Pasley, "Conspiracy Theory and American Exceptionalism from the Revolution to 
Roswell."  Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays . 
37 Aaron Loocock, 1783-273, Thomas Buckle, 1783-350, GA Petitions. 
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“At the Earnest Request of his Neighbours”: Honor and Citizenship as 
Neighborliness38 
 South Carolina needed good citizens for its experiment in republican government.  
Loyalists strove to show fellow residents and legislators through their petitioning that 
they could be those good citizens.  Men should be honorable citizens with upright 
conduct.  One way that they could display their command of these traits was to show that 
they were linked to local networks that could vouch for them.  In the creation and 
maintenance of those networks, they could demonstrate a history of honorable service.  In 
this argument, we can see that neighborliness, as defined by actions over time that spoke 
to personal reputation as seen through community interactions, was a primary 
determinant of citizenship for eighteenth-century Americans, despite legal definitions 
concerned with oaths of allegiance and birth.  Citizenship was an active entity, and one 
dependent on the norms of a face-to-face society. 
 Many things went into making a man honorable and upright.  Such a man was a 
good husband, father, soldier, and neighbor/community member.  He was upright in 
business dealings and his word was dependable in business, politics, and conversation.  
Honorable men needed and worked for the respect of other men.  While the categories of 
honorable manhood can be separated in discussion, in practice they were mutually 
reinforcing.  If a man fell short in any of the categories, it put his entire character at 
risk.39 
 
38 John Adamson, 1783-40, GA Petitions. 
39 Kann, Republic of Men  
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 As Joanne Freedman has pointed out, in uncertain times the grammar of honor 
“was a source of stability.”  Gentlemen were expected to speak honestly, making only 
promises they would actually keep.  “A man without honor was no man at all,” she 
argeus.  Frustratingly for eighteenth-century men, honor was also entirely validated by 
the outside world—making public reputation vital to individual self-esteem and 
community standing.40 
 To understand the role of petitioning in Loyalist strategies for reconciliation, we 
need to understand evolving American and British notions of citizenship—
understandings that took on new life in the American Revolution.  During the Revolution, 
implicit understandings of citizenship were tested against new realities. 
Implicit in the American understanding of citizenship was that citizenship was the 
product of voluntary choice, not unwavering birth allegiance.  American states had long 
offered generous naturalizations as part of their efforts to attract migrants, making their 
system of citizenship quite different from Great Britain’s, which carefully controlled 
naturalization.  James Kettner has established that traditional early modern British legal 
and popular understanding of citizenship held that citizenship was unchangeable.  
Citizens owed allegiance to the king by birth, and they could not choose to change such 
allegiance.  But colonial Americans had been developing a different version of 
citizenship, one that defined citizenship as voluntary and changeable.41  South Carolina 
continued to try to attract white immigrants up to the Revolution, and therefore had a 
history of generous citizenship to those white men who chose voluntarily to join South 
 
40 Joanne B. Freedman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic (New Haven, 2001) xv-xvi. 
41 James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1978)  For a 
rather different take: Catherine A. Holland, The Body Politic: Foundings, Citizenship, and Difference in the 
American Political Imagination (New York, 2001). 
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Carolina and take a basic oath to their new state.  Further, implicit in the widespread 
colonial definitions of male citizenship was a standard of basic landownership that the 
vast majority of white South Carolinian males met.  Men who had arrived from other 
colonies had no trouble establishing themselves as South Carolina citizens upon the 
acquisition of land.  Almost universal male citizenship without muss and fuss is a good 
description of the actual norms in what was still a relatively new immigrant colony on the 
eve of the Revolution. 
England did allow non-citizens to gain citizenship through naturalization, but the 
practice was very unusual.  To become naturalized, men had to be made citizens by a 
special act of the Parliament.  In practice, only a few wealthy and determined men 
became naturalized citizens.  In the American colonies, naturalization quickly became 
readily more obtainable, as the colonies sought to attract people who did not hold English 
citizenship.  A 1740 act of Parliament specifically authorized American colonies to create 
British citizens through their own naturalization procedures.  American naturalizations 
allowed all rights of citizenship, including the right to hold public office, ensuring that 
naturalized citizens in America truly enjoyed all the privileges of citizenship despite their 
birth. English law vigorously enforced exclusions on voting and office-holding on 
naturalized citizens and aliens.  Colonists were generally unconcerned about these 
distinctions.  Further, they eagerly welcomed white immigrants, whose labor helped to 
build the economy.  Colonists came to believe that “aliens who chose to commit their 
efforts and resources to the common good justly deserved an equal share of the rights of 
membership.”  The stance toward aliens was helpful, not confrontational and limiting.  
Naturalizations continued apace after the American Revolution.  South Carolinians 
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continued their practice of making new citizens.  These new citizens had to take an oath 
of allegiance to the state of South Carolina with a local court official, who then recorded 
the oaths with the House of Representatives.  Naturalizations did not require a specific 
legislative act.  In fact, a perusal of the 1780s oathtakers in the legislative journals and 
records shows that many defecting British soldiers were warmly welcomed as new South 
Carolina citizens with all the rights of native-born Americans.42 
Over time, with the rise of easy naturalization and the logic of an immigrant-
friendly society, Americans had come to understand citizenship as based on the desire to 
be a citizen of the locality.  In so doing, they came to understand citizenship as defined 
by the volitional actions and attitudes of individuals, not birth allegiance.  They followed 
the instincts of political philosophers like John Locke, rather than established English or 
American law.  During and after the Revolution, Americans began to confront the 
tensions inherent in the differences between the way they saw citizenship and the way the 
law defined it.  Loyalists created major problems for understanding American 
citizenship.43 
 The American Revolution offered Americans the chance to define citizenship for 
themselves, but Loyalism, and the way assemblies dealt with Loyalists, actually defined 
in broad terms the challenges posed by any notion of citizenship.  While perhaps 2/5 of 
the white male population were Loyalists of some stripe, American Revolutionaries could 
not tolerate dissent on this point.  Internal dissenters threatened the war effort, and also 
sapped enthusiasm and the image of unity.  Yet a society that believed that citizenship 
 
42 Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 74, 122, 127.   
43 Locke actually was far more radical in his insistence on citizenship as a choice than eighteenth-century 
Americans (or even twenty-first century Americans) were.  Locke denied birth citizenship entirely. Rogers 
S. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven, Conn., 1997) 78-79. 
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was a voluntary choice faced a dilemma.  Republican theory held that governments 
gained their legitimacy from the consent of the governed.  Loyalists chose not to be part 
of that governmental compact.  How could they be forced to choose American 
citizenship?  Majorities could rule, but Americans were creating a new contract.  Further 
complicating the legal position, there was no such thing as United States citizenship until 
1787.  Citizenship came through state citizenship, and states controlled the definition of 
who was a citizen.  
During the war, state governments papered over the legal and moral dilemmas 
arising from Loyalists’ rejection of American citizenship, since wartime made toleration 
of open dissent impossible.  Congress and individual states enacted laws to control 
Loyalists, branding them traitors and banishing open dissenters from the states.  Congress 
and individual states claimed that so long as men had been citizens in 1776, and claimed 
protection from the United States, they were obliged to become American citizens by 
virtue of a majority decision by each state to join the United States.  Yet if Americans 
were truly committed to the idea that individuals chose their own loyalties, this position 
could not stand.  During the war, the point was somewhat moot both because war 
exigencies obscured legal problems, and because states had the clear right from English 
practice to sequester estates, regardless of whether the property belonged to a treasonous 
citizen or an enemy alien.  Even during the war, it was difficult to convict Loyalists for 
treason because their allegiance was openly to another entity.  Juries and judges were 
careful because treason was a capital crime, and a hanging cannot be reversed.  South 
Carolinians legally treated Loyalists as traitors under wartime legislation, culminating in 
the Confiscation Act.  Even the eventual peace treaty distinguished between British 
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residents and American citizens in determining how each side should proceed in honoring 
property claims.44 
After the war, South Carolina and other states had more breathing room to be 
merciful towards the Loyalists.  Wartime assemblies in all the colonies had plastered over 
incompatibilities between legal definitions of citizenship, inherited from English law, and 
an American understanding of citizenship, that took shape in a growing colonial society.  
After the Revolution, with the immediate threat past, Americans had time to work 
through the nature and definition of citizenship more carefully.  If citizenship was an 
individual choice, what choice had Loyalists made?  If they switched sides, which 
decision was binding?  And, having made the choice for the British, could they argue that 
they were still American citizens?  Further, did Loyalists choose to be British subjects, or 
were they always American citizens entitled to all the protections of that status?  The 
Confiscation Act of 1782 declared most Loyalists non-citizens.  But in the ensuing years, 
Americans began to soften this stand. 
This was a messy bundle of issues for South Carolinians, as so many of the 
Loyalists petitioning to be removed from confiscation had switched sides at least once.  
They were long-term residents of South Carolina.  Further, many of them had only taken 
protection from the British after the state was conquered.  As the commissioners pointed 
out in recommending clemency on John Deas’s petition, the punishment was “too large 
an Imposition for doing no more than what the Bulk of the Citizens had done before 
him.”45  Legally and morally, conquered people did not change their citizenship by 
 
44 Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 174, 180-81.  Smith, Civic Ideals 93. 
45 Report of the Commissioners on the Petition of John Deas, Esq., enclosed with Oct. 1783 letter to 
Commissioners, Box 4, Miscellaneous Papers Relating to Claims on Estates, Commissioners of Forfeited 
Estates, Comptroller General Papers, S 126170, SCDAH. 
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coming to terms with an invader.  Under monarchial rule, making terms with the invading 
prince did not mean that individuals had forsaken their obligations to the monarch.  
Similarly, South Carolina’s independent Patriot government could not protect its citizens 
in the wake of the fall of Charleston.  Making terms with the British invaders in no way 
made people traitors, but simply normal people trying to protect themselves when their 
government no longer could.  Partly to combat this problem, and partly to assuage 
competing interests in the caucus itself, the General Assembly singled out people who 
had taken highly public actions in favor of the British, such as using their names to 
congratulate the conquerors, and taking commissions as officers of Loyalist militia units.  
In this way, they selected people who had arguably done more than simply accept British 
protection.  In practice, even this was a problematic distinction, as the British 
occupational administration had increasingly required that men under protection fight for 
the British, or work in the administration.  During the war, it became increasingly 
difficult to maintain anything approaching neutrality. 
In short, there was some legal precedent for the actions the South Carolina 
General Assembly took against prominent Loyalists in 1782, but there were also legal 
counterarguments based on European law.  While several members of the 1782 General 
Assembly were lawyers, the Assembly as a whole was working with an implicit 
definition of citizenship widely shared by South Carolinians, but not reflected in law.  
Loyalist South Carolinians came from the same background and shared the same 
assumptions about citizenship.  By seeing how they defined citizenship in their outreach 
to the General Assembly, we can see what those underlying beliefs were.  As the first 
group to enunciate a defense of volitional citizenship based on honorable neighborliness, 
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the Loyalists pushed Patriot South Carolinians into defining citizenship for all in a way 
that included Loyalists.  A majority of Loyalists subject to confiscation and banishment 
had their citizenship and the bulk of their property restored by 1785, a mere three years 
after the passage of the original act.  Therefore, we must take the Loyalist arguments 
about citizenship seriously, for they were successful. 
Now, what were those arguments on behalf of lived citizenship—what we might 
call neighborly citizenship?  Many Loyalists cited their care for others during the war as 
evidence of the uprightness of their conduct. Part of proving one’s stature as an honorable 
man was to show that one had acted in a sympathetic way during the war.  The violence 
and endless cycles of revenge that were endemic to both sides in the war were 
incompatible with the figure of the honorable man, versed in codes of war and 
sympathetic behavior.  While wartime participation and bravery were essential to honor, 
the kinds of brutal behavior that actually occurred in much of the guerilla fighting were 
harder to square with honor.   Burning houses, for instance, hurt dependent women and 
children that honorable men were pledged to protect.  Americans also painted the 
Loyalists and British in a very harsh light in wartime atrocity propaganda, arguing that 
they had committed the worst of offenses against mankind.  Loyalists had to show that 
their own wartime conduct met the highest standards of honor, and was completely 
separate from the picture of frenzied destruction that was front and center in the minds of 
most Patriots.  Some Loyalists (ironically) were able to show their essential 
honorableness through their conduct in the very offices that had landed them on the 
confiscation and amercement lists to begin with.  Others were unable to rely on that, and 
so they offered other explanations of their wartime conduct that showed them as men of 
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humanity.  Several Loyalists were quick to point out that they were now caring for 
orphaned children of Patriot soldiers.  Three women who petitioned in support of John 
Hartz applauded him for keeping “an Orphan child of a deceased American soldier, 
which he has and does now treat as his Own.”  Mary Inglis defended her husband 
Alexander as a “Man of Integrity” who “has under his Care, Several Minors and Orphan 
Children.”  In the absence of orphanages, individuals stepped forward to care for and 
protect vulnerable children.  Taking on the paternal role for other men was a sign of 
neighborly investment.46 
Taking care of orphans was well and good, but a man’s conduct towards adults 
was also important.  Loyalists who lived in or entered occupied Charleston were in a 
good position to help Patriot prisoners of war being held in the city.  Loyalists who fled 
to East Florida had the chance to offer their services to American prisoners of war held 
there.  Many Loyalist petitioners cited their service to American prisoners in their attempt 
to portray themselves as honorable men.  Charles Johnston simply argued that he had 
“endeavored to alleviate the distresses of many,” but he also submitted a petition from 
Benjamin Villeponteaux, a prominent Charleston merchant, testifying that “Mr. Johnston 
has rendered him great Services while a prisoner.”  Alexander Rose "assisted American 
citizens in distress.”  This honorable action put him at risk, because his efforts to help 
Patriots “occasioned the British to use every means to Injure him."  Actually, the British 
usually did not interfere with efforts to make prisoners of war more comfortable, but 
public sympathy with prisoners certainly might mark someone as determined to stand 
above the divisions of civil war.  Patrick Hindes, who pleaded poor health as his reason 
 
46 Petition of Sarah Clark, Ann Smith and Sarah Clement on behalf of John Hartz, Mary Inglis on behalf of 
Alexander Inglis, excerpted in Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 20, 127. 
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for staying in occupied Charleston, had “assisted prisoners with Necessaries since the 
Capitulation.”  Richard Wayne also “made it his Study to relieve the distresses of the 
American prisoners in Town" while he was living in occupied Charleston.  John Hartz’s 
supporters were careful to testify that he not only assisted prisoners, but also put his 
money where his mouth was by offering monetary assistance as well as his company. 
Sarah Clark claimed he “relieved the distresses of the American prisoners, on Board the 
prison Ships and Hospitals in this Town by supplying them with Money and Necessarys.”  
He also exposed himself to rampant infectious disease when ministering to prisoners on 
board the prison ships in Charleston harbor.  Giving money and donating supplies was 
common.47 
While anyone could help prisoners, doctors were especially likely to trumpet their 
professional services on behalf of American patriots when possible.  (Of the doctors on 
the confiscation list, some had served the British for long periods in their professional 
capacity, and therefore chose to minimize such professional activities as much as possible 
in their own petitions.  But others had taken protection and aided prisoners, rather than 
serve the British forces as a surgeon.)  Dr. Charles Fyffe, who served the Americans as a 
field surgeon before the fall of Charleston, took British protection afterwards.  He 
emphasized "that while in the hospital he got Several Wounded and Sick Americans there 
and attended them untill they recovered and was also attentive to the North Carolina 
Officers."  As a man of honor, he continued to use his professional skills to aid America.  
Further, he was subtly emphasizing that while he took protection, he did not accept a 
 
47 Charles Johnston, 1783-95 GA Petitions, Benjamin Villeponteax on behalf of Charles Johnston, 1783-
335, GA Petitions.  Richard Wayne, 1783-106, GA Petitions.  Alexander Rose, Patrick Hindes, Petition of 
Sarah Clark, Ann Smith and Sarah Clement on behalf of John Hartz, excerpted in Thompson and Lumpkin, 
eds., House J. 1783-1784 15-16, 20. 
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position as a surgeon to British troops.  His skills were in hot demand, and all doctors 
were encouraged to take positions as troop doctors.  He did not do so, but merely 
accepted protection.  Soldiers of all ranks appreciated the efforts of doctors and sought 
out medical care, making their skills popular.  Loyalist doctors had a skill vital to both 
sides.  Perhaps in recognition of that fact, the 1784 Assembly chose to relieve from 
confiscation almost all the doctors who petitioned.  (James Fraser was never relieved, 
probably because he had joined the British well before the reduction of Charleston, and 
participated in British military activities as early as 1779.)  Relieved doctors went on to 
practice medicine in the state, ensuring that valuable skills largely held by foreigners 
remained available to South Carolinians.48 
John Scott took another tack in promoting himself as an honorable man who put 
himself at some risk in order to protect Americans and American interests.  He assured 
the legislature that “he was particularly Active in promoting a petition in favour of 
Colonel Hayne.”  Colonel Hayne’s case was a cause célèbre for South Carolinians, 
memorialized across generations as an example of British perfidy.  Hayne was a 
Lowcountry planter and the owner of a major iron works in York County in the 
backcountry.  He was captured in action, brought to Charleston, and then publicly 
executed without trial as a traitor to the crown.  His death was meant to be a warning to 
other Patriots who had taken oaths of allegiance to the British government or might not 
 
48 Dr. Charles Fyffe, Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 22.  Caroline Cox, A Proper Sense 
of Honor: Service and Sacrifice in George Washington's Army (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2004).  See Act. No. 
1229, Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. .  Kathy Roe Coker argues that professionals were much 
more likely to be Whigs, which made Loyalist professionals unusual.  This was much truer for lawyers than 
doctors, however, perhaps because most doctors received training abroad, and all but one of the Loyalist 
doctors in South Carolina were foreign-born.  As to James Fraser, he did not bother to petition the South 
Carolina General Assembly until 1797.  By that time, he had already received money from the Loyalist 
Claims Commission in Britain.  Coker, "The Punishment of Revolutionary War Loyalists in South 
Carolina" 125-73.  James Fraser, 1797-66, Mary Fraser for James Fraser, 1796-26, GA Petitions. 
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be strictly honoring the terms of their paroles.  Instead, his death caused furious comment 
on both sides of the Atlantic, as many British observers considered it an outrage just as 
the Americans did.  Isaac Hayne claimed to be a man of honor who had been released 
from his oath of allegiance to the British, and was therefore perfectly free to resume his 
actions on behalf of the Americans.  In either case, anyone who had pushed a petition to 
save Hayne would not have been popular with the British authorities, although he would 
have been respected by many Loyalists.  Sarah Scott also referenced Hayne’s case when 
she pleaded for her husband’s return.  “Also the part he took in the affairs of Colonel 
Hayne and Captain Lining will manifest how Sincerely he was affected by the distresses 
of his Countrymen.”49 
A significant subset of petitioners claimed that they had accepted commissions at 
the instigation of neighbors as a combined neighborhood strategy to avoid the worst 
excesses of the war.  John Adamson “accepted of it [the commission] at the Earnest 
request of his Neighbours (now Subjects of this State) to prevent its falling into the hands 
of a person whose intentions was well known to oppress them.”  He took his post in 
collusion with his neighbors.  His neighbors believed he was an honorable man based on 
his previous actions, and therefore he was a reliable choice to hold office.  Of course, 
they also recognized his personal stake in taking a commission in order to protect his own 
family and property.  (As a merchant, that was sizable.)  While many Lowcountry 
 
49 John Scott, Jan. 24, 1783, Sarah Scott, Feb. 1, 1783, Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784  
35, 76-77.  Senate J. Feb. 3, 1783, SCDAH.  For a brief discussion of Isaac Hayne’s capture and execution, 
see Bowden, The Execution of Isaac Hayne .  Isaac Hayne’s case was similar to the much more famous 
execution of John André after Benedict Arnold’s betrayal at West Point.  Historians often point to the 
popularity of the case in the officer’s imaginations, and as a continuing drama in revolutionary memory.  
Michael G. Kammen, A Season of Youth: The American Revolution and the Historical Imagination (New 
York, 1978) 105-06.  Robert E. Cray, Jr., "Major John Andre and the Three Captors: Class Dynamics and 
Revolutionary Memory Wars in the Early Republic, 1780-1831," Journal of the Early Republic 17, no. 3 
(1997): 371-97, Larry J. Reynolds, "Patriot and Criminals, Criminal and Patriots: Representations of the 
Case of Major Andre," South Central Review 9, no. 1, Historicizing Literary Contexts (1992): 57-84.   
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planters made these claims with the support of their neighbors, Adamson’s claim is 
unusual because he was a Camden landowner and merchant.  Even his backcountry 
neighbors were willing to accept divided loyalties in the greater interests of local 
harmony.  His supporters agreed that he had taken the commission with Patriot support, 
indicating “he used all the Influence he had with the British in favour of Such persons as 
avowed their attachment to the American cause.”  Certainly good men would protect their 
neighbors, thus subverting British administrative aims.  However, the extent of 
Adamson’s “Influence” might pose a problem.  If he had considerable influence with the 
British, he could certainly do his neighbors good, but he would very likely not have had 
such influence unless he had committed openly to his Loyalist beliefs.  Men who had 
“Influence” usually had reassured the British of their zealousness in persecuting and 
controlling Patriots.  John Adamson’s case was actually complicated because he was a 
lieutenant in a Loyalist regiment in Camden that strove to enforce conformity.  While 
Adamson’s own behavior was circumspect, he did take an active military role in the war.  
His close association with Joseph Kershaw and John Chesnut, who worked to protect him 
with the General Assembly, saved him.  Adamson was related to several other Loyalist 
militia leaders, suggesting he not only took protection to save himself but out of personal 
conviction.  Twenty-three Camden residents signed his petition, which suggests that 
Kershaw’s protection healed his position in Camden by early 1783.50 
Joseph Seabrook also was “prevailed upon by his neighbors to take a Militia 
Command under the British Government in order to prevent plundering.” Plundering was 
rampant in South Carolina, and was one of the most infuriating common wartime 
 
50 John Adamson, 1783-40, GA Petitions. Supporters of John Adamson, Jan. 28, 1783, Thompson and 
Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 53-54. 
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experiences for most of the population.  If he could actually succeed, this would be a 
good excuse for his wartime conduct.  Seabrook argued that he only took it after a 
committee of concerned neighbors “prevailed upon” him to do so.  This argument did 
have some validity, but it also became a popular gambit among petitioners.  James 
Casells, a Lowcountry planter, also defended his actions by arguing he protected “the 
persons and properties of his neighbors from violence and plunder.”  Yet Cassells did not 
receive a pardon in 1784 while Adamson and Seabrook did, largely because his conduct 
as a Loyalist leader was so dedicated that Balfour dubbed him more “manly, & worthy of 
credit” than any other militia leader.  Yet despite Cassells’ Loyalism, he probably did try 
to protect his neighbors as much as possible.  Unlike others, he did not claim he took a 
commission on the entreaties of the community.51 
Military service had long been considered a vital part of manly citizenship.  Adult 
able-bodied men were required to serve in the militia until they were in late middle age.  
Militia service, while often avoided, was crucial in cementing individual citizens’ 
standing as free men.  In war, men could prove their bravery.  In the more quotidian 
experience of peacetime, men could show their adeptness at following the many rules of 
military mustering.  Linda Kerber has also confirmed that military service was a vital part 
of what defined men as manly members of their community.  Militia service was legally 
required, but it was expected as well as a part of one’s community contribution.  Men 
who did not face up to their military duties chose to shirk their vital duties of community 
defense, and the community could rightly choose to doubt their commitment.  Such men 
were not good community members, and not good citizens.   Loyalists had avoided their 
 
51 Joseph Seabrook, 1783-240, James Cassells, 1784-36, GA Petitions.  Coker, "The Punishment of 
Revolutionary War Loyalists in South Carolina" 214-16. 
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militia duties to South Carolina after taking protection, and in other cases had actively 
taken militia positions with the British.  As such, they had failed one of the most 
important tests of male dedication to citizenship, in some cases twisting it (in Patriot 
eyes) by undertaking important duties for the wrong side.  Loyalists who invoked military 
service for the British cause faced a conondrum, for they needed to show they were 
honorable in their devotion to military service, while not emphasizing wartime activities 
that had hurt individual Patriots and the Patriot cause.52 
Henry Rugeley also argued that he “only did [take the commission] in 
Compliance with the request of some principle Neighbours (now Subjects of this State) to 
prevent its falling into the hands of a person, who would have distressed them…”53  
Following the pattern, he argued that he was upholding community norms in his 
performance in office, but also in his officeholding.  Adding a new wrinkle, he suggested 
that communities drew a distinction between likely candidates for a Loyalist commission, 
and endeavored to get local choices in office.  Rugeley’s neighbors felt they knew him 
well enough to be sure his conduct would be well-regulated; presumably, he would 
protect their community instead of using the Loyalist militia as an arm of political 
control.  The other, unnamed party was suspected of a desire to enforce conformity.  
Rugeley also made a point of mentioning that those neighbors who encouraged him to 
take a British commission were “now Subjects of this State” rather than fellow Loyalists.  
Benjamin Rees’s sixty-five supporters contended that: 
whereupon the Inhabitants did of their own freewill and accord, Solicit and 
request Mr. Benjamin Rees to take upon him the Charge of a Company of Militia, 
 
52 For much more on military service for enlisted men and officers in the Revolution, see Cox, Sense of 
Honor .  Linda K. Kerber, Women of the Republic: Intellect & Ideology in Revolutionary America (Chapel 
Hill, N.C., 1980). 
53 Henry Rugeley, Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 66. 
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in which capacity he acted with lenity and moderation; and many of your 
Petitioners can testify, that he was ready and willing at all times, to do what 
services he could to all those that were dignified with the name of Rebels. 
 
Here we see the formula elaborated at length.  He was known to act in all areas of life 
with “moderation” and therefore was elected by committee.  He used his own position at 
some peril to himself to perform “services” to Patriots.  Rather than truly being a military 
commander seeking to support British rule in America, he was a glorified sheriff, 
maintaining social order so that everyone else could get on with the business of life.  
Should the legislature have any doubts that this upright behavior entitled him to clemency 
since it proved his fitness as a citizen, his supporters drove the point home, “not doubting 
that his future conduct will merit the favour and protection of his Countrymen.”54 
A longer example from a backcountry Loyalist will show how these different 
claims of honorable wartime conduct came together.  Patrick Muckle Murray of Crackers 
Neck “ever had the goodwill of his neighbours in particular, and others in general” during 
his sixteen years as a South Carolina settler.  Presumably it was because of that reputation 
that he was chosen by his neighbors to take a British commission.  He explained thusly: 
during which time Oppressive and violent measures were Carrying on in other 
districts by the British owing to men being put into Commission not known to the 
Inhabitants, by reason of which your Petitioner by the entreaties of the Inhabitants 
of the district aforesaid (known friends to the American Cause) was induced 
purely to serve them, and with no other motive accepted of an appointment from 
the Inhabitants to act as their Commander.  That during the time your Petitioner 
Acted as aforesaid, he never fired a Gun against his Countrymen, and made use of 
every means in his power to secure peace to the Settlement aforesaid nor did he 
ever make use of any arbitrary or oppressive measure against the Inhabitants 
thereof, but on the Contrary did every thing in his power to Serve them.55 
 
54 Inhabitants of St. Marks Parish in behalf of Benjamin Rees, excerpted in Jan. 23, 1783, Thompson and 
Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 21. 
55 Patrick Muckle Murray, Feb. 3, 1783, Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 81-82.  This 
petition is accompanied by a petition from 40 residents of Cracker Neck in support of Murray.  The petition 
in the original series (SCDAH) is misspelled as Elmurray. 
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Once again, we see that this Loyalist took a position as a military commander not through 
ideology, but as part of a concerted neighborhood action to minimize the negative aspects 
of occupation and ongoing war.  South Carolinians felt that the presence of local 
leadership was the difference between oppression and safety.  An outsider was a man 
whose primary allegiance was to the British.  A local leader who was selected by the 
community would put local interests ahead of British military aims.  Murray took the 
position but served honorably, never “fir[ing] a Gun against his Countrymen” and 
“secur[ing] peace to the Settlement.”  In other words, he controlled looting and kept the 
militia from being used as a tool of political enforcement, all the while avoiding active 
involvement in the conflict for both himself and other members of the militia.56  How do 
we know he sought to avoid using the militia as an arm of political enforcement?  
Because he made no use of “any arbitrary or oppressive measure against the Inhabitants 
thereof.”   
We can see the logic of neighborly citizenship in the phrase, “did everything in 
his power to Serve them.”  As a planter, he was obliged to protect more vulnerable men 
of lesser position.  In an area swamped by civil war, his duty included protecting them 
from political intrigues they had no power to affect. 
There was a surprising number of petitioners who argued that they took 
commissions in the British militia or civilian occupation in order to protect their 
 
56 Crackers Neck appears to be named after Crackers Neck Swamp in Orangeburg County, South Carolina.  
Cracker was a jocular name for people of Scots-Irish descent by the late eighteenth century.  Both the 
location (Orangeburg County) and the name, coupled with the name of the petitioner, suggest that Murray 
represented a backcountry district of Scot-Irish settlers. There are other reports of backcountry Loyalist 
militias that were organized more for appearances than for actual partisan warfare.  One backcountry 
Loyalist militia became infamous for always arriving at the battle a day late, thereby missing the action. 
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neighbors.  Equally surprising is the number of supporters who would indicate that they 
encouraged people to take commissions.  The frequency of the claims, coupled with the 
fact that supporters were willing to testify to them, suggests that at least some of these 
claims should be taken seriously.  These claims are evidence of collusion across political 
lines.  Faced with difficult choices, communities sought to have representatives of local 
interests on both sides of the conflict.  That way, whoever won, they would still be 
protected.57 
If that was the case, however, what did South Carolinians expect holders of 
commissions to do in their posts?  What were the limits of such posts, if a person indeed 
took one for the interests of the collective?  James Smyth’s supporters pledged that he “in 
many instances Interested Himself in behalf of those suffering under British tyranny and 
Oppression.”  He claimed that “to lessen the distress of the people he was induced to take 
the Command of St. Thomas’s Company.”  But after taking the commission at the behest 
of his neighbors he was disappointed in the practical limits of his ability to change the 
essential nature of partisan warfare.  “That his Expectations of Serving his countrymen 
not being as effectual as he had hoped he resigned the command, having held it three 
months.”58  If a man took a command for honorable reasons, at the behest of his local 
community, he still needed to administer that office in an honorable way.   Holding office 
meant a duty to protect.  If a gentleman could not uphold that sacred duty, he must step 
down.  In war, many discovered that it was not possible to protect their dissenting 
 
57 Families sought to hedge their bets occasionally by having members on each side of the fight, but others 
were split by the war.  Communities were the same way; some deliberately tried to protect themselves from 
outsiders by ensuring local control in all cases.  Most, however, were engaged in something more ad hoc.  
People who were determined to fight on for the Patriots would.  Those who wanted to take protection could 
find an honorable way to do so by exerting themselves to protect their neighbors. 
58 Inhabitants of Various Parishes on behalf of James Smyth, 1783-368, GA Petitions. 
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neighbors.  British commanders were all too well aware of how few of their commission-
holders were willing to press home the British advantage against their fellow Americans. 
Loyalist petitioners also differentiated between active and passive participation in 
the war on the British side.  For many, it was acceptable to protect family and community 
by taking a commission or signing an address, but not by taking up arms.  Remember, 
Patrick Muckle Murray was quick to make the distinction that he “never fired a Gun 
against his Countrymen.”  The original terms of peace after the fall of Charleston made a 
similar distinction.  Cornwallis required South Carolinians to lay down their arms and 
cease fighting.  He did not originally require them to take up arms against their fellow 
Americans.  The unraveling of South Carolina began when Cornwallis changed the terms 
of the occupation to require people under British protection to become actively involved 
in the war, meaning they were required to participate in military action against Patriots in 
South Carolina and other American colonies.  This was a culturally meaningful 
distinction for all concerned.  Petitioners drew the distinction in their own actions and 
expected the legislature to recognize that distinction.  Even men who took militia 
commissions made a distinction between gathering the militia as they might in peacetime, 
and actually taking up arms and requiring other men to march to a battle.59 
John Wigfall "…did accept of a Commission under the British, at a time when he 
thought no effectual opposition could be made in defence of the State, and that he never 
expected to be Called upon to Act against his Fellow Citizens."  While he hoped that he 
 
59 Early Americans did not have a theory of active versus passive citizenship like that which became 
famous and problematic in France.  Abbe Sieyas, the French Revolutionary political philosopher, first 
formulated a notion of active versus passive citizenship that aimed to differentiate between citizenship at 
the bare minimum and those who had enough at stake in society to be electable to public office.  In this 
case, we see a different formulation of active and passive citizenship being argued.  Active wartime 
conduct was opposed to neutrality.  Neutrality is being construed to allow commission-holding, so long as 
the actions of the officeholder only included those the role would have had in peacetime. 
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would never have to act against other Americans, in the end he obviously did, for he felt 
the need to explain he did so only under duress. "If he Acted with any Severity against 
his Country men, it was not done with any evil disposition of his, but by the Express 
Orders of his Superior officers."  Once he found that his initial assumption that he could 
only take a passive part in the war was wrong, he resigned his commission when "he 
found he was liable to Act against his Country.”  David Bruce, a printer, also crowed that 
“he has never taken up Arms, or acted in any post against America.”  This distinction 
between active and passive wartime action seems to depend on how men acted after 
taking commissions.  If commission holders only acted in ways they would during 
peacetime, then their conduct was acceptable.  The crucial distinction was to avoid taking 
bellicose actions.60 
 I want to turn briefly to one other piece of evidence that suggests that South 
Carolinians understood citizenship to be based on neighborliness.  This evidence deals 
with Loyalists and the effects of Loyalism on South Carolina, but does not come from 
legislative records.  William Henry Drayton made a leisurely tour of the backcountry in 
April and May of 1784.  He was no stranger to the extremes of backcountry Loyalism; he 
had travelled on a barnstorming tour for the Patriot cause in the uncertain days of 1775, 
trying to muster support and buy off potential Loyalists. When he went back in 1784, he 
stayed with one landlord who cheerfully reported that he would be leaving soon, as he 
had killed two neighbors.  Drayton was moved to record in his diary that this was another 
“unhappy consequence of the late war” which had so destroyed society that it had 
 
60 John Wigfall, 1783-370, David Bruce, 1783-63, GA Petitions. 
 220 
“dissolv’d not only the Ties of Friendship & Neighborhood, but even of Humanity.”61  
Notice that Drayton explicitly defined the ties that bound South Carolina together as 
those of “Friendship & Neighborhood,” or precisely those ties that Loyalists worked so 
hard to cultivate after the Revolution, and that the General Assembly considered in 
deciding how to deal with individual Loyalists.  Drayton was an educated lawyer, able to 
make explicit his underlying assumptions.  If a lawyer trained at England’s famed Middle 
Temple considered the ties of belonging that held society together to rest at heart in 
“Friendship & Neighborhood,” despite training in the legal bases for citizenship, how 
much more so must have ordinary people.   
Drayton was reacting to one man who had demonstrated his lack of 
neighborliness by killing two men as “coolly…as if they had been Bucks or Wolves.”  
His neighbors also reacted by threatening to “haul him over the coals” and then hang 
him.62  In this case, all concerned, outsiders and locals, lawyers and ordinary people, 
agreed that local control over citizenship was important (because Drayton made no move 
to protect his landlord), and that citizenship depended on neighborly behavior, even in the 
context of war. 
 
61 Keith Krawczynski, ed., "William Drayton's Journal of a 1784 Tour of the South Carolina Backcountry," 
South Carolina Historical Magazine 97, no. 3 (1996): 182-205 190. 
62 Krawczynski, "1784 Tour of Backcountry,"  190. 
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Loyalty and Honor 
The first rhetorical bar for Loyalists was to show that they were Americans, 
willing to make common cause with their community.  If they succeeded in convincing 
their neighbors and the General Assembly of their fundamental patriotism, the next step 
was to reassure these audiences that they would continue to support America in the 
future.  
Claims of loyalty to America came in many different forms, depending on the 
ability of each petitioner to realistically claim that he had been loyal to the nation if not 
the Patriot cause.  Christopher Williman claimed he had always been “warmly attached to 
this Country” while Gilbert Chalmers argued that he had “always been a friend to the 
United States.”  Philip Porcher’s neighbors believed (or at least were willing to argue in 
public) that he “always appeared to be a friend to his Country.”  Of course, the word 
“appeared” does suggest his neighbors were a bit tentative about his true loyalties.  John 
Harth, who signed the address to Clinton, claimed that when he did it "he had no design 
of Injuring the American cause, for which he has the highest Veneration."  James Mackey 
"never harbored or entertained a single thought or most remote wish prejudicial to the 
Welfare & Interest of America or Repugnant to the Independance thereof."  (One does 
wonder how members of the legislature avoided laughing at these claims, given these 
men’s active involvement in the British administration.)  Benjamin Rees’s supporters 
were more circumspect, only certifying that "he has always conducted himself to the best 
of our Knowledge as a good friend to the American cause until the Enemy got possession 
of this part of our State."  Further, these supporters recognized that his loyalty could only 
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be reasonably supported for those years before the fall of Charleston.  Many other 
Loyalists fell into this category. Their supporters emphasized their active efforts for 
American independence before the fall of Charleston. Doctor Lynah’s supporters 
reminded the legislators that he "took an early and active part in the American Cause" 
and despite his taking a commission "they look on him as a Steady Friend to America."63 
A few petitioners were able to argue that their attachment to the American cause 
could be shown through their actions, despite their ending up on the confiscation list.  
This could be more persuasive.  After all, actions do speak louder than words, especially 
to members of the legislature, many of whom had risked much themselves in order to 
secure American liberty during the Revolution.  Andrew Hibben claimed "that he has 
been plundered and robbed by them [the British] for avowing Sentiments favorable to 
America" while he was living in occupied territory.  In this way, he tried to show that he 
was so vocally loyal to American independence that he had come to the attention of 
British authorities looking for Patriots.  Edward Hare "evince[d] his attachment to the 
American Cause [by going] to Bermuda and purchas[ing] a Sloop and Cargo of Salt” for 
the American cause.  Paul Hamilton could at least point out "that he has refused any place 
under the British Government, from the Love to his Country."  All of these men showed 
that they had continued to support the American cause in the crucial period after the fall 
of Charleston and the beginning of civil war.  Edward Fenwick and Edmund Petrie both 
presented evidence that while in British service, they had sent valuable military 
information to American commanders.  As American spies, they showed their 
 
63 Inhabitants of St. Stephens Parish on behalf of Philip Porcher, 1783-10, John Harth, 1783-15, GA 
Petitions. Christopher Williman, Jan. 22, 1783, Gilbert Chalmers, Jan. 22, 1783, James Mackey, Inhabitants 
of St. Marks Parish in behalf of Benjamin Rees, Jan. 23, 1783, excerpted in Jan. 23, 1783, Thompson and 
Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784  13-14, 21, 25. Inhabitants of S.C. in behalf of James Lynah, 1783-394, 
GA Petitions. 
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willingness to risk their own lives for the American cause.  However, spying could also 
be the mark of someone completely untrustworthy.  Eighteenth-century gentlemen were 
not spies, after all.  Spies were men who responded to money, not honor.  Petrie and 
Fenwick therefore marshaled their arguments carefully, framing their activities as 
evidence of their ongoing attachment to America, not as spying.  Their rhetorical 
problems also framed a very practical problem; both were part of a spy ring run by 
Colonel John Laurens, who managed to get himself killed in minor skirmishing in August 
1782.  Since he was dead, and he had deliberately kept no records of his spies’ identities, 
their membership was difficult for them to prove.64 
Loyalty to America was important for potential citizens of the new nation.  South 
Carolinians were looking for both new citizens and reintegrated former Loyalists to show 
their dependability as citizens.  If a petitioner could prove his loyalty to the satisfaction of 
neighbors and legislators, then he could be depended on to support the new state.  The 
underlying fear was that Loyalists would comprise a fifth column within South Carolina, 
outwardly interested only in personal gain but actually working against America.  This 
fear was not entirely unjustified.  The 1783 General Assembly were simultaneously 
approving changes to the confiscation lists and approving a bounty to hunt down Loyalist 
vigilantes who were terrorizing parts of the backcountry.65 
By putting themselves in danger to aid America, petitioners had shown where 
their truest sympathies lay.  In addition, this claim served to mollify critics who had 
themselves risked everything in the struggle for American independence.  After all, some 
 
64 Andrew Hibben, 1783-34, GA Petitions.  Edward Hare, Jan. 23, 1783, Paul Hamilton, Jan. 25, 1783, 
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House J. 1783-1784 215. 
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of these petitioners had taken protection to guard their estates and families.  These were 
understandable goals, but it was hard for Patriots who had suffered as a result of not 
taking protection to sympathize.  By citing their own risky endeavors on behalf of 
American independence (however far they might be from those of the heroes of the 
Revolution), they allied themselves with those members of the legislature who had also 
shared in the pains and trials of the independence struggle.  These Loyalists positioned 
themselves as fellow victims of the British occupation, also worried about being 
dispossessed and imprisoned. 
Loyalty was an essential test for citizens of the newly independent nation.  
Assurances of loyalty, however well worded, might simply be glib promises that a man 
would once again fail to keep.  How could Loyalists persuade the legislature that their 
loyalties could be trusted?  What else went into making the dependable citizen South 
Carolina sought? 
Regardless of their relative social and economic status, free men had been forced 
into the public theater by the war.  Choosing alliances made people into visible political 
actors in a way that voting had not.  In this new climate, many more men were now 
judged by standards for honorable conduct that had originally been forged for elite men.  
Widespread propaganda about wartime conduct and the proper rules of engagement 
(often honored in the breach) focused on discussions of honor.  Honor thus became one 
of the fundamental qualifications of citizenship for free men of the Republic. 
Male honor was fundamental to the founding of the republic.  To be truly a 
citizen, one would have to be a man of honor.  America was to be a republic of virtue, 
where democracy depended on the predictability of right action.  Joanne Freeman 
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explains that while American historians conventionally believe honor to have been an 
overriding concern only for men of property in the antebellum South, in fact “it was 
integral to the 18th century mindset—part of a larger body of pervasive cultural 
assumptions.”66  Honor was an essential part of politics.  A person’s character and 
reputation established him in the hierarchy of meaning that determined how others should 
treat him.  Honor is more than that, however.  It was a fundamental part of how people 
saw themselves.  Men had to manage honor, making sure that they convinced themselves 
and others of their possession of this important quality.  Most of the Loyalist petitioners 
were men who had once been people of clear character and reputation.  In taking militia 
commissions, they had accepted positions relative to their rank.  Had the British won, 
their honor would not have been harmed.  However, by choosing the losing side, their 
actions were laid bare for scrutiny.  Their honor was not assured. 
Character had a specific meaning to the eighteenth-century Anglo-American.  
Character was not only one’s personality, but one’s moral standing in the public eye.  
Honor also involved moral decisions in respect to all aspects of a man’s public status, 
including his credit, social rank, personal habits, and known character.  Honor and 
reputation were actually used interchangeably.  Further, honor was part of Republican 
citizenship, which was intrinsically gendered.67 
Therefore, the Loyalist petitioners strove to refashion their honor, both to 
themselves and to their intended audiences.  Who were those intended audiences?  One 
potential audience was their own neighbors.  Petitions that they and their lawyers drew up 
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for their neighbors to sign are the most direct evidence that assertions of honor worked to 
reassure their neighbors.  In encouraging their neighbors to support their petitions, 
Loyalists were not only depending on the good will and previous ties from before, and in 
some cases during, the war, but on their own willingness to reach out to them now.  By 
seeking the signatures of their neighbors, they showed that they were willing to become 
good neighbors again.  Reaching out established their interest in maintaining the social 
networks on which these localities depended.  It also put them in a position of 
vulnerability to their neighbors.  The General Assembly might be required to hear their 
petitions, but other citizens were certainly not required to affix their signatures to the 
documents.  Loyalists’ citizenship and property depended on their ability to persuade 
their neighbors to support them as much as it depended on the goodwill of the legislature.  
Loyalist petitioners and their supporters filled their claims with assertions of 
honor.  These men made claims for their honor in different ways.  One way was simply to 
show that a man’s public character was honorable. David Bruce was proud that he “has 
maintained an honest Character.”  Robert Murrell’s supporters “believe him to be an 
honest, industrious and inoffensive Man.”  William Glen argued that in 56 years of South 
Carolina residence he had always had “the reputation of an Honest man.”  Honesty spoke 
to a man’s public credit—the assurance that he could make good on his financial 
promises, but also other kinds of promises.  Honesty meant that a man’s assurances were 
worth something.  David Bruce went the furthest when he asserted his “honest 
Character,” as character meant the sum of public actions.  Others made the link between a 
reputation for honesty and a public honorable conduct more explicit.   Philip Porcher’s 
supporters felt “in private life he is an honest Man and in public character, a friend to his 
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Country.”  Philip Porcher had taken a commission, but his “public character” spoke to his 
years of good behavior and moral conduct, all of which suggested that he would continue 
to behave in the ways good citizens needed to.  Robert Beard’s mother-in-law was 
“hopeing from his public Character…that he may be allowed to return and enjoy his 
former liberties.”  She made the connection between public honorable reputation and the 
ability to resume citizenship explicit.  Isaac Delyon himself made the connection between 
honorable character and citizenship when he said in his own defense that he had “always 
maintained the Character of a good Citizen.”  George Cooke also drew that connection 
explicitly when he pointed out that during all the troubles he “hath preserved a fair 
Character as a quiet and peaceable Citizen.”  Cooke’s claim is interesting because he 
linked character to passive qualities: “quiet” and “peaceable” behavior rather than active 
striving on behalf of the republic.  We think often of republican citizenship as requiring 
the virtues that make a good leader.  But as a former Loyalist, Cooke wanted to play 
down activity.  Passive citizenship seemed a better route to inclusion.  George Cooke in 
large part argued that he had all the public qualities that made a good follower, not a good 
leader.68 
Suspected Loyalists claimed other kinds of honor as well.  If public character was 
one marker of honor, wartime conduct could also show a man’s essential honorable 
nature.  After all, officers learned the intricate art of waging war, including plenty of rules 
of gentlemanly war conduct, from books on war.   In a war filled with bad behavior, 
petitioning Loyalists sought to portray themselves as people whose conduct was above 
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reproach, even if they had taken the losing side.  Given the reality of atrocities, and the 
even more inflated rhetoric about those atrocities, Loyalists worked to explain their war 
conduct as distinct from the image of British warfare embedded in the most emotional 
parts of the Patriot psyche.  John Walters Gibbs asserted that “while a British citizen he 
acted with humanity and moderation, and even avoided the Converse of those who acted 
otherwise, which occasioned him to be Suspected.”  As a gentleman, his social behavior 
was a sign of his feelings and motivations.  By displaying his public character as an 
avoider of more brutal Loyalists, he signaled (or so he suggested) his true American 
sentiments.  James Brisbane also argued that while “in his office he acted with 
Moderation” which at one time “lost him ƒ251.17.1 Sterling.”  Both of these men 
asserted that their behavior, despite taking protection, was so in favor of the American 
cause that the British noticed and punished them for it.69 
Supporters were willing to commit their own reputations based on their 
perceptions of the honorability of an individual Loyalist’s wartime conduct.  That fact in 
and of itself argues that wartime conduct was important in determining the honor of 
Loyalists, and by that their fitness as citizens.  John Wigfall’s supporters suggested “he 
acted with moderation, abstained from acts of Malice.”  James Smyth’s supporters argued 
that he “behaved with lenity, [and] abstained from acts of Malice.”  In each case, 
Loyalists painted themselves as men who behaved without “Malice,” which seems to 
mean that they treated individuals under law and did not use their power to pursue 
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personal enemies or enforce political conformity on unwilling victims.  In addition, their 
“lenity” included not personally profiting from plunder.70 
The striking similarity in these claims is not an accident, nor is it an example of 
one copying the other.  Instead, the similarity of these claims speaks to the shared 
understanding among petitioners and their supporters about what the traits of a good 
citizen were and what Loyalists would need to reassure their neighbors and fellow 
citizens about in order to be seen as good citizens instead of traitors.  Edward Fenwick 
made the connection between wartime conduct and honor most explicit when he argued 
that he used his position in the British service to “lessen the horrors of war by every 
office of Humanity and attention towards the Persons and property of those who fell 
within his Power.”  His “humanity” in a position of great power guaranteed his 
continuing honorable conduct.  Rather than seek revenge, he paid “attention towards 
the…property of those who fell within his Power.”  Fenwick understood the concerns of 
his fellow South Carolinians and used them to frame his own claims for legislative 
clemency.71 
These Loyalist petitioners were responding to new concerns about honor in the 
context of the brutality of the war.  They shared with their fellow South Carolinians a 
horrified sense that the war had exceeded the norms of honorable behavior.  Given a 
tendency by the winners to blame all atrocities on the Loyalists and the British, Loyalist 
petitioners faced heightened concerns about the boundaries and definitions of honorable 
conduct.  Time and time again they strove to show their own behavior as clearly within 
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the boundaries of honorable conduct.  They proposed that, in contrast to a standard of 
wartime behavior that concerned itself with military strategy first and foremost, they 
privileged “Humanity” in their actions over specific aims. 
Edward Fenwick’s claim of honor based on his behavior towards “the 
Persons…who fell within his Power” is not unusual.  Many Loyalists made claims that 
argued that their wartime conduct towards vulnerable Americans showed their honor and 
their fitness as citizens.  Good conduct in the face of opportunities for petty revenge and 
plunder was one marker of honor.  Another was one’s actual conduct towards neighbors.  
If the ultimate test Loyalists had to meet in their efforts to re-secure their estates was to 
show that they were fit citizens of an independent state, then they had to prove that they 
had acted in an upright manner.  In a world of local ties, service to one’s neighbors was 
also used to show that indefinable thing: the content of one’s heart.  Legislators wanted to 
know why each Loyalist took a commission or protection.  Did they take those positions 
because they were firmly attached to Britain and a foe of American independence, or 
because they were base opportunists? Or was it really because the Loyalist was upright 
and saw a chance to aid other people?  Loyalist petitioners tried to claim that their motive 
in taking British positions was really to serve their neighbors.  Christopher Williman’s 
“constant attention was for the relief of his fellow Citizens in Distress.”72  James Gordon 
“took a British Commission with a View to Act with Lenity”—in other words, to protect 
people’s safety and property.73   Again, we see a practical, shared understanding of 
citizenship as attention to mutual duties as a neighbor, at work in the claims of Loyalist 
petitioners. 
 
72 Christopher Williman, Jan. 22, 1783, Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 13-14. 
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Female Petitioners 
 Margaret Colleton, an absentee British landowner, was the only woman named in 
the Confiscation Act.  Nonetheless, some fifty women who were married to Loyalist men 
or otherwise dependent on them were involved in cases in the 1780s.  Many of them 
petitioned the General Assembly directly, representing their husband’s case.  Others 
represented only their own interests, asking for support or property for themselves. 
Anglo-American women were subject to coverture (the legal construction that 
subsumed adult married women under the legal personhood of their husband).  While 
women technically owned no property, the legal system did recognize specific kinds of 
female claims on property.  Widows were customarily entitled to one third of the real 
property their husband owned.  A widow could use the income for life, and at her death 
the property passed to her sons or other male heirs.  Widows of childless men were 
entitled to a higher share of the estate.  Dower was assured by law; a man could not 
disinherit his wife of that share.  Dower rights recognized the sacrifice women made in 
giving up their own property at marriage, and allowed women and minor children a basis 
of support outside of the government.  South Carolina women were entitled to this as a 
matter of law, but many families also used wills, jointures and marriage settlements to 
ensure that women received more property.  In wealthy families, women inherited 
property in slaves outright.  Women often received slaves as marriage portions, and 
fathers worked to ensure their daughters retained this property all their lives, using trusts 
and other legal strategies to circumvent the assumptions of coverture.  Dower rights 
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superseded debts, although increasingly in the late eighteenth century courts sold 
dowered property to satisfy such debts.74 
The Confiscation Act had deliberately taken property from entire families, 
undoing the protections of dower for women connected to Loyalists.  There was a 
provision for minimal, temporary support for women and minor children, but that support 
was far less than the dower value in property.  Yet women expected the General 
Assembly to recognize their need for support.  Many prominent South Carolinians were 
sympathetic to their claims.  Henry Laurens reassured one woman that Southern 
legislators would surely “reserve in favor of a Female Orphan” after the war, even if in 
the “Pell Mell” they had confiscated her property.  This “reserve” would be the 
customary third share of the estate, designed to support dependents handsomely.  He told 
Anne Burn, the wife of a British official in South Carolina, that “in honor to my Country 
I cannot believe that the property of the innocent Widow & Children” should be taken.  If 
the property was to be sold, it was “impossible” that a “proper Reservation in favor of his 
family” would not be made.  All of Laurens’ customary expectations held that women 
were entitled to a share of their husband’s estates, and he could not imagine that a more 
confiscatory policy would be pursued.  (He also realized, as his other letters make clear, 
that the General Assembly would reconsider the harshest decisions after the war was over 
and the British actually withdrew.)   He held this idea not just because women were 
customarily entitled to the dower share, but also because women were not considered 
political beings with the necessity of making a political choice that could then be held 
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against them.  He deemed Anne Burn “innocent.”  Despite her second marriage to a 
British official, she was still considered not to be political.  Her choice of a mate was not 
indicative of her loyalties.  Not only were women not held responsible for their husband’s 
actions, but their choices of mates even during the war, while sometimes unacceptable to 
their families, was not considered a political choice.  Women who married British 
soldiers and British officials often were treated more favorably than women married to 
Loyalists, as their own property was still protected.75 
Linda Kerber shows that while women could be considered traitors, most states 
did not otherwise recognize women as political actors.  Women’s political wills were 
subsumed by their husbands’, just as coverture also covered women’s property.  During 
the war, women were allowed free passage to join their Loyalist husbands because their 
own political participation was not at issue.   Only two states explicitly required women 
married to Loyalists to make a public choice of their own political loyalty.  
Massachusetts and Virginia only protected women’s property rights, including dower, for 
women who stayed in their respective states, regardless of where their husbands moved.  
In practice, many Loyalist women across America adopted this strategy, staying on their 
properties after their husbands had fled for British lines.  Grace Galloway, the wife of an 
outspoken Pennsylvania Loyalist writer, was loud in her own Tory views.  Yet she stayed 
on her family property, fully expecting that she would prevail in her efforts to keep it 
long after her husband had been driven out of the state.  She did not see that her political 
opinions mattered as women’s opinions were just that, opinions.  (In her case, she was 
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overly optimistic.  Her notoriety, coupled with her husband’s, guaranteed that she would 
be removed from Philadelphia.)76 
 The original South Carolina Confiscation Act was harsher to women than those of 
other states.  South Carolina recognized the need to provide some temporary support for 
Loyalist wives, but explicitly did not recognize women’s dower rights.  In contrast, North 
Carolina was more generous in guaranteeing dower rights to women.  For Loyalist 
families after the war, this was a pressing concern.  South Carolina certainly did move in 
later years to recognize the majority of dependent women’s claims, especially when they 
could be considered claims of dower, marriage portions, or separate marriage settlements.  
(Women’s success rate in claiming inheritances from their fathers and brothers was 
lower, but still sizable.)  Why was the General Assembly originally so harsh, when in 
later years it became so generous?  It certainly was not because they changed their views 
on the status of women and women’s political agency.  Legislators protected the right to 
temporary support from the beginning, and the language of the Confiscation Act also 
explicitly recognized legal property transactions undertaken before 1776, which protected 
most women’s marriage settlements.  The Assembly never specifically addressed why 
they were unusually harsh to women, but given the texture of all their decisions, one 
reason stands out.  Condemning all women’s property at first gave them the power and 
prerogative to decide which women to protect.  It certainly forced women to join the 
throngs petitioning the Assembly.  Over and over again, the General Assembly preferred 
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to deal with Loyalists in general terms as a unified group, and thus present a public image 
of South Carolina unity in dealing harshly with the many Loyalists.77 
 Years later, Margaret Mondin’s case went to the high courts.  Mondin was the 
remarried widow of Richard Pendarvis, who lost his property under the Confiscation Act.  
She asserted her own dower rights on behalf of herself and her heirs.  Her husband’s 
property had not only been confiscated, but also given to a male relative who badgered 
the General Assembly into giving it to him.  She began petitioning in 1785, but her case 
did not come to the courts until 1789.  At that time, Attorney General Alexander Moultrie 
argued that if the General Assembly had intended to protect women’s dower rights from 
the process of confiscation, they would have said so.  Correctly noting what indeed did 
happen as a result of the piecemeal recognition of dower rights in intervening years, he 
pointed out that acknowledging dower rights detracted from otherwise secure property 
claims.  In a novel legal argument, he tried to convince the courts that South Carolinians 
had deliberately taken away Loyalist wives’ dower rights “upon the idea, that husbands 
are oftentimes influenced and governed by the sentiment and conduct of their wives.”  
For Moultrie, women did have political identities that could be determined by their 
behavior, as expressed through their own public behavior and the behavior of their 
husbands.78 
 Stepping back from this argument a moment, I wish to emphasize that the court 
rejected Moultrie’s claim.  The judge concluded that the state could never have intended 
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to “deprive the widow of a common law right, when the act itself is silent on the subject.”  
Alexander Moultrie’s views are interesting, nonetheless, because he was a member of 
both the Jacksonborough Assembly and the subsequent assemblies that lifted confiscation 
from so many.  He was involved in the debates.  Of course, as the defender of the state’s 
interest, he had to create some sort of persuasive argument for the court, whether or not 
anyone else really believed it.  His argument that women’s political beliefs could be 
fairly suggested by their husband’s behavior (while having a certain common sense 
appeal) was explicitly rejected by the court.  Yet he was present at the creation of the 
relevant clauses, which did not recognize a dower right.  Sales advertisements did not 
mention that part of any property might be reserved.  People certainly bought property 
with the guarantee it was unencumbered.  Given all of this, I think we can safely 
conclude that at least a sizable minority of the Jacksonborough Assembly really did 
intend to deprive women tied to Loyalists of family property.  Practically, this made 
complete sense.  If a banished Loyalist man could leave for England after having sold his 
wife’s third of the property, the whole family would have a way to start anew with a hefty 
portion of their assets.  Denial of dower portions was a sensible policy if the Assembly 
sought to insure pitilessness.79 
Petitioners therefore strove to show that they were worthy objects of 
governmental clemency.  While some women wrote seeking mercy for their husbands, 
others (with whom I deal in this section) argued on their own behalf.  Ann Legge, for 
instance, hoped that her husband Edward Legge would be pardoned.  But she made a 
parallel argument supporting her own claim in the event her husband was not pardoned.  
 
79 Coker, "The Punishment of Revolutionary War Loyalists in South Carolina" 416-17.  Edgar and Bailey, 
eds., Directory S.C. House Rep.  3: 515-17. 
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(In fact, he was relieved from confiscation but was subject to amercement without the 
right to vote for many years.)  Admitting that public policy might be construed to “dictate 
a refusal to this part of her prayer,” she then asked for support on her own behalf so her 
“poor inscent children” would not be left penniless.  Practically, she pushed the General 
Assembly to “vest” property in her own name.80 
Women also made legal arguments to support their interest in getting possession 
of at least some of their husband’s confiscated property.  Dower rights were most 
commonly mentioned in the 1783 and 1784 petitions.  As we will see in Chapter Four, 
petitions in later years invoked not only dower rights, but also marriage settlements and 
complicated inheritances.  In 1783, Florence Cook argued that the legislature had 
“deprived [her] of her right of dower.”  Ann McGillivray argued that since her dower 
property had come to her from her father, it was really her property, not her husband’s. 
“The greatest part was given her in Marriage by her Father….”  A recognition of dower 
rights also provided the General Assembly with a potential escape hatch.  They could 
return property to women and children, restoring family wealth, while still banishing 
Loyalist men who could not be depended on to be honorable, upright citizens.  Further, if 
they withheld action for several years after the war, they could encourage men to leave 
and start new lives elsewhere while leaving their wives to manage family affairs in South 
Carolina.  Women who petitioned for separate property arrangements on behalf of 
themselves and their children were more likely to stay and use that money for themselves 
and a new South Carolina generation. Isabella Kingsley understood this in her own 
petitioning strategy.  She asked for her husband’s estate to be vested in her children for 
 
80  Coker finds several of these women, including Elizabeth Clitherall and Edith Rose.  Coker, "The 
Punishment of Revolutionary War Loyalists in South Carolina" 406 footnote 12.  Ann Legge, 1783-336, 
GA Petitions. 
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their support, especially since “most of them [are] natives of this Country and citizens of 
the State.”81 
Some women appealed directly to men’s pocketbooks.  If their husbands were 
deprived of their estates, and those estates were also off-limits to women and children, 
who was going to support these men’s dependents?  Were they to starve in the streets? 
Even if they were the spawn of hated Loyalists, could honorable men watch that happen?  
Were the local taxpayers supposed to support them as indigents when there were private 
resources available for their support?  Mary Cape reminded legislators that she was the 
mother of “Innocent Children” who had not themselves taken part in the war.  Eleanor 
Mackey, an older childless woman, appealed to the tender hearts of legislators.  If the 
confiscation was maintained in force, she would “be completely wretched & deplorable 
cast forlorn on the wide World, friendless & hopeless destitute of all resource & 
Subsistence with a mind preyed upon by Sorrow and a Body weaken’d by care and the 
approaches of age.”  How unconscionable would it be for the legislature to leave an old 
woman without any support?  Sarah Scott worried about her children turning into an 
“incumbrance” to the community without secure support.82 
Ann Legge reminded the legislature that she was “left with three helpless 
Children…That if wholly deprived of her property, which the Act directs, She and her 
family must be reduced to a situation truly distressing.”  Sarah Glen wondered what 
would happen to her “six Children in a distressed Situation.”  Ann McGillivray, a widow, 
pleaded with the legislature “if the Laws should take the Estate, she must be reduced to 
 
81 Florence Cook, Jan. 23, 1783, Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 22.  Ann McGillivray, 
Jan. 28, 1783 Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 53, Senate Jan. 25, 1783.  Isabella 
Kingsley, 1783-343, GA Petitions. 
82 Mary Cape, 1783-263, Sarah Scott, 1783-186, GA Petitions. Eleanor Mackey, Jan. 29, 1784, Thompson 
and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 387-88. 
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the necessity of Soliciting the Bounty of her friends or the Officers of the Parish, for the 
support of herself and her Children.”  She put the problem (and the threat) in a nutshell: if 
she was deprived of the property, she would be cast on the parish for support, which 
meant that the local taxpayers would have to support her.  Practically, South Carolinians 
did not want to do this.  Such claims also struck another cord: that of honorable 
caretaking.  As Henry Laurens had claimed, of course men would take care of the 
“Female Orphan.”  Men expected to support their own wives and children.  Having made 
it impossible for Loyalist men to fulfill these duties, they had emasculated them.  As long 
as the General Assembly could ensure that mercy was only extended to dependents, they 
could bask in the warm self-regard formed by protecting such dependents when their own 
husbands were too unmanly to do the job.83 
A few women asserted their own Patriot credentials.  Even if their husbands had 
been Loyalists, they had favored the Americans.  As loyal Americans, they and their 
children should be able to stay in South Carolina and enjoy their husbands’ property.  
Florence Cook tried to get James Cook’s property back without mentioning his own 
conduct during the war.  Instead, she emphasized that she “is a Sincere friend to her 
Country” who had “always endeavord to inculcate…the love of Liberty of this her Native 
Country” in her own daughter.   Florence Cook positioned herself as the ideal Republican 
mother, training her own child in the “love of Liberty.”  Republican motherhood 
promised that women would serve a vital role in the American republic by inculcating 
 
83 Ann Legge, Jan. 22, 1783, Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 15.  Sarah Glen, Jan 25, 
1783, Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784  40.  Her mother also filed a petition in support, 
citing her inability to support her grandchildren due to losing two sons to the American cause.  Sarah Jones 
on behalf of John Glen, Jan. 25, 1783, Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 40.  Ann 
McGillivray, Jan. 28, 1783, Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 53.  Kann, Republic of Men 
15-16, 31, 73. 
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Republican virtue in their children, especially their sons, and training them as useful, self-
denying citizens.  In this respect, she exemplified the ideal qualities of a female citizen of 
the new Republic. Unfortunately for her, she was the mother of only a daughter, but her 
petition shows she understood the equation of Republican motherhood.  “If providence 
had blessed her with a number of Sons,” she would have worked to “render them fit for 
the defence and Support of their Country.”  Despite that, she gave her only child “a 
Confirmed aversion to our enemies.”  She did not entirely avoid the subject of her 
husband, arguing that he had no choice but to take protection. Just as male petitioners 
portrayed themselves as good citizens of South Carolina, Florence Cook made a case for 
herself as the right kind of woman for the new republican South Carolina, and therefore 
as someone who should be welcome in the new order.84   
Margaret Brisbane also reassured the legislature that “her Sentiments with respect 
to the present Contest, ha[ve] always differed from her husbands…”  Brisbane and Cook 
were the only two women to address their own political beliefs specifically.  Yet 
Margaret Brisbane certainly did not let her appeal hang only on her own political beliefs.  
She also reminded the General Assembly that the political opinions of women didn’t 
matter.  “From their Sphere in Life” they could not be considered “promoters of the War” 
or “disadvantageous to the Contest.”  Further, women’s opinions “do not frequently 
operate, on the Judgment of Men.”  Margaret Brisbane did share another similarity with 
Florence Cook: both women were married to men who were unlikely to receive 
 
84 Florence Cook, Jan. 23, 1783, Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 22.  Linda Kerber used 
Florence Cook’s case at length in her own evocation of Republican motherhood and the trials of 
independent women’s political loyalties during the war.  She is impressed by Cook’s evocative claims.  I 
am more skeptical.  Florence Cook did make some unusual claims on her own behalf, but I suspect they 
were largely a function of who her husband was, which is a detail Linda Kerber never addressed.  Cook 
was more than usually hated, largely due to allegations that he pushed a policy prohibiting men from 
working without signing addresses to the conquering British or taking protection.  For more on James 
Cook’s own behavior, see Chapter 5.  Kerber, Women of the Republic 127-29. 
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clemency.  In fact, the Brisbanes were never removed from confiscation and both ended 
up living abroad for the rest of their lives.85   
Other women did use less obvious gambits to promote their own political 
loyalties.  Susanna Smyth subtly positioned herself as the ideal Republican Wife.  She 
told the legislature that “she can venture to declare he [her husband] is Weaned from 
every attachment to the British Crown, from thorough Conviction…”  How could she be 
so sure if she did not discuss political opinions with her husband?  Republican 
motherhood could also be the ideal for mothers of older children.  Elizabeth Mitchell 
argued that “herself and the heirs of Said Deceased are well affected to this state” and 
that her son “tho’ a Youth of tender Years hath lately turned out a Volunteer in the State 
Service….” After the war, these questions became more pressing for Tory families.  
South Carolina put women in the situation of needing to prove they did participate in 
their family’s political opinions.86 
Overall, female petitioners used tropes of women’s dependence and apolitical 
status to convince the General Assembly to fulfill their customary obligations as 
honorable men in supporting dependent women and children.  The only two women who 
made a claim for independent political opinions did so because they were married to 
hated men who stood little chance of returning to South Carolina themselves.  In all 
cases, clemency to women worked on an individual basis, requiring women to petition 
for help and to have each case judged individually by the Assembly.  This made women’s 
cases like all others.  The Assembly favored individual control. 
 
85 Margaret Brisbane, 1783-261, GA Petitions. Linda Kerber pioneered the concept of Republican 
motherhood.  Kerber, Women of the Republic 11-12, 127-28. 
86 Susanna Smyth, 1783-286, GA Petitions.  For an argument on Republican wifehood, see Jan Lewis, "The 
Republican Wife: Virtue and Seduction in the Early Republic," William and Mary Quarterly 3rd. ser., 44 
(1987): 689-721. Elizabeth Mitchell, 1783-246, GA Petitions. 
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A System of Local Control 
Thus far, we have seen how male Loyalist petitioners used discussions of honor 
and neighborliness to present themselves as fit citizens of the newly independent state, 
and how female petitioners presented themselves as dependents in need of care.  In short, 
we have paid attention to the rhetorical strategies of petitioners.  But there is another side 
of the coin.  What were legislators looking for in these petitions, and how did they expect 
to evaluate them?  We have also seen that neighborliness was a major claim in favor of 
citizenship.  Loyalist petitioners understood their local knowledge and networks of 
relations as crucial to citizenship.  Did the Assembly concur? 
 The General Assembly had punished Loyalists in an effort to ensure social 
stability and peace after the war.  What they did not want, at almost any cost, was a 
continuation of the reign of mob violence and vigilantism that had characterized large 
sections of the interior during the war.  If Loyalists were to be permitted to remain in the 
state, the state needed to ensure that they could not undermine South Carolina from 
within.  The Confiscation Act presumed that ordinary South Carolinians needed a target 
to assuage ordinary people’s anger at the Loyalists for the pain, destruction and death 
they had wreaked on the populace.  If they were going to overturn their decisions in 
individual cases, legislators needed to be assured that these individuals had intact social 
networks.  They needed proof that their neighbors wanted them back. 
Edward Rutledge, one of the chief architects of the Confiscation Act, recognized 
the principle of local control early on.  After passage of the act, he wrote approvingly of 
Loyalist “deserters” who left Charleston in 1782 and went back to their homes, despite 
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the fact that some were subject to confiscation.  He thought they would be allowed to live 
there if “peaceably inclined,” but if they were not peaceful, “the People in that part of the 
State will soon make their Situation very uncomfortable.”87 
As it turns out, the most important thing a Loyalist petitioner could do to increase 
his chances of success was to submit evidence of local support.  The more members of a 
community who were willing to sign their names to a petition in support of a Loyalist 
application, the more convinced legislators could be that the Loyalist had a wide base of 
support in his own community.  Such petitions were evidence that Loyalists had enduring 
local ties.  A significant minority of 1783 petitioners submitted supporting petitions 
signed by anywhere from 13 to 114 people.  As we have seen previously, even those who 
did not give such evidence argued that they could produce support from their neighbors, 
and often did so at the 1784 hearings (discussed in the next chapter). 
Raymond Bailey’s study of petitioning in eighteenth-century Virginia suggests 
how petitions were generally circulated for signatures.  Petitions were often posted at 
county courthouses.  This might have worked well in South Carolina’s coastal regions, 
but in the backcountry courthouses were rare.  In Virginia, petitions also were posted at 
churches, militia mustering areas, stores, and anywhere else people gathered.  
Occasionally, petitions were advertised in newspapers.  Petitions of very local concern 
were hand carried from residence to residence within the community, either circulated by 
the most interested individual or simply passed from one signatory to the next.  While the 
question of what to do with Loyalists was a statewide question, Loyalist petitions were a 
 
87 Edward Rutledge to Arthur Middleton, Cane Acre, April 23, 1782, Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Jan. 
1926," 14. 
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local matter.  Signatories were from the same area.  It is reasonable to suppose that they 
were therefore carried around or posted at a local church or store.88 
The General Assembly did respond to this pressure.  They referred individual 
petitions to a committee of at least two legislators from the same area as the applicant.  
The standing committee for Charleston had many more members to handle the large 
workload for that region.  The schedule of hearings was published in the Charleston 
newspapers.  Individual Loyalists were given the chance to prepare and present evidence 
on their behalf, including producing multiple character witnesses.  The entire system 
worked to take a statewide matter and put the decisions about it into local hands.  If a 
Loyalist could prove that his neighbors supported him publicly both as petitioners and as 
personal character witnesses, and he could convince legislators from his own area that he 
would be a trustworthy citizen, then he had made a persuasive case.  His neighbors had 
already proved they would not lynch him, and by approving his application, local 
legislators had backed his claims.  Further, committees with local members were aware 
of community ties and personal relationships that are hard for contemporary historians to 
reconstruct.  In short, they were in a much better position to analyze the names on each 
petition than we are.  Still, they were swayed more by the profusion of names than the 
identity of each individual name, with the proviso that having prominent supporters never 
hurt. 
Two objections could be posed to the locally-based system of clemency.  One, 
what if only some neighbors were willing to forgive wartime loyalties?  Perhaps the 
citizens who stepped forward were a minority who could not speak for the mind of the 
community.  How could the legislature measure the minds and hearts of those who did 
 
88 Bailey, Popular Influence 26-27. 
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not sign the petitions?  Second, what if the Loyalist had engaged in unforgivable behavior 
during the war, which made him a poor prospect for citizenship and a target for outrage 
and vigilantism, but his own immediate neighbors were not themselves the victims of this 
behavior, and hence were not the ones whose decision potentially really mattered? 
The evolving ad-hoc system actually provided a working system of checks and 
balances that addressed these concerns.  There were in practice two kinds of checks built 
into this system.  The first check was the opportunity for those who did not trust the 
former Loyalists to make their opinions known.  The legislature set up evening hearings 
open to the public to hear testimony from the Loyalists and their supporters.  These 
hearings were announced ahead of time in the Charleston newspapers, which served as 
the newspapers of record for the entire state.  In a few isolated cases, people did go out of 
their way to present testimony that certain individuals were not fit to be given clemency.  
While unusual, these moments caused consternation, leading to a breakdown in the 
hearing.  
The committee itself provided the other check.  Committees were composed of 
local members.  Local legislators sitting on the committees were in a better position to 
know more about the petitioner and the people who had signed supporting petitions.  
Unfortunately, the hearing records do not preserve debate, and the committee records are 
limited to the final report.  But the committee must have considered whether the signers 
represented a reasonable cross-section of the landed members of the community.  Were 
there any prominent people whose signatures did not appear?  Were their closest 
neighbors signatories?  Were the signatories Patriots themselves, or as in one case, were 
all the signatories actually people who had fought with the Loyalists? 
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By handing what had been statewide judgments off to a system of local decision 
making on an individual basis, the legislature bowed to the greater knowledge of the 
localities while preserving their own ultimate prerogative of control.  In making these 
decisions based on local opinion, they guaranteed that pardoned Loyalists had shown that 
their communities welcomed them.  These were people with enduring ties who would 
indeed make good citizens. 
For Loyalist petitioners, petitioning was a way to refashion their honorable 
character and reputation as upstanding men who had once been and would now again be 
the kinds of citizens their neighbors and the state wanted most to build a new, strong 
social, economic and political order.  The rhetoric of the petition package itself allowed 
former Loyalists to shape an image of themselves as worthy men, not the traitors that the 
confiscation and amercement acts had labeled them.  But proving oneself an honorable 
person (and by extension loyal and trustworthy), while essential, was not enough.  
Petitioners also strove to show that they were acceptable, even desired, members of their 
local community.  The importance of proving local ties cannot be overstated.  Both the 
General Assembly and ordinary citizens were concerned with the question of whether 
former Loyalists could and should be integrated, full-fledged members of the community.  
As will be shown by their later actions, they were willing to be moved on the subject of 
leniency towards the Loyalists.  However, they did not increase leniency unilaterally.  
Instead, they responded to pressure and appeals from South Carolina citizens who sought 
to allow the legal return of former Loyalists to their property and citizenship.  Despite all 
the hostility and bad feeling, sizable numbers of South Carolinians agreed that post-war 
stability depended on integrating a large majority of former Loyalists into the body 
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politic.  Rather than the legislature’s pushing normalization from above, we can see that 
the actions and words of South Carolinians encouraged the General Assembly in that 
direction.  Rather than the leaders leading, the leaders followed. 
Conclusion 
 I have been taking the reader through some of the very interesting rhetorical 
strategies that Loyalists and their supporters used to regain their citizenship and property.  
The large number of these claims and the willingness of supporters to back such claims 
suggest that they reflected widespread belief that the local bounds of community defined 
the reliability of a citizen.  Citizenship might legally be defined in terms of state 
allegiance, but people understood citizenship as an outgrowth of honorable character, that 
was demonstrated by everyday actions.  But none of this would matter if these claims 
were not recognized by the General Assembly.  In fact, the General Assembly endorsed 
this way of understanding citizenship by giving the majority of petitioners what they 
wanted: the return of their citizenship and property. 
 South Carolinians were not alone in reconciling their folk ideas of citizenship 
with the idea of volitional allegiance, in ways that benefited Loyalists by the late 1780s.  
While we have been considering citizenship as it was understood during the period when 
ordinary people were trying to work it out, jurists had the chance to consider the issue of 
Loyalists’ standing as American citizens with the benefit of years of peace.  Most of the 
cases arose as Loyalist descendants attempted to reclaim estates.  The cases were 
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therefore based on the least lucky Loyalists: those who did not return home.  In North 
Carolina, the Supreme Court reasoned in Bayard v. Singleton (1787) that when the 
United States separated from Great Britain, Americans were like a “people ship-wrecked 
and cast on a maroon’d island—without laws, without magistrates, without government.”  
As such, citizenship began anew, and only for those who voluntarily joined the new 
political community.  In the North Carolina case, the Loyalist was deemed never to have 
taken citizenship in America, but to have remained a British subject traveling under a 
British flag.  A New Jersey court considered the issue of whether a Loyalist could forfeit 
a declared allegiance at a later date during the war.  In that case, one Coxe had accepted 
the privileges of New Jersey citizenship, and therefore could not make a change and 
become a British citizen.  In his case, he was deemed entitled to the privileges of 
citizenship; the state was forced to recognize his rights.89 
 Loyalists compellingly communicated their enduring neighborhood ties, and their 
willingness to put those ties above the demands of armies.  In so doing, they defined 
citizenship as a demonstration of neighborliness, not ideology.  Patriotism was 
demonstrated by lived service to community and state.  This definition was shared by 
Loyalists and Patriots, and became the basis upon which Loyalists were allowed to return 
to South Carolina and live without legal stigma.  
I suspect that South Carolinians simply came to this understanding earlier than 
other states because they were forced by their situation to confront their definition of 
 
89 Bayard v. Singleton, 3 N.C. 42 (Accessed through Lexis-Nexis).  Although I discuss the case in terms of 
its implications for Loyalist citizenship, it is more commonly cited by legal scholars as an early case of 
judicial review over legislative decisions.  The case brought into question North Carolina’s Confiscation 
Act, although the only part the court overruled was the interpretation that later generations had no standing 
to contest Loyalist property losses despite the citizenship of the later generations.  Kettner, The 
Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 201. 
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citizenship.  Throughout the early national period, Americans continued to understand 
citizenship as local and character-based, just as they continued to identify with their state 
over the nation.  The grand claims of American universal democratic citizenship, despite 
James Madison’s theories, were in practice based on the comforts possible in a face-to-
face society.   The rise of universal male voting, and the fraught abolitionist politics of 
the antebellum period redefined citizenship again, but Americans made it through the 
crucial early years of this nation with a notion of citizenship based on the local and the 
character-driven. 
Just as John Murrin has argued that the early Republic had a “roof without walls,” 
meaning that our Founding Fathers erected the roof, a Constitution, with no national 
identity (the walls) to support it, here we find a case where the implicit early modern 
notion of citizenship endured well into the early nineteenth century, waiting for the 
reality of everyday understanding to catch up to the grand words of the founders.  Once 
again, with other scholars, I find evidence that the early republic in fact depended for its 
existence on the persistence of early modern ways of thinking, and that they bridged the 
crucial gap that existed because there was no genuine, strong sense of national identity to 
make an American citizenship based on documents and ideology at all coherent.90  
 
90 John M. Murrin, "A Roof without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity," in Beyond 
Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity ed. Richard R. Beeman (Chapel 





ACHIEVING LEGISLATIVE RECONCILIATION: LEGISLATIVE 
GIVE-AND-TAKE AND MASS CLEMENCY FOR LOYALISTS, 
1783-1800 
 In the summer of 1783, Stephen Mazyck wrote his young nephew Peter Porcher, 
who was studying in England.  Porcher’s father “was fully determined to stay in this 
Country not withstanding his Estate was confiscated.”  Philip Porcher, Peter’s father, 
understood well that despite the harsh tone of the Confiscation Act, he and other elite 
men who had changed sides during the war, but not committed violent acts, were likely to 
find increasing sympathy.  Even those with more problematic histories hoped to find 
favor with the new state government.  Gambling on his understanding of the situation, 
Philip “stayed at Santee” on his family’s property throughout 1782 and 1783, going up to 
Charleston for the meeting of the Assembly and hearings.  Even then, he lived freely in 
the city at the Mazyck home.  Stephen Mazyck was optimistic about Philip Porcher’s 
chances, and soothed his nephew that “your Father amongst others having a great many 
Powerful Friends” and being known for his “Universal good character,” would gain 
legislative favor.  The legislative committee on Loyalist petitions recommended 
removing Porcher from the Confiscation Act.  Porcher, along with many others, was 
relieved from confiscation and banishment in 1784, although he became subject to an 
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amercement.  Meanwhile, Porcher benefited from a temporary protection law that 
allowed him to live freely in South Carolina on his own property.  The same law stayed 
the sale of his property.  While the situation was no doubt unsettling for Philip Porcher, it 
was a very comfortable purgatory.  Mazyck reassured his nephew that his father lived on 
his own property “as usual very quiet and you need not be the least uneasy about him.”  
(He also rushed to reassure his nephew that the property he would one day inherit would 
also be restored.)1 
 Philip Porcher’s experience is representative of Lowcounty Loyalists, and to a 
lesser extent, backcountry Loyalists.  He was originally a supporter of American 
independence.  As such, he was elected to the First and Second Provincial Congresses, 
and to the General Assembly.  When Charleston fell to the British, he made the decision 
to accept protection, and took a British commission.  In his own defense, he told the 
General Assembly in his 1783 petition that he first laid “whole nights in Santee River 
Swamp” hiding from the British, giving up in fear after a few very uncomfortable weeks.  
In addition, Porcher made his decision to take a commission as a lieutenant in the militia 
after hearing persistent rumors that every member of the legislature would be 
“apprehend[ed]” and imprisoned on an island outside Charleston.  Given the smallpox 
outbreak, Porcher pleaded that imprisonment seemed “certain Death.”  Forty-some 
members of his parish filed a supporting petition on his behalf.  His character was “that 
of a man attentive to the Duties of his Station” and “beloved and respected.” He 
explained that he took the commission hoping that he would only have to run slave 
patrols, not participate in the war.  When he realized that combat training was required, 
he resigned the commission, and his neighbors seconded this.  He was the perfect picture 
 
1 Stephen Mazyck to Peter Porcher, Charlestown, June 14, 1783. 49/509, Porcher Family Papers, SCHS. 
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of many of these Loyalists: a supporter of American independence who made the best 
accommodation he could with the British after they took Charleston.  He tried to protect 
his family and his property without actually harming the American cause.  Maintaining 
good relationships throughout the war with neighbors and kin, he had warm ties to 
augment his own direct appeal to the General Assembly.  And for the Assembly, those 
ties were solid proof of his honor and fitness for the responsibilities of citizenship.2 
 In his case, supporters must have worried that questions lingered about his 
conduct, for they offered another petition later in 1783 that tried to answer more specific 
questions about Porcher’s wartime conduct.  Any “inconsistency of Conduct into which 
he may have been betrayed” came from his efforts to protect his family by appearing 
complicit with British aims.3  Porcher did not join the American forces in response to 
Governor Rutledge’s 1781 proclamation, but he did look for ways to rejoin the American 
side.  He sought and secured help from General Francis Marion in returning home.  
Marion approached Governor Mathews (his successor) on his behalf and he was allowed 
to return to his plantation until the legislature met to consider Loyalist petitions. 
 The General Assembly recommended removing him from the confiscation list in 
February 1783, but like other Loyalists, he did not receive official relief until 1784.  At 
that time, he was restored to his estate and citizenship, but he was still subject to an 
amercement of 12% and a several-year ban on holding public office.  In the economic 
downturn of 1785, one year after he received clemency from the General Assembly, he 
again petitioned for relief, this time from paying his amercement.  He continued 
petitioning for relief from amercement through 1788, finally gaining some limited 
 
2 Philip Porcher, April 1782, 3-1782-3, GA Petitions.  Edgar and Bailey, eds., Directory S.C. House Rep.  
2: 534. Inhabitants of St. Stephen’s Parish in Support of Philip Porcher, 1783-10, GA Petitions. 
3 Inhabitants of St. Stephen’s Parish and Others, 1783-59, GA Petitions. 
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success.  In 1788, he was granted permission to use otherwise very devalued bonds to 
reduce his outstanding amercement, although he still had to pay part in current money.  
Peter Porcher died on his own plantation in 1800, fully restored as a citizen.  His son 
Peter Porcher returned to South Carolina, where he served eight terms in the General 
Assembly.  His political ambitions were aided by his father’s recovered wealth, and 
unharmed by his father’s Loyalism.  Today, Philip Porcher’s home in Charleston is a 
pricy bed and breakfast in the heart of the Historic District.  Advertising materials and 
guidebooks make no mention of his Loyalist status.  By convenient silence, he has 
become just another Revolutionary Patriot.4 
 This chapter considers what happened in the wake of Loyalist petitioning in 1783.  
The General Assembly began revising laws, considering how to deal with individual 
Loyalists.  Limited records of hearings, complete with occasional witness testimony, give 
insight into the process of negotiations between the South Carolina Assembly and former 
Loyalists who sought official reentry into society. I will show how these negotiations led 
to increasing clemency for Loyalists.  Further, I will show that the hearings continued the 
discussion of character, honor, and citizenship in a new nation that Loyalist petitioners 
began.  Loyalists were largely successful in their efforts, leading to an omnibus bill in 
1784 that moved a majority of Loyalist petitioners from the confiscation list to the 
amercement list, freeing them to live and prosper in the state.  In the aftermath of that 
bill, only a few others were able to obtain official legislative clemency in later years.  To 
illustrate the fluidity of the process, I detail the trials of administering the confiscated 
estates.  Finally, this chapter concludes a discussion of legislative reconciliation with a 
 
4 Philip Porcher 1785-39, 1785-29, 1788-62, GA Petitions.  Edgar and Bailey, eds., Directory S.C. House 
Rep. 3: 568-69.  Philip Porcher Inn, http://bbonline.com/sc/porcher/.  Darwin Porter and Danforth Prince, 
Frommer's Portable Charleston (New York, 2003) 54-56. 
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consideration of the uses of amercement and the ways in which pardoned Loyalists also 
tried to evade paying amercements. 
“Fully determined to stay in this country:” Loyalist Strategies for Safe and Legal 
Alternatives to Flight5 
When the British finally evacuated Charleston, they took many Loyalists with 
them.  Loyalists living in occupied Charleston had months to decide what to do.  The 
local Loyalist newspaper published the Confiscation Act, and those on it knew they were 
banished from the state at pain of death (at least legally).  Others, not listed on the Act, 
also knew, through their own sense or through pointed threats delivered to them by 
women in Charleston or by letter, that their neighbors did not want them and would kill 
them if they returned.  Some 4,000 white people left Charleston with the British, 
comprising South Carolina families as well as Georgians and North Carolinians.  Yet 
sizable numbers of Loyalists banished under the Confiscation Act stayed in South 
Carolina in order to facilitate their petitions.  Others left their families and withdrew to 
East Florida, from where they marshaled their applications.  In a spirit of practical 
generosity, the General Assembly recognized these complications.  Having decided to 
accept and consider the petitions just as they would any other address, they tacitly 
 
5 Stephen Mazyck to Peter Porcher, Charlestown, June 14, 1783. 49/509. Porcher Family Papers, SCHS. 
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recognized these petitioners as entitled to the protections of citizenship.  In so doing, they 
began to undermine the logic of the Act itself.6 
In 1783, the General Assembly recognized and codified the growing tolerance 
towards former Loyalists that was already practiced, especially by military leaders.  
Generals Marion and Greene led a movement to release many former Loyalists, like 
Philip Porcher, back to their own estates under military passes.  As military leaders they 
dealt with the intricacies of individual needs all the time, and did not see issuing civilian 
passes to former Loyalists barred by legal authorities as so different from the myriad 
other passes they routinely issued to civilians on both sides.   In addition, both were 
supporters of greater clemency to Loyalists.   In Charleston, the sheriff took charge of 
Loyalists, releasing some under bail and confining others (such as John Wragg) in gaol 
until the General Assembly would decide their fate.7 
Loyalists were well aware that possession was nine tenths of the law.  Loyalists 
across America strove to maintain a stake in their property by leaving family members on 
the property during the war, even in the face of considerable danger.  South Carolinians 
left their wives on family estates, as did other Americans in similar situations.  This 
strategy had varying success.  In Virginia’s eastern shore, women and children stayed 
behind while their husbands fled, but their slaves were taken away and the properties 
sequestered anyway.  Still, the Virginia legislature recognized this tactic by letting 
women ‘inherit’ those properties as though their husbands were dead.  Adele Hast found 
in her study of Virginia’s eastern shore that only one group of Loyalists could not achieve 
 
6 Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution  254.  4, 200 Loyalists registered to leave 
with the convoys by the middle of August 1782, according to British military records and the 
correspondence of British commanders in Charleston. 
7 Stephen Mazyck to Peter Porcher, Charlestown, June 14, 1783. 49/509. Porcher Family Papers, SCHS. 
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“reconciliation and reintegration”—those who left Virginia during the war and then tried 
to return.  Pennsylvania Loyalists also tried to remain in the state, or leave their wives, in 
order to protect their property.  In South Carolina, Margaret Cunningham, a Loyalist 
widow, demonstrated the importance of squatter’s rights when she strategically continued 
living in her home while appealing her husband’s (and therefore her) confiscation.  While 
she lost some of his land, the General Assembly relented and gave her “the Tract of Land 
on Rayburnes Creek Containing Two Hundred Acres, whereon she formerly lived.”8 
 In all of these cases, Loyalists who were named on the confiscation list actually 
were still residing in the state after the date they were supposed to flee.  In recognition of 
this reality, the General Assembly acquiesced to the situation by regularizing the status of 
such men.  Several days before the end of the 1783 session, the General Assembly passed 
an act lifting the death penalty for Loyalists who stayed after the forty-day deadline the 
previous year.  Recognizing that: 
notwithstanding the said Act [the Confiscation Act], on the evacuation of the 
garrison of Charlestown by the British forces, many persons whose names are 
mentioned in the lists annexed to the said Act, relying on the lenity of the 
American government and the mercy of their fellow citizens, did remain and 
continue in Charlestown,  
 
the General Assembly allowed them to stay legally.  Judges and justices of the peace 
across the state were bidden to take these named Loyalists into custody and determine 
whether and how much bail was appropriate to their situation.  For their part, Loyalists 
 
8 Hast, Loyalism in Revolutionary Virginia  127, 131, 169.  Ousterhout, State Divided  218-20.  Margaret 
Cunningham, 1785-6, GA Petitions.  Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786 78, 167-68, 188.  
Andrew Cunningham Plat for 1,000 acres in Berkeley County, Colonial Plat Books (Copy Series), vol. 9, 
pg. 208, Andrew Cunningham Plat for 100 acres in Berkeley County, Colonial Plat Books (Copy Series), 
vol. 11, pg. 373, other plats recorded in other counties.  Andrew Cunningham, File No. 1686B, Reel 29, 
Frames 488-, Accounts Audited of Claims Growing out of the Revolution in South Carolina, 1775-1856, 
SCDAH.  For just one of his many legal claims before the Revolution, see Gov. Charles Montagu v. 
Andrew Cunningham, Box 96A, Judgment Roll of the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas 
(Charleston), SCDAH. 
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were bidden to “keep the peace, and be of good behavior towards all and every the good 
citizens of the said state” and other Americans.  This emphasized that while the General 
Assembly had chosen to relent in allowing proscribed Loyalists to stay in South Carolina 
pending a final hearing on their fate, they were not to presume this mercy guaranteed a 
favorably outcome in their cases.  As people living on sufferance, they should act 
accordingly meek.9 
 The General Assembly explained that on further examination they would favor 
Loyalists who had voluntarily “surrender[ed] and submit[ed] themselves” to legitimate 
authority figures of the independent state of South Carolina, by staying their sentences 
and allowing them time to pursue appeals to the Assembly.  By so doing, the General 
Assembly both regularized Loyalist activity that was technically illegal, and accepted the 
demands of Loyalists for individual trials or hearings in order to present evidence and 
contest charges.10 
 In addition, the act stayed the sale of Loyalist property until “the final 
determination” on each petitioner.  There is some evidence that the Commissioners of 
Forfeited Estates were already holding back some property.  In fairness and sympathy, 
the Assembly extended this ad-hoc understanding to all Loyalist petitioners.  This 
provision only covered the Loyalist petitioners, who were listed by name.  Loyalists who 
had not submitted petitions by early 1783 were left out of these protections.  On the face 
of it, this rewarded people who had not played by the rules—people who had pushed the 
boundaries of the law by staying and petitioning for redress.  In practice, what it did was 
recognize that those who stayed and petitioned early were more likely to be men accepted 
 
9 Act No. 1176, “An Act to Alter and Amend An Act Entitled ‘An Act for disposing of certain Estates and 
banishing certain persons therein mentioned,’” Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 1: 553-54. 
10 Act No. 1176, Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 1: 553-54. 
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by their neighbors, with stable communities and families wishing their return.  Those 
lacking these essential protections and markers of good citizenship were less likely to 
have stayed.  This act separated Loyalists likely to be pardoned from those much less 
likely to receive clemency on the same essential bases as would eventually decide the fate 
of individual petitioners.  This acquiescence to Loyalist petitioners also made it almost 
certain that the Assembly would pass an act forgiving most of the petitioners. 
 Patting itself on the back for their “accustomed lenity,” the Assembly moved to 
enshrine the right to a “trial at law” for all accused Loyalists, regardless of what law 
confiscated their citizenship and property.  Act No. 1189 guaranteed “all such person or 
persons who have withdrawn themselves” the right to such trials if they returned to stand 
trial within six months of the close of the winter 1783 General Assembly session.  (The 
Assembly closed at the end of March, so Loyalists hoping for a trial needed to return by 
late September 1783 to qualify.  Of course, given the obvious tendency of the General 
Assembly to extend deadlines after the fact, no one probably worried too much about 
these deadlines.)  Still, such deadlines worked to incorporate Loyalists whose neighbors 
were sanguine enough about their conduct to allow them to live unmolested in 1783, in 
the recent wake of the war.11 
 All of these were efforts to deal with the reality of proscribed Loyalists still living 
in South Carolina.  They legitimated the presence of people who were outlawed in the 
recent statute, and served as notice that the General Assembly was prepared to be 
 
11 Ibid. Act No. 1189, “An Ordinance for Disposing of the Estates of Certain Persons, Subjects and 
Adherents of the British Government; and for Other Purposes Therein Mentioned,” March 17, 1783, 
Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 1: 568-70.  No one was put to death for returning, but there is 
some evidence from post-1784 petitions that returning Loyalists after that date were careful to request 
permission from Charleston city officials and/or port officials as they entered the harbor.  For instance, see 
Mary Champneys on behalf of her husband, 1787-39, John Champneys, 1785-38, GA Petitions.  
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generous.  It was in this atmosphere that hearings began for accused Loyalists proscribed 
by the Confiscation Act. 
Presenting the Case: Loyalist Hearings and the Committee Deliberation Process 
Loyalist petitioners claimed the right to a hearing or trial at which they would be 
able to present exculpatory evidence.  As we saw in Chapter Three, the right to petition 
carried with it the affirmative right to consideration.  In the spirit of that right, the 
Assembly moved to a committee system dedicated to examining the specific claims of 
the petitioners.  As we have seen, in 1783 those committees convenend with local 
members to consider carefully the evidence Loyalists presented.  However, the 
advantages of a more formal trial setting quickly became clear.  In addition to the high-
minded ideals of protecting liberty that trials represented, the work of sorting through 
Loyalist evidence quickly overwhelmed the committees.  In the interests of justice and 
efficiency, the Assembly moved to consolidate hearings into one series, all held in 
Charleston, and in the same time frame.  While it is not entirely clear when each hearing 
took place, they were held between March 1783 (the end of one Assembly session) and 
January 1784 (the beginning of another general session).  These hearings were especially 
encouraged because while the General Assembly committees met and made reports on 
many Loyalist cases during the 1783 session, they did not act on those decisions.  
Pushing the entire issue back a year, they bought time for more extensive fact-finding. 
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These hearing dates were advertised in local papers well in advance of the actual 
date, although plenty of petitioners still did not make it to their hearing.  Some, like 
Alexander MacBeth, probably didn’t appear because they were not in the state at the 
time, and could not find anyone to testify favorably on their behalf.  In his case, three 
men testified against him after he failed to appear at his hearing.  Others simply did not 
show—especially women appearing on their husbands’ behalf.  Edith Rose and Elizabeth 
Atkins, both petitioning for male relatives, did not appear.  The clerk noted in both cases 
(with some apparent irritation) “she not attending agreeable to Advertisement nor any 
other persons for her, the Committee proceeded to form their Judgment.”12 
Petitioners brought their own witnesses when possible.  In other cases, certain 
committee members and other locals testified repeatedly, and especially against 
petitioners who did not appear.  In reading the testimony, it becomes clear that certain 
Loyalists were put on the confiscation act for very specific acts against the American war 
effort, regardless of the relatively benign particulars specified in the Confiscation Act. 
Well-advertised hearings alerted petitioners and their supporters to prepare for 
and attend the evening sessions, but it also alerted enemies.  These hearings offered 
Loyalists a chance to present character witnesses and letters of support, both testaments 
and evidence.  But it also opened the door to contrary accusations.  On the other hand, the 
Free Conference Committee also received letters of support for petitioners.  John Floyd 
wrote a letter in February 1783 in support of Dr. James Clitherall’s petition, reiterating 
important themes about how Clitherall actually performed in his capacity as a Loyalist 
commander in the Lowcountry.  Floyd, and Clitherall, felt that he had to make his points 
 
12 No. 61 McBeth [probably Alexander MacBeth], No. 53 Mary Philip, No. 54 Edith Rose, Testimonies and 
Notes, Petitions for Relief from Confiscation 1783-1784, General Assembly Free Conference Committee, S 
165035, Papers of the General Assembly, SCDAH.  (Hereinafter, Free Conference Comm. Hearings) 
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more explicit: Clitherall did no “injuries to the inhabitants of the Country” and only 
served in his Loyalist military capacity once, when he appeared at the “Horseshoe Field 
to see the militia enrolled.”13 
 Just as in many aspects of life, showing up was half the battle.  The Free 
Conference Committee was much more impressed with those who produced witnesses, 
even if they were the lawyers representing them, than those who could not find anyone to 
speak for them.  In some cases, this may have been because those who did not appear 
were those living abroad who feared for their safety—in other words, real offenders.  Not 
attending was a hazard in itself, signaling all sorts of unpleasant possibilities to the 
legislators staffing the Free Conference Committee.14 
Men who did not appear usually had their reputations undermined by negative 
testimony.  Andrew Deveaux did not appear, and in his absence, both Colonel Harden 
and a member of the Dupont family testified that he was “an Active man against 
America” and always regarded as a British adherent.  When Samuel Bonsall failed to 
appear, a witness testified that Bonsall had been such an early, outspoken Loyalist that he 
“was sent off this state formerly when he was Exiled for not taking the Oaths.”  What he 
meant was that Bonsall had refused to take the oath of allegiance in 1777 and was already 
banished from the state by that earlier legislation—evidence of a more ideological 
commitment to Loyalism.15 
 
13 John Floyd to Honorable Gibbes, Feb. 14, 1783, Folder: Forfeited Estates, Miscellaneous, Box 4, 
Miscellaneous Papers Relating to Claims on Estates, Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, Series 126170, 
Comptroller General Papers, SCDAH. 
14 No. 54 Edith Rose, No. 58 Elizabeth Atkins, No. 55 Nicholas Laffilie, Free Conference Comm. Hearings. 
15 No. 56 Andrew Deveaux, No. 60 Samuel Bondsall, No. 59 James Mackie, Free Conference Comm. 
Hearings. 
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Putting in an appearance was clearly very important.  But just arriving was not 
enough.  The point was to produce additional exculpatory evidence with character 
witnesses and any additional evidence.  These witnesses offered what they thought would 
be important, and the committee also questioned them, sometimes more fiercely than 
others.  Positive witnesses were motivated to do a good job.  Mr. Fraser, testifying for Dr. 
James Clitherall, felt he had not been persuasive enough, so he wrote the committee the 
next day to give them “one Circumstance…which escaped him last Night.”  (The actual 
new evidence was not that impressive, but it does speak to Fraser’s desire to be the best 
possible witness.)16 
All of this confirms my argument in the previous chapter: the most important 
factor influencing whether a Loyalist would receive clemency from the General 
Assembly was whether he had sizable local support.  Everything else derived from that 
crucial qualification.  Here, if a petitioner appeared and offered personal witnesses 
willing to devote an evening to linking his reputation to the Loyalist’s reputation, he was 
likely to convince the Free Conference Committee to recommend restoration of his 
property and citizenship.  Personal ties were important, but they were important as 
evidence of character and community belonging, not simply favoritism. 
 Petitions tell one side of the story.  They were carefully marshaled arguments 
couched in the traditionally humble language of petition.  But Loyalists were not able to 
control hearings as carefully.  In the hearings, petitioners might lose control of their story.  
While their character witnesses were prepared to defend them, the language they would 
use was not as easily controlled.  The language certainly had rote attributes (especially in 
 
16 Fraser to Gibbs, Feb. 15, 1783, Box 4, Misc. Papers Relating to Claims on Estates, Commissioners of 
Forfeited Estates, Comptroller General Papers, S 126170, SCDAH. 
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the ways the notetaker chose to record testimony), but sometimes witnesses said things 
that an editing process would have eliminated. 
 Three individuals were grilled on whether they sabotaged food supplies in 1780.  
In preparation for the siege at Charleston, local authorities laid in food supplies for the 
garrison.  Much of the meat spoiled to the point it was inedible.  At the time, people 
alleged that certain individuals had deliberately allowed the meat to spoil in order to 
undermine Patriot defenses and cause the city to fall into British hands faster.  James 
Mackey, a Charleston cooper, was accused of “behav[ing] in such a manner as to spoil all 
the meat.”  Even worse, witnesses claimed he “bragged off” about it after “the British had 
possession of Town.”  David Taylor was also accused of spoiling meat.  William Logan, 
testifying on David Taylor’s behalf, admitted that Taylor was responsible for curing meat 
for the Charleston garrison but that the meat in question was “spoilt before he says it 
[was] in his hands.”  The committee questioned Taylor’s witnesses very carefully, asking 
two “Did you know anything of his Conduct respecting the Care of Meats for the 
Garrison of Ch. Town”?  King assured them that Taylor “had not it in his power either to 
cure or spoil the meat” as he was “only Employed to Cooper” the stores.  Dillon also 
rushed to defend Taylor, arguing that it was not “his particular business to cure the meat.” 
A third witness corroborated these statements.  William McKinney, another cooper, also 
came under suspicion for spoiling the meat.  He didn’t bother to attend the hearing, but 
Loveday testified against him that he “spoiled the meat” and further that he “knows 
nothing good of him.”  In these cases, men had deliberately worked from a position of 
trust to destroy the American effort to save Charleston. Such double-dealing (if it really 
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took place) was good proof of both committed Loyalism and less than honorable 
conduct.17 
 Several artisans harbored Loyalist tendencies at a time when Patriot artisans 
exerted great control over Charleston and state politics.  These “Friends of Government” 
were justifiably eager to punish the radical artisans who had made their lives difficult, 
and also to find ways to profit by the British position.  James Cook and Gilbert Chambers 
started a petition denying Patriot artisans the right to pursue their trades—a position that 
would cause some to starve.  They requested that such artisans “not be suffered to carry 
on their trades & Occupations to the detriment of British subjects” who needed the work.  
These Loyalist mechanics pointed out that it was in the British interest to help them, as 
without such a prohibition Whigs did not have “proper encouragement to return to their 
allegiance.”  James Rugge was later accused of being one of these men, which is 
probably why he was placed on the confiscation list.  (He was officially punished among 
those who volunteered in the Royal militia.)  In his hearing, he tried to claim that he took 
his position solely for the “preservation of the property” of citizens, but witnesses 
vigorously protested that claim.  While one focused on the practical objections (his own 
goods were stolen by the British while Rugge had care of them), another zeroed in on 
Rugge’s efforts to entrap Charlestonians into taking protection.  “He was one of the men 
who petitioned to the Commandant to prevent every person from following their 
Employment without taking protection, which was carried in Effect.”  The joint 
legislative committee on Loyalist petitions was also unimpressed with Rugge’s sincerity 
as a petitioner.  In March 1783 they concluded that he had “given undeniable proofs of 
 
17 No. 59 James Mackie, No. 122 David Sayler recommitted, No. 104 William McKinney, Free Conference 
Comm. Hearings.  James Mackie was known as a dissident to the radical artisans organization long before 
the fall of Charleston.  Walsh, Sons of Liberty  92 footnote 9. 
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his Preference of the British to the American Government” on “many Occasions.”  
Further, his persistent Loyalism mixed with his actual conduct made him “a Subject very 
improper for the Support [of] a Republic.”  He was not relieved from confiscation in 
1784.18 
 Hearings also focused on other specifics of wartime conduct.  In some cases, 
witnesses volunteered explanations of behavior, and in others committee members asked 
pointed questions.  John Wigfall was apparently careful to “give Orders not to plunder.”  
Further, his supporters testified that he often “Express[ed] his Abhorrence against 
Burning houses & plundering.”  He was “as moderate as possible” in his public behavior 
while holding a British commission, and instructed his underlings to “take no Notice of 
anything to be molested.”  John Deas (subject to amercement himself) defended Henry 
Peronneau by claiming he always “Expressed himself in favour of America.”  Verbal 
affirmations of the rightness of the American cause were popular.  Archibald Brown 
“often reprobated the conduct of the British”—presumably plunder, amongst others.  In 
contrast, Andrew Deveaux was accused of being a “henchman” to the British.19 
 We saw in Chapter Three that several petitioners claimed that they took 
commissions at the instigation of their local communities, and supporters were willing to 
back those claims.  Witnesses at the hearings also frequently testified to this community 
collusion.  John Wigfall’s supporter Benjamin Quark agreed that he took the commission 
to “prevent its being fallen in other hands which may have in their power to use the 
people in the District ill.”  Henry Rugeley, a Loyalist from Camden who led a local 
 
18 Walsh, Sons of Liberty 97-98.  No 70 James Rugge, Free Conference Comm. Hearings. Thompson and 
Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784  221. 
19 No 40 John Wigfall, No 51 Henry Peronneau, No 52 Archibald Brown, No 56 Andrew Deveaux, Free 
Conference Comm. Hearings. 
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militia company, found a supporter willing to testify that Col. Joseph Kershaw 
“Persuaded [Rugeley] to take the Commission” to “prevent any Others from distressing 
the Inhabitants.” Captain Struther testified on Archibald Brown’s behalf that he accepted 
a commission to “keep out a bad man.”  Another supporter for Brown concurred that he 
took the commission due to “the Solicitation of his Neighbors.”20 
 The importance of how a man came to take a commission becomes clear from the 
negative evidence.  One witness testified against John Forsyth that he “was not solicited 
to take Commission, but offered himself to that Command.”  James Gordon took a British 
commission from “principle” in the eyes of one witness, but General Marion testified 
against him that he was very earnest in hamstringing the Patriot military operations while 
he was in charge of a Loyalist militia.  In fact, Marion rather bitterly remembered he 
“acted in Conjunction to keep the Little Pede [sic] men in arms against us.”  Mr. 
Vineyard testified against John Forsyth that he “heated his men” as Captain of the 
Grenadiers and was “very active” against the Americans.21 
 Wartime conduct in offices was also important to the Free Conference 
Committee.  As we saw in Chapter Three, Loyalist petitioners strove to paint themselves 
as honorable victims of circumstance: they took commissions because they had to, and 
served honorably, helping Americans while not doing anything useful for the British war 
effort.  Witness testimony and the pointed questions committee members sometimes 
raised make it clear that these concerns were central to the decision-making process. 
 John Wigfall’s witnesses testified he often “Express[ed] his Abhorrence against 
Burning Houses & plundering.”  Further, he protested British commander Major 
 
20 No. 40 John Wigfall, No. 44 Henry Rugeley, No 52 Archibald Brown, Free Conference Comm. 
Hearings. 
21 No. 68 John Forsyth, No 71 James Gordon, Free Conference Comm. Hearings. 
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Muncrief’s decision to burn houses in Georgetown.  When Wigfall sent out his militia 
company to John Wragg’s plantation on the Black River, supposedly to seize his stores, 
he ordered his men to “be as moderate as possible, & to take no Notice of anything to be 
molested.”  By contrast, John Rose Drayton’s case was complicated by witnesses happy 
to report second-hand gossip that he was “accused of being the Means of Cusack being 
hanged” in addition to rampant plundeering and destruction of houses.22 
 Moderate men took commissions under necessity, but resigned them when it 
became clear that they would have to act against America.  We saw this distinction in the 
previous chapter, and witnesses upheld it in the hearings.  Archibald Brown’s witness 
thought he had “resigned his Commission” after he was ordered to “send down the old 
members of the Assembly to town.”  Robert Quark testified for one petitioner that he held 
his commission for a “short time” and was careful to “Indulge[]” his men in not 
“appearing in Arms.”23 
 Questioners specifically asked if accused Loyalists had participated actively in 
British military aims.  One witness for David Guerard was asked “did you know if he 
ever took up Arms against Am[erica]?”  His brief, to the point answer: “No.”  Another 
witness shored this presumption up by asserting that David Guerard also “made it a point 
to Inform him when the British had any advice against him [the witness].”24 
 Political principles also mattered, but witnesses drew a distinction between those 
principles and the way they were expressed.  James Brisbane was “confirm[ed an] Enemy 
 
22 No. 40 John Wigfall, No 52 Archibald Brown, Free Conference Comm. Hearings.  On the burning at 
Georgetown, and the context of the American efforts to take and hold the town, see Gordon, South 
Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History  154, 158. 
23 No 52 Archibald Brown, No 64 John Rose Drayton, No 62 James Smyth, Free Conference Comm. 
Hearings. 
24 No 75 David Guerard, Free Conference Comm. Hearings. 
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to America” by “several persons,” which explains why he was not included in the 1784 
clemency.  Alexander MacBeth was judged “a strict adherent of the British” but never 
“active for or against us [the Patriot cause].”  Further, his Loyalism was excused by his 
youth.  (Another witness was less forgiving, arguing he went out of Charleston in order to 
march back in with the British.)  William Harleston testified that James Smyth was a 
“peaceable good man” whose “Disposition Inclined him to favour the British.”  James 
Duncan was seen as having no particular principles, but was a “very weak man which 
[sic] can be largely frightened to any thing.”  Similarly, General Francis Marion judged 
Robert Muncrief Junior to be a “passive Character,” and in the same vein David Taylor 
was judged “as to his political principles he had none.”  By contrast, Andrew Inglis was 
judged “always…inimical to America.”25   
 Of course, there were pathetic excuses as well.  Witnesses agreed that John 
Wagoner took protection because he was incapable of independent action since he “took 
to Drink & was scarcely ever Sober.”26 
 John Forsyth’s hearing is an excellent example of mixed testimony at the 
hearings.  His own witnesses testified to his positive qualities and upright conduct, as 
expected.  But others testified against him, undermining every assertion of upright 
conduct and adherence to America.  James Smith testified that Forsyth was “an upright 
Dealer & honest man” and therefore a man of good character.  Another supporter testified 
that Forsyth took the commission out of despair that the Americans could not control the 
 
25 No 43 James Brisbane, No 46 Florence Cook, No 61 McBeth, No 62 James Smyth, No 63 James 
Duncan, No 66 Robert Muncrief Jun., No 65 Alexander Inglis, No 122 David Taylor recommitted, No 116 
George Duncan, Free Conference Comm. Hearings. 
26 No 123 John Wagoner recommitted, Free Conference Comm. Hearings.  This reminds me of the petitions 
on behalf of Alexander Harvey, whose sister claimed he was insane and was finally committed by an 
English doctor.  Mary Champneys on behalf of her brother Alexander Harvey, 1785-56, GA Petitions. 
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country after the defeat at Charleston, but was a supporter of the Americans.  He had 
become a supporter of the American cause because he was “Deceived” by the British, 
and “abhorred the proceedings of the British Government.”  Further, Forsyth’s witness 
painted him as justly deferential to the power of the General Assembly and the moral 
fitness of the American people.  He “acknowledged the Justness of the Confiscation Act, 
& that the British would do just the same by the Americans had they prevailed.”  (In 
contrast, other Loyalists went out of their way to protest the legality and morality of the 
Confiscation Act.)  Captain William Buhundun suggested enthusiasm and flexibility 
when he suggested Forsyth “would be happy to become a Citizen on any terms….without 
the Expectation of his Property being restor’d.”  This was more than a bit disingenuous, 
as all of the Loyalists did seek the return of both their citizenship and their property.  
Legal citizenship carried with it stringent protections on property, and a restoration of 
citizenship without at least a nod to the restoration of property would be legally suspect 
and corrosive to the entire system of property.  Still, it did suggest a becoming modesty 
of aim in the petitioner.  This suggestion also pointed the way to an acceptance of partial 
property restoration.  In this case, Forsyth might quietly disclaim any property already 
sold by the Commissioners of Forfeited Estates while recovering property not yet sold. 
 However, Forsyth’s application stirred considerable negative testimony as well.   
While Captain Buhundun had argued Forsyth accepted a commission under some duress 
(as countless others had claimed), Atkins argued that Forsyth “was not solicited to take 
Commission, but offer’d himself to that Command.”  Atkins accepted the arguments that 
were made in several of these cases that men had taken military commissions under the 
British at the behest of their neighbors, but angrily asserted that Forsyth was not one of 
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those men.  He had put himself forward seeking a commission, in an act displaying both 
his true political loyalties and his self-promotion (never an ideal trait for a gentleman).  
To make it worse, he not only eagerly sought a commission, but also was energetic in 
executing his duties under it.  He “had them [his troops] Drilled & offered the 
Commandant to march out with his Comp.[any]” and indeed led his men in a “victory 
gained by the British.”27  All of his activities argued that he was truly a committed 
Loyalist who had taken an active part against America, and that decision and his actions 
were entirely voluntary.  This negative testimony was especially important, because 
while Atkins testified in two other cases, this was the only one in which he was negative 
about the claimant.28 
 Two other witnesses came forward to reinforce this negative portrayal.  Ferguson 
agreed with Atkins that Forysth had “always appeared forward in the duty of his 
Commission.”  Vineyard agreed that Forsyth had shown great ardor in carrying out his 
duties as a leader of the Grenadiers, as he “heated his men” and “was very active.”  
 Loyalists worked to secure their own futures in other ways as well.  John Deas, an 
amerced Loyalist who also represented several confiscated Loyalists, petitioned to have 
his amercement lifted in 1783.  The committee agreed that he should be relieved, but his 
case was tabled with everyone else’s until 1784.  since he did nothing but take protection.  
In October 1783, Deas wrote a letter to the Commissioners of Forfeited Estates enclosing 
a copy of the favorable report by the legislative committee.  He also pleaded with them 
personally, adding that so “severe a Fine” was especially harsh on someone who was 
already “cruelly amerc’d by British Depredations.”  There is no evidence that this letter 
 
27 No. 68 John Forsyth, Free Conference Comm. Hearings. 
28 No. 60 Samuel Bondsell, No. 61 McBeth, Free Conference Comm. Hearings. 
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changed anything—he still had to wait until March of 1784 for any help.  Still, he 
obviously thought keeping his case fresh in the minds of people with the power to 
influence it was a good thing, and if anyone subject to either confiscation or amercement 
had reason to understand the process, it was attorney John Deas.  He never missed an 
opportunity to put his case before authorities, as he also brought witnesses to support him 
in front of the Free Conference Committee when they held hearings for amerced persons 
in late February and early March of 1784.29 
In January 1784, the General Assembly convened again, spending a great deal of 
energy on the question of Loyalist clemency.  When the committee met throughout early 
February to determine each individual case, they recalled some Loyalists and gave them 
another chance to clarify issues and present new witness testimony.  In most of these 
cases, these Loyalists were subject to disagreements between the House and Senate over 
whether to remove them from the confiscation list.  At the initial meeting on Feb. 3, 
1784, things started off cleanly for the free conference committee, a joint committee of 
both legislative chambers.  After agreeing on the order of discussion (people everyone 
agreed on, followed by people who only one house wanted to forgive), they read and 
voted on each case.  Most of the time, they agreed to relieve each man of confiscation 
and banishment, and then amerce them 12%.  Occasionally, disagreements led to efforts 
to change the default option, by setting amercement at a lower level or by lifting 
confiscation but not banishment.  On the fourth day of deliberations, they moved to call 
 
29 Report of the Comm. on the Petition of John Deas Esq. enclosed with letter from John Deas to 
Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, Charleston, Oct. 1783, Letters Received by Commissioners of 
Forfeited Estates, Box 4, Miscellaneous Papers Relating to Claims on Estates, Commissioners of Forfeited 
Estates, Comptroller General Papers, SCDAH.  No. 7 Deas (On Amercement), Testimony and Notes on 
Persons Seeking Relief from Confiscation or Desiring to Become Citizens 1783-1784, General Assembly 
Free Conference Committee Concerned with Petitions for Relief from the Confiscation Act of 1782, S 
165035, SCDAH.  (Hereinafter Free Conference Comm. Meeting.)  John Deas continually emphasized he 
only took protection, but did not hold “any place of profit Honors or Employment.” 
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back Edward Legge Jr. to “Answer to such Questions as may be ask’d.”  He was merely 
the first allowed a second chance.  At least he wasn’t kept cooling his heels in a waiting 
room, like John Gaillard.  “As Mr Gaillard was in the Lobby that he be call’d in to know 
if he was ready to take his Tryal as ch was unanimously agreed to” but they voted to 
adjourn instead.  Nor did Gaillard get a chance the next day.30 
 Sometimes these reconsiderations helped, but sometimes they did no good.  In 
some cases, it had been months since the hearings, and with rumors circulating about who 
might be forgiven, there was plenty of time for people to present evidence against 
Loyalists.  When the committee reconsidered Edmund Ellis’s case on Feb. 13, 1784, they 
announced that “several new & oppressive Acts appeared he was guilty of” had arisen.  
John Gaillard had similiar problems, as “a paper contain[ing] heavy Accusations ag John 
Gaillard” was sent to the committee.31 
 All of this set the stage for a reevaluation of the position of Loyalists—a 
reevaluation that was bound to be favorable for many of them, given the notable warming 
trend towards Loyalists in the General Assembly from 1782 to 1784.  Those two years 
were crucial.  The war had ended, the British had withdrawn, and a peace treaty was 
signed.  South Carolinians had two years to watch and evaluate former Loyalists in their 
midst, and watch their behavior as neighbors and potential citizens.  They were in a very 
different position than they had been in 1782, when the original Confiscation Act was 
passed.  Further, Loyalist petitions and hearings were not only legislative work, but part 
 
30 Feb. 7, 1784, No. 35 Thomas Eustace, No. 39 John Gaillard.  For an example of changes to amercement 
accounts, see Thomas Corbell. etc., including John Laroche “granted at 10 pr Ct,” John Martinsdonald 
“Granted at 5 pCent.” Free Conference Comm. Meeting. 
31 No. 50 Edmund Ellis Reconsidered, Feb. 13, 1784, Feb. 14, 1784, Free Conference Comm. Meeting.  
John Gaillard must have known the contents of the letter, for in his hearing he countered them one by one. 
John Gaillard, Feb. 14, 1784, Feb. 23, 1784, Feb. 24, 1784, Free Conference Comm. Meeting. 
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and parcel of the process of reconciliation.  For Loyalists to find reconciliation, the entire 
society had to find some peace with the horrors of internecine war.  The careful process 
of legislative reconciliation gave many a chance to work out their own tricky and tortured 
feelings about the war itself.  In discussing wartime behavior, South Carolinians had a 
chance to consider complicated emotions about all wartime conduct. 
Mass Clemency: General Assembly Moved for Generous Public Reconciliation, 1784 
 The Confiscation Act passed at Jacksonborough in 1782 was harsh.  Yet, as we 
have seen, torrents of petitions quickly led to long committee sessions, and a system of 
hearings for accused Loyalists.  This process took a year, from the beginning of January 
1783 (through a mid-year meeting) to the General Assembly meeting in 1784, where the 
Assembly had a chance to consider the committee reports and hearing testimony 
generated in the previous year.  This also gave many other Loyalists an opportunity to 
submit petitions that were read on the floor of the House of Representatives in January 
and February of 1784.  Petitioners whose petitions were read in 1784 had sent them 
throughout 1783, but largely in the last few months of the year.  Many of them show 
greater use of lawyers and legal arguments than previous petitions.  After all, they had the 
advantage of an additional year to discover what sorts of arguments were more 
persuasive.  Later petitioners were also, by and large, more problematic cases, and 
probably recognized they needed the advice of a lawyer.  For example, James Nassau 
Colleton argued that he received a punishment meant for those who “took an active part 
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in opposition to this Country” which was unfair to do to people who “by absenting 
themselves and standing Neuter” were labeled enemies.  This strikes me as a very 
legalistic argument made by someone versed in arguments about citizenship.  His petition 
picks up the popular theme of active citizenship, in which a person did or did not act 
against the country, but then invoked a new principle of studied neutrality.  His entire 
discussion of active and passive citizenship is much more sophisticated than the largely 
inchoate notions at work in the 1783 petitions.32 
 Governor Guerard also encouraged the spirit of reconciliation in his annual 
address to the combined houses.  He argued that to “effectually and acceptably put into 
practice” South Carolina’s new independence, they must begin by “forgiving and pitying 
our enemies.”  They could do this by planning “to remit (upon principles of impartial 
justice) the amercements and confiscations that have taken place on certain Characters, 
guilty of no other crime than taking British protection, and remaining within their lines.”  
This act of generosity was also one of “impartial justice,” for as Governor Guerard was 
willing to say aloud in 1784, taking protection was something “which many of their 
fellow Citizens were also constrained to do.”  Of course, he still encouraged the 
Assembly to make distinctions between various acts during the war.33 
 Unfortunately, little remains of committee deliberations on individual Loyalists.  
In some cases, the full text of the final report survives, and in other cases we have only 
the evidence of the final act.  What is clear is that the General Assembly, the Governor, 
 
32 Jan. 29, 1784, Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784  383-84. 
33 Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 400-402.  I want to add an important caveat about 
Governor Guerard as a political leader.  He was unusually outspoken, and seemed to take delight in 
nagging, satirizing, and provoking the General Assembly.  (All of this helps to explain why despite 
widespread agreement on his brilliance, he didn’t serve very long.)  His pronouncements certainly cannot 
always be taken as evidence of widespread legislative agreement, since many of them hated him.  Still, 
given the circumstances, in this he was not far apart from the General Assembly. 
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and many ordinary South Carolinians regarded the reevaluation process as a chance to 
separate the wheat from the chaff.  Resolving to ameliorate conditions for Loyalist 
petitioners and their families, the Assembly considered each petition alone, but handled 
all the petitions as a group, neatly devising group solutions tailored to degrees of 
clemency, and local attitudes. 
 In 1784, the General Assembly spent a lot of time renegotiating the terms of 
confiscation.  Ultimately, there was a groundswell of support for removing many 
petitioners from the strains of banishment and confiscation.  At first, individual 
legislators pushed for special bills for one friend or another, but given the number of 
individuals and the effort going into hearings and committee reports, the General 
Assembly decided to make a blanket law covering everyone.  In restoring estates, they 
again made use of a system of lists, creating three categories for Loyalists removed from 
the penalty of confiscation and banishment.  The luckiest people were placed on list two, 
in which they received a full lifting of all penalties for themselves and their heirs.  Their 
property was restored, although in some cases it had already been sold.  If that was the 
case, as the Commissioners of Forfeited Estates received payments on the properties, they 
turned those monies over to the pardoned Loyalist.  Purchasers of property often 
complained that they paid inflated prices, but Loyalists who had lost their property did 
not agree.34 
 People on list one were moved from confiscation to amercement, pledged to a 
standard 12% amercement.  If their estate had been sold, the amercement came out of the 
funds before they were reimbursed.  People on list three were also subject to amercement 
 
34 Act No. 1299, “An Act for Restoring to Certain Persons, Therein Mentioned, Their Estates, Both Real 
and Personal, and for Permitting The Said Persons to Return to this State,” March 26, 1783, Cooper and 
McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 1: 624-26. 
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in the place of confiscation, but they were still considered fundamentally untrustworthy at 
some level.  They were “disqualified from being elected” governor, lieutenant governor, 
privy council, or to either house of the legislature, or “of holding any office or place of 
trust” in South Carolina for seven years.  What made these men pardonable but still 
unworthy of public trust?  This fate was reserved for men who had taken military 
commissions during the war.  This was not targeted only at men who had taken British 
military commissions, but at men who held posts of responsibility and trust in the Patriot 
forces and then took British commissions.  Finally, anyone who had petitioned the 
General Assembly already and was not already granted relief in this bill, but had at least 
one house favorably inclined to their case, could live in freedom and not have their 
property sold until the next meeting of the Assembly.35 
 In practice, the seven-year restriction on voting ended a year early, when South 
Carolina passed a new constitution that struck down those voting restrictions.  At least 
one Loyalist on the list of amercees who couldn’t vote or hold office was quickly 
returned to the General Assembly himself after the 1790 constitution came into being.36 
 How did South Carolina’s move for amelioration for Loyalists compare to other 
states?  Historians have long suggested that New York and South Carolina stood out for 
the harshness with which they dealt with former Loyalists, and there is certainly 
something to that.  Nonetheless, as we have seen in Chapter Two, South Carolina’s legal 
strategy towards Loyalists resembled that of Georgia and North Carolina much more than 
the legal regimes of other states, largely because Southern states formulated laws in 
reaction to the Southern war effort, which was timed very differently than New York’s or 
 
35 Act No. 1299, Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 1: 624-26. 
36 Edgar and Bailey, eds., Directory S.C. House Rep. 4: 139-40. 
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Pennsylvania’s experience, for instance.  Georgia also halted sales of confiscated 
property in 1783 while debating mass clemency, although they did not enact a 
comprehensive clemency.  In North Carolina, one legislative faction introduced bills 
starting in 1784 for years in an effort to repeal confiscation, but it continually failed.  The 
closest North Carolina came was a rash of individual acts, mostly in 1784 and 1785, to 
benefit particular Loyalists subject to confiscation.  Most of these clemency moves were 
directed towards Loyalist wives and children, not the proscribed Loyalist.  North Carolina 
did not pass a general revision of the laws on confiscation until after the Constitution, 
which was part of a movement among the growing nationalist coalition to finally honor 
the Treaty of Paris.37 
 More northerly states also took steps towards clemency, revising laws passed 
earlier, but mass clemency was rare.  In the fall of 1782, Pennsylvania began considering 
individual petitions for forgiveness from confiscation, banishment, and 
disenfranchisement.  In some cases, individual Loyalists were given trials and/or 
legislative hearings, but most failed to achieve clemency.  Pennsylvania also avoided 
enacting a mass clemency.  In 1790, in the wake of enactment of the new Constitution, 
the Pennsylvania legislature considered a general pardon for all those still subject to 
confiscation and banishment, but its unpopularity led to continual postponement, and 
 
37 Brown, Good Americans  228-29.  Joseph S. Tiedemann, "Patriots, Loyalists, and Conflict Resolution in 
New York, 1783-1787," in Loyalists and Community in North America, ed. Robert M. Calhoon, Timothy 
M. Barnes, and George A. Rawlyk (Westport, Conn., 1994).  Lambert, "Loyalist Property in Georgia," .  
DeMond, N.C. Loyalists  166-68.  Nationalists argued that Americans needed to obey all aspects of the 
Peace Treaty in order to gain credit on the world stage.  Since Articles 5 and 6 required readmitting 
Loyalists and providing restitution, and open collection of pre-war debts, these men supported the repeal of 
all confiscation and test acts.  For a longer, more involved discussion of nationalist orientation, Loyalism, 
and the move away from Confederation, see Jacobs, "Treaty and the Tories" .  Much of this research was 
stimulated by Jackson Turner Main’s work on the Confederation period, and strove to further elucidate his 
theories of political party behavior in all Confederation states.  Main dwelt at length on debates on paper 
money, debt repayment, and land prices, but also included divisions between parties on treatment of 
Loyalists.  Main, Political Parties . 
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Pennsylvania never passed a general amnesty despite considerable pressure from 
nationalists seeking world credit for the new Constitution and federal government.  The 
most Pennsylvanians were willing to do was revise the test laws in order to allow former 
neutrals, and Loyalists who never took up arms or sought safety within British lines, to 
take a new, post-war oath of allegiance that struck out the customary abjuration of King 
George’s authority.  Even this act was controversial, taking more than two years to find 
enough supporters for final passage in 1786, two years after South Carolina’s clemency.  
Test acts were finally overturned in 1789, but those who had been convicted of treason or 
otherwise became subject to confiscation (usually termed attainted in this state) never had 
any recourse besides individual petitions, dealt with strictly individually.38 
 In another contrast, New Yorkers actually passed new anti-Loyalist legislation in 
1784, at the same time South Carolinians moved to void large numbers of confiscations.  
The Voting Act of 1784 reiterated that Loyalists were disenfranchised.  Loyalists subject 
to confiscation did find individual relief, but most people subject to confiscation were 
rebuffed.  New York also passed a restoration act in 1784, but it only restored the estates 
of twenty-seven individuals.  Only thirty Loyalists total achieved such clemency in New 
York by 1790.  Advocates of restoration finally achieved a partial victory in 1792 when 
all banished Loyalists were given the legal right to return, but only with their explicit 
recognition that their confiscated property was irretrievably lost to them and their 
families forever.39 
 
38 Ousterhout, State Divided 217, 219.  Siebert, The Loyalists of Pennsylvania  86, 88-90.  Pennsylvania’s 
new test act also fulfilled a second important function: it allowed young men who had been minors during 
the war to take the oath, and therefore secure their own voting and office-holding rights. 
39 Tiedemann, "Patriots, Loyalists in New York." 80.  Zeichner, "Loyalist Problem New York," , especially 
298.  In New York, treatment of Loyalists became a major issue between political factions.  Organized and 
implacable hostility towards Loyalists surfaced in 1783 and 1784, including public meetings and county 
petitions to the legislature demanding that body not readmit Loyalists. 
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 Massachusetts also debated amnesty for Loyalists in 1784, but strictly 
distinguished between neutrals, who were passive during the war, and those who had 
done military service or been officeholders in the British administration.  Debating 
amnesty actually hardened what had been a rather ad-hoc series of town decisions.  
Masachusetts did differ in that, according to David Maas, 86.6% of Loyalist real estate 
had never been legally confiscated, and so it was easy to allow the vast majority of 
Loyalists to return.  In many cases, that real estate was vested in the control of family 
members.  In contrast, South Carolina did offer clemency to those who saw military 
service or served in the occupation administration.  Part of the difference lies in the 
timing—most Massachusetts Loyalists who were subject to confiscation had fled in 1776, 
when few Massachusetts residents were committed Loyalists.  They were not survivors of 
a civil war in the way South Carolina Loyalists were.  That makes it more remarkable, I 
argue, that South Carolina offered restoration to those who had clearly taken up arms 
against America.40 
 Perhaps the most generous Northern state was Connecticut, which repealed most 
anti-Tory wartime acts in May 1783, at the instigation of conservatives in the legislature.  
While this did not automatically rehabilitate all Loyalists, it went a long way.  Towns, 
which held considerable sway, were less uniformly positive.  Nonetheless, New Haven’s 
town meeting set up a committee in March 1784 to consider which former Loyalists 
should be readmitted, based on their character and usefulness to the community.  The 
committee enthusiastically reported back the same day, while denying readmission to 
Loyalists who had plundered and murdered.  Once again, in the midst of clemency, we 
 
40 David E. Maas, "The Massachusetts Loyalists and the Problem of Amnesty, 1775-1790," in Loyalists and 
Community in North America, ed. Robert M. Calhoon, Timothy M. Barnes, and George A. Rawlyck 
(Westport, Conn., 1994).  See also Maas, Return of Mass. Loyalists  318. 
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see that plunder and murder provided an easy rhetorical and practical dividing line to 
distinguish between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ Loyalists.  In South Carolina, these distinctions 
were not so easy.41 
 South Carolina Loyalists who were left out of this mass clemency were 
understandably upset.  Some recognized that this meant their chances for forgiveness 
were slim, and they waited years to try again.  (As we will see in a subsequent section, 
several people tried in later years.)  Others used the 1784 legislation as a building block 
for their own appeal, trying to show that their cases were similar to those of recently 
pardoned men.  Charles Atkins put it clearly when he spoke of being “encouraged by the 
Humanity of the late Legislature, in restoring to their former happy Condition, several of 
his Country men in a similar situation with himself.”  His petition was not successful.42 
An Honor Better Forgone: The Trials of the Commissioners of Forfeited Estates 
The original legislation at Jacksonborough appointed five commissioners of 
forfeited estates to oversee the collection, auditing, selling, and accounting of estates 
confiscated, as well as collecting amercements.  This was a large task.  In order to ensure 
than the commissioners performed honestly, they were required to post sizable personal 
bonds to guarantee their fiduciary duty.  This was a standard requirement of the period 
for offices involving financial transactions, but it was a personally onerous requirement 
that practically limited such offices to wealthy men.  The original commissioners did not 
 
41 Zeichner, "The Rehabilitation of Loyalists in Connecticut," , especially 319-20, 328. 
42 Charles Atkins, 1785-34, GA Petitions.  Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786  135-36. 
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realize what a burden the confiscated estates would become.  In fairness, the General 
Assembly also didn’t realize it at the time.43 
The job was already huge.  The Commissioners had to survey property (or rather, 
hire surveyors), check plats and land titles, advertise and organize public sales designed 
to bring in the largest number of potential purchasers possible, and keep impeccable 
accounts of all of the above.  The real estate was one problem, but moveable property 
was another.  Slaves were valuable property, and easily saleable at good prices.  After the 
mass migration of African Americans out of South Carolina during the war, South 
Carolinians were eager to replace their slaves in order to rebuild their own plantations.  
But slaves were often scattered around, and accounting for them was difficult.  Other 
valuable moveable property, such as plate, had the misfortune that it was moveable—and 
therefore hard to account for.  It was also often stolen during the war.  In the aftermath of 
the war, plate was property families could easily hide. 
“Missing” slaves from confiscated estates were worth a lot of money to which the 
General Assembly wanted access.  In order to regularize the process of retrieving this 
property, the Assembly passed Act No. 1160 in late March 1783 “obliging” all persons 
who controlled property in slaves, horses, cattle, other livestock, household furniture, and 
other easily moveable property to give a written return of the property they held to the 
local justice of the peace within three months (by the end of June 1783).  The justice of 
the peace was responsible for publishing an advertisement describing the property in at 
least one Charleston-area newspaper.  Property owners could then claim their property 
after reimbursing advertisement fees and a small fee for the justice’s trouble.  More 
 
43 Act No. 1153, “An Act for Disposing of Certain Estates, and Banishing Certain Persons, Therein 
Mentioned,” Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 1: 516-21, especially articles 13, 14, 16, 17, and 20. 
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importantly, the law had teeth—harsh punishments for people who knowingly strove to 
“secret and convert” property.  If found guilty, offenders forfeited double the value of the 
original stolen property.  In a pointed barb at some troops, the order was read in front of 
all militia companies in the state.  Thomas Sumter’s troops had, with his permission, paid 
themselves in confiscated slaves when ready pay was not forthcoming from the 
legislature.  Such “payments” caused problems for the Commissioners of Forfeited 
Estates for years.  Thomas Waring, one of the more stalwart Commissioners, complained 
in 1788 that certain articles on the books were never “Exposed to Sale” and explained the 
only way that seemed possible was that the items were “taken for the use of the Army & 
by Persons who were not Legally Authorized in so doing” which he reflected was “much 
practiced during the War.”44 
Collusion in families didn’t help matters.  The records of the Commissioners, 
along with other sources, make it clear that families tried to preserve property for 
banished Loyalists (or at least keep it in the family).  Stephen Deveaux kept at least seven 
of his brother’s slaves.  He alerted the Commissioners he had them in Sept. 1783, a few 
months before the General Assembly moved Andrew Deveaux from the confiscation list 
to the amercement list.  He claimed he reported them “agreeable to an Advertisement, I 
very lately saw in the newspaper,” but the timing suggests he suspected he had held them 
long enough to ensure either he or his brother would be able to keep them.  Similarly, 
 
44 More evidence suggests that the Commissioners spent time trying to establish precisely what Loyalist 
property had been given to troops, even after the General Assembly acted to curtail future claims and 
guarantee those troops title to the property.  Act No. 1160, “An Act to Oblige Persons Having Negroes or 
Other Effects, Not Their Own Property, in Their Possession,” Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C.  1: 
539-40.  General Sumter, Congareers July 5, 1785, Box 2, Thomas Waring Sr. Charleston Aug. 14, 1788, 
Returns of Estates Campbell, McCartan-Clitherall, James, Box 3, Miscellaneous Papers Relating to Claims 
on Estates, Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, Comptroller General Papers, SCDAH. 
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Elias Ball of Comingtee aided his cousin Elias Ball of Wambaw in keeping several 
slaves, and recruited the help of another Loyalist subject to confiscation to help.45 
In an effort to control these problems, the General Assembly continued to push 
for public advertisements.  These laws were widely reprinted in local newspapers to 
ensure that everyone knew to whom they were supposed to turn in such property.  
Authorities also ran regular warnings that if people did not return the property, they 
would be prosecuted for stealing.  Some people really did turn in slaves.  Major William 
Mellwe proudly advertised that he possessed a “Negro man named Dick” whose owner 
was unknown.  Mellwe added that he had captured this slave from William “Bloody Bill” 
Cunningham’s unit when Cunningham “murdered” a local Patriot party.  For him, this 
was good self-advertising.  Someone else turned in a slave named Boston (in Orangeburg 
District, South Carolina) to the local justice of the peace, as required.  Another Justice of 
the Peace advertised two slaves of different masters.  Others corresponded with the 
Commissioners of Forfeited Estates directly.  James Moore wrote in May 1784 with some 
irritation asking “what you wou’d have me Do with the Confiscated Property (say A 
Brown & Aaron Loocock Negroes that I have in my hands).”  His irritation becomes 
clear in the next sentence, when he pointed out he had “Expected an Order for them some 
Months Past, they Plague me.”  A few honest souls even reported stray furniture, such as 
a “plain double Chest of Drawers, with brass furniture” left in one house in Charleston 
after the evacuation.46 
 
45 Return of Stephen Deveaux, Sept. 17, 1783, Returns of Estates Campbell, McCartan-Clitherall, James, 
Box 3, Miscellaneous Papers Relating to Claims on Estates, Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, 
Comptroller General Papers, SCDAH.  Elias Ball to Elias Ball of Wambaw, Kensington, May 15, 1784, 
Ball Family Papers, 11-516-7, SCHS.  John Gaillard helped Elias Ball with the slaves. 
46 March 11, 1784, Sept. 23, 1783, Nov. 11, 1783, Dec. 9, 1783, May 17, 1783, June 10, 1783, South 
Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser.  James Moore to the Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, May 
19, 1784, Forfeited Estates, Returns of Estates Campbell, McCartan-Clitherall, James, Box 3, 
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Commissioners were charged with surveying and selling the properties as 
expeditiously and profitably as possible.  Both were big jobs.  Land sales were widely 
advertised in local publications, and as broadsheets passed around and left in public 
places.  In June 1783, the South Carolina Gazette carried advertisements for land sales in 
Camden and Ninety Six.  To drum up interest, they reminded potential purchasers that 
they could use state indents to ‘discount’ the auction price.  Advertisements also 
reminded those living in confiscated houses that they were legally required to move out 
within a month of the sale.  To make life more complicated, they also reassured Loyalist 
families (and warned potential purchasers) that a new 1783 understanding allowed 
“families (say wives and children)” to stay until forty days after the next meeting of the 
General Assembly, at that time some six months away.  And, just to add to the nightmare, 
on top of land and slaves (spread across the state), there were other odd bits of property to 
be disposed of.  At various times, the Commissioners tried to sell pews, such as the “pew 
in the fourth ile of St. Michael’s Church” in Charleston.  “Stock of different kinds” was 
also on offer at the auctions.47 
And those were just the problems that were immediately obvious!  As the General 
Assembly moved to moderate the enforcement of the Confiscation Act, the 
Commissioners faced new complications.  When the 1783 Assembly stayed the sale of 
confiscated properties belonging to persons who had petitioned for redress, it was the 
Commissioners who had to segregate their properties.  When the Assembly moved more 
                                                                                                                                            
Miscellaneous Papers Relating to Claims on Estates, Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, Comptroller 
General Papers, SCDAH. 
47 June 24, 1783, South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser.  Circulars, Commissioners of Forfeited 
Estates, Folder 2, Box 5, Misc. Papers Relating to Forfeited Estates, Comptroller General Papers, S 
126170, SCDAH.  (Circulars are all over the varied collections of papers relating to the confiscated estates, 
but these are a representative sample.)  St. Michael’s is an Anglican church in Charleston, and the pew was 
the property of Loyalist Thomas Phoepoe. 
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than 70 more Loyalists from the confiscation list to the amercement lists in 1784, the 
Commissioners were the ones who inherited the headache of supervising the transition.  
Just to make it worse, they had already sold some property that now was restored.  While 
the statute recognized this, it provided that the Commissioners trade indents and bonds 
for the estates.  All of this created a real administrative problem.  Restoring previously 
sold estates also opened the Commissioners to complaints from Loyalists that their 
estates had not been valued correctly in the first place.  John Gaillard, a very self-
empowered complainer in later years, petitioned the General Assembly complaining the 
Commissioners had sold twenty-five slaves at “only about a third of their value.”48 
At the same time, frustrated authorities revisited the provisions affecting the sale 
of Loyalist properties.  Notice of upcoming property sales was extended for two months 
before the sale, and commissioners were required to leave plats in the “neighborhood of 
the place where they are to be sold” with enough advance notice that residents could 
peruse them.  They clarified their intentions to provide generous terms for financing these 
purchases, including two years’ credit with some secure bond.  In addition, they arranged 
to allow any provable debts on the public to be discounted from the cost of confiscated 
property.  All of these actions were intended to encourage buyers, and get the sales 
moving quickly.49 
The 1784 General Assembly also spent time trying to clean up the mess that the 
confiscated estates accounts were becoming.  In 1783, legislation limited the time in 
 
48 John Gaillard, 1787-42, GA Petitions.  Michael E. Stevens and Christine M. Allen, eds., Journals of the 
House of Representatives, 1787-1788 (Columbia, S.C., 1981) 123-24.  Entire sections of the confiscated 
estates accounting was devoted to “account currents respecting Restored Estates,” making the situation ever 
more complicated.  For just one example, see the restored estate of Robert Wells, Restored Property, Box 1, 
Misc. Papers Relating to Claims on Estates, Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, Comptroller General 
Papers, S 126170, SCDAH. 
49 Act. No. 1177, “An Act to Amend an Act Entitled ‘An Act for disposing of certain estates, and banishing 
certain persons, therein mentioned,’” Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 1: 555-57. 
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which creditors could submit accounts against confiscated estates, while at the same time 
guaranteeing their right to such payments.  Amidst ferverent complaints, the time was 
extended again in 1784 for one more year, making the new deadline March 1785.  
(Predictably, some people would continue to make new claims after this date, but they 
were less successful.)  The accounts were also getting confused because some people 
bought properties but never put up the money for them.  The General Assembly took 
action in 1784 to make sure property buyers who had not made payment arrangements 
would see their properties sold again.  They also settled a nasty dispute between two 
buyers by name who had each contracted for the same property.  All of this goes to show 
what a nightmare running the confiscated estates was becoming.50 
Just to make it worse, the easy credit terms the Assembly provided in order to 
encourage widespread participation in land sales (allowing men of limited means to gain 
property) also ensured confusion.  Purchasers were allowed to make small down 
payments, often guaranteed by other property.  They then had five years to pay the rest of 
their debt.  Buyers were supposed to deposit bonds with the Commissioners that were 
redeemable every year.  These bonds added a lot of paperwork to the accounting—and 
that assumes they were paid on time.  Instead, buyers neglected to deposit bonds at all, or 
stopped paying them.  Collecting payment became an irritating and impossible job.  In 
September 1783 the Commissioners ran an advertisement in the South Carolina Gazette 
not-so-gently reminding delinquent debtors that if they didn’t pay by the first of 
November, the law would be “strictly in force.”  A stellar lack of success led them to 
 
50 All accounts were to be rendered by July 1783 under Act No. 1177, Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of 
S.C. 1: 556.  Act No. 1222, “An Act for Allowing a Further Time to Render in a State and Proofs of any 
Demands Against the Confiscated Estates,” March 26, 1784, Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C.  1: 
620.  Act No. 1236, “An Ordinance for Amending and Explaining the Confiscation Act,” March 26, 1784, 
Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C.  1: 639-40. 
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continue badgering the public through advertisements in 1784.  “Urg[ing]” purchasers to 
make bond seemed to be all they could do.51 
Purchasers of confiscated estates often found they had paid too much for the 
properties.  In the confusion of such a giant undertaking, some properties were not as 
represented in the advertisement.  Others fell behind in payments, or stopped paying 
interest.  Some of these purchasers quietly disappeared, but others petitioned the 
legislature for new terms of payment.  Moses Glover was disappointed in his purchases 
from Gideon Dupont’s estate.  He found two tracts of land not to his liking, and 
petitioned the General Assembly to release him from the contract (without losing his 
deposit).  Others tried to quickly flip confiscated estates to new buyers, either because 
they couldn’t pay for the lands, or because they were looking for a quick profit.  The 
Commissioners ended up recording and organizing those transactions as well.  For 
example, Thomas Hallum purchased a confiscated estate from John Crumb, who had 
purchased it at a confiscated estate auction.  The Commissioners recorded it in their 
records in 1784.52 
Amerced estates had their own complications.  Amercement required the 
Commissioners to take an account of the entire estate in order to fairly decide the 
property value.  Amercement was a flat percentage of the total value of the estate.  As we 
 
51 Sept. 23, 1783, Jan. 17, 1784, South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser.  To put it into 
perspective, every branch of government was having trouble getting people to pay their debts, or even 
record them.  The Commissioners of the Treasury also resorted to threatening public notices to collect 
taxes.  One notice complained that “very little regard” had been shown to previous requests.  May 13, 1784, 
South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser. 
52 Stevens and Allen, eds., House J. 1787-1788 327.  John Crumb, Sept. 18, 1784, Returns of Estates 
Campbell, McCartan-Clitherall, James, Box 3, Miscellaneous Papers Relating to Claims on Estates, 
Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, Comptroller General Papers, SCDAH.  This group of records contains 
many other instances of transfers of confiscated estates, all for money.  Examples include Richard Jones, 
Peter Taylor, Reubin Coleman, Martha Robertson, and Douglas Stark.  While much of the Loyalist 
petitioner activity was generated by Lowcountry figures, land transfers favored the backcountry, especially 
the Loyalist-rich Ninety-Six District. 
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will see, amerced persons often disagreed with the valuation of their property.  Further 
complicating matters, while most estates were subject to a 12% amercement, some were 
subject to a 30% rate.  In later years, after many Loyalists were moved from confiscation 
to amercement, a few individuals were subject to different amercement amounts, further 
complicating the bookkeeping. 
Like any other high office, being a Commissioner of Forfeited Estates was an 
honor.  But the office very quickly became a burden for the officeholders, and they began 
to drop out one by one.  Further, it became clear to the Commissioners that the situation 
wasn’t going to improve. 
 Managing and selling confiscated estates was an irritating business in other states 
as well.  But only South Carolina and Georgia faced the sheer volume of estate sales, and 
South Carolina still stood out for the number of official and unofficial reversals in policy 
that made keeping the books so maddening.  Several studies of the sales of confiscated 
estates in Northern states indicate that most estates were sizable, and owned by absentees 
or committed Loyalists who ran off early in the war.  Confiscated estate sales actually 
generated a sizable, if brief, historical literature as a way of testing the thesis that the 
sales of confiscated estates democratized landholding in the new United States, thereby 
spreading democracy.  Certainly, most states devised relatively liberal payment terms for 
estate sales, balancing the desire to appease democratic interests seeking a chance for 
new landowners to enter the market with the ever-present need for ready money to fund 
new state governments faced with pressing financial needs, and a notoriously tax-averse 
population.  A wave of historical studies quickly showed that in fact, confiscated estate 
sales did not lead to greater distribution of land across classes.  Wealthy people lost large 
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estates, and despite caps on how much land could be sold as a parcel, wealthy people 
speculated in land.53 
 In Georgia, confiscated estate sales got off to a robust start, with eight sales 
(events, not properties) by October 1782, a mere six months after the passage of their 
confiscation act.  These sales raised almost £345,000.  Like South Carolina buyers, 
however, many paid too much, and much more than their incomes could really support.  
Buyers were often unable to fulfill the purchase terms, and land ended up back in the 
hands of the Georgia Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, who had the saving grace of 
sharing the load among thirteen people, not five.  (The down side was, thirteen people 
had to meet at the same time and agree with each other, which is why Georgia reduced 
the size of the board the following year.)  But in early 1783, at the same time the South 
Carolina General Assembly began to halt confiscated estate sales, the Georgia Assembly 
also halted such sales.  After pardoning several Loyalists and returning their estates, the 
commissioners continued to try to sell the remaining estates, as well as getting rid of all 
the estates that the Georgia legislature allowed over-extended purchasers to return and get 
their money back.  Commissioners in Georgia, like those in South Carolina, also 
sometimes made individual judgments to suspend sales pending later legislative 
consideration.54 
 
53 Examples include: Keesey, "Loyalty and Reprisal: The Loyalists of Bergen County, New Jersey and 
Their Estates" , Brown, "The Confiscation and Disposition of Loyalists' Estates in Suffolk County, 
Massachusetts," , Yoshpe, The Disposition of Loyalist Estates in the Southern District of the State of New 
York , and Staughton Lynd, "Who Should Rule at Home? Dutchess County, New York in the American 
Revolution," William and Mary Quarterly 3rd. ser., 18, no. 3 (1961): 330-59.  This line of inquiry 
originated in response to J. Franklin Jameson, who argued that banishing Loyalists helped end the iron grip 
of the colonial aristocracy, including through the democratization of land ownership.  Jameson, The 
American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement . 
54 Lambert, "Loyalist Property in Georgia," 83-86, 89. 
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 North Carolina’s problems with confiscated estates also echo similar complaints.  
North Carolina, like South Carolina, lumped in two kinds of confiscees: those who were 
named in a confiscation act, and those subject to confiscation under the Act of Pardon 
and Oblivion, which made those who had fled and not returned within a year subject to 
the provisions of the confiscation act.  This complicated the books in North Carolina.  
North Carolina also had trouble keeping sales moving in later years, passing acts in 1784 
and 1785 to compel sales of assets still on the books, and liberalizing payment terms 
(especially accepting state currency and soldier’s pay certificates) in order to find new 
purchasers.  Still, like South Carolina and Georgia, early sales did net North Carolina 
serious money to fund short-term needs.55 
 Pennsylvania also used an organized system to sell confiscated estates, but instead 
of commissioners they used a standing committee of the legislature itself.  Perhaps 
sharing the pain of administration with people in a direct position to complain about it 
and change it helped.  It certainly didn’t help make sales more timely, however.  Unlike 
in North and South Carolina and Georgia, sales were slow at first, perhaps because the 
war was still in progress.  Like South Carolina, however, sales continued for years, and 
the estate books show properties still being sold in 1790.56 
 Plunder and fraud also complicated efforts to control forfeited estates in 
Massachusetts.  While Massachusetts actually confiscated few estates, during the 
uncertain war years, residents and government officials took advantage of Loyalist 
 
55 DeMond, N.C. Loyalists 165-66, 173.  By November of 1783, the North Carolina confiscated estates had 
generated more than £100,000 for the state’s use. 
56 Siebert, The Loyalists of Pennsylvania 92-94. 
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absence and chaos to plunder estates.  Unlike South Carolina, this did not later become a 
problem for formal administration, as few estates were later sold.57 
New complications arose in South Carolina in later years.  Both the courts and the 
General Assembly began to recognize encumbrances on property, such as widow’s and 
dower portions.  (Georgia followed suit.)  Women were able to recover property that had 
been sold under those legal terms.  In some cases, courts ordered people who had 
purchased confiscated estates at auction to reimburse women, or divide the property.  In 
either case, aggrieved purchasers discovered their new estates were worth much less than 
they had paid for them.  Mary Miller sued in the Court of Chancery to recover her dower 
rights in the property due to a complicated situation in which her deceased husband was 
not the Loyalist in question, but had engaged in transactions with him during the 
prohibited time.  When the court ruled in her favor, she sought to recover her share of the 
property from Samuel Beekman.  Beekman had purchased the house and lot on Church 
Street in Charleston at a confiscated estate sale, expecting clear title.  Aggrieved, he 
petitioned the General Assembly for help.  Reminding them that he “bought the said 
House & Lott of land free from all incumbrance or any claim whatever,” he asked for 
relief.  The Court ordered him to pay her dowry at 420 pounds plus interest from 
November 1783, which was a “heavy charge” that was more than he had paid for the 
property.58 
Other kinds of claims also put the Commissioners of Forfeited Estates in the 
middle.  Fenwicke Bull died during the war, and his estate was confiscated.  His will left 
his property to his children.  Some of his grandchildren by one daughter sought the 
 
57 Maas, Return of Mass. Loyalists 270-91, 313.  Generally, the only estates that were sold were a few 
highly influential, well-known early, committed Loyalists. 
58 Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786  83-84.  Lambert, "Loyalist Property in Georgia," 87. 
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property in 1785.  Jacob Willeman had already purchased the property at auction because 
while the Commissioners were aware of the situation, they “did not deem themselves at 
Liberty to Stay the sale of the property of Fenwicke Bull, without having the authority of 
the Legislature.”  The General Assembly did return the bonds to the grandchildren, in 
part because the “Fathers of the Children to whom this property now devolves, have by 
their faithful Services to this Country during the late War Suffered much in their 
property.”  The Commissioners of Forfeited Estates were unfortunately involved at every 
step along the way, from the initial approach of the family, to providing the indents and 
bonds to the family after the legislature returned the property.59 
Joseph Adair was also upset to learn that property he bought in Ninety Six District 
(on which he wanted to live) for £75 from the Commissioners was legally claimed by the 
Loyalist’s son James White.  James White informed him he owned the property under his 
father’s will.  After “Consult[ing] Councill” and discovering he had paid for a property 
he had no legal claim over, he petitioned the General Assembly for a refund of his 
purchase price and his expenses.60 
James Nassau Colleton was restored to his property in 1784, but still owed an 
amercement.  He complained he could not pay the amercement until the Commissioners 
paid him for his property that had already been sold.  The Commissioners didn’t pay him 
because he had made no move to pay his amercement, and they didn’t release bonds until 
they were satisfied it would end the account.  Richard Dennis made similar complaints.  
The Commissioners never gave him bonds for his sold property, and even canceled some 
of the indents they had already given him.  Squabbles between purchasers and other 
 
59 Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786 129. 
60 Joseph Adair, 1788-20, GA Petitions. 
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interested parties also made the confiscated estates accounts chaotic.  In the backcountry, 
some of the confiscated estates were actually speculative claims purchased by 
Lowcountry Loyalists.  In one case, the Loyalist speculator James Simpson gave casual 
verbal assurances to settlers on his property that they could settle, improve the land, and 
then buy the title on easy terms.  Simpson’s Tract, in Abbeville County, was confiscated 
as Simpson’s property, to the great distress of the settlers.61 
Even a cursory examination of the records of the Commissioners of Forfeited 
Estates indicates how large the task became.  For instance, the records contain five boxes 
of plat records alone, recording the dimensions of each estate in order to sell it.  Mose 
Kirkland commanded the Ninety Six Loyalist regiment and was named on the 
confiscation act as a person disowned for holding a British commission and being with 
the enemy (the second worst offense, as we saw in Chapter 2).  He had good reason to 
believe that he might be hated for his Loyalist activities, as he actively engaged in 
military planning and operations well before the British took Charleston.  He was 
especially reviled for planning Native American actions against the Patriots.  He 
evacuated with the British and moved to Jamaica.  He did not file a petition with the 
General Assembly, instead pursuing a claim with the British for his losses.  Tragically for 
him, he died in 1787 on the journey to England to appear at a hearing for his losses.  
Moses Kirkland’s estates had no clear encumbrances or any chance of them, and should 
have been sold immediately.  Parts of it were certainly sold in the first two years, but his 
accounts were included in a later (1790) ‘cleaning up’ of accounts.62 
 
61 James Nassau Colleton, 1785-27, GA Petitions.  Stevens and Allen, eds., House J. 1787-1788 168.  
Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786 325-26. 
62 Plat of Moses Kirkland, Forfeited Estates Plats, Comptroller General Papers, S126102, SCDAH.  Misc. 
Papers Relating to Claims on Estates, Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, Comptroller General Papers, S 
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By 1786, the forfeited estates accounts lay in such disarray that a frustrated 
General Assembly ordered the Commissioners to “lay before this House an exact 
Account of all the Confiscated property sold by them” and otherwise account for all their 
transactions.  Less than a month later, an evidently irritated Ways and Means committee 
reported that the forfeited estates had “large balances remaining unsettled which Very 
much embaras [sic] the Finances of this State,” and advised the legislature that “the said 
Commissioners be called in in the most pressing terms to have their accounts closed with 
all possible expedition.”  In response, the General Assembly appointed a five-member 
committee to “examine the Accounts of the Commissioners of Forfeited Estates.”  The 
committee reported that the account books were “so deranged by property being returned 
&ca.” that they could not make a full report.  The committee of the General Assembly 
particularly complained in 1786 of people who had never given in bonds for their 
purchases, thereby depriving the state of years’ worth of interest.  Further, by March of 
1786, only 2 of 5 commissioners were actually serving, as others had stepped down 
without ever being replaced.  The General Assembly again moved to fill at least one of 
those three spots, in an effort to regularize the accounts.  The Assembly also recognized 
that being a Commissioner of Forfeited Estates was “very Troublesome.”63 
 In 1787, the Commissioners reported on their books, and the General Assembly 
concluded they were now the picture of “neatness and propriety.”  The books were 
deposited with the General Assembly and the Commissioners (both those currently 
serving and original members who had stopped) were finally paid fees owed them, 
                                                                                                                                            
126170, Box 5, Folder 1, SCDAH.  Edgar and Bailey, eds., Directory S.C. House Rep. 2: 380-82.  Gregory 
Palmer, Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution (Westport, Conn., 1984) 466-67. 
63 Lark Emerson Adams, ed., Journals of the House of Representatives, 1785-1786 (Columbia, S.C., 1979) 
402, 462-63, 497, 517-18. 
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totaling more than two thousand pounds.  Yet that did not close the matter.  The impatient 
General Assembly gave the remaining commissioners a one-year deadline in 1788.  Yet 
the records of the Commissioners of Forfeited Estates make it clear that attempts to settle 
and clear the accounts continued for more than a decade.  The Commissioners found the 
indents for restored property especially trying.  From 1788 to 1795, consistent entries in 
the accounts show payments for interest and bonds on properties sold in the heated days 
of 1782-1783.  James Clitherall was still eagerly collecting interest in 1794, long after he 
had been forgiven even his amercement.  David Guerard finally settled his claims with 
the Commissioners in March 1799.  He paid off his amercement with interest only when 
forced.  Cases that went to court took even longer.  Even selling property took well into 
the late 1780s, with one sale in 1788 covering land and property from all over the state.64 
 Managing the forfeited estates turned out to be a bigger job than anyone ever 
realized.  The convoluted ways in which the General Assembly managed the task of 
punishing, and then forgiving, Loyalists made the job difficult.  By examining these 
records and the experiences of the Commissioners of Confiscated Estates, we can see 
how chaotic and ad hoc the process of reconciliation really was. 
 
64 Stevens and Allen, eds., House J. 1787-1788 291, 364.  Forfeited Estates, Restored Property, Indents and 
Receipts, Box 1, Misc. Papers Relating to Claims on Estates, Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, 
Comptroller General Papers, SCDAH.  Circular Dec. 25, 1787, Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, Folder 
2, Box 5, Misc. Papers Relating to Claims on Estates, Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, Comptroller 
General Papers, SCDAH.  Further testament to the trials of settling and even understanding the state of the 
confiscated estates accounts can be found in the records of a commission to adjust public accounts in the 
1790s, which spent considerable time trying to reconcile these records.  Letterbook, Commission to Adjust 
Public Accounts, S 126106, Comptroller General Papers, SCDAH. 
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Try, Try Again: Petitioning for Removal from Confiscation, 1785-1810 
What happened to Loyalists who were still subject to confiscation after the 1784 
restoration legislation?  Since the mass legislation in 1784 that offered clemency to many 
former Loyalists was meant to be the final decision, the General Assembly handled far 
less Loyalist business later. Clearly, Loyalists did occasionally receive clemency in later 
years, but these cases were few and far between.  From 1785 on, only six men still living 
had their names removed from the confiscation and banishment list by official act.  
(Another handful of estates received relief on behalf of family members, but no other 
Loyalist profited from those arrangements, as these arrangements favored sons and 
widows of deceased persons in most cases.)  A few other Loyalists gained some official 
legislative amelioration in official reports or readings of bills that were not enshrined in 
official acts.  For instance, Benjamin Wofford and “inhabitants of Spartanburg County” 
petitioned in 1789 for Wofford’s return.  Wofford himself was originally from Maryland, 
but he served in Robert Cunningham’s Ninety Six Brigade in the heat of the civil war in 
the backcountry.  At some point after the Revolution, he moved to Spartanburg County, 
South Carolina, where he established himself as a good neighbor—a good citizen in the 
daily interactions that defined this for most Americans.  The 1790 census indicates he 
owned nine slaves—a substantial stakeholder in white society.  Despite official 
banishment, he felt safe enough to acquire new property in the state.  In 1792, he openly 
wrote that “your Petitioner Never left the State but Returned to his family where he now 
lives” and chose to rely on the “Merccy of his Contry.”  Once upon a time this sort of 
admission would have inflamed a General Assembly jealous of its new, post-Revolution 
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authority, but now it served to reassure.  The committee concluded his status should be 
regularized, but for whatever reason the law was never published.  Perhaps it was merely 
an oversight, or perhaps since he had been content to live for so many years without legal 
status, the Assembly felt it was better to let the situation continue without official 
comment.65 
While in 1784, Loyalist petitioners were handled as a group, after 1785 the 
General Assembly used individual acts to enact clemency—a sign that the Assembly had 
no intention of offering clemency to very many people.  These individual acts were 
sometimes fine-tuned to  allow property restoration or citizenship, but not both.  For 
instance, Edward Fenwicke was relieved from confiscation by a special act in 1785.  
While he was given his property, he was not returned to citizenship, but given twelve 
months to resolve his affairs and leave.  (Fenwicke had very powerful supporters, and 
chose to petition again in 1786, at which time he was also granted the right to reside in 
South Carolina.)  James Nassau Colleton slipped into the midst of an act regulating 
continuing financial problems for the confiscated estates accounts in 1786.66 
 
65 Benjamin Wofford petitioned in 1789 and 1792 for clemency.  In 1789, the General Assembly favored 
him by reading a bill lifting confiscation, but it disappeared after only one reading, never becoming law.  In 
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Representatives, 1789-1790 (Columbia, S.C., 1984) 196. Benjamin Wofford and inhabitants of 
Spartanburg, 1789-110, 1792-99, 1792-162, GA Petitions.  Michael E. Stevens, ed., Journals of the House 
of Representatives, 1792-1794 (Columbia, S.C., 1988) 108, 120.  Dec. 11, 1782, Committee Report 1792-
100, Committee Reports, Papers of the General Assembly, SCDAH.  United States. Bureau of the Census. 
and United States. Census Office. 1st census 1790., Heads of Families at the First Census of the United 
States Taken in the Year 1790: South Carolina (Baltimore, 1966) 86. 
66 Feb. 5 and 9, 1785, Governor’s Messages, Records of the General Assembly, SCDAH.  Edward 
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Petitions. Act No. 1302, “An Act to Exempt Lachlan Mackintosh from the Amercement of Twelve Per 
Cent,” March 11, 1786, Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 1: 721.  Act No. 1378, “An Act to 
Exempt William Bull from the Pains and Penalties to Which He is Liable by Several Acts of the General 
Assembly,” March 28, 1787, Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C.  5: 44.  Act No. 1338, “An Act to 
Amend the Confiscation Act; and for Other Purposes Therein Mentioned,” March 22, 1786, Cooper and 
McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 1: 758.  Act No. 1519, “An Act to Exempt John Fisher and Malcolm Brown 
from the Pains and Penalties of Confiscation and Banishment,” Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C.  
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John Champneys petitioned repeatedly for clemency and economic restoration, 
using new strategies each time, until he finally was given the right to return to the state in 
1789.  In 1785, he asserted his right to twelve months’ safe passage under the “Definitive 
Treaty of Peace.”  He was also entitled to return in order to seek a trial under post-
Revolutionary law.  He asked for clemency and citizenship, insisting he was “desirous of 
passing the remainder of his days amongst his Family and Friends, in a Country to which 
he wishes to be bound in future by the strictest ties of Allegiance.”  In his quest for 
citizenship, he favored personal ties over political loyalties, seeking to make his home 
among “Family and Friends” whom, with the experience of loss and war, he understood 
to be worthy of the “strictest ties of Allegiance.”  Since he left before Charleston was 
occupied, he had sold most of his property before leaving, limiting the amount the state 
had confiscated and therefore the amount they would lose by pardoning him.  He did lose 
a wharf, which he did ask to get back.  In 1787, his wife petitioned on his behalf, this 
time using a different strategy.  She requested that he be allowed to return long enough to 
settle his affairs and escort her and their children back to England.  Despite her request 
only for safe passage, she made an argument for his widely recognized good character.  
“Several Members of your Honorable House can testify his return will be agreeable to 
Nine tenths of the Good Citizens of the State who know him.”  She submitted petitions 
from individuals willing to support his petition.  Since the petition no longer exists, there 
is no way to know how many individuals supported it, but there is a committee report on 
“the petition of many citizens” the following year.  John Champneys finally got some 
relief in 1789.  Newly empowered, and confident of his persuasive powers, he 
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immediately began another multi-year petition drive to settle bonds for a slave 
confiscated in another man’s estate.67 
 By the 1790s, the generosity of the General Assembly in pardoning and restoring 
property gave rise to expectations from men who had been very active in the Loyalist 
cause.  John Wells, a Charleston artisan, was an active, committed Loyalist (which is why 
he ended up on the confiscation list).  When the British occupied Charleston, John Wells 
harassed and intimidated several fellow artisans into signing the congratulatory address to 
Clinton and Arbuthnot.  Thomas Elfe, for instance, testified in his petition for clemency 
that he only signed the address after “being Severely threatened by John Wells.”  John 
Wells fled for England at the end of the war, and pursued claims with the British 
Loyalists Claims Commission.  When he claimed compensation from the British, he 
asserted he had ‘“embraced the earliest opportunity of manifesting his Attachment to his 
Majestys Government”’ and took a commission under Col. Balfour.  He didn’t bother to 
 
67 Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786 118.  Stevens and Allen, eds., House J. 1787-1788 155. 
John Champneys, 1785-38, 1789-83, 1789-31, Mary Champneys, 1787-39, GA Petitions.  Committee 
Report on the Petitions of Many Citizens on Behalf of John Champneys, 1788-164, General Assembly 
Committee Reports, Records of the General Assembly, SCDAH.  His wife purchased a slave from 
Alexander Harvey, who was confiscated as Loyalist property.  She managed to keep the slave in her 
possession for years, not petitioning until 1790.  In 1793 they received title to the slave. John Champneys, 
1790-20, John and Mary Champneys, 1793-20, GA Petitions. Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-
1786 83.  William Greenwood, 1785-18, 1786-55, 56-1789, 1791-114, GA Petitions.  Coker, "The 
Punishment of Revolutionary War Loyalists in South Carolina"  338-40. Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House 
J. 1785-1786 235-36. Palmer, Loyalist Biographies 340.  “Fat sheep” refers to a comment by Alexander 
Garden, who claimed that members of the General Assembly cried upon hearing some wealthy names “a 
fat sheep.  Prick it!”  A General Assembly committee actually approved allowing Greenwood to return for 
12 months in 1789, but the larger legislature did not approve full clemency until 1791.  General Assembly 
Committee Reports, 1789-41, S165005, SCDAH.  Michael E. Stevens and Christine M. Allen, eds., 
Journals of the House of Representatives, 1791 (Columbia, S.C., 1985) 300.  For other examples of these 
strategies, see James Carsan, James Keith, Charles Atkins and Zephaniah Kingsley. Petitions of James 
Carsan, 55-1785, 51-1786, 85-1787, GA Petitions.  Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786 235-36. 
Stevens and Allen, eds., House J. 1787-1788 130-31. James Keith, 1783-145, 1785-19, William Keith, 
1784-3, GA Petitions.  Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786 82-83.  Charles Atkins, 1785-34, 
Elizabeth Atkins for Charles Atkins, 1783-348, GA Petitions.  Zephaniah Kingsley, Adams and Lumpkin, 
eds., House J. 1785-1786 157-58, 440.  Benjamin Legare to Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, March 5, 
1785, Box 4, Misc. Papers Relating to Claims on Estates, Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, Comptroller 
General Papers, S 126170, SCDAH. 
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submit a petition for clemency in South Carolina, and he was not included in the 1784 
act.  He finally petitioned in 1791 and 1792, asking for permission to return.  He didn’t 
even apologize and did not try to explain away his Loyalism.  In fact, he did not address 
it directly, merely admitting his name was on the list, but the “same Reason” no longer 
existed for this punishment.  One historian of the petitions calls this an “audacious 
request,” but apparently the General Assembly did not find it so very audacious.  They 
allowed him to return to the state without comment, but did not restore his property, 
splitting the difference.68 
Paying Just Debts?: Petitioning Away Amercement, 1783-1810 
 As we saw in the beginning of this chapter, Philip Porcher tried to get out of 
paying his amercement within a year of his removal from confiscation.  One might think 
that having been restored to the bulk of his property, he would cheerfully pay a 12% tax 
in order to resolve his situation.  Yet he, and many others like him, did not.  Despite 
being a wealthy man recently blessed by the forgiveness of his peers, he worked hard to 
get out of paying his amercement.  In February of 1785, he told the General Assembly 
that due to “the scarcity of Coin” and the “General Calamity at Santee” (crop losses), he 
was unable to pay his amercement “without reducing his Family to the greatest Distress.”  
 
68 Senate Journal Jan. 28, 1783, SCDAH.  Thomas Elfe, 1783-43, GA Petitions.  Patrick Hinds made 
similar allegations in his petition. Patrick Hinds, 1783-9, GA Petitions.  Loyalist Transcripts as quoted in 
Coker, "The Punishment of Revolutionary War Loyalists in South Carolina"  92.  John Wells, 1791-231, 
1792-83, GA Petitions.  Coker, "The Punishment of Revolutionary War Loyalists in South Carolina"  91-
92.  Act No. 1571, “An Act for Relieving and Exempting John Wells from Banishment,” Dec. 21, 1792, 
Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C.  5:  224. 
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He offered that he had “been Endeavoring” to gather the money in time to meet the 
March 1785 deadline, but was unable to do so.  In his defense, he reminded the 
legislature that in 1777 and 1778 he lent the state more money than he currently owed.  
Out of motives of kindness, might they not “allow him a Discount” on his full penalty, or 
find some other “Relief”?  They offered to reduce his outstanding penalty by the amount 
of his indents from 1777-78.69 
 Amercement was intended as a lesser penalty for prominent Loyalists who had 
committed offenses against South Carolina.  Originally, just over 15% of those 
mentioned by name were amerced.  Officially, the Assembly distinguished between 
passive support for the British (leading to amercement) and active support for the British 
(leading to confiscation), although the actual difference was much less clear.  (By this, I 
mean that people ended up on one list or another, or none at all, for the same official 
actions, as we saw in Chapter Two.)  Over seventy men were moved from the 
confiscation list to the amercement list in 1784, bringing the total number of men subject 
to amercement to more than one hundred and thirty.  The Commissioners of Forfeited 
Estates had already sold some property of men in this group, making their financial fate 
more difficult than simple amercement.  In addition, while the majority of amerced men 
faced a 12% payment, a few faced more confiscatory rates between 25% and 30%.  In a 
few other cases, the Assembly carefully tailored the rates to the offense (or to the ferocity 
of personal support each Loyalist could muster).  Colonel John Harleston was listed in 
some sources as being subject to a 12% amercement, but the Senate actually only 
amerced him 5%.  (He was a difficult subject for the House of Representatives because 
 
69 Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786 107-08, 134.  Stevens and Allen, eds., House J. 1787-
1788 487. 
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one of his daughters married Edward Rutledge, Speaker of the House at 
Jacksonborough.)70 
 Men newly subject to amercement under the 1784 law, as well as those who had 
always been subject, were given until March 1785 to pay their amercements in full with 
specie.  South Carolina faced an economic recession in 1785.  A series of crop failures, 
changes in the world market, and the usual colonial crises of specie availability conspired 
to make this deadline difficult.  Debtors (most South Carolinians) faced a situation where 
they could not pay back their debt in specie.  Angry debtors closed courts to stop them 
from issuing judgments and forcing the sale of properties.  In this atmosphere, paying 
debts was genuinely hard.  However, there was a cynical and opportunistic edge to 
Loyalist appeals to be spared amercement.  Many of these men had joined other planters 
in rapidly replacing their slave work force, entailing a dramatic expansion of their debt to 
foreign merchant houses.  Some appealed every year trying to find a way out of paying 
anything on their amercement, using one tactic after another.71 
Amercement laws were intended to raise money from Loyalists while sparing 
them the bulk of their wealth.  They were not intended to be so modest as to require no 
pain.  Loyalist petitioners were unwilling to sell any property to satisfy their 
 
70 Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786 187. Palmer, Loyalist Biographies 307, 485-86.  
Benjamin Mathews’ case makes little sense, as he was imprisoned by the British for 13 months after the fall 
of Charleston, yet was amerced anyway.  Perhaps part of the explanation lies in the fact that he violated the 
Non-importation Agreement quite publicly in 1770.  For differing amercements, see Free Conference 
Comm. Hearings. 
71 Act No. 1299, “An Act for Restoring to Certain Persons, Therein Mentioned, Their Estates, Both Real 
and Personal, and for Permitting the Said Persons to Return to this State,” Cooper and McCord, eds., 
Statutes of S.C. 1: 624-26.  In 1785 and again in 1787, the General Assembly passed stringent temporary 
measures to stop the collection of debts, protecting debtors who could not pay in specie.  The 1785 act kept 
creditors from using the courts to collect debts, and the 1787 act allowed debtors to pay in installments over 
three years.  In 1785, the General Assembly opened county courts in the backcountry, as they had been 
planning to do since the end of the Regulator movement.  However, the timing ensured that the courts 
opened just in time for massive debtor prosecutions, and many county residents promptly moved to close 
the new courts.  Klein, Unification of a Slave State  126-39. 
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amercements, regarding their payments as negotiable.  In March of 1787 an aggrieved 
General Assembly appointed a member to look into whether anyone, including the 
Commissioners of Forfeited Estates, was pursuing and prosecuting people who hadn’t 
paid their amercements.  William Valentine, who was moved from confiscation to 
amercement in 1784, was quite taken aback to be arrested in December of 1787 for not 
paying his amercement.72  
Of the approximately fifty individuals originally subject to amercement, at least 
sixteen (or 30%) petitioned the General Assembly in 1783 to have their amercements 
dropped.  Unlike petitioners subject to confiscation, who petitioned in a steady stream 
throughout 1783 and 1784, only one more individual petitioned for relief from 
amercement in 1784.  While this represents an appreciable number, it is significantly less 
than the percentage of confiscated men who petitioned for clemency.  This suggests that 
men on the amercement list largely recognized that they had been spared, since many of 
them were in fact given that punishment as a compromise position.73 
The other fact that stands out is that only one of the sixteen submitted a petition 
from supporters.  “Sundry Inhabitants of Johns Island” petitioned on behalf of John Freer.  
They reiterated they knew “of no Act that he has Committed whereby to deserve, 
Amercement, unless his having taken British protection.”  He did get a chance to present 
evidence at the winter meetings of the Free Conference Committee.74 
 
72  Stevens and Allen, eds., House J. 1787-1788 196, 324-25.  William Valentine, 1788-17, GA Petitions. 
73 Isaac Rippon petitioned in both 1783 and 1784, and was the only amercement petitioner in 1784.  Isaac 
Rippon, 1783-185, 1784-44, GA Petitions. 
74 Inhabitants of Johns Island on behalf of John Freer, 1783-270.  Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 
1783-1784 160, 72.  John Freer, 1783-125, GA Petitions.  No. 3 John Freer (On the Amercement), Free 
Conference Comm. Meeting. 
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William Price petitioned for relief from amercement without spelling out what 
kind of relief would be acceptable.  He attempted to explain two things: why he took 
protection to begin with, and why he failed to take advantage of Governor Rutledge’s 
1781 offers to come back to the American side.  He had been a Patriot before the 
reduction of Charleston, serving as a member of the General Assembly in 1779 and 1780.  
Like other prominent Patriots, he was a target of the British, and he succumbed.  He did 
point out that he was initially refused British protection thanks to his “attachment” to the 
American cause, and that he would not have taken protection “but for the Example of the 
greater part of the Citizens of this State, Especially Some who had held high offices 
therein.”  Very few people dared to make claims like this in 1783 when petitioning for 
redress from confiscation, but amercement petitioners felt much bolder.  However, 
arguing that some high officers had also taken protection was true, but risky.  Like 
confiscation petitioners, he addressed his own “Violent fitt of Sickness” as an excuse, but 
for not coming out under Gov. Rutledge’s proclamation, not as an excuse for taking 
protection.  Knowing that one justification for the Amercement Act was to recoup money 
that Patriots had spent on war demands, he rushed to emphasize that he “Complied with 
the Law in furnishing a Substitute.”75 
 Given the claims of amercement petitioners, it becomes clear that many of them 
found their way to the amercement list because they did come back to the American side 
before the evacuation at Charleston, but later than the time specified in Gov. Rutledge’s 
1781 Proclamation.  In some cases, they came out after the Jacksonborough Assembly, 
 
75 William Price, 1783-75, GA Petitions.  Edgar and Bailey, eds., Directory S.C. House Rep. 3: 584-85.  For 
another example, see John Wells, 1783-346, GA Petitions.  William Price’s lead witness later testified that 
he lived as a “Recluse” to avoid the company of the British.  No. 8 Price (on Amercement), [not clear 
whether William or Thomas], Free Conference Comm. Meeting. 
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and used that action to protest a right to be removed from amercement (while beefing it 
up with other claims).  James Bentham came out on Aug. 7, 1782 under “Gov. Mathew’s 
protection And has since been doing duty on Edisto Island.”  At other times, petitioners 
argued that their amercements should be lifted because they had fulfilled the terms of the 
original proclamation.  Thomas Radcliffe Junior argued that because he had “availed 
himself of the Governors proclamation, and Joined his Countrymen in August last,” he 
should be “relieved from the pains & penalties” of the Amercement Act.76 
In early March 1785, the committee concluded that while forty-eight people were 
originally amerced, eighteen had already been released from their amercements by the 
previous session.  To regularize the process, the committee suggested lifting the 
amercement on all individuals who were subject to it by 1782 legislation, since the two 
groups did “not appear to be distinguished” except by some “being more fortunate in 
obtaining a decision on their Cases.”  The committee read aloud the names of the thirty-
one men still subject to amercement (including Daniel Horry).  After the reading, the 
House of Representatives rejected the committee’s decision by a 66-39 vote—a dramatic 
victory for those who still wished to punish Loyalists.77 
At first, the General Assembly drew sharp distinctions betwen those men who had 
always been amercees and those who came to that punishment as a relief from 
confiscation.  Both the committee and the entire House of Representatives agreed that “it 
would be inexpedient to grant them [former subjects of confiscation] any farther 
indulgence” except to grant all of them an extension for paying.  Some men who held 
state debt would be allowed to settle their accounts with that debt, but otherwise the 1785 
 
76 Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 98-99.  William Doughty, 1783-117, John Harleston, 
1783-378, GA Petitions. 
77 Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786 186-88. 
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General Assembly held the line on greater forgiveness.  And yet, they still exempted a 
few petitioners from even this amercement, while insisting that they would not.  The 
Assembly gave themselves rhetorical immunity by asserting that these men had been 
“amerced by wrong information, or the want of information,” but this seemed to be as 
much a ruse to get the bill to pass over the objections of members who wanted to punish 
Loyalists than a real reason.78 
In the light of the increasing warmth of the General Assembly towards former 
Loyalists, several Loyalists who had been moved from the penalty of confiscation to the 
penalty of amercement tried again after 1785.  Even as unlikely a figure as John 
Cunningham, a member of the infamous Cunningham family, petitioned for removal 
from confiscation in 1786.  He had the decency to at least rhetorically acknowledge the 
“lenity and goodness” the body had already shown him in “makeing him only liable to a 
small Emercement.”  Still, he argued that no punishment was really fair, since his only 
“misfortune was, that he was Brother to and nearly related to several men of the same 
name, who were very active against this country.”79  In 1783, his petition for clemency 
from confiscation was turned down flat by the legislature.  With the general warming, he 
succeeded in getting clemency in 1784, and then waited a mere two years before 
beginning his campaign to get out of paying his amercement.80 
Robert Murrell Jr. petitioned for the legislature to “Relieve him from the Pains 
and Penalties of the Amercement he now lies under” less than a year after he was 
 
78 Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786  186-88., 230-31. 
79 John Cunningham, 1787-51, 1786-25,1786-27, 1789-19, 1791-99, GA Petitions. Adams and Lumpkin, 
eds., House J. 1785-1786  436.  Stevens and Allen, eds., House J. 1787-1788 153, 458.  Lorenzo Sabine 
suggests he was a commissary.  John Cunningham, like others with weak cases, also made application to 
the British Loyalist Claims Commission for his losses, claiming £2,316 sterling. Lorenzo Sabine, The 
American Loyalists, or Biographical Sketches of Adherents to the British Crown in the War of the 
Revolution (Boston, 1847) 235.  Palmer, Loyalist Biographies 195.  
80  
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removed from the confiscation list.  He lamented the injustice that he was “punished with 
disgrace” by such public disapproval, but he suggested that had his case been fairly 
known, the 1784 General Assembly would have removed him from any penalty.  He 
argued that his actions during the war had been “Misrepresented” and that he had now 
managed to convince his local representative to the Jacksonborough Assembly of this 
error.  His supporters concurred that he was innocent of the charges.  Further, he charged 
that a local member of the committee who knew his “Character & Conduct” was unable 
to attend his hearing.  Given these facts, forty-eight supporters wished the legislature 
would not “let the Innocent suffer with the Guilty.”  In the growing spirit of generosity, 
the General Assembly lifted his amercement.81 
 Some petitioners spent years in complicated legal and economic maneuverings 
trying to get out of their amercements.  James Clitherall was unusually determined and 
obnoxious in his constant appeals to the General Assembly.  Having gotten out of 
confiscation, he then petitioned the General Assembly to remit the duty on slaves he was 
bringing back into South Carolina from St. Augustine.  Then, he wrote a querulous 
petition seeking to offset his amercement with payment for confiscated property that had 
already been sold, and with a revaluation of his slaves.  He complained that his slaves 
were being valued at three times as much as his seized slaves had been sold for.  In short, 
he didn’t sound like a penitent at all, but rather like a lawyered-up businessman pressing 
home his advantage.  By 1786 and 1787 he was trying to get indents from the 
Commissioners of Forfeited Estates before paying his amercement.  In 1787, he sought 
the money from twenty-seven slaves who were sold by the Commissioners, along with 
copious personal items.  He further continually argued that his property should be valued 
 
81 Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786  106-07, 228, 235. 
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at the rate it was sold for in 1783 and 1784, rather than current prices.  James Clitherall 
continued to petition over his confiscated property values and amercement problems 
through the 1790s.82 
 Overall, amercement was a halfway house solution that enabled the General 
Assembly to punish former Loyalists while allowing them to live freely in the state and 
rebuild their lives.  Amercement was also intended to fill state coffers, if less quickly than 
confiscation could.  Yet despite efforts to hold the line on amercements, many people 
were eventually able to get away with paying nothing at all.  Others harassed the General 
Assembly with one specific request after another, conspiring to reduce the amount they 
eventually had to pay through a series of individual recalculations of their debt. 
The Special Case of Women: Gallantry Meets the Desire for Clemency with 
Deniability 
 As I discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the original Confiscation Act 
deliberately took property without regard to the claims of women or subsequent 
generations.  The intent was to disown children and strip entire families of wealth as a 
punishment for their sins.  Further, this made titles more secure and increased the total 
amount of property available for sale to benefit the state.  The original intent of the act, as 
written on paper, seems clear.  Women and minor children were entitled to basic 
maintenance in lieu of their property, so that no one would starve (or have to support 
 
82 James Clitherall, 1783-189, 1785-66, 1785-75, 1785-47, 1786-34, 1787-34, 1791-92, 1792-185, 1793-67, 
1794-22, 1794-137, 1794-111, 1798-30, GA Petitions. 
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them).  They were entitled to nothing further.  Yet very quickly, sympathy for women 
caught by the act worked on the consciences of the legislature.  And with the mass 
restoration of property in 1784 to a majority of petitioners, it became more difficult to 
deny the claims of women. 
 Some members of the elite had reservations about complete family confiscation 
from the beginning.  Arthur Middleton, South Carolina’s representative to Congress, 
mourned the “inhuman Sentence of visiting the Sins of the Fathers upon the guiltless 
women, [and] Children.”  As we saw in Chapter Three, women were not considered to be 
political actors required to choose, and therefore had committed no crime.  “Reducing a 
whole family for the Sin of one” was unconscionable. It also might be expensive, as 
women were cast onto their friends and relations for support.83 
In a move to ameliorate the conditions for Loyalist families, the General 
Assembly also codified more generous arrangements for them into law in 1783.  
Household goods, clothing, household (but not field) slaves and carriages and horses to 
draw them were guaranteed for these families.  This was far more generous than the 
Confiscation Act, which had merely suggested a modest pension for such families.  It is 
likely that in practice, women and children were already being allowed such niceties, and 
that this law codified a growing practice.  Still, it was a definite loosening of the idea 
behind total confiscation: punish entire families and drive them out of South Carolina in 
retribution for the sins of Loyalist fathers and husbands.  This new recognition of limited 
property reservations for Loyalist families is suggestive.  First, for wealthy families, this 
property was worth a sizable amount.  Property in slaves was valuable, and horses and 
carriages were the trappings of a very comfortable life.  Wealthy families provided their 
 
83 Arthur Middleton to Aedanus Burke, April 7, 1783, Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Jan. 1926," , 29. 
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daughters with slaves in marriage petitions and inheritances.  The bill also protected 
“plate.”  Household plate, linens, and clothing were traditionally female-owned property 
in early America.  In less wealthy households, women’s moveables might be worth as 
much as the real estate, which was men’s property.  Moveables were passed through the 
female line as part of women’s dower and marriage portion, and were recognized as 
women’s property.  Historians of colonial New England have found that specific objects 
such as silver cups and chests were emblazoned with women’s initials and passed 
through the family line mother to daughter.  This understanding fueled the General 
Assembly’s backtracking on confiscating property from the entire family.84 
Loyalist families deliberately left women living on family estates after the male 
householder fled, knowing that their presence would discourage sales.  Margaret 
Cunningham stayed behind to guard her family’s property, ultimatly succesfully 
petitioning to protect “the Tract of Land on Rayburnes Creek Containing Two Hundred 
Acres, whereon she formerly lived.”  The Assembly gave the imprimatur in 1785 to a 
situation they had tolerated unofficially for three years previously.  Margaret 
Cunningham’s case proves the importance of ‘squatter’s rights.’85 
 
84 Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784  382.  Act. No. 1177, “An Act to Amend an Act 
Entitled ‘An Act for disposing of certain estates, and banishing certain persons, therein mentioned,’” March 
16, 1783, Cooper and McCord, eds., Statutes of S.C. 1: 555-57.  Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, "Hannah Barnard's 
Cupboard: Female Property and Identity in Eighteenth-Century New England," in Through a Glass Darkly: 
Reflections on Personal Identity in Early America, ed. Ronald Hoffman, Mechal Sobel, and Fredericka J. 
Teute (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997). 251-63, 271.  In colonial New England, the stock of moveables was 
growing along with the consumer revolution in goods.  South Carolinians were the wealthiest colony on the 
eve of the Revolution, and the Confiscation Act favored wealthy individuals.  The total value of the plate, 
linens, furniture, and other female property must have been sizable. 
85 Margaret Cunningham, 1785-6, GA Petitions.  Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786 78, 167-
68, 188.  Andrew Cunningham Plat for 1,000 acres in Berkeley County, Colonial Plat Books (Copy Series), 
vol. 9, pg. 208, Andrew Cunningham Plat for 100 acres in Berkeley County, Colonial Plat Books (Copy 
Series), vol. 11, pg. 373, other plats recorded in other counties.  Andrew Cunningham, File No. 1686B, 
Reel 29, Frames 488-, Accounts Audited of Claims Growing out of the Revolution in South Carolina, 
1775-1856, SCDAH.  For just one of his many legal claims before the Revolution, see Gov. Charles 
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 Henry Laurens tried to help several women of his acquaintance regain family 
property in South Carolina and Georgia.  In helping Elizabeth Stead Izard regain Georgia 
property (after a fortuitous marriage saved her South Carolina estates), Laurens opined it 
was not possible that any American legislature intended to hurt the “Female Orphan.”  In 
the “Pell Mell, [the General Assembly] confiscated every thing that could be 
denominated British” but would think the better of it later.  He pledged to “do or attempt” 
anything that would help the family regain at least a share of the property.86 
 Anne Burn, the widow of merchant John Burn, also sought Laurens’s help.  He 
tried to get her to find another advocate, but did opine, “I cannot believe that the property 
of the innocent Widow & Children of a Man who was also unoffending has been wrested 
from them.”  He counseled that surely some provision would be made for dependents.  
He termed it a “proper Reservation in favor of the Family” but did not detail what 
percentage of the estate that might be.  Some applicants echoed Laurens’s objection to 
punishing one individual for the crimes of another.  Charles and Elizabeth Atkins were 
able to collect property from South Carolina (at the same time as Charles received a 
British pension) in part due to her argument that it was never “the Intention of the 
Legislature to reduce to abject Poverty, a Wife, or Child, for the Conduct of a Husband, 
or a Father.”87 
                                                                                                                                            
Montagu v. Andrew Cunningham, Box 96A, Judgment Roll of the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas 
(Charleston), SCDAH. 
86 Laurens to Alice Delancey Izard, Paris, June 5, 1783, Henry Laurens et al., The Papers of Henry 
Laurens, 16 vols. (Columbia, 1968-) 16: 204-05. Edgar and Bailey, eds., Directory S.C. House Rep.  3: 
373-75.  Izard’s efforts to regain her property were also complicated by the fact that the Georgia property 
was sold by early January 1783. 
87 Laurens to Anne Burns, London, Aug. 8, 1783, Laurens et al., The Papers of Henry Laurens  16: 247. 
House J. 1785-1786, 158, 252.  The only petitions from her in the petition series are in 1783 (1783-124, 
1783-348, Petitions to the General Assembly, SCDAH), and they are very similar in wording to the one 
introduced on Feb. 28, 1785.  Her husband petitioned separately for the right to return and enjoy all of his 
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Later generations of jurists also were uneasy with the original decision to affix 
families with the sins of the father.  The North Carolina Supreme Court concluded in 
1787 that “such disabilities in their nature were merely personal” and not properly 
transferred to others “by descent.”  Loyalist descendants were entitled to the right to sue 
for possession of property they would otherwise have inherited because otherwise they 
would lose their own guaranteed right to trial by jury.  Interestingly, North Carolinians 
decided this despite a 1785 North Carolina law establishing “secure” possession of 
purchased confiscated estates for their new purchasers.88 
Very few women actually claimed dower rights in the first wave of petitioning 
that took place in 1782 and 1783.  Women submitted petitions for their husbands or other 
male relatives, but rarely made specific claims for their separate property rights.  In the 
first round, families tried to get everything back.  Florence Cook was unusual in trying a 
strategy that cut her husband out so early and even she was not willing to do so entirely.  
It was in later rounds that women, often with the help of paid legal talent, made claims 
based on their separate property rights.  This timing is proof that women’s separate 
property rights were a way to get around the intent of the law.  Women offered the 
argument in their petitions, and the legislature was pleased to seize the opportunity to 
give back some property while still punishing male Loyalists. 
Wealthier women also asserted their property rights as daughters and sisters 
whose traditional portions and marriage settlements became prey to the insecurities of 
confiscation.  Coverture, the traditional legal belief that women’s legal identity was 
subsumed in their husband’s after marriage, already had limits in South Carolina.  
                                                                                                                                            
property. Charles Atkins, 1785-34, GA Petitions..  Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786 135-36.  
Palmer, Loyalist Biographies  28. 
88 Bayard v. Singleton, 3 N.C. 42. 
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Wealthy fathers wanted to ensure that their daughter’s sizable marriage portions and 
inheritances protected them, and therefore were willing to recognize protections for 
women’s property under law.  Jane Villepontoux petitioned the 1786 General Assembly 
to regain her inheritance from an uncle.  Her brother Gideon Dupont Jr. was a Loyalist 
whose estate had been confiscated.  He was also her guardian at the time she inherited, 
and her inheritance became mixed up in her brother’s affairs.  She hoped the legislature 
would pay her the value of her inheritance out of the proceeds of her brother’s forfeited 
estate, which had already been sold for more than £10,000.  Since she was able to 
produce a bond from her brother dated before the Revolution (although it was sent from 
England years later), she was able to obtain restitution from bonds on the Commissioners 
of Forfeited Estates.89 
Women’s property rights also might be used as a way to retitle assets during war.  
John Tunno, a Loyalist merchant in Charleston, fought with the British from early in the 
war.  While he was living in Charleston in 1781 under British rule, he married Margaret 
Rose, whose father John Rose was also a Loyalist.  Rose offered a sizable marriage 
portion by bond on October 21, 1781, but due to “the Situation this Country has been in” 
was not able to offer cash.  John Rose left the city in late 1782 with the British transports.  
John Tunno and his new wife Margaret also prepared to leave the city, and signed the 
bond over to William Blacklock for consideration.  Blacklock first pestered the 
Commissioners of Forfeited Estates to pay up, then turned to the Assembly in 1786 after 
repeated denials.  Despite the usual protections for women’s property, this case had the 
problem that Margaret Rose was not the petitioner, and she lived in England.  
Accordingly, a joint Senate-House committee rejected the request because “it 
 
89 Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786 433, 470. 
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appears…the Petitioner is only made a party for the Purpose of Recovering from the 
Sales of the Confiscated Estate of John Rose.”  And it probably was so.  It certainly was 
not the only time Loyalists tried to arrange property before they left in order to preserve 
value or title to it in the name of relatives and friends.90 
A few points are in order here.  Women’s property rights were recognized, but 
largely after the initial sorting decision on male Loyalists.  That is to say, once men had 
their chance to regain their estates through petitioning, those men who did not succeed in 
convincing the General Assembly to pardon them by 1784 used their wives and daughters 
to regain at least some of their American assets.    While sympathy was one reason to 
give property back to women, it was a parallel, lesser system.  Florence Cook got 
property because James Cook could not. 
The General Assembly also recognized family interest in properties for men.  
While the General Assembly was often concerned with the ability of wives and children 
to pay for their upkeep, they also sometimes restored Loyalist property to grown male 
relatives.  As we saw in Chapter Two, even at Jacksonborough there was an effort to 
allow Patriot male relatives to acquire the property of Loyalist relations.  Needless to say, 
a healthy number of sons, cousins, and nephews sought this way of increasing their 
wealth.  This was one reason the Assembly was loath to enshrine a right to property 
transfer among male relatives into law.  Instead, they evaluated cases one by one (much 
as they did everything else).  
George Barksdale even succeeded in having the amercement lifted from Andrew 
Hibben’s estate as the adoptive father of Hibben’s three children.  He worried that paying 
the amercement would deplete the estate too much to properly provide for the “Education 
 
90 Palmer, Loyalist Biographies 873, 745.  Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786 431-33, 458. 
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and Support” of the Children.  Like other South Carolinians, he argued that it was unfair 
and unwise to visit the sins of the father on the children.  In his own formulation, 
“whatever Political Errors the Parent May have been guilty of, the Children then very 
young, must have been perfectly innocent.”91 
Perhaps the most movingly written demand for help for children came from 
Andrew Williamson’s children.  Williamson had been moved from the confiscation list to 
the amercement list already, which was a minor miracle.  A planter from Ninety Six, 
Andrew Williamson earned the sobriquet the ‘Benedict Arnold’ of South Carolina.  He 
received clemency from confiscation in 1784 largely through the personal intervention of  
General Nathanael Greene.  In 1789, his children petitioned for relief from amercement 
after his death.  In order to pay his amercement, they would need to sell “all the active 
and moveable Property.”  “Your petitioners entreat this Honorable House not to think 
them importunate.  Necessity & fear will inspire the weakest hearts with courage.”  But 
with the “dread of impending ruin,” they sought help.  They put the argument at its 
starkest while being polite: “Humanity surely would never suffer the Paternal Bread to be 
torn from the hands of innocent children.”  Loyalist families saw no reason they should 
suffer along with their male household head, and increasingly a forgiving Assembly 
agreed with them.92 
 
91 George Barksdale, 1785-27, GA Petitions. 
92 Stevens and Allen, eds., House J. 1789-1790 66-67. 
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Conclusion 
Loyalists inundated the South Carolina General Assembly with petitions seeking a 
way out of confiscation.  Within two years, the Assembly acquiesced to the continued 
presence of Loyalists in the state, gradually legalizing their status.  For their part, 
Loyalists had to take several public, proactive steps that defined their own active interest 
in South Carolina citizenship and their fitness for that role.  By petitioning, showing up 
for hearings, and producing visible support from neighbors at all points in the petition 
process, Loyalists convincingly demonstrated local support—the best marker of fitness 
for citizenship, and also the best marker that they were peacefully accepted.  The General 
Assembly worked to put the stamp of state-wide authority on what were really local 
decisions.  Hearings and committee decisions depended on local General Assembly 
members, and local Patriot supporters.  Decisions depended on local support, and were 
then put into state laws that grouped individuals, with widely-varying cases, into the 
organization of state-wide laws covering groups.  
 While the Jacksonborough Assembly moved harshly, the lived reality for many 
Loyalists was quickly far more kind, and far less universally hostile to reconciliation.  
Loyalists lived in Charleston and the rest of the state in their own (confiscated) 
properties, and both the Assembly and the Commissioners of Forfeited Estates 
recognized and accommodated this.  While the Commissioners sold some estates, sales of 
properties women and male petitioners were living on were stayed in 1783 to await the 
judgment of the legislature in the next year.  In more than a year of hearings, the General 
Assembly heard and reviewed cases, sometimes calling men to testify repeatedly.  These 
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hearings spread the widest net possible, to allow interested parties pro and con the chance 
to weigh in on the debate through in-person testimony and letters. 
 After this intensive one-year investigation into the specifics of individual Loyalist 
cases, the General Assembly relieved more than seventy proscribed Loyalists from the 
penalties of confiscation and banishment.  Moreover, they joined fifty other men on the 
amercement list.  Some of those men were deprived of voting rights for seven years, but 
all gained citizenship and property.  With this mass clemency, the Assembly largely 
hoped to end the question of Loyalism. 
 Yet Loyalists continued to petition in later years, and some (though far fewer) 
were successful in getting off the confiscation list.  Women who had petitioned for their 
husbands in 1783 tried other tacks after the 1784 legislation, looking to keep family 
property in their own names, if their husbands could not regain it in their own names.  
This tactic was often very successful, and the General Assembly moved to be much more 
generous to the family members of Loyalists.  In this way, they could show mercy to the 
family while still punishing specific Loyalist men. 
 Any examination of the move to legislate clemency to Loyalists makes clear that 
the process was ad hoc and shaky, lurching from one position to another.  What allowed 
the General Assembly to become more generous to Loyalist petitioners in 1784 than they 





UNEASY NEIGHBORS: TENSION OVER THE PLACE OF 
FORMER LOYALISTS IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
William “Bloody Bill” Cunningham and his men were a guerilla band of Loyalists 
loosely associated with the British forces.  Shortly after receiving news of the British 
defeat at Yorktown, Cunningham and his men fought an engagement near Edgefield, 
South Carolina. After the American troops surrendered, Cunningham and his followers 
hanged the American leaders, and summarily executed the other American soldiers.  The 
killing was brutal enough, but (as we saw earlier) Matthew Love, one of Cunningham’s 
men, went further.1   
After the slaughter was over, Love traversed the ground, where lay the dead and 
dying, his former neighbors and acquaintances, and as he saw signs of life in any 
of them, he ran his sword through and dispatched them.   Those already dead, he 
stabbed again.  And where others seemingly without life, and who were pierced 
with his sword, gave involuntary convulsions from the pain, to these he gave new 
wounds.2 
 
Love therefore crossed a line—the bounds of civilized warfare.  By running 
through dying men with his sword, he reveled in causing additional pain to those dying 
soldiers who had opposed him.  This further disfigured corpses, including “those already 
dead,” whom he repeatedly stabbed.  Those who watched him were convinced he did it 
 
1Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History  171-72. 
2 Justice Aedanus Burke to Governor Benjamin Guerard, Dec. 14, 1784, Aedanus Burke Papers, South 
Caroliniana Library. 
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out of wanton hatred to those he knew.  By the judgment of his former neighbors, he was 
“held in universal execration.”3  In late 1784, as it became clear that the General 
Assembly was pardoning many prominent Loyalists (as we have already seen), Love 
gambled that the growing spirit of reconciliation would include him.  He returned to 
Ninety Six, apparently intending to return to his pre-war life.  But Love, unlike so many 
other Loyalists who did succeed at establishing reconciliation, made a fatal 
miscalculation.  He did not understand that for reconciliation to be possible, his neighbors 
had to think he was trustworthy.  
 When Love arrived back in Ninety Six, his neighbors seized and incarcerated him.  
The local authorities cooperated, reasoning “so barbarous a man did not come under the 
treaty of peace, so as to be sheltered from prosecution.”  When Justice Aedanus Burke 
arrived to hold court in the district, he found Love under trial for these wartime actions.  
Love’s prosecution attracted a large number of men of “good character,” including the 
“fathers, sons, brothers and friends of the slain prisoners.”  When Burke told them that it 
wasn’t possible to prosecute Love for his actions during the war, the men in the 
courtroom seized Love and took him about a mile away, in the woods, where they 
“arriving under a tree, to the arm of which they tied one end of a rope, with the other 
around his neck, and bid him prepare to die.”  He protested that it was unjust to kill him 
without a trial, and the crowd angrily retorted, “that he should have thought of that when 
he was slaughtering their kinsman.”  Finally, they sat Love on a horse with the rope 
around his neck, and scared off the horse, leaving him hanging from the tree.  The crowd  





 What does this vivid story tell us about reconciliation in the backcountry, or 
indeed anywhere in South Carolina?  On the face of it, this is a story about lawless 
disorder, and a profound distaste for anything smacking of reconciliation with Loyalists.  
It is tempting to read it as evidence of ongoing disorder and anger.  Yet Aedanus Burke, 
the judge and letter writer, did not see it that way.  In writing Governor Guerard, he 
rushed to emphasize that despite “whatever appearance this transaction may have,” in 
fact “the people of Ninety Six appear very desirous to forget the injuries, and settle the 
government.”  It was not that backcountry settlers were uniformly hostile to Loyalists, 
but that they drew a distinction between former neighbors they wanted to settle with, and 
men who were not likely to be peaceful, likeable neighbors.  As we have seen in earlier 
chapters, this was the crucial dividing line between Loyalists who were admitted freely 
and those who faced implacable opposition.  While outside commentators spread the 
story as one of backcountry rednecks with whom one could never live in a civilized 
manner, Burke emphasized that they understood the importance of “settl[ing] the 
government.”  Backcountry residents were as fully rational as the Lowcountry elites, and 
that focus on the future, with a stable government and a state under the rule of law, 
mandated a settlement with Loyalists.  All sides understood this fact. 
Burke himself noted that residents of Ninety Six wanted Loyalists back “provided 
those do not return among them who have committed wanton acts of barbarity.”  Ninety 
Six now counted among the post-war citizens “many plunderers and other mischievous 
people, who had taken part with the enemy, now set down among them without 
molestation.”  Plunderers, who were understood to be people who took advantage of 
circumstance for personal profit due to low economic and social circumstances, lived at 
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peace in the district.  Further, Burke emphasized that men who had served the Loyalist 
cause with honor “act[ing] like a soldier…kill[ing] their friends in fair open action” were 
accepted without rancor.  They met the test of honorable men, who engaged in reputable 
warfare.  Burke claimed that many such men were already quietly living in Ninety Six 
without comment.  Burke was a defender of the backcountry against the Lowcountry, and 
certainly wanted to paint the region in the best light possible.  But he was correct in 
understanding that even outside legislative clemency, South Carolinians desired 
reconciliation, but had mental categories of what sort of man was reclaimable (or not.)  
Matthew Love had seriously misunderstood how his neighbors really felt about him, and 
in what category his actions placed him. 
 Further, a close look at the timing of Love’s act helps to explain partly why he did 
it and why it was truly beyond the bounds of acceptable practice.  The specific battle he 
was later prosecuted for took place after the surrender at Yorktown.  The rage he felt after 
the battle, which he apparently directed at his neighbors and relations, was that of a 
confused loser.  But by so seriously violating norms of behavior as to kill defenseless 
men whom he knew personally, after the war was in large part decided, was an 
unforgiveable act.  (Especially since he was on the losing side.  There were persistent 
stories that William Bratton, a well-regarded Patriot leader, committed similar acts in the 
aftermath of the Battle at Brattonsville without censure.)  What did Love think he was 
doing by returning?  He obviously thought the warming trend towards Loyalists would 
include him, and yet he was very wrong.  Burke wondered with irritation how Love could 
“be so infatuated as to return?”  Yet Burke saw the whole event with hindsight.  Matthew 
Love probably saw the stream of former members of Cunningham’s band, and other local 
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Loyalists, trickling back to the area, and thought he was in the same group.  The 
plunderers and soldiers living in Ninety Six included men much like Love in wartime 
service and allegiance. 
The Treaty of Paris which that ended the American Revolution forbade criminal 
prosecutions of Loyalists for their wartime conduct, although this story clearly shows that 
ordinary people, and the local justice of the peace, felt that war prosecutions were still 
possible for extreme acts of violence that exceeded norms of civilized warfare.  (I discuss 
the Treaty of Paris’s provisions regulating Loyalists later in this chapter.)  Matthew Love 
may well have been banking on his fellow South Carolinians’ strictly adhering to the 
letter of the peace treaty.  Alternatively, he may have disagreed with them that his 
wartime actions were so truly “barbarous.”  And perhaps he mainly came back because 
he didn’t know what else to do.  He was a very ordinary man, without great wealth.  
Florida, where Cunningham’s men had fled, was about to be ceded to the Spanish, 
forcing all the Loyalists who had sought refuge there to move again.  Perhaps he felt that 
his best financial option was to return.  Still, he thought he could return to South Carolina 
and keep his life.  Many others clearly made the same decision without paying the 
ultimate penalty.   
While on the surface, Love’s experience suggests hatred towards the Loyalists, 
this event is actually the exception that proves the rule.  Justice Aedanus Burke wrote the 
letter that immortalized the incident for historians because the governor had already heard 
rumors about the events.  This vigilantism was unusual, which is why it was such a 
popular story. 
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Backcountry Trouble: Banditry, Loyalists, and the Desire for Revenge 
 Matthew Love’s murder was one shameful event in a series of problems in the 
backcountry after the Revolution.  As we will see later in this chapter, Charleston also 
saw crowd action and occasional mob violence against selected Loyalists.  But the 
backcountry had much larger problems of public order.  Loyalists were a large part of this 
problem, as Loyalist bands continued to sweep through the region, wreaking terror on 
individuals traveling or living in isolated homes.  The problems that led to the Regulator 
movement were being reenacted again, with the merest overlay of ideology. 
 South Carolina had a long history of instability and violence in the backcountry.  
The South Carolina Regulators drew strength from their promises to enforce order on a 
fractious region.  Horse thieves and other opportunistic bandits roamed the region before 
the Revolution, helping to spark the Regulation in response to a wave of crime in the 
1760s.  Bandits organized into multi-racial, mixed-sex gangs.  In so doing, they upset the 
social system and served as symbols of disorder (as well as actual proponents of 
disorder).5 
 During the Revolution (as we saw in Chapter One), Loyalist guerrillas swept 
across the backcountry wreaking havoc on property as well as persons.  As Nathanael 
Greene angrily pointed out to the President of the Continental Congress, he couldn’t give 
him good news of the war in the South in large part because the “spirit of plundering 
which prevails among the Inhabitants adds not a little to our difficulties.”  If that wasn’t 
bad enough, “people … are frequently murdered as they ride along the road, and also 
 
5 Klein, Unification of a Slave State  47-49, 61-64.  See also Brown, Sc Regulators  113-35. 
 324 
between this and Cross Creek, Guilford Courthouse and Hillsborough in which extent of 
Country great numbers of tories are way laying the roads.”  Nathanael Greene concurred 
with popular opinion that linked Tories with bandits.  During the war, Loyalist forces 
patrolled the roads in an effort to control the movement of people and goods—a 
legitimate military goal.  However, in practice this meant their main action was to 
interrogate and irritate a large cross section of the civilian population, giving rise to the 
idea that all Loyalists were bandits disrupting trade.  Of course, both sides also routinely 
plundered in an effort to keep troops supplied.  It is a truism of war that armies eat, and 
Greene also noted the difficulty.  “You may as well attempt to bail the sea dry as to think 
of farming and equipping the whole Militia of this Country” and the attempt “will lay 
waste a whole Country.”  Extensive plunder was a problem on both sides, but the winners 
conveniently blamed the losers for all of it.6 
Further inflaming backcountry sensibilities, there were genuine links between 
Loyalists and banditry.  Joseph Coffel, who led a faction of backcountry settlers opposed 
to the Regulators, headed a mixed-race gang who fought for the British cause as early as 
1775.  Patriots across the state began to refer to Loyalists as scoffolites “after their 
leader” Coffel.  Coffel’s gang concentrated on plundering, giving all appearances of 
using political labels as a cover for individual greed.  David Ramsey, an early South 
Carolina historian of the Revolution, considered backcountry Tories to be nothing but 
“ignorant unprincipled banditti…horse thieves and others whose crimes had exiled 
themselves from society.”  Other known bandits joined the British cause, looking for 
plundering opportunity.  The Orangeburg Hutto family was one such clan.  William Lee 
 
6 Greene to Samuel Huntington, Camp at the Cheraws, Dec. 28, 1780, Greene to General Ezekial Cornell, 
Camp on the Pedee, Dec. 29, 1780, Showman, ed., The Papers of General Nathanael Greene  7: 9, 21. 
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was condemned to death for stealing horses and cattle in 1763, but his sentence was 
reprieved.  He joined William “Bloody Bill” Cunningham’s men.  It is easy to find 
example after example of backcountry bandits who were loosely associated with the 
Loyalists.7 
 After Yorktown, the war in South Carolina continued, including aggressive 
Loyalist incursions designed to cause pain and anguish as much as to advance military 
goals.  “Bloody Bill” earned his sobriquet by forcing his men to participate in wholesale 
slaughter of prisoners in small engagements after Yorktown, in order to force them from 
militia unit to guerilla resistance fighters.  Aedanus Burke complained in May 1782 that, 
“the Country is ravaged by small armed parties, who retiring in swamps, make cruel 
excursions on the inhants.  The Outlyers sally from their swamps, & destroy our people in 
Cold blood.”  For some Loyalist bands, the end of the war made little difference.  
Cunningham’s men continued their raids on the interior well into 1784.  These bands 
were a constant irritant to rural people and fueled continuing rage against Loyalists.8 
 Plunder was especially frustrating to backcountry denizens because the region had 
been so reduced by the war that poverty and desperation were widespread.  William 
Drayton described a region still so stricken by poverty in 1784 that children went without 
shoes, and many adults were “half naked Beings.”  On his tour of the backcountry, he 
“was deprived of the Pleasure of seeing Wynnes-borough” because the nearby roads were 
so unsafe, thanks to marauders.  Life in the backcountry was worse for those members of 
society already living at the margins, and the backcountry was now full of them.  Ninety 
Six District had 1,400 widows and orphans at the end of the war.  While the Lowcountry 
 
7 Klein, Unification of a Slave State 95-98.  David Ramsay, History of South Carolina: From Its First 
Settlement in 1670 to the Year 1808 (Newberry, S. C.,, 1959) 1: 259. 
8 Burke to Middleton, May 14, 1782, Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Oct. 1925," , see 201. 
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had many more adult men than youthful ones (under sixteen), all of the counties in 
Camden and Ninety Six districts had the reverse.  As late as 1788, residents of Ninety Six 
District were only able to pay ¼ of the previous year’s tax allotment.  Rachel Klein points 
out that conditions were very similar to those that provoked the Regulation, and 
backcountry grand juries repeatedly complained of disorder and vagrancy.9 
 Of course, sometimes the rumors of disorder in the backcountry outstripped even 
the reality.  Charlestonians read in alarm that ruffians near Camden murdered a man on 
his way from North Carolina to Charleston.  Four days later, the paper rushed to reassure 
readers that this had been a mistake, and that his happy family removed their mourning 
attire.  Yet given the reputation of backcountry roads, readers easily accepted the premise 
that a traveler had been murdered.10 
The tensions were very real.  Newspapers nervously reported that David Fanning, 
hated leader of North Carolina Loyalist forces, and William Cunningham joined forces in 
the immediate aftermath of the British evacuation of Charleston to harass settlers in the 
backcountry.  They attacked Col. Thompson’s home and harassed others, “plundering 
and destroying all that opposed them”.  Military leaders sent gangs after them, to no 
avail.  In March 1783, the South Carolina Senate approved a request for a ranger group to 
capture or kill “such notorious offenders who disturb the peace, tranquility and harmony” 
of the interior.  Both William Cunningham and his follower William Lee were singled 
out by name.  The General Assembly also authorized a three hundred guinea reward to 
apprehend William Cunningham and two of his followers for their part in “sundry 
Murders, Robberies, and other offences in the back parts of this State.”  Frustratingly, 
 
9 Nadelhaft, Disorders of War  127, 129-30.  Krawczynski, "1784 Tour of Backcountry," , see 197.  Klein, 
Unification of a Slave State 114-15. 
10 South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, Nov. 4 and Nov. 8, 1783. 
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Cunningham was hard to catch because he was “harbored by wretches as unprincipled 
and unfeeling” as he was.  To sweeten the pot, the reward included a full pardon to any 
Loyalist who turned him in.  The General Assembly seems to have been right that the 
backcountry still had many quiet Loyalist supporters who helped Cunningham evade 
justice, as they had to approve another reward for him in 1785.  This time, his adversaries 
plaintively noted that he was perhaps the “most noted of the banditti who have so long 
infested the district of Ninety Six.”11 
 Cunningham was the most famous bandit, but not the only one.  One gentleman in 
Charleston was so frustrated by his losses at the hands of the self-styled Florida Scouts 
that he offered a personal reward of twenty guineas for the conviction of the thieves, plus 
a bounty for each horse recovered.  Governor Guerard issued a large reward for the 
apprehension of James Booth and his “small party of Ruffians” after they murdered Dr. 
Orr on his way through the swamps between Savannah and the ferry.  James Booth was 
not yet twenty years old when he was finally captured and came before Aedanus Burke 
for a robbery charge.  A jury showed him mercy by banishing him forever from the 
continent but sparing his life, largely because he had not fought for the British cause but 
instead turned to a life of crime out of need.  Governor Guerard eventually signed off on 
his pardon, despite the earlier reward.  Perhaps he was eventually cleared of the murder.12 
 Even Aedanus Burke decided it was necessary to crack down on bandits, given 
the uproar.  He told Governor Guerard he would give horse thieves no mercy.  He 
 
11 The South-Carolina Weekly Advertiser, Feb. 19, 1783, April 2, 1783.  South Carolina Senate Journal, 
Mar. 6, 1783, SCDAH. Theodora J. Thompson and Rosa S. Lumpkin, eds., Journals of the House of 
Representatives, 1783-1784 (Columbia, S.C., 1977)215. Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1785-1786  
198.  Klein, Unification of a Slave State 97-100. 
12 South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, Oct. 18, 1783. The South-Carolina Weekly Advertiser, 
Feb. 26, 1783.  Burke to Guerard, Nov. 11 and 17, 1784, Governor’s Messages, Feb. 2, 1785, Records of 
the General Assembly, SCDAH. Nadelhaft, Disorders of War 128-32. 
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worried that people were “half ruined by a set of horse thieves” and could not even 
protect their crop shipments to Charleston.  Backcountry residents continued to petition 
the General Assembly for rewards for local bandits.  For example, in 1784 the residents 
of Little River petitioned for relief from a “desperate set of Outlaws.”  A gang of six 
robbers robbed Andrew Pickens, the legendary partisan leader, of four wagons in 1786, 
prompting more complaints.13 
Further, one Lowcountry attack suggests that Loyalist bands did sometimes target 
Patriot leaders deliberately.  Thomas Waring, a Lowcountry merchant and an author of 
the Confiscation Act, was attacked by ruffians who plundered him in 1783 at a plantation 
in Cane Acre (in the Lowcountry).  Perhaps he became a target because of his well-
known activities in favor of retribution.  Andrew Pickens’ misfortunes may not have been 
accidental either.14 
Backcountry residents did fight back against the intrusions.  In addition to 
petitioning the General Assembly repeatedly for military and economic aid, locals 
organized themselves.  However, in a suspicious society, this also led to trouble.  In some 
districts, locals suspected their own as potential harborers of Loyalists.  In the New 
Acquisition District (today York County), James Simril led a group of Whigs to harass 
local men suspected of harboring or aiding Tories.  Simril even accused local war hero 
Col. Lacey, calling him “a protector of horse-thieves and tories.”  Lacey was a hero of the 
Battle of Brattonsville, but his father was an ardent, if infirm, Loyalist.  The story went 
that he had to tie his father to the bedstead the night before the battle to keep him from 
 
13Burke to Guerard, Dec. 14, 1784, Governor’s Messages, Papers of the General Assembly, SCDAH.  
Petition of the Inhabitants of Little River, March 7, 1785, 105-1785, Petitions to the General Assembly, 
SCDAH.  For other petitions, see the petition series.  Klein, Unification of a Slave State 117. 
14 South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, Oct. 18, 1783. 
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warning the Loyalist forces.  Perhaps it was this family connection that made Simril 
suspect Lacey, or perhaps Lacey protected law-abiding men associated with Loyalism in 
his position as county leader.  Given that Lacey was a local bigwig, serving as a judge, 
sheriff, representative to the General Assembly, and militia leader, and was happily 
litigious, this was a mistake.  Lacey was so angry at the charges that he took Simril to 
court and publicized the decision in the papers, but harm was already done.15 
Other backcountry denizens turned to more legal (if sometimes less effective) 
methods to voice their hostility to the return of some Loyalists.  Repeatedly, backcountry 
districts remonstrated with the General Assembly to hold the line against Loyalist return 
through petitions and grand jury presentments.  Signatories from the “upper part” of St. 
George’s Parish admitted to being “greatly allarmed” about widespread reports that the 
legislature was entertaining petitions from “the most atrocious offenders.”  They strongly 
urged the committee to never pardon Loyalists subject to penalties.  How could the 
legislature “rank the worthy Cytizens of this, or any of the United States, with such a set 
of Miscriants[?]”  Here we see clear evidence that ordinary South Carolinians saw the 
issue in terms of citizenship.  These petitioners went on to reinforce the reasons Loyalists 
should never be readmitted, after a long list of ways in which they had deceived their 
fellow South Carolinians.  They reminded the Assembly “from Experience that there is 
no confidence to be put in such an unprincipal set of men,” and that whatever assurances 
they made now in petitions, nobody should believe they would uphold any promises.  
 
15 South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, June 5, 1784. Walter Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats: 
The Southern Conflict That Turned the Tide of the American Revolution (New York, 2001) 80.  William 
Moultrie Concerning Appointment of Sheriffs and Commissioners of the Roads, Oct. 7, 1785, Governors 
Messages, SCDAH.  York County, Minutes of the Proceedings of the County and Intermediate Court, 
Journals, WPA Transcripts (990) Book A, SCDAH.  Edgar and Bailey, eds., Directory S.C. House Rep.  3: 
410-11. 
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After all, these were the same men who “Receieved the Enemy with open arms. … 
Numbers who ware in arms with us Ran over again to the Enemy and headed parties, and 
ware our most invetered and Merciless Enemy.”  Offering a final policy prescription, 
these petitioners “hope[d] that instead of Granting them Pardon or doing away [with] the 
Confiscation Act that it may be supported and Strengthned with additions of Severity…”  
They also called for laws prohibiting any Loyalists from voting or holding office.  
Clearly, there was resistance to clemency for Loyalists, especially so recently after the 
end of the war.16 
Residents of Ninety Six were also very unpleased with any hint of legislative 
clemency for Loyalists who were subject to official legislative punishment.  Invoking the 
“misery of this State to be infested with many Internal Enemys who have revolted from 
the allegiance due the State,” the petitioners cautioned the legislature to ignore the 
blandishments of the Loyalist petitioners.  They asked the legislature to instead speed the 
sale of Loyalist estates, so that there was no hope of reclamation.  Ninety Six residents 
certainly believed that Loyalists subject to confiscation had already been given several 
chances, and had refused them all.17 
Complaints continued after the General Assembly passed the 1784 revision of the 
confiscation law, relieving many of the worst penalties, but these complaints focused on 
enforcing the remaining restrictions on Loyalists, not overturning the Assembly’s 
clemency.  The Ninety Six Grand Jury complained that despite voting prohibitions, 
former Loyalists were still voting.  Other Ninety Six residents from the Little River area 
 
16 St. George was a Lowcountry parish, but these petitioners were careful to signal that they were from the 
region near the fall line, and I am therefore including their concerns with the backcountry.  Inhabitants of 
the upper Part of Prince George’s Parish, Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784  92-93. 
17 Subscribers of Ninety Six Distr. & Town, Thompson and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 1783-1784 242-43 
footnote 2.  (The petition may or may not have been read on the floor.) 
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protested the return of many “whose characters were obnoxious.”  They reminded the 
legislature to consider the desires of the “many citizens who were plundered and their 
Friends murdered” who still “entertained resentments” and would produce “disquiet” in 
the area if Loyalists roamed freely.  Yet despite being nervous, Little River residents 
actually wanted the General Assembly to solve current problems, not overturn clemency 
legislation.  They sought government reward money to aid their efforts to capture the 
remaining bandits.18 
Some backcountry communities and individuals had long memories, especially 
where tax money was concerned.  While by the 1790s, many Loyalists were readmitted, 
Philemon Waters, a veteran of the Revolution and a member of the Jacksonborough and 
clemency-granting General Assemblies, discovered that Lydia Miller, a Loyalist widow, 
had collected a fifty-pound pension for her husband.  Waters wrote the treasurers to show 
that Henry Miller had “died in the service of the British,” and further intimated that three 
justices of the peace had helped her gain money she wasn’t supposed to have.  During the 
investigation, authorities discovered two more former Loyalists drawing military 
pensions, including one who had been a prisoner of the American forces during the time 
he claimed American service.  On the one hand, this suggests some people had short 
memories, as it took a particularly well-connected and determined foe to expose these 
pensioners.  On the other hand, when it did come to official attention, the General 
Assembly recommended that the justices of the peace and Lydia Miller, the false 
claimant, be prosecuted.19 
 
18 Sundry Inhabitants of Little River in the District of Ninety Six, Adams and Lumpkin, eds., House J. 
1785-1786 195.  Klein, Unification of a Slave State 122. 
19 Philemon Waters, Dec. 1783, Report, 1794, in the case of Henry Miller, Accounts Audited of Claims 
Arising from the Revolution, SCDAH.  Stevens, ed., House J. 1792-1794  523, 550.  Edgar and Bailey, 
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As will become clear in the next section, backcountry residents often reacted to 
this continual provocation by threatening revenge against Loyalists, especially prominent 
ones.  Yet the continued disorder also gave rise to the desire for stability and some way to 
move ahead.  Aside from the occasional outburst, South Carolinians confined themselves 
to murmured threats, not actual violence. 
To Settle the Peace of the Country by “moderation, and reconciling principles”: 
Aedanus Burke, Increasingly Vocal Opponent of Anti-Loyalist Measures20 
 As we have seen in Chapter Two, Aedanus Burke worked against the 
Confiscation and Amercement Acts as a member of the Jacksonborough Assembly in 
1782.  His opposition to the acts hardened in the latter part of 1782, and by 1783 he 
moved from frenzied letter writing in opposition to increasingly public pronouncements 
against any government-backed measures against Loyalists.  In so doing, he also 
organized against a faction of Lowcountry planters and lawyers whom he saw as self-
aggrandizing petty tyrants.  His public campaign against government discrimination 
against Loyalists culminated in a series of grand jury addresses where he used his 
position as a justice to further his cause.  In addition, he published a lengthy argument 
against the Acts under the pseudonym Cassius, which pseudonym appeared to fool 
almost nobody.  His 1784 letter explaining the Matthew Love case can therefore be seen 
                                                                                                                                            
eds., Directory S.C. House Rep. 3: 752-53.  The justices of the peace may have filed a fraudulent 
application for personal profit, not sympathy with Lydia Miller.  Mrs. Miller rapidly endorsed her pension 
certificate to a man in Fairfield District, who actually collected the money. 
20 Judge Aedanus Burke’s Charge to the Grand Jury of Ninety Six District, Nov. 26, 1783, as reprinted in 
the South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, Dec. 18, 1783. 
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as a part of a series of interventions in this public argument, in which Aedanus Burke 
consistently staked out a position more extreme than his fellow advocates.  This was 
certainly in keeping with his reputation as a hot-head devoted to the delights of 
argumentiveness above almost all else. 
As we saw in Chapter Two, Burke hated the Loyalists as much as any other 
victorious Patriot in late 1781, when he admitted he was moved by “a Love of Revenge 
natural to the mind of man.”  Yet concern for the well-being of the state quickly tempered 
his judgment.  By May of 1782, he felt that the Confiscation Act was a “punishment 
[Loyalists] justly merit” because of their “deep, dark malice,” but that a better idea for the 
greater cause of continued independent democracy was to not create such a “pernicious” 
precedent.  Burke’s legal training asserted itself, as he worried that the Confiscation Act 
created a trial without jury, where the General Assembly tried Loyalists in absentia and 
found them guilty without jury or a chance to muster evidence in their favor.  As we saw 
in Chapter Three, this was a point that Loyalist petitioners also made repeatedly in their 
attempts to persuade the General Assembly to create a system of hearings or trials for 
accused Loyalists.21 
Burke also complained that the Confiscation Act was illegal as an expost facto 
law (a law punishing actions taken before the actions became illegal).  Both of these 
complaints, which he formulated in a private letter in spring 1782, would become part of 
his later public addresses in 1783.  He was even more opposed to the Amercement Act, 
unlike most of his allies against Confiscation.  South Carolinians could “make them our 
Friends by Pardoning,” but if they pursued amercement, the amerced would “feel 
 
21 Burke to Middleton, Camp before York, Oct. 16, 1781, Burke to Middleton, May 14, 1782, Barnwell, 
"Middleton Corr. Oct. 1925,"  187, 197-98. 
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themselves injured” and join factions, work against the public good, and hand on this 
orientation to their children.  Instead of passing such harsh laws, the state would be better 
served by a general act of oblivion.  Burke recognized the strong desire for revenge, and 
suggested the act of oblivion might have “some exceptions to satisfy publick justice, and 
as you would throw a Tub to a whale to satisfy the vengeance of those who have 
suffered.”  Like other members of the Assembly, he did accept that the legislature needed 
to slake the thirst for revenge to maintain order, but he hoped they could get away with 
only a few token individuals.22 
As early as 1782, Aedanus Burke made one major move against efforts to use 
government controls to punish Loyalists outside of the safety of letters.  As we saw in 
Chapter Two, Governor Rutledge and the General Assembly envisioned two parallel 
tracks of punishments for former Loyalists.  Certain prominent or notorious Loyalists 
who came from higher social circles were dealt with by name by the Jacksonborough 
Assembly.  Loyalists who were less prominent were dealt with in two ways.  Local 
officials cataloged those who fled their homes at the end of the war and their names were 
forwarded to the governor.  Inclusion on the list subjected people to inclusion in the 
penalties of the Confiscation Act: namely banishment and complete confiscation of their 
estate.  Loyalists who stayed in their communities but who were alleged to have 
committed a crime would be tried in the newly reopened criminal courts.  It was this last 
way to punish Loyalists that gave Aedanus Burke his opportunity.  When Governor John 
Rutledge tried to reopen the courts, Burke, newly appointed a justice, defied him.  
“Holding Courts at present is a farce, a mockery on Justice.”  Cases could not be fairly 
 
22 Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Oct. 1925,"  200.  His full quote on the Amercement Act: “holding him up as 
an Enemy, wch. effectively makes him one, & then keep him in your Country, to thwart public measures, 
form parties, join some dangerous faction out of mischief, & malice, wch. he transmits to his children.”  
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decided when “you cd. not enter a Company that some do not talk of hanging many 
hundreds.”  Burke had no wish to become a hanging judge, and his worries were not 
unfounded.  One London newspaper angrily reported that in Georgetown, the foreman of 
the Grand Jury amended his oath to render justice impartially, instead “hop[ing] his 
Honour admitted an EXCEPTION in the case of Tories.”  Burke’s keen sense of justice 
was also offended at the probable unevenness of such prosecutions, for “if the Law of the 
Land was enforced for every violation of such crimes [except capital crimes, which he 
explicitly excluded], I may venture to affirm, there are not one thousand men in the 
Country who cd. escape the Gallows.”  Burke also vigorously resisted Governor 
Mathews’s 1783 suggestion that he convene a special session to try some one hundred 
Loyalists in Orangeburgh.23 
Practical considerations allowed him to refuse as well.  Bandits captured Justice 
Pendleton on his way to hold court, and Burke complained of having to ride hard and fast 
to stay ahead of a party after him.  With all of these tactics, he succeeded in avoiding 
opening the courts for a year.  His experiences with Matthew Love certainly suggest he 
was right not to open the courts earlier, as people certainly would have used them to 
prosecute Loyalists.  Other states did use courts to prosecute Loyalists. 
In Virginia the use of courts helped the cause of reconciliation, because they were 
used to settle claims arising from wartime plunder, rather than criminal actions.  Virginia 
intended citizens to use both the criminal and civil courts against Loyalists after the war, 
but at least in the coastal regions, citizens avoided using the criminal courts (the courts 
Burke was afraid of) but made extensive use of the civil courts in 1783 to sue Loyalists 
 
23 Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Oct. 1925,"  200-202. South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, May 
22, 1784. 
 336 
for wartime property damage.  Adele Hast has concluded that such damage suits 
“provided a means for some degree of reconciliation.”  Of course, in those regions, courts 
operated through most of the war, whereas in South Carolina they were closed for several 
years, and never operated in regions where conflict between locals was greatest.24 
In North Carolina, courts functioned to impede reconciliation, not aid it.  Matthew 
Love was not the only Loyalist prosecuted and killed by angry backcountry folks.  In 
Hillsborough, North Carolina, Frederick Smith was prosecuted in 1783 for the wartime 
murder of a Patriot man.  Despite evidence he wasn’t the guilty party, but simply a 
member of the band (leaving aside the fact that by this late in the war, both sides were 
routinely murdering prisoners), “no lawyer spoke one word in his favor,” perhaps due to 
the fervor of the crowd.  In this case, the court found Smith guilty of murder, despite the 
doubtful legality of such charges, and hanged him right away.  If the court had not been 
willing to prosecute and convict Smith, the crowd would have turned to vigilante justice 
as did the crowd in the Love incident.  One court observer recounted that “if the jury had 
not brought him in guilty, I am sure they would have killed the wretch before he could 
have gotten out of the house,” especially since other courtroom observers were overheard 
“wishing…they might have the pleasure of putting the rascal to death with their own 
hands.”  In short, Aedanus Burke knew his audience, and knew what would happen if the 
courts opened too early; it happened in North Carolina.25 
But the courts could not stay closed forever.  Burke tried to convince himself in 
July 1782 that the “minds of men are growing more cool,” though he also reported that 
backcountry people had warned him if he held court, he could not let Loyalists have 
 
24 Hast, Loyalism in Revolutionary Virginia  123-24, 135. 
25 DeMond, N.C. Loyalists  123. 
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lawyers, lest the men punish Burke for favoring Loyalists.26  Burke enjoyed his role as a 
devil’s advocate, but he also simply distrusted letting emotion, rather than logic, rule 
government action.  Further, time and time again he argued that turning the other cheek 
was the best policy.  Anything else would continually fan the flames of civil insecurity, 
promoting endless rounds of civil war. 
Burke made this point in his letter on Love’s execution.  He worried about how 
this event might have stirred up bad feelings in the population that would better lie 
dormant.  If other men like Love returned “to keep alive the remembrance of past 
calamities, and this prevent a restoration of public tranquility,” what would become of 
South Carolina?  Love managed to unleash popular resentment that was otherwise 
dormant.  In this vein, good government demanded a quick, even and well-expressed 
solution to the problem of Loyalism that would resolve the issue permanently.  Too much 
continual conversation and provocation would, instead of making people feel better, only 
make things worse.  The “remembrance of past calamities” was in itself dangerous to the 
security and peace of South Carolina, and solutions should be framed around this 
principle.27 
 In 1783, Burke was ready to participate in opening the courts again.  He continued 
to oppose using the courts to punish Loyalists, a point he quickly made clear in his 
addresses to the Grand Juries of Charleston and Ninety Six.  In his widely reprinted 
charge to the grand jury for the Charleston district, he called for reconciliation with 
Loyalists for the good of the whole state.  First, he reminded his listeners that the British, 
not Loyalists, were their true enemies.  South Carolinians had no nearby “foes, unless we 
 
26 Burke to Middleton, July 6, 1782. Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Oct. 1925,"  205. 
27 Ibid. 
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ourselves should make them by our internal dissensions.”  Loyalists were natural citizens 
by dint of their attachment to the state, and South Carolinians had a unique chance to 
cement their natural affections.28 
 Burke lectured the grand jurymen that the civil war allowed the population to get 
used to settling arguments through extralegal means, yet the stability of post-war society 
required that they turn away from these understandable, yet unacceptable habits.  The war 
unleashed the “spirit of private revenge.”  As such, their job was to make sure that private 
revenge ceased, returning to the “liberal and humane” spirit that they were known for 
before the British arrived.  (It is, of course, doubtful that South Carolinians were ever 
known for calmness and an avoidance of extralegal means, especially in the backcountry, 
but Burke saw a chance to sugarcoat his message by persuading Carolinians of their 
better nature.)  The purpose of the courts was to serve justice through written law, and 
South Carolina must turn back to law in order to build a lasting future. 
 Burke eloquently painted a picture of what society would be like if they did not 
do so: 
 
Yet we fear that without a very forceable exertion of the judicial authority, the 
high temper of men will for some time, like the waves of the sea, after the storm 
has ceased, continue to move with mischievous tumult and impetuosity.  …  Our 
citizens from a habit of putting their enemies to death, have reconciled their minds 
to the killing of each other; and it is too true, I fear, that man by custom may be so 
brutalized, as to relish human blood the more he has shed of it.29 
 
More subtly, Burke indicated that war brutalizes those who have to take life, and makes 
men less likely to appreciate the difference between legal and extralegal action, in the 
same way the actual fighting of the Revolution in South Carolina helped erase 
 
28 Charge to the Grand Jury June 9, 1783, reprinted in the South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, 
June 10, 1783. 
29 Ibid. 
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distinctions in many people’s minds between the battlefield and civilian life.  Burke 
warned, “Private revenge may truly be called the demon of civil discord, and should be 
banished from the land as if it were a pestilence.”  Should Carolinians continue to pursue 
war hurts, they would create more civil war, and destroy their independent nation before 
it ever had time to exist.  In so doing, South Carolinians would accomplish the aims of 
European nations for them—for Britain to see that they “had succeeded in setting us 
together by the ears.”30   
Burke also tried to persuade the Grand Jury of the merits of clemency and mercy 
for everyone—reconciliation as a matter of self-interest.  If Grand Jury rose to the 
occasion by “burying in oblivion past injuries, and past errors, a disposition of 
benevolence may go out through the land, and connect our citizens in ties of harmony and 
common brotherhood.”   Burke went so far as to call Loyalists “our citizens.” That 
emphasis on citizenship was not beside the point—rather it emphasized that there was no 
acceptable status for white men in South Carolina except citizen in this new Republic.  
To create ‘damaged citizens’ was to destroy the state.31 
 Burke’s words carried power because he argued about very real concerns.  
Matthew Love’s murder was not the only example of vigilantism or riot against Loyalists 
in the state.  While the incidents (which I discuss in this chapter) were surprisingly few, 
such incidents struck fear into the hearts of both former Loyalists and other South 
Carolinians worried about stability.  Burke carefully alluded to some of these incidents in 
his attempts to persuade grand juries to follow his lead.  In addition to “the many 





men have been slain in Charleston” (where he was giving this speech) and other men 
“libel and assault each other, in the very face and defiance of the Magistrate.”  The Grand 
Jury in particular, but society in general, must make stability under the rule of law the 
highest priority, or risk cascading back into civil war.  As a Grand Jury, he was warning 
them to apply justice impartially, or risk the court losing its legitimacy to the street. 
 Men should not be called Tory or Patriot, for such post-war distinctions made by 
people who “call themselves Whigs” really meant to “keep the Republick in perpetual 
distraction” and “act the part of an incendiary.”  Such “incendiaries” would keep conflict 
alive for generations.  Should South Carolinians wish vengeance for the harm wrought by 
the cruel war, could they not be satisfied with the Loyalist families split apart, the 
families sent to live on “the inhospitable shores of Nova Scotia” and others who were 
now “deeply plunged…in wretchedness[?]”32 
 Aedanus Burke and his audience agreed about long-term goals.  The most 
important thing was to establish South Carolina as a free, independent, economically self-
sufficient and republican state.  What he tried to persuade them was the only way to do 
this was “by moderation, and reconciling principles.”  It was most important to “forgiv[e] 
what past during the late troubles” and focus on the future.  Only “reconciling principles” 
offered a sure way forward for peace.33 
 He received a respectful hearing, but did not convince anyone.  The Ninety Six 
Grand Jury applauded his forthrightness but found “the doctrine of reconciliation 
unexpected” and “unpopular.”  Such reproach was especially startling since grand juries 
usually rubber-stamped such addresses.  Instead, this Grand Jury disassociated from the 
 
32 Aedanus Burke’s Charge to the Grand Jury of Ninety Six District, Nov. 26, 1783, as reprinted in the 
South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, Dec. 18, 1783.. 
33 Ibid. 
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“doctrine of reconciliation.”  Judge Burke could not order reconciliation into the hearts 
and minds of South Carolinians.  But by speaking out, he could plant the seed of doubt in 
their heads, and persuade like-minded individuals to use his words as cover for more 
moderate actions in favor of clemency towards former Loyalists. 
 Aedanus Burke was a unique voice in favor of not using the courts in any way 
against former Loyalists, but other jurists cautioned against using courts for retribution.  
Justice John Fauchereau Grimké (father of Angelina and Sarah Grimké, the famous 
Southern abolitionists), another early judge of independent South Carolina, rushed to 
persuade the Grand Jury of Cheraws and Camden (roughly the more settled areas of the 
backcountry) to turn from retaliation to “affirming the reins of Justice” lest they 
“sacrifice the dignity of our country” by stooping to the tactics of the enemy.  Grimké 
and Burke agreed that vigilante justice must be ended now that courts were sitting.  
Rhetorically, Grimké whipped up his hearers, trotting out the usual staples of wartime 
propaganda, such as atrocities, the whipping of women, home burning, and the execution 
of Isaac Hayne.  While during the war it was “necessary and politic” to draw distinctions 
between Whigs and Tories that hurt Tories, such distinctions were no longer appropriate.  
“The terms of Whig and Tory are no longer useful” and must be abandoned in dealing 
with people coming before the court.34 
Unlike Burke, however, Grimké believed using the courts to prosecute some 
Loyalists was appropriate.  Any man who had joined the British after the occupation of 
Charleston and used British power as a cover to “exercise[] a wild and brutal dominion 
over his fellow-citizens,” stealing property and sometimes murdering people, should be 
 
34 Justice Grimké’s Address to the Court of General Sessions, Cheraws and Camden, Nov. 1783 
(Charleston, 1783).  Accessed through Early American Imprints, 44457. 
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routinely hated and prosecuted.  Grimké believed that prosecuting genuine crimes, 
regardless of when they were committed, was much more likely to make people use and 
trust the courts.  The important thing was that the court treated offenders the same despite 
their political labels.  “If any man commits murder, or robs a citizen, or perpetrates any 
other enormous offense, let him be apprehended” and tried.  Grimké assured grand juries 
that the court properly had power to prosecute wartime offenders, despite the Treaty of 
Paris: 
 
But here I must beg leave to assure you, that if any citizen has been injured during 
the late British assurpation over the country, although I will discountenance any 
man’s arrogating satisfaction to himself by force of arms, that I will give every 
encouragement within my power to bring the offender to trial, and cause him to 
make exemplary compensation for the injury.35 
 
 
While Aedanus Burke repeatedly argued (including to the assembled crowds wishing to 
try Matthew Love for murder) that the Treaty of Paris ruled out any use of the courts, 
Grimké pointedly disagreed.  Further, he believed that the General Assembly also 
intended for the courts to prosecute war criminals.  “For the pardon, which such men may 
have received from the Legislature, extends only to offenses against the government, and 
by no means to injuries done to individuals.”  Therefore, the coast was clear to prosecute 
war crimes off the field of battle.  Further, Grimké told these backcountry leaders that the 
General Assembly had been careful to limit pardons against Loyalists to political actions, 
not only allowing, but expecting the courts to pursue Loyalists for criminal behavior.  
This was true, at least in terms of the fact that General Assembly did intend to use the 




Judge Grimké did agree with Burke that the courts must not rely on political 
labels in adjudging guilt.  It was all too easy to fall into the trap of believing that “none 
but Tories could commit crimes” and that actions done by Tories were crimes while 
actions committed by Patriots were “not only pardonable but commendable.”  Yet this 
was untrue and indefensible.  Further, Grimké reminded his hearers that “many of the 
persons hitherto designated by the title of Tories, and remaining amongst us, have thrown 
themselves upon the mercy of their country, and are intitled to the benefit of our laws.” 
Understanding Judge Grimké’s position helps show how unusual Aedanus 
Burke’s arguments were.   While all jurists agreed that it was important to promote the 
court system as a means to stability, they disagreed on whether Loyalists should be 
prosecuted for war crimes.  Burke went further in urging a “spirit of reconciliation” on 
the community.  But he became frustrated with how little effect he seemed to be having, 
and moved to more incendiary comments in a pamphlet published under a pseudonym. 
Losing Patience: Cassius Speaks Out for Aedanus Burke 
Wishing to lay out his arguments at length, yet looking for plausible deniability, 
Aedanus Burke followed his barrage of grand jury charges and letters to government 
leaders with a widely distributed publication “An Address to the Freemen of the State of 
South-Carolina,” making arguments in favor of widespread reconciliation with former 
Loyalists.  In this address he reiterated the legal arguments he had been making in letters 
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and grand jury statements, as well as lobbing very specific charges of factionalism and 
personal profit at the political leaders who had led the move for the Confiscation Act.36 
The address was printed under the pseudonym “Cassius,” invoking the Roman 
senator who led the assassination plot against Caesar in order to save the Republic from 
dictatorship.  Cassius was a hero in his effort to save republican government from a 
potential tyrant.  Aedanus Burke believed that John Rutledge, the wartime governor of 
South Carolina, was a petty tyrant in the making.  He charged that much of the anti-
Loyalist legislation was orchestrated by John Rutledge and his conservative supporters, 
who sought to gain solid political control over the state by whatever means possible.  By 
eliminating a large number of potential voters, they could narrow the pool to a small 
enough number that they could prevail.   
Burke focused considerable attention on Governor Rutledge’s Proclamation of 
Sept. 1781 for the first time, largely to link Rutledge to all the ills of revenge against 
Loyalists.  As we saw in an earlier chapter, this proclamation offered an amnesty to 
Loyalists who had not committed any crimes and who abandoned the British, came to the 
American lines, and served six months with the South Carolina armed forces.  As I have 
argued before, the proclamation was intended to recruit more soldiers and isolate the 
British by bringing Loyalists back to the American side.  It was also intended to offer 
amnesty to Loyalists in return for forcing them to make some positive affirmation for the 
American side.  In the wake of American victory, the measure intended to offer Loyalists 
a fresh start only if they were willing to share the costs the Patriots were already paying.  
Aedanus Burke saw it differently.  Given that he argued Loyalists did nothing wrong 
 
36 Aedanus Burke, An Address to the Freemen of the State of South-Carolina (Philadelphia, 1783).  
Accessed through Early American Imprints. 
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legally to take British protection after the fall of Charleston, there was no reason why 
they should have to take steps to regain citizenship they never lost.  Instead, there must be 
more nefarious reasons for the proclamation: it was “calculated for no other end but to 
sow the poisonous seeds of faction and party, …, and throw the whole weight and powers 
of government out of the people into a few families.”  He then described those few 
families as “a fierce and jealous aristocracy” that used the war to gain power.  Since 
Governor John Rutledge had made the proclamation, Burke’s allegation against 
designing men seeking to create an aristocracy was clearly an attack on Rutledge and his 
supporters.  Burke was lobbing well-identified bombs.  In his insistence on seeing politics 
he did not like as the product of illicit private aims by designing men, he was a product of 
the late eighteenth century, when threatening differences of opinion were the product of 
intrigue.37 
Rutledge thereby wasted an ideal opportunity for clemency, for had he made 
positive overtures, “a proclamation would have had a happy tendency to bury in oblivion 
what was past” and “unite the affections of all.”38  Instead, by legally excluding 
Loyalists, Rutledge put men so defined “under such disabilities as degraded them below 
the rank of freemen.”  Here we begin to see what so angered Aedanus Burke.  When 
Rutledge used his executive powers to define some men as less than freemen, he stripped 
them of their citizenship.  In making them “less than freemen,” Rutledge violated the 
guarantees of citizenship that underlay the entire system.  Dangerously, creating a class 
of sub-citizens who were white men laboring under permanent legal constraints 
undermined white citizenship for all.  Setting white men against each other might destroy 
 
37 Burke, Address 10.  Gordon S. Wood, "Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the 
Eighteenth Century," William and Mary Quarterly 39, no. 3 (1982): 401-41 
38 Burke, Address 11. 
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the system of racial harmony on which South Carolina depended.  Burke could only 
imagine one reason that anyone would want to do something so seemingly perverse: that 
Rutledge, the author of the proclamation, sought to destroy democracy and rule as the 
head of a small aristocratic faction. 
In so doing, Rutledge disqualified a large number of voters, and made other 
former Loyalists dependent on him.  Only men who had complied with the 1781 
gubernatorial proclamation that Burke so detested were allowed to vote.  In Burke’s 
words, Rutledge bended all to “packing an Assembly.”39 
Burke elaborated his position that Loyalists had not committed treason because 
the government did not exist at the time they made their decisions.  When the British took 
over Charleston, the independent government of South Carolina could no longer protect 
citizens.  European precedent and legal scholars agreed “the obligation of subjects to the 
State is understood to last so long, and no longer than the power lasts by which it is able 
to protect them.”  When the British took the city, the government could no longer protect 
them and therefore it was permissible to take British protection, regardless of the terms.  
Burke then linked this principle directly to the issue of signing congratulatory addresses, 
for which almost half of the men named on the Confiscation Act were being punished.  If 
“they thought they could secure better treatment, or alleviate their calamity by 
congratulations, they had an undoubted right to do it.  It did not show much political 
wisdom, I allow; but let the matter be as it will, they did not commit any crimes against 
the laws or government, for neither law nor government existed.”40  
 
39 Burke, Address 14. 
40 Burke, Address 7. 
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 Therefore, the Confiscation, Amercement, and Exclusion Acts were illegal under 
international law, since they depended on men having renounced their citizenship by 
taking part in British efforts to subdue and rule the state.  Loyalists who were allowed to 
stay in the state but stripped of voting rights were “ruled and taxed without their consent” 
in opposition to “every privilege we have been contending for these seven years past.”  
Burke acknowledged the intense feelings civil war created, but admonished his fellow 
South Carolinians for succumbing to “retaliation.”  In giving into retaliation, they made 
their own position dangerous.  Ex post facto laws, once begun, might come back to bite 
South Carolinians.  “If so obscure a man as Paddy Hinds, or so obnoxious a one as Bob 
Williams, can be banished, amerced, or put to death without trial, hearing, or 
examination; whence comes security to you, or even to J_ R_ himself.”41 
The Amercement Act was unjustified for the same legal and moral reasons.  But 
in addition to being indefensible, the Amercement Act was also incredibly short-sighted.  
(In Burke’s words, “the most impolitic [act] that could be devised.”)42  
But the divisions and heart-burnings which those amercements will leave behind, 
would turn out a bitter misfortune to us, and go as an inheritance to our children.  
It will irritate one half of the people against the other, and disgrace both.  It will 
also serve to keep alive the memory of the troubles of the present day, which 
should be buried in oblivion.43 
 
The Amercement Act guaranteed that the divisions of war would never cease—the worst 
possible resolution.  While other legislators saw amercement as a merciful (lesser) 
 
41 As I explain in other chapters, the Confiscation Act named some 250 Loyalists as subject to banishment 
from the state forever, and the complete confiscation of their estates from themselves and their families.  
The Amercement Act took in another 60 or so Loyalists considered lesser offenders, who paid a one-time 
tax of 12% of the value of their estates to the state.  Finally, the Exclusion Act controlled voting rights 
among former Loyalists who were allowed to stay and keep their estates, but were kept from voting or 
running for public office for several years.  Burke, Address 16-17, 24.  The first two men’s names are 
imaginary.  The third is clearly John Rutledge himself. 
42 Burke, Address 25. 
43 Burke, Address, 25. 
 348 
punishment, keeping people in a permanent lesser state guaranteed resentment.  Why in 
the world would any sane people want to keep a perpetual white underclass, who would 
turn their attentions to undercutting society?  South Carolinians put legal restrictions on 
Loyalists for two reasons: to punish them, and to guarantee they could not act as a fifth 
column destroying the state.  The Amercement Act would guarantee that former Loyalists 
would become a fifth column, exactly what the legislature was hoping to avoid.44 
 All of these acts subverted efforts to establish a peaceful government, which we 
have seen Burke reiterate time and time again.  He argued that Oliver Cromwell, the 
hated dictator of interregnum England, had come to power because of a “spirit of 
discord” that was not healed after the first phases of the English Civil War.  Should South 
Carolinians follow in this path, they too might end up paying by losing the republic.  The 
only clear way forward was to enact a general act of oblivion, which would forever 
pardon former Loyalists for their wartime allegiances.  Burke suggested that both 
Machiavelli and Charles II had promoted amnesties as the best solution to civil war.  
Practically, an act of amnesty should have as few exceptions as possible, and those who 
found themselves on the list of exceptions should have a clear process of trial to remove 
themselves from that condition.45 
 Aedanus Burke was unusual in his outspoken opposition to confiscation, but he 
had a few allies across the United States, if none in South Carolina.  Alexander Hamilton 
was opposed to rough treatment of Loyalists, both as a matter of law, and because he was 
afraid capital would leave the country if Americans proved unwilling to pay their debts 
 
44 Burke, Address, 27. Practically, many loopholes in the law seemed designed (at least to Burke) to anger 
former Loyalists.  Amerced men could not appeal the valuation of their estate, and “it is said by good 
judges, that some estates have been appraised at upwards of twice their real value.”  Since they were paying 
at least a 1/10 share of the valuation, overestimates cost Loyalists a great deal of money 
45 Burke, Address, 28-32. 
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and protect Loyalist property rights.  In March of 1784, as anti-Tory hysteria was at its 
peak, he spoke out against it as “Phocion” (an Athenian statesman known for his honesty, 
and also for his frequent isolation as the only opposition) in the New York newspapers, 
just as Aedanus Burke and Christopher Gadsden wrote under barely-concealed 
pseudonyms in South Carolina newspaper wars.  Robert Livingston attacked the motives 
of New York politicians trying to persecute Loyalists, arguing that “one wishes to possess 
the house of some wretched Tory, another fears him as a rival in his trade, a fourth 
wishes to get rid of his debts…,” but only Hamilton took his attack public, daring to 
suggest that his opponents were not true Whigs, because they failed to protect the right of 
trial.  (Hamilton, unlike Burke, faced charges of self-interest, since he was paid for legal 
representation by at least forty-four Loyalists between 1784 and 1791.)  Hamilton, like 
Burke, argued that harsh punishments against Loyalists would ensure that they remained 
committed enemies to America, while a show of protection and friendship would make 
them government supporters.  Further, Hamilton argued that the Loyalists would be a 
very small minority anyway, and therefore could not pose a real threat to the new 
government (the reason for excluding Loyalists in the first place).46 
 Others in other states also opposed continuation of confiscation and other 
retaliatory laws against former Loyalists, but were content to address the issue in the 
legislative arena, not the public one.  Arthur Lee, a Virginian in the Continental 
Congress, worried that pursuing confiscation would “wound[] our national character, by 
holding us up as a vindictive, persecuting People,” but he kept that opinion to personal 
correspondence.  Alexander Hamilton and Aedanus Burke were unusually outspoken 
 
46 Willard Sterne Randall, Alexander Hamilton: A Life (New York, 2003) 260, 295-304.  Jacobs, "Treaty 
and the Tories"  124-30. 
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against confiscation, and largely agreed, as two lawyers, on the problems with such acts: 
that they were expost facto laws, that they stripped people due the rights of citizenship of 
those protections without a trial, and that anti-Loyalist legislation was likely to make 
permanent enemies out of people who actually would otherwise be trustworthy and 
enthusiastic Americans.  It was not a majority opinion, but in speaking out they did begin 
to change the conversation, and gave cover to more moderate parties who shared the ideal 
of limiting or ending confiscation.47 
“the public peace was yesterday greatly interrupted”: Organized Opposition to 
Loyalists in Charleston48 
 Aedanus Burke was reacting to real problems in post-war South Carolina.  
Charleston, the capital and largest city, saw several disturbances in the years after the 
war.  Riots that at first blush might have seemed spontaneous sometimes turned out to be 
the product of organized opposition to Loyalists.  These disorders brought home to many 
South Carolinians the real dangers of continuing to punish former Loyalists, as the 
resulting disorder, while perhaps exhilarating to those who mourned the excitement of the 
Stamp Act actions, was an indictment of the Revolution to others. 
Independence Day celebrations in Charleston in 1783 were marked with special 
joy, as this was the first celebration of Independence Day in South Carolina’s capital city 
since the British had finally withdrawn in December 1782.  “The city was grandly 
 
47 Arthur Lee as quoted by Jacobs, "Treaty and the Tories" 140. 
48 South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, July 8, 1783. 
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illuminated, and the day ended with great happiness and pleasure.”  It is important to 
understand that this first truly independent Independence Day celebration was important 
in celebrating the recovery of Charleston from British forces.  But, as Len Travers 
pointed out in his study of Independence Day celebrations, with no way to take out their 
anger on the British, South Carolinians could only turn on each other.  In the midst of the 
revelry, there is some indication that important organizers were worried about the 
potential for discord and trouble.  One of the toasts wished that “the harmony of the day 
be not interrupted with quarrels, tumult, or licentiousness.”  Some of this was pro-
forma—imploring celebrants to avoid customary drunken fighting and large-scale games.  
But calling attention to the need for peace in the streets also suggested uneasiness with 
the potential for “tumult” among the white population.  And, as always, white South 
Carolinians were afraid that their slaves would use Independence Day as an opportunity 
for revolt.49 
 Charlestonians were right to be worried.  Less than a week later, a public spat 
turned into several nights of brawling in the streets.  Independence Day was celebrated on 
a Friday. The following Tuesday, Thomas Barron, a British merchant, accosted and 
insulted a French soldier living in Charleston, calling him a “French rebel” and abusing 
him.  The two men exchanged blows, and the Frenchman was taken away, while rumors 
spread into the crowd that he was dying.  In response, crowds gathered looking for Mr. 
Barron and whipped him.  One local newspaper termed this action “marked vengeance” 
against enemies of free South Carolina.  An editorialist crowed that “those who call 
themselves the friends of a particular description of people, are very ill advised when 
 
49 Len Travers, Celebrating the Fourth: Independence Day and the Rites of Nationalism in the Early 
Republic (Amherst, M.A., 1997) 39-41. South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, July 5, 1783. 
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they attempt to irritate—the present temper of the people will not bear it.”  Baron himself 
was a British merchant who had stayed in Charleston under a controversial arrangement 
with Governor Mathews that gave British merchants who came to Charleston during the 
occupation twelve months to wrap up their business affairs unmolested.  This coddling of 
British merchants with no claim to roots in South Carolina was especially galling to 
many.  The paper crowed that this riot would “teach certain persons a little more 
civility.”50 
 This initial incident touched off several nights of rioting in Charleston.  These 
subsequent riots make it clearer that the continued presence of Loyalists was the issue.  
Rioting continued on Wednesday and Thursday nights.  The crowd was more organized 
on Thursday than the previous two evenings, and probably also larger.  Excitedly, the 
crowd planned to “pump” certain offenders, and actually attacked at least five people.  
Pumping was a punishment enforced by mobs acting for the magistrate in extra-legal 
action against the targets.  Targets were usually agreed upon by the crowd as examples of 
behavior deemed illegal, so that the crowd acted on behalf of civil authorities.  Such 
crowd action was time-honored before the Revolution in both the American colonies and 
Great Britain, but the Revolution changed the meaning and actions of the crowd.  Crowd 
action made sense in a pre-Revolutionary world, but Americans sharply divided on the 
legality and acceptability of crowd action after the Revolution.  When a wide number of 
adult men had the chance to vote for representatives in an independent government, was 
there still a role for the crowd?  This debate over the proper way to partake in the political 
process had implications that resonated strongly in South Carolina, a place with a 
noticeable population of former Loyalists.  Was it appropriate for the crowd to discipline 
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former Loyalists, when the crowd differed with the General Assembly on the proper 
punishment?  Crowd action was not legitimate in the absence of civil authority’s 
condoning the underlying reason for the action.  The crowd was supposed to act as the 
arm of the law, not to circumvent the law.51 
 The South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser complained that the pumpers 
were without authority, as “a legal remedy is at hand.”  The crowd dared to act when the 
Speaker of the House, the President of the Senate, and many members of the General 
Assembly were in town.  What before the Revolution was seen as acceptable was now 
“disgraceful to good government.”  In response, several members of the General 
Assembly rushed to the governor to encourage him to take a stand in order to end the 
rioting.  Further, they were horrified by the threat to general order, as the crowds became 
bigger every night.  On Friday, July 11, one week after Independence Day, Governor 
Guerard proclaimed that any future rioting would be severely prosecuted: “all good 
citizens” were called on to “surpress[] and discourag[e]” rioting.  In a brief nod to the 
sensibilities of the crowd and their supporters, the proclamation recognized that Thomas 
Barron had “impudently and grossly insult[ed] a Citizen.”  This characterization also 
suggests a problem.  Did Barron drastically overstep the boundaries of good sense by 
insulting a man at a time of great tension for Loyalists and British merchants?  Or did he 
feel perfectly entitled to all liberties of the street because of the agreement, coupled with 
the General Assembly’s hearings for clemency of Loyalists in 1783?52 
 
51 See Pauline Maier, "Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America," William and 
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 Rioting ended after the Governor’s Proclamation, but public comment continued 
for a few weeks.  Elite defenders of the British merchants strove to differentiate the 
merchants from other Loyalists.  “A Patriot” blamed the riots on “faction,” “a contempt 
for government,” and the “ambition” of a few men.  Another writer blamed “the daring 
affronts” on people seeking “private revenge, in defiance of law and a wise policy.”  In 
defending the British merchants, he argued they were different from Loyalists, and would 
make far better citizens than Loyalists because they “offer to become good Citizens.”  
Choosing American citizenship showed a positive allegiance that defined the status.  
Further, unlike a Loyalist who “stabs you privately,” the British merchants took public 
action.  Even those incensed by a “few contemptible” Loyalists should exempt the whole.  
Interestingly, the anonymous writer rushed to state his bona fides, saying he had “no Tory 
relations who I wish to screen, nor Tory connections I wish to serve.”  This would set 
him apart from many members of the General Assembly, who were intimately connected 
with Loyalists subject to confiscation.  Within the month, a crowd attacked a newspaper 
publisher for publishing handbills in favor of allowing the British merchants to stay.53 
 Another writer complained that the mechanics leading the charge against the 
British merchants were now “noisy patriots,” but recently hid “in silent corners, remote 
from danger.”  This was almost certainly a reference to Alexander Gillon, who was 
promoting the riots, but had a very checkered Revolutionary past.  He spent much of the 
post-Revolutionary years trying to get paid for a ship seized by several different 
governments. 
 In angry response, an “anti-Tory” wrote to the papers attacking Wells (the printer) 
in particular, and Loyalists in general.  “That person whose heart is fraught with the 
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principles of toryism, I consider as having bid an eternal farewell to honour, or indeed to 
common honesty.”  Such people had no right to continued existence in South Carolina, 
and the mob was perfectly justified in chasing out such men.  The Independence Day 
tumult of 1783 finally died down, but the fundamental quarrel continued.54 
 One reason public tumult finally died down was a deliberate change in the 
governing structure of Charleston.  More conservative factions, alarmed by the rise of 
artisan power in the city, moved to incorporate the city.  The artisans had long been 
proponents of this move, so in many ways it was an attempt to buy them off.  Under 
incorporation, a city council and intendant (like a mayor today) controlled most 
government functions of the city, giving artisans a stronger voice in city government than 
they had in the overall General Assembly.  But this system of government also came with 
checks on the power of the crowd, for elected members of the city government posted 
bonds for good order.  In this way, city government aligned the economic interests of the 
top of the artisan class with stability.  But while city incorporation strengthened city 
government, it didn’t stop outspoken opposition to the return of Loyalists.55 
 Trouble in the Charleston streets began again in March 1784.  The 1784 General 
Assembly met from the beginning of January to the end of March.  On March 26, 1784, 
they passed an act restoring at least 35 confiscated estates outright and transferring 95 
men from the confiscation list to the amercement list, overall changing the status of 
almost half of the men subject to confiscation.  (The numbers are a matter of a small 
controversy since they moved men based on their category of offense, and some of the 
names are in doubt from version to version.)  John Lewis Gervais, a member of the 
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General Assembly, was right to worry that “in some cases we have been too lenient, 
some are permitted to return which I am afraid will not contribute to establish peace and 
good order among us.”  While there was sizable quiet support for the General Assembly’s 
actions, there was also discontent, and the mass lifting of confiscation from prominent 
Loyalists set off the Charleston crowds.56 
Remnants of the Charleston Sons of Liberty, along with Alexander Gillon, a local 
planter and seaman, and James Fallon, a transplant from Georgia, took over a small anti-
smoking society and renamed it the Marine Anti-Britannic Society.  This society became 
the locus for anger against Loyalists, and against General Assembly members that 
supported clemency.  While the legislature was in session, the Society tried to dissuade 
them from efforts to ameliorate the status of prominent Loyalists by a barrage of 
newspaper editorials and waggish poems.  Before the General Assembly even adjourned, 
Captain William Thompson, a local tavern keeper, insulted John Rutledge, the author of 
confiscation.  The growing spat got so out of hand that Rutledge had Thompson hauled in 
before the Assembly to answer charges of insubordination, and then had him arrested for 
“gross insult” to Rutledge.  Thompson was eventually released on a sizable bail, but 
continued to attack the ‘aristocratic faction’ in the papers.57 
In April 1784, Charleston saw increasing violence in rhetoric, and then in crowd 
action.  The Marine Anti-Britannic Society helped marshal organized opposition, but 
certainly called on more generalized discontent.  Efforts by Intendant Hutson (who had 
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defeated Gillon, the Marine Anti-Britannic Society President, in the previous election) to 
control the crowds turned into what historian Richard Walsh termed “an invitation to a 
general fray.”  At the time the legislature adjourned, one crowd threatened recently 
returned and pardoned Loyalist James Cook.  James Cook was a carpenter from 
Charleston who, by all evidence, was a Loyalist by conviction.  He not only took 
protection, but also authored and pushed a petition to the British commander prohibiting 
tradesmen who did not take protection from following their trade.  This would have 
bankrupted the artisan class, as well as day workers.  Fortunately, the British moderated 
this policy, but hatred towards Cook ran deep, especially among the members of the 
Marine Anti-Britannic Society.58 
In response, a crowd “Lampooned” the General Assembly, and ran Cook out of 
town.  Then they hanged him in effigy, carrying the effigy throughout the town in a 
warning to other Loyalists.  Finally, the crowd marched to Christopher Gadsden’s wharf 
with the now-burning effigy, as Gadsden had become a prominent supporter of clemency 
towards Loyalists.  (I will discuss this at greater length in the next section.)  James Cook 
evidently took the warning, and never again tried to live in South Carolina.  In the 
aftermath of this successful demonstration against Cook, a secret committee posted 
increasingly threatening handbills across the city, culminating in a widely-distributed 
handbill warning off thirteen Loyalists by name.  They were told to leave the state or risk 
their lives.  While Governor Guerard responded quickly by offering a thousand dollar 
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reward to anyone who would identify and testify against the perpetrators, unrest 
continued.59 
Twelve of the thirteen men ordered to leave South Carolina forever were former 
Loyalists who had been subject to confiscation and banishment under the 1782 act, but 
who the General Assembly removed from the lists in 1784.  The final man was a British 
merchant who fell under the agreement.  The Marine Anti-Britannic Society had support, 
as evidenced by their ability to draw a crowd, from people who resented the sudden 
easing on Loyalists, especially well-off Loyalists.  But their organization in the wake of 
the General Assembly’s move towards reconciliation with Loyalists also suggests that 
they represented a minority view, and their desperation was what led them to increasingly 
public threats against Loyalists.  Private threats had no effect on the thirteen men, who 
continued living in Charleston.  Publishing that handbill smacks of desperation: an 
attempt for publicity to make Charlestonians realize the enemy in their midst.  Further 
evidence for the relative equanimity towards toleration for former Loyalists is the 
peacefulness of the riots.  With few exceptions, there was no violence towards persons, 
only threats.  In only a few, extreme, cases were Loyalists whipped.60 
Angrily responding to the Governor’s reward offer, the secret committee ordered 
away another twenty-six men.  Yet while “most people expect[ed] great Commotions in 
Town,” “every thing [wa]s peaceable.”  The crowd did take action against one other man 
in May 1784, but he, like James Cook, was an unusually divisive figure.  William Rees, 
an officer in the Loyalist militia, found himself on the confiscation list largely due to his 
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ferocity in backcountry fighting.  He personally oversaw the hanging of a captured rebel, 
earning him the lasting enmity of the Patriot militia.  When the General Assembly 
removed him from confiscation (still requiring amercement) and he dared show his face 
in South Carolina, people reacted.  Backcountry sympathizers in Charleston chased him 
through the streets and up to his roof, where they caught him and gave him fifty lashes.  
They threatened to whip him again and more severely if he did not leave the state forever 
within three weeks.  Further, the secret committee proudly published the names of the 
entire group in one local anti-Loyalist newspaper, taking credit for the whipping.61   
John Gervais reported the incident with some amusement, saying that the 
backcountry settlers termed whipping “the Juice of Hickory,” and had applied such 
“juice” to Rees.  Gervais believed the commotions about such hated men proved his point 
that “if at first only those had been admitted that were least obnoxious, every body would 
have been Satisfied, and in a Year or two” the others might have returned quietly.  Rees 
toughed it out, continuing to live in South Carolina.  There is no indication he was ever 
whipped a second time.  Despite the popularity of attacking Rees, there was limited 
support for anti-Loyalist activity beyond a few notorious offenders.  An opponent of the 
Anti-Marine Society crowed that the society which “formerly boasted 620” at meetings 
could no longer find more than forty people willing to attend.62  
While peace descended on the city after this incident, the authorities took no 
chances.  The 1784 Independence Day celebrations were tightly controlled, and the 
governor banned illuminating houses.  This was partly due to the fire risk in a drought 
year, and also because of the ever-present risk of arson from slaves, but it also was due to 
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nervousness about Charleston’s ability to get through a celebration without riots.  
Authorities were right to be nervous, as shortly after the celebrations a new round of 
tension hit the city.  Reading the newspapers for July and August 1784, one might think 
the city was engulfed in tension.  Pro- and anti-Loyalist writers argued about who had 
started the riots and which faction had broken the law first.  Yet however heated the war 
of words, actual violence was very limited.  The Charleston Intendant did send a small 
group to break up a tiny (not more than 20 men) crowd of sailors and others parading 
around town with the American colors.  The crowd broke up peacefully, if in irritation.  
Writers later claimed that the men breaking up the crowd included Loyalists and British 
merchants, but it is not clear that was true.63   
This crowd, like those before, carefully selected targets.  The crowd did threaten 
James Cook and his family, telling Mrs. Cook that her husband “should be hanged on his 
return as his effigy lately was.”  In order to demonstrate the seriousness of this threat, one 
man, a tailor, identified himself by name.  Another crowd entered merchant John 
Wagner’s home and beat him and destroyed his household furniture.  With the exception 
of these three incidents, there is no evidence of widespread rioting.  Instead, even 
opponents had to admit that no damage was done.  Certainly, precipitous action by the 
Privy Council helped control problems by authorizing the militia to take action against 
rioters.  These actions were part of a united effort to keep peace in the city.  Alexander 
Gillon, the President of the Marine Anti-Britannic Society, sat on the Privy Council and 
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helped pass the order for the militia unanimously.  He understood the will of the majority: 
some protest, but peaceful.64 
Some Loyalists certainly took proper precautions to avoid further trouble.  Elias 
Ball Jr., who was removed from the confiscation list by the 1784 General Assembly, 
wished to “avoid [Charleston] on account of grate disturbances there with Mobbs.”  No 
doubt others also decided to retire to their restored properties outside of the city for at 
least a year.65 
In short, while there was tension and violence in Charleston in the aftermath of 
General Assembly moves towards reconciliation with former Loyalists, it was carefully 
controlled and largely peaceful.  Crowd action focused on a few hated Loyalists who had 
gone far beyond taking protection to active, ruthless, and often cruel responses to Patriots 
during the war.  As unwilling as most Charlestonians were to live with James Cook, they 
were willing to live with a wide number of former Loyalists.  Gervais was correct that 
“the people in General are very well Satisfied with every part of [torn] to the return of 
those that were in opposition & oppressed them in their distresses” and were willing to 
treat the British merchants with “kindness.”66  Part of the reason South Carolinians were 
willing to do so was the influence of advocates for the Loyalists who were far more 
moderate that Aedanus Burke. 
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“he that forgets and forgives most…is the best citizen:” Christopher Gadsden and a 
Middle Way Against Confiscation67 
 Christopher Gadsden was also a vocal opponent of the Confiscation and 
Amercement Acts.  However, he and General Francis Marion, the partisan leader, tried to 
use their influence within the General Assembly and with other South Carolina leaders to 
effect a move away from harsh measures towards former Loyalists to a much more 
inclusive policy that removed official recriminations from all but a symbolic handful of 
men.  Gadsden had opposed the Confiscation and Amercement Acts during the 
Jacksonborough Assembly.  His opposition to these measures might have something to 
do with why Arthur Middleton told a friend that while he was glad the Jacksonborough 
Assembly paid Gadsden the “compliment” of being the next governor, he was also glad 
he did not take the position.  (Obviously, personal squabbles also influenced this 
distaste.)68 
 He was no friend to Loyalists ideologically.  He had suffered at least as much as 
other members of the Jacksonborough Assembly who were in favor of confiscation.  As a 
prominent voice for the Patriot cause, including outspoken opposition to the Stamp Act, 
he was imprisoned after the fall of Charleston.  He had the humiliation of surrendering 
the city itself on May 12, 1780 as Lieutenant Governor, since Governor John Rutledge 
had fled the city.  (This must have been especially galling to Gadsden, since Rutledge 
was earlier willing to hand over the city without much of a fight.)  Shortly after 
capitulation, he was imprisoned in a surprise move by the British and sent to St. 
 
67 Christopher Gadsden to General Francis Marion, Nov. 17, 1782, Walsh, ed., Gadsden Writings  197. 
68 Walsh, ed., Gadsden Writings  197 footnote 1. 
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Augustine.  He spent eleven months in captivity in San Marcos Castle where he 
complained that he never saw the sun.  He was later granted a prisoner exchange and sent 
to Philadelphia for the duration of the war, where he mingled with other American 
prisoners.  Like many wealthy and middling South Carolinians, he was well aware that 
repairing his fortunes from the destruction of the war might be his life’s work.69 
 In 1782, Gadsden wanted to offer clemency to some Loyalists, but he also wanted 
to stand up for American interests against British interests.  In so doing, he campaigned 
against the 1782 agreement with British merchants, feeling that it favored recently 
arrived British merchants far beyond any advantage to the state as a whole.  While trade 
was important, the real reason Governor Mathews had created this agreement was to 
secure the return of slaves captured by British forces from Lowcountry plantations.  
Governor Mathews was in negotiations with General Leslie, who was using slaves as a 
bargaining tool—a very persuasive bargaining tool, as it turned out.  Gadsden objected 
strenuously, arguing that it was a terrible move, only favoring men who had done the 
least to support the Revolution.  “The inhabitants near the sea are principally concerned 
in negroes; has their conduct during this campaign been so  meritorious?”  Should the 
rhetorical not be enough, Gadsden went on to point out that the Lowcountry slaveowners 
had been “the most backward in the State during these critical Times to turn out” for 
militia duty.70  This agreement with British merchants became a flashpoint with the 
Charleston artisans, as the most visible symbol of favor to the most hated Loyalists—
those who were not even South Carolinians, but merchants who had arrived under British 
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protection after Charleston’s fall in order to profit under the subjugation of South 
Carolina. 
 Gadsden complained loudly against the Confiscation and Amercement Acts, but 
not in the way Aedanus Burke did.  Some of his clearest statements against these anti-
Loyalist actions were pursued in semi-private letters to his ally General Francis Marion.  
In late 1782 he tried to explain his own thinking about his actions during the 
Jacksonborough Assembly after the fact.  As we saw in Chapter Two, while he was 
opposed to the acts, he had not always been a friend to Loyalists.  He had, in fact, 
threatened two friends who took Governor Rutledge’s 1781 Proclamation offer with 
death when they arrived in the camps.  Yet in the waning days of 1782, he patted himself 
on the back for his forthright opposition to confiscation within legislative chambers, 
telling Marion he “ha[d] met with continual rebukes from my friends, and not a few gross 
affronts” for his efforts to “restrain and to mitigate their rage and impetuosity.”   The 
Confiscation Act and Amercement Act encouraged the “vindictive spirit,” making post-
war stability harder to achieve.  Despite attacks by General Assembly members he termed 
“the violent confiscation men” (he probably meant Edward Rutledge and his faction), he 
“fought it through, inch by inch, as unjust, impolitic, cruel, premature, oppressing 
numbers of innocent for one man supposed to be guilty, formerly signing a paper, when 
visibly under the power and restraint of a known cruel, oppressive and tyrannical 
enemy.”  Strong words, indeed.  Gadsden objected to the aura of revenge in the Assembly 
just as much as Aedanus Burke, but he was more concerned with the “impolitic” nature 
of confiscation.  Alienating well-off men who could support a fragile new state, 
especially by promoting much-needed trade, was a bad move.  In order to stop the 
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Confiscation Act, he apparently (or so he claimed later) grandiloquently threatened to cut 
off both his hands before voting for such a proposal.71 
 Christopher Gadsden, while an ardent Patriot himself, certainly had personal 
reasons to support clemency to Loyalists.  Numerous relatives were Loyalists or were tied 
emotionally and financially to Loyalists.  His wife’s father, merchant John Wragg, was 
on the confiscation list.  In 1783, Gadsden himself introduced Wragg’s petition into the 
General Assembly, thereby putting his weight behind it.  This pressure helped ensure 
Wragg’s success, and he was moved from the confiscation list to the amercement list in 
1784.   These efforts paid off for Gadsden as well, as when Wragg died in 1796 he owned 
336 prime acres in Charleston, a plantation with 76 slaves, and a schooner complete with 
a slave crew.  Gadsden’s daughter, Ann Gadsden Lord, was the widow of a Loyalist 
merchant whose entire estate was confiscated in 1782.  His daughter eventually reclaimed 
property worth more than 6000 pounds sterling.  Gadsden also had a son whose wife 
came from a prominent Loyalist family, and they petitioned for clemency as well.  
Gadsden never directly interfered in that case, but his allegiance to the family was well 
known.  His own personal allegiances influenced his public efforts against anti-Loyalist 
measures.  Perhaps most directly, he tried (unsuccessfully) to insert a clause in the 1782 
Confiscation Act allowing the next male heir (within the degrees of son, brother, or 
nephew) who could show he had been a good Patriot to inherit his Loyalist relative’s 
estate.72 
 After the passage of the Confiscation Act, Gadsden, like many others, expected a 
process of renegotiation and reconsideration.  He told his ally Marion “we must patiently 
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wait till the next Assembly to endeavor to have its severities at least mitigated where 
there is room.”  In 1783, he continued a letter-writing campaign outlining his 
philosophical and practical objections to the Confiscation Act.  By 1784, he began 
writing a series of newspaper editorials, usually styling himself an “open and steady 
republican.”  In his editorials, he opposed Alexander Gillon in particular and the Marine 
Anti-Britannic society more generally.  In attacking the Society, he was speaking out 
against his former Revolutionary allies.73 
Both Burke and Gadsden found it easy to blame nefarious politicians for the 
Confiscation Act.  Eighteenth-century political theory often devolved public policy 
prescriptions on corrupt hidden actions of men seeking private gain through the 
manipulation of public proceedings.  Lawyers were often the target of these conspiracy 
theories.  Conveniently, John and Edward Rutledge, the cousins who wrote the 
Confiscation Act and promoted its passage as Governor and Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, respectively, were both lawyers.  Gadsden complained that “I know two 
lawyers who were extremely severe in this Act, to whom more had been forgiven and 
overlook’d by the public people than almost to all the culprits in the Act put together.”  
While he did not devote entire pamphlets to attacking the Rutledges, like Burke, he was 
very hostile to the two.  Edward Rutledge particularly made a fortune from land 
speculation after the Revolution.   Later, Gadsden also accused Alexander Gillon of 
manipulating crowds for personal political gain.  He called Gillon one of the 
“indefatigable sons of Cunning, who wish to set us by the ears for their own purposes.”74   
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Aside from his distaste for the authors of confiscation, Gadsden also believed the 
times called for generosity in the service of stability.  Widespread punishment benefited 
nobody.  Instead, the state would be better served by a much more limited banishment act 
that would single out a few offenders, while preserving the rights of all others.  While 
times were still uncertain, moderate restrictions might be placed on men whose political 
allegiance was suspect, but even those restrictions should be lifted shortly. “For my part I 
think it sufficient that such as are suspected as dangerous, should be restrained from 
electing or being elected, or not put into any office of trust till the war is over.”75  In this 
he disagreed with Burke, who hated the Exclusion Act.  Gadsden saw no problem with a 
temporary, limited citizenship for Loyalist men that allowed them full social intercourse, 
full economic maneuvering, and full inclusion in the legal system, but without political 
participation.  The state could choose to exclude men it otherwise recognized as full 
citizen actors from political participation on a temporary basis in order to affirm the 
stability and safety of the political process.  For Gadsden, citizenship was a package 
whose parts were severable and discernable, while for Burke the package was intricately 
bound and indivisible. 
Gadsden’s great insight was that the times called for generosity.  South Carolina 
citizenship carried positive obligations as well as rights.  People needed to control their 
basest feelings in the interest of the collective good.  Gadsden opined “In short, he that 
forgets and forgives most, such times as these, in my opinion, is the best citizen.”76  The 
General Assembly needed to forget and forgive, but in order for elected leaders to do so, 
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the people they represented also had to live up to the best of citizenship by forgetting and 
forgiving war hurts. 
 Gadsden condemned Gillon and his followers for deliberately whipping up anti-
Tory sentiments in a bid to create disorder.  He felt that peace and good order was settling 
on South Carolina, and Gillon and his followers were creating conflict rather than simply 
riding the wave of conflict that already existed.  Vital trade and happiness was risked for: 
 
revenge on a few individuals at our feet!  Shabby politics indeed!  Is this not 
biting our nose to spite our face?  It is very lamentable that civil wars, the worst of 
all wars, are far from being a new thing in History, almost all nations have had 
them, and what has been generally done by a wise people when they were over?77 
 
Further, the “heats and jealousies, the natural consequences of the times, were subsiding 
fast, had not this writer [Gillon] and his dupes established a lasting fund for keeping them 
up.”78  Constant harping on the wrongs of the past only kept “alive old piques and 
resentments, make many families unhappy and spoil good neighborhood.”79  Gillon 
threatened to undermine vital peace.  After civil wars, the least said, the soonest mended. 
 Two different leaders, representing two regions of South Carolina, had each 
turned from legislating to frantic public writing in an effort to turn the public discussion 
on Loyalists from confiscation and retaliation to a more just and far-sighted approach to 
the return of Loyalists.  While they disagreed on how much the state should control and 
punish those Loyalists who were given clemency, both South Carolinians agreed that it 
was wise public policy to reincorporate many Loyalists subject to confiscation. 
 Thus far, I have dwelt on specific examples of unrest in the backcountry and in 
Charleston, and the efforts by prominent men to effect a clemency for Loyalists that 
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could serve as a foundation for a stable society.  Now, in the second half of this chapter, I 
wish to turn my attention to more diffuse cultural politics surrounding the treatment and 
position of Loyalists in post-war South Carolina.  This second section deals with 
unattributed newspaper accounts of Loyalists and their treatment in South Carolina and 
other states, as well as isolated accounts of the ways in which very ordinary South 
Carolinians, especially in the backcountry, dealt with former Loyalists and the history of 
division. 
Settling the Peace Treaty: South Carolina Anxiety About How a Treaty Would 
Change their Arrangements for Loyalists 
 Roberta Jacobs has shown that the Treaty of Paris provoked widespread anxiety, 
and increased hostility towards Loyalists in 1783 and 1784 across all the states.  In New 
York, mobs took to the streets, just as in Charleston.   Newspapers whipped up anti-Tory 
enthusiasm, throwing down the gauntlet to legislators who might dare to revise wartime 
anti-Loyalist legislation.  Massachusetts, Maryland, North Carolina, and New York 
residents instructed and petitioned their legislative representatives to keep exiled 
Loyalists from returning.  As we have seen, South Carolinians behaved similarly, 
petitioning the General Assembly against revising the Confiscation Act.  Just as in other 
states, the proposed peace treaty focused South Carolinians’ minds on the issue of 
Loyalists.80 
 
80 Jacobs, "Treaty and the Tories" 62-68, 71-74.  
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Months before the final treaty, the South Carolina Gazette and other newspapers 
began public discussion of an issue close to the hearts and pocketbooks of many South 
Carolinians: what the eventual peace treaty should look like.  Americans eagerly read 
about the ongoing negotiations, and wrote anxious letters to each other spreading the 
latest rumors.  Peace treaty dsicussion in the public arena became a non-violent place for 
South Carolinians to work out their anxieties about the process of enacting reconciliation.  
Two issues predominated: the status of pre-war and wartime debts contracted with British 
merchant houses, and whether Loyalists would have to be restored to their property 
and/or guaranteed citizenship.  Historians have written at length about the influence of 
anxiety about mounting debt on Americans in getting into the Revolution.81  South 
Carolina grandees, while some of the richest men in America, were also carrying large 
balances with British merchant houses.  Many claimed no desire to shirk such 
obligations, but wanted infinite time and terms under which to pay it back.  Others argued 
that the war damages more than outweighed the amounts South Carolinians owed to 
London, and should erase such debts.  Further, during the Charleston occupation, a new 
generation of British merchants arrived in the city.  They petitioned the governor to be 
allowed to stay after the war, and were allowed a twelve-month grace period after the war 
to finish collecting their accounts.  This meant that the public face of British mercantile 
debt in South Carolina was men without deep local ties, who were encouraged to collect 
outstanding debts quickly at a time when few people had access to much cash.  People 
were concerned with restoring damaged property and rebuilding their operations, 
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including using available cash and mounting debt to buy new slaves to replace the twenty 
percent of South Carolina slaves who fled to British lines during the war.  The last thing 
they wanted to do was pay back their debts immediately to men who had come during the 
occupation to live under British protection and profit from South Carolina’s humiliation.  
Further, the artisans and other less exalted people bitterly resented the continuing 
presence of the merchants in Charleston, as we have seen earlier in this chapter. 
 South Carolinians were especially nervous about how the treaty would handle the 
fate of Loyalists.  Even people who supported individual Loyalists did not want to be 
compelled to readmit all Loyalists under compulsion from Britain.  It became an issue of 
sovereignty to easily offended Americans. 
 Before addressing the widespread interest in the treaty (with sometimes 
incomplete rumor), let me review the actual relevant provisions of the Treaty of Paris 
dealing with debt, and with Loyalists of all varieties.  Article IV dealt with debtors with 
admirable brevity, agreeing that, “creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful 
impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money of all bona fide debts 
heretofore contracted.”  Americans would quickly move to subvert this.   
Articles V and VI dealt with Loyalists.  Article V called for Congress to 
“earnestly recommend” that each state restore confiscated Loyalist property to certain 
categories of persons: British subjects and Americans who had never participated in 
military actions against America.  Further, the article provided that the states should also 
be “encouraged” to provide that people not meeting those two descriptions be allowed 
free movement in the United States for one year in order to settle their affairs and attempt 
to “obtain the restitution of such of their estates, rights and properties, as have been 
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confiscated.”  This mirrored the agreement South Carolinians made with the British 
merchants. 
The treaty called for Congress to use moral suasion over the states to choose to 
restore the estates of people in that third category, arguing “that spirit of reconciliation” 
should recommend repealing confiscation, and opening American courts to Loyalist 
efforts to reclaim property, including debts. The Treaty also emphasized that wartime 
property damage caused by military actions was not subject to post-war litigation, 
preempting the possibility of forcing Loyalists to pay for all burned buildings and ruined 
homes. 
 Notice that the treaty very cleverly called for “earnest recommendation” only—
British negotiators pushed hard for American restitution of some variety to displaced 
Loyalists, while Americans pushed hard to avoid any obligations for Loyalists, and any 
impediments to how they could treat them.  This article was a compromise between the 
two sides that made the British feel better without binding Americans to anything.  South 
Carolinian Henry Laurens, who had lost property, been imprisoned, and seen his son 
killed in a minor skirmish with British troops while he was imprisoned in the Tower of 
London, was also one of America’s lead negotiators at Nantes.  Laurens wrote a relative 
during the negotiations that while there was an article to “recommend to the several 
States restitution of Estates” subject to confiscation, James Laurens should “observe tis to 
be a recommendation” only.82 
Such guarantees were never meant to be worth the paper they were written on, at 
least to the American side.  South Carolinians cheered reading Londoners’ complaints 
that Americans were organizing to prevent Loyalists from claiming their property, in part 
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by discouraging (through crowd action, threats, and public disapprobation) lawyers from 
taking cases for Loyalists.  London papers were angry that they had been gypped in the 
peace negotiations.83 
 Article V agreed that states would not confiscate any more estates, and more 
importantly, that no one would be charged, prosecuted, or forced to pay damages on the 
basis of his wartime behavior after the treaty’s effective date.  Anyone who was in prison 
on war-related charges should be released immediately.  This had significant 
repercussions for South Carolinians, as it would close off the possibility of using courts 
to prosecute Loyalists.  As we saw in earlier chapters, the South Carolina General 
Assembly intended to use the courts to prosecute Loyalists.  Peace treaty negotiators 
worried (correctly) that Loyalist prosecutions would turn into kangaroo courts, and the 
British moved to cut off that possibility. 
The April 9, 1783 edition of the South Carolina Gazette printed the first 
newspaper edition of the general outline of the treaty (as negotiated by November 1782) 
to an eager audience.  The general summary noted that Congress would recommend 
restitution of Loyalist property of British citizens and Americans who lived under British 
protection and did not participate in military activities against the United States.  Months 
in advance, this language was already widely reported in America, to some consternation.  
Further, at the same time that the South Carolina General Assembly was trying to auction 
properties confiscated from Loyalists under the 1782 Confiscation Act, reports were 
circulating in South Carolina that the Treaty might return confiscated estates, thereby 
making titles to confiscated estates insecure.  For instance, in April 1783, the South 
Carolina Gazette reported that such estates might be restored, and the states would owe 
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Loyalists the “bona fide price” for estates that had already been sold.  This would protect 
purchasers, but wise men could see potential problems in the next clause: “all persons, 
who have any interest in confiscated lands, either by debts, [or by] marriage settlements” 
could seek redress in the courts.  As we have seen in earlier chapters, dower rights had 
been excluded from the Confiscation Act, and the reintroduction of those rights made 
property purchases insecure.  Purchasers who bought property under one set of rules 
discovered that they later had paid 33% too much, as they had to carve women’s shares 
out of their purchase.  Wise Americans saw these problems coming when they read that 
the treaty would require honoring marriage settlements.84 
 Later in the year, South Carolinians were eager to read that the British House of 
Commons were preparing to make grants to the Loyalist refugees there in the 
neighborhood of two million pounds.  Of course, everyone knew that given the “present 
state of finances” they would not be paid the full value of their losses, but some slightly 
guilty South Carolinians were relieved to discover that Loyalists living in Britain would 
receive “at least ten shillings in the pound.”85  Other South Carolinians must have thrilled 
to the humiliation those Loyalists faced, living on little in one of the world’s most 
expensive cities, and being paid only a small percentage of their total losses, meaning 
they would take a material step down in the world in return for the Loyalist activities.  
How the mighty are fallen!  Reading about Loyalist humiliation stoked Americans’ 
pleasure in victory, and perhaps helped them ultimately come to accept clemency for 
some Loyalists, as long as they had the psychic satisfaction of knowing that some 
Loyalists were paying dearly. 
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 When the peace treaty was finally signed, South Carolinians, along with their 
fellow Americans, had the chance to see how Congress would actually act in urging the 
return of Loyalist property, as officially called for under the treaty.  In February of 1784, 
the South Carolina Gazette ran the Congressional call for the return of Loyalist property.  
In large part, the language simply repeated the language of the treaty, “earnestly 
recommending” to the states that they offer restoration of the two categories of persons 
mentioned in the treaty (true British subjects and American residents of occupied areas 
who did not take up arms against America), and that they allow those who had borne 
arms against America to come back for one year to settle their estates.  Further, it 
officially called for restoring the estates of even those who had taken up arms against 
America in the “spirit of conciliation…which should universally prevail” in much the 
same language as the peace treaty had called for the “spirit of reconciliation.”86  Such 
calls mostly spelled out the hopefulness of an idiot, hoping that better times would 
magically lead angry men and women to do what had never been proposed openly by 
most people: restore property to men who had, in fact, taken up arms against the 
Americans during the Revolution.  South Carolinians recognized that there was nothing 
Congress could do to actually enforce the suggestion, and there was a highly cynical edge 
to the entire exercise. 
 By the time South Carolina newspapers ran the actual text of the peace treaty, 
readers had been well prepared for what the provisions would hold for them.87  The 
governor required that the treaty be promulgated widely much more as a formality than a 
necessary piece of information, for South Carolinians faced no surprises.  But they 
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continued to use newspapers to conduct an open conversation about what should be done 
with the Loyalists. 
Public Discussions of Loyalists: What to Do with the Losers 
 Englishmen had their own ideas about how Loyalists should be treated, of course.  
The South Carolina Gazette ran the high-minded wishes of one such Englishman in May 
1784, who ardently hoped that “all past differences of sentiments between individuals 
were buried in oblivion, and that every thing which has a tendency to keep alive 
dissentions and persecutions was banished from society.”  Should Americans not clasp 
the Loyalists to their bosom, “the future honor and glory of America” would be 
tarnished.88  South Carolinians were also really interested in the future of Loyalists, but 
they were far less willing to purchase their “honor” with instant forgiveness for Loyalists.  
Even a cursory examination of newspapers from 1783 and 1784 shows avid discussion of 
Loyalists in South Carolina, other states, and British dominions.  This discussion, just 
like that of the peace treaty, allowed South Carolinians to rhetorically consider the fate of 
Loyalists without violence.  In the end, heated newspaper discussion provided a non-
violent escape mechanism for anti-Tory feeling. 
Public opinion leaders cultivated interest in the fate of Loyalists with their 
attempts to sway the public, and those in a position to directly influence the legislature.  
As I discussed above, Christopher Gadsden turned to the papers in his attempt to 
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persuade his fellow citizens to offer Loyalists clemency.  He was not the only one.  
People read to see Tories brought low, and shared the hatred for them that pervaded much 
of the newspaper coverage.  Yet they also were open to considering ‘the Tory problem’ 
as a public policy problem with more than one possible solution.  As much as most South 
Carolinians hated Loyalists as a group, many had strong, warm personal ties with 
individual Loyalists. 
 Anti-Loyalist opinion dominated the coverage, especially in 1783.  South 
Carolinians eagerly read how other states planned to deal with their Loyalists.  Some of 
the coverage explained other states’ current legislative policies, while other coverage 
dwelt on anti-Tory agitation in other areas.  New York, for instance, had a confiscation 
act, and enforced it.  Reading about New York’s strict enforcement no doubt encouraged 
South Carolinians that other Americans were equally harsh towards Loyalists.  Georgia 
was closely linked to South Carolina both in population (many people owned property in 
both states and crossed the border often) and in wartime experience (fierce fighting 
between militias on both sides).  Therefore, South Carolinians naturally were interested in 
Georgia’s intentions towards Loyalists.  Georgia passed its own confiscation act in May 
1782, a few months after South Carolina.  At that time, there was no free Patriot press 
operating in South Carolina to note the Georgia example, but the Loyalist newspaper in 
Charleston avidly followed news of confiscation acts in the area.  News certainly spread 
quickly of the Georgia confiscation law, because Aedanus Burke noted it disapprovingly 
a few months later; the Georgians “have outdone us far enough, and already disposed of 
upwards of two hundred thousand pounds” of Loyalist property.89   
 
89 South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, June 1, 1784.  Aedanus Burke to Arthur Middleton, 
Head Quarters July 6, 1783. Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Oct. 1925,"  203. 
 378 
Yet the intercourse between the two states gave rise to problems of men who had 
access to property in both states.  South Carolina readers were cheered to see that cooper 
James Mackey, who was accused of deliberately letting meat intended for the defenders 
of Charleston spoil, was refused Georgia citizenship along with four other South Carolina 
Loyalists on the Confiscation list.  The Georgia General Assembly decided they were not 
interested in taking in any persons subject to confiscation in any other state, a decision 
South Carolina would second.90 
Reading about similar efforts in other states no doubt encouraged anti-Loyalist 
factions, and the Charleston papers were quick to reprint stirring anti-Tory rhetoric from 
other areas.  In a story just after Independence Day, Philadelphia’s freemen argued that 
the Loyalists had “justly forfeited [their property] by their treasons,” and pledged to 
uphold the confiscation law personally by taking a group pledge to use “all the means in 
our power, to expel [Loyalists], with infamy.”  They made it clear that they were willing 
to resort to intimidation and violence to keep Loyalists from returning, a stand South 
Carolinians certainly appreciated.91 
 Philadelphia pointed to a concrete way to oppose Loyalists, albeit one that South 
Carolinians never fully adopted.  Just as before the Revolution, the Sons of Liberty had 
encouraged voluntary compacts to control individual choices in the service of political 
goals (the non-importation and non-consumption agreements), Philadelphia radicals 
turned to such compacts after the Revolution to encourage citizens to bind together in 
driving out Loyalists.  They “mutually pledg[ed] ourselves to each other…to expel” 
Loyalist refugees.  In order to ensure widespread knowledge of who to pursue, they 
 
90 South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser July 1, 1783.  For more on James Mackey’s specific 
offenses, see Chapter 4. 
91 South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, July 8, 1783. 
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published the names of returning Loyalists in the local papers, a practice South 
Carolinians never adopted.  Yet reading about more radical South Carolina leaders 
encouraged those who hated Tories without actually taking the same actions.92 
 At a time when the General Assembly was deluged with Loyalist petitions 
seeking redress, South Carolinians were interested to learn that New Jersey faced the 
same situation.  Papers reported that New Jersey received numerous petitions demanding 
that the “Refugees might not be permitted to return to this state.”  New York City and its 
environs, including parts of New Jersey, suffered from civil war in the Revolution.  The 
British occupied New York City for most of 1783, giving New Jersey Loyalists a safe 
base from which to petition their legislature.  Facing similar problems as South 
Carolinians, some New Jerseyites also spelled out what would happen to Loyalists who 
returned.  First they would be warned.  Anyone who refused to leave would receive the 
“just punishment due to such infamous parricides”—instant death.  It is not clear why this 
speaker thought Loyalists had committed parricide (the murder of a parent), but calling 
Loyalists parricides emphasized their inhumanity.  These New Jerseyites also called for a 
compact to root out “Tory fugitives” and those who harbored them.93 
Sister state North Carolina also moved against Loyalists, passing several 
confiscation laws from 1776 to 1778 that were enforced after the war.  Edenton residents 
applauded these laws, as reprinted in the South Carolina press.  “We scorn to triumph 
over enemies we have defeated; but considering those people in general, we are satisfied 
they never can make good subjects of these states.”  Again, other states tied rights for 
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Loyalists to their fitness as citizens, reassuring South Carolinians that Loyalists were 
detested across America.  Interestingly, these North Carolinians offered a novel reason 
for opposing the readmittance of Loyalists.  Loyalists would make bad neighbors because 
“the mortification they feel from their defeat” would drive them to undermine society in 
their efforts to rebuild their own reputations.94 
Local newspapers also carried stories about Americans who took their hostility to 
Loyalists further than words.  Some South Carolina readers probably cheered when 
reading that a group of New Yorkers had captured a group of visiting Loyalists and cut 
off their arms and legs, and in one case, an ear.95  Incidents like this were few and far 
between, especially with this level of violence.  The incident in question may not have 
even happened, but it was reprinted in London newspapers and South Carolina papers 
because it struck a cord.  South Carolinians who wanted to hurt Tories probably would 
never actually commit such acts, but enjoyed the vicarious emotional release of 
imagining someone else viciously attacking Loyalists.  Legislators realized that 
something had to be done to fulfill widespread desires for revenge on Loyalists.  Florid 
rhetoric also had its place in slaking blood lust. 
Not all of the violence was theoretical, of course.  Newspapers printed 
information on the rioting in Charleston as it happened, further fanning the flames.  Even 
readers who would never turn out into the streets might enjoy reading about other people 
teaching hated Loyalists a lesson. 
 
94 DeMond, N.C. Loyalists 153-66.  South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, Sept. 30, 1783 
95 South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, Sept. 23, 1783. 
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 Newspapers also spread rumors of Loyalist bad faith.  For instance, New York 
Loyalists reportedly threatened to burn the city rather than evacuate it.96  These stories 
reinforced a belief that Loyalists were untrustworthy, and deserved whatever they got.  
For readers on the fence about whether Loyalists might be reclaimable citizens, these 
stories were evidence that at least some of the Loyalists were still seeking to destroy the 
nation. 
 By the middle of 1783, supporters of greater clemency to Loyalists also used the 
newspapers to make their arguments.  While newspapers were dominated by anti-Loyalist 
argument, it was not the only opinion published.  Supporters of general amnesty made 
sure that local papers reported that Georgia was considering passing an act of oblivion 
returning both citizenship and property to Loyalists.97  Since Georgia had passed a very 
similar act of confiscation and banishment a few short months after South Carolina, it 
was a natural laboratory for changes to any Loyalist regulatory scheme. 
 At least some North Carolinians joined the general warming trend by 1784.  They 
lobbied their legislature for the free return of all refugees from the area and other states 
excluding only those who “by the enormity of their crimes, have become the enemies of 
all societies.”  Allowing them to settle freely could only enrich the area with their 
mercantile skills and assets.  Further, many Loyalists were honorable men who had 
differed only in “sentiments on a great political question.”  This idea undermined the 
entire premise of the confiscations.98 
 Connecticut showed signs of tolerating Loyalists as well.  New Haven citizens 
elected to allow Loyalists back into Connecticut, arguing that American victory would be 
 
96 South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, Oct. 28, 1783 
97 South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, July 19, 1783. 
98 South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, May 18, 1784. 
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incomplete unless “distinguished for justice and magnamity.”  How Americans treated 
the Loyalists would determine their character.  “Future generations, not being influenced 
by our passions, will form their ideas of our characters” from American treatment of 
Loyalists.99 
 Alexander Hamilton was outspoken in his defense of Loyalists.  His own post-war 
law practice specialized in defending Loyalists and British subjects in their efforts to 
control their property in the United States.  He defended one British merchant in the 
famous case of Rutgers v. Waddington (1784), and won a victory for his client.  The 
South Carolina Gazette picked up one of his Phocion circulars, and without rehashing the 
discussion earlier in this chapter, I want to consider how South Carolinians heard certain 
points.  He eloquently argued that true Whiggism was “generous.”  Expelling “a large 
number of their fellow citizens” without the benefit of a trial was contrary to the ideals of 
the Revolution, and made every citizen vulnerable to the whims of any “prevailing 
faction.”  While it was “common … for a free people, in times of heat and violence, to 
gratify momentary passions,” letting revenge dictate law distorted law, and ultimately 
liberty.100 
 Expatriate Loyalists certainly also found glee in reading about Americans’ 
problems.  Certainly Loyalist expatriates filled the London newspapers with tales of woe.   
Henry Laurens even worried that refugee rabble-rousing might upend treaty 
arrangements.  He told a friend “if all the people called Loyalists were scattered in 
America they would not do so much mischief as they do here.”  Loyalist refugees fed off 
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the increasing hysteria, reading in the London papers that “all accounts from Charles-
Town describe the inveteracy of the inhabitants towards the English in very strong 
terms.”  Similarly, South Carolinians took pleasure in news of extensive crop failures in 
Canada.  The outlook for the next year was “dreadful” and Canada would have to rely on 
grain imports from America.101 
 Yet there was sympathy too.  The South Carolina Gazette printed an obituary for 
George Duncan, a Charleston merchant who was banished in 1778 and spent his 
remaining years in England.  While recognizing his Loyalism, his obituary writer 
emphasized his “unblemished integrity” and his assistance to Charleston prisoners. 
(Perhaps he was easier to forgive since he left the state long before the reduction of 
Charleston.)102 
 Newspaper discussions of Loyalism touched on many nerves.  Such publicity  
certainly shows that all manner of the reading public were concerned with the question of 
clemency or punishment for Loyalists.  This interest was especially high in the first few 
years after the war, at the same time as the General Assembly debated the future of 
Loyalists.  Such public discussion was intended to sway and persuade South Carolinians 
as to the proper role of Loyalists after the war.  Newspaper debates helped keep the 
problem of Loyalism alive just as surely as the physical presence of Loyalists did.  Such 
debate also provided an escape valve for hostility towards Loyalists; rather than targeting 
all former Loyalists, South Carolinians debated Loyalists in the newspapers. 
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 In conclusion, I wish to consider one popular satirical poem that was published in 
several states’ newspapers in 1783 and 1784.  In November of 1783, the South Carolina 
Gazette and General Advertiser ran a satirical poem poking fun at the Loyalist dilemma.  
“The Tory’s Soliloquy,” a humorous if pedestrian take-off of Hamlet’s soliloquy, “To go 
or not to go,” ran in many state newspapers where Loyalist numbers were highest.  New 
Yorkers and South Carolinians got an especial charge from it.103  It invoked the Loyalist 
dilemma: 
 
“To go, or not to go”—is that the question?  
Whether ‘tis best to trust the inclement sky, 
That scowls indignant o’er the dreary Bay 
Of Fundy, and Cape Sable’s rock and shoals, 
And seek our new domains in Scotia’s wilds,  
Barren and bare;--or stay among the rebels!— 
And, by our stay, rouse up their keenest rage, 
That, bursting o’er our now defenseless heads, 
Will crush us for the countless wrongs we’ve done them? 
 
Very few white South Carolina Loyalists chose to go to Nova Scotia for precisely the 
reasons the poem suggested: Nova Scotia was “dreary” and offered limited economic 
possibilities, especially for people used to a much warmer climate with better soil.  Yet 
“stay[ing] among the rebels” depended on Patriots’ willingness to deal generously with 
Loyalists.  This wag correctly deduced that the physical presence of Loyalists, especially 
wealthy ones, would induce rage.  In choosing to stay, Loyalists depended on those who 
had suffered the most during the war, since post-war legislatures in South Carolina and 
other states were filled with war heroes. 
 The poem continues by imagining the plight of Loyalists who stay and provoke 
Patriots.  In addition to having to appeal to former enemies for mercy, the Loyalists might 
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find themselves facing “the kind stare of some outrageous mob,/ Who, for their sport our 
persons may adorn/ In all the majesty of tar and feathers.”  Such waggery, like much 
newspaper propaganda, tried to encourage mob action against Loyalists.  The writer went 
further, suggesting Loyalists worry lest “our necks, to keep their humour warm/ May 
grace a rebel halter!”  Our satirist went to more mundane concerns as well.  Loyalists 
faced public ridicule in an attempt to shame them into disappearing.  The poet painted 
Loyalists as thin-skinned creatures, “pierc[ed]” by the “open insult—the heart piercing 
stab” of being called a “dam’d Tory.”  “Or worse, far worse,/Committee’s rage—or jury’s 
grave debate/On the grand question “shall their lives” forfeit/Or property—or both.”  
Would Loyalists be able to reclaim their property, or would others profit from their 
losses?  Despite the grand rhetoric, this was the central question for most South 
Carolinians. 
Coping with the Strains of Civil War: Dealing with the Inherent Human Tendency 
towards Violence 
 South Carolinians faced practical and psychological obstacles in their efforts to 
move ahead after the war years.  Most of the population was scarred from the trauma of 
violence.  In the backcountry, Reverend Archibald Simpson, newly arrived back in his 
homeland after the war, found ‘“a dark melancholy gloom.’”  Henry Laurens certainly 
complained frequently of his losses (as we have seen).  While his complaints had the 
potential advantage of letting him avoid even the appearance of obligations he did not 
wish to take on, it also let him work through his anger.  He despaired to one woman of 
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the pain of “beginning the World anew upon terms infinitely worse” than he faced as a 
youth.  He also believed he was far from the only one.  He warned one friend to 
“remember the Minds of the People are sore.”  Like many other South Carolinians, he 
had lost close friends and family to the war.  In his case, he openly was in “deep 
mourning for that brave honest man…the dear object of my present Woe,” his son John 
Laurens.  Arthur Middleton, South Carolina’s delegate to Congress, was so “anxious” 
about the future of his country he considered “the really melancholy Situation of our 
Country.”  Years later, Henry Rugeley wrote his Irish mother that “considering the 
Troubles I have experienced,” he should not complain about reaching the age of fifty in 
decent health.104 
 For elite men, the trauma was yet greater.  British efforts to attract slaves away 
from their owners during the war led to mass black migration and flight.  Philip Morgan 
suggests that some 25,000 South Carolina slaves, or 25% of the total slave population, 
permanently left plantations during the war.  The majority who did not leave stayed 
principally because they didn’t get a chance to flee safely.  Slave owners who were 
invested in a paternal model where they headed “my family, black and white,” were 
deeply distressed to find that their black family had abandoned them.  Yet their 
expectations were more tempered than those of their nineteenth-century descendants.  As 
Philip Morgan argues, “if the overwhelming response of mid-nineteenth century 
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slaveholders to their slaves’ actions in the Civil War was one of betrayal, that of late 
eighteenth-century slaveholders was one of surprise.”105 
 Owners were anxious during the war that their slaves might flee (and rightly so).  
Governor Dunmore’s Proclamation in Virginia spelled out the threat: the British might 
offer slaves freedom in return for destroying the plantation system, and setting off 
pandemonium in Southern slave societies.  Such a blow would cause chaos and bring the 
economic system of the Southern colonies to its knees.  Moses Kirkland, a backcountry 
Loyalist, relished the prospect, crowing that ‘“the instant that The Kings Troops are put 
into motion,’” the slaves would ‘“rise upon their Rebel Masters.’”  Henry Laurens 
reacted to the threat by calling all of his slaves together and delivering them a long 
lecture warning them of the dangers of leaving the plantation or associating with anyone 
off the plantation.106  
During and immediately after the war, South Carolina masters found they had 
little control over their slaves.  One of John Lewis Gervais’s slaves threatened an 
overseer that he would leave Florida for South Carolina at his pleasure.  Eliza Pinckney 
complained that her slaves were ‘“insolent and quite their own masters.’”  Henry Laurens 
rejoiced that most of his slaves stayed with him during the war, but uneasiness about their 
true affection for him slipped out.  While in prison, he took comfort in periodic letters 
from his slave overseer Samuel Massey, showing that at least one slave would stick by 
him.  Massey reassured him that while some of his slaves could “hardly be perSwaided to 
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Stay[, …] those at Mepkin are all for Staying at home.”  After the war, one enterprising 
South Carolinian offered forty slaves for sale with one overwhelmingly positive attribute: 
the slaves never fled even when the British were nearby.107 
 Families split by the war suffered a special kind of pain.  The Ball family saw two 
men named on the Confiscation Act: Elias Ball of Comingtee and Elias Ball of Wambaw.  
First, Elias Ball of Comingtee found favor with his kinsman Henry Laurens, who made 
provision for him to take stewardship of his Georgia plantation while he petitioned for 
clemency, which he was granted in 1784.  Laurens looked forward to being able to “take 
him again into my arms as a friend.”108  When Elias Ball did return to South Carolina he 
was relieved and pleased to discover that his father was “as Harty now as he has bin for 
some years & my Brother has two fine Boys,” showing the pain he felt at not being able 
to help in family affairs.  Elias Ball of Wambaw was permanently exiled to Great Britain 
after the war, but maintained a transatlantic relationship with his extended family for 
many years.109 
He remained friends with his cousin Elias Ball of Comingtee, who even 
purchased his cousin’s slaves at auction in an effort to preserve his estate.  In 1784, Elias 
Ball worriedly asked his cousin if his passage to England had been “agreeable” and if the 
family was settling into Devonshire well.  He asked his cousin to pay his respects to his 
wife and hoped that despite current appearances, he might “spend[] some part of the 
remainder of his days with you.”  A few months later, the cousin in South Carolina wrote 
his cousin in England that he faced “total ruin” due to weather changes before harvesting 
 
107 Samuel Massey to Henry Laurens, Charles Town, June 12, 1780, Hamer, Rogers, and Chesnutt, eds., 
Laurens Papers 15: 305.  Morgan, Slave Counterpoint 283-85, 384-85. 
108 Laurens to John Owen, London, Aug. 9, 1783, Hamer, Rogers, and Chesnutt, eds., Laurens Papers 16: 
260. 
109 Elias Ball Jr. to Elias Ball of Wambaw, Limerick, July 25, 1784, 11/516/52 Ball Family Papers, SCHS. 
 389 
his crop.  Such intimate disclosures maintained family closeness across a large 
ideological and geographic distance.  Comingtee Elias Ball was glad to hear that his 
cousin expected a healthy pension from the British government.  In the fall of 1786, the 
South Carolina cousin informed Elias Ball of Wambaw that “my Good Father” died.  
Despite the sad tidings, he wished his English family “health & happiness” and, as 
always, signed himself “your affe[ctionate] kinsman.”  In 1787, Elias Ball of Comingtee 
congratulated his Bristol relative on the “nuptual of your daughter.”  He even kept his 
cousin apprised of his favorite slave’s health: in 1790, Elias Ball of Wambaw learned that 
“poor old Tom has bin in a declining state for some months past.”  These cousins also 
trusted each other in business.  Elias Ball of Comingtee used Elias Ball of Wambaw as 
his mercantile agent in England.  In this guise, Comingtee Elias Ball shipped rice to his 
cousin and relied on him to reduce his costs from the “extravagant Charges” London 
merchants took from his account.  (Mixing business with affection promptly backfired, as 
Comingtee Elias Ball fell behind in his accounts.)  Wambaw Elias Ball also relied on his 
cousin to supply him with documentation of his lost South Carolina property for his own 
claim for losses on the British government.110 
At times, the relationship frayed, but over the same kinds of things any other 
family relationship suffered from.  Wambaw Elias Ball disputed a family will in 1786 
from his home in Bristol.  He was amazingly sure of his inheritance rights from such a 
distance, and as a person with no legally enforceable rights in South Carolina.  He wrote 
John Ball to complain that no “person can mistake the plain express words of the Will.”  
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Piercingly, he accused his in-law of “show[ing] an inclination to grasp at her Mother’s 
estate” since his marriage to Elias Ball’s sister.  Elias Ball even threatened to come to 
South Carolina to settle the will, which he had no legal standing to do.  He was especially 
enraged because he was supposed to be the executor of the estate, yet others still in South 
Carolina settled it in his place.111 
Cordial, and even close, relations continued among the Ball family for years, 
probably until after the Revolutionary generation died.  Eventually, ‘Wambaw Elias Ball’ 
became a story told to children in the clan, often to scare them.  The ‘Wambaw Elias’ 
was a “mean fella” who captured his own runaway slaves and sold them before departing 
for England.  His portrayal as the family Tory lived on, coming to match the later 
nineteenth-century portrayal of Loyalists as especially cruel, hard people.  Later 
descendants did not know the history of warm relations.112 
 South Carolinians, for all the pain and confusion, were excited about the prospect 
of moving forward.  Rice crops that were abandoned in 1781 were replanted by 1783.  
South Carolinians rapidly began importing new slaves to service an expanding 
agricultural economy.113  Optimistic plans for post-war betterment filled men’s minds and 
hearts.  In just one example, the General Assembly became involved in plans to build a 
substantial waterway network well into the interior for the purposes of expanding 
commerce.  Underlying some of this optimism was the desire for post-war stability.  
Also, in the rush for personal and societal wealth-building, South Carolinians correctly 
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divined that a society in which men were focused on getting rich was a society with better 
things to do than rehearse old wrongs.   
Yet amidst the optimism, some of their moves to build a better society suggest 
war-scarred psyches.  Having seen the worst that could happen, enthusiasm was tempered 
with a desire to set into place bulwarks against a repeat of civil war. 
 We have already seen in Chapter Three that individual citizens (both Patriot and 
Loyalist) took in orphaned children during and after the war.  In most cases, men took in 
children whose parents had been their friends or business acquaintances before the war.  
They honored the call of personal ties in caring for dependent children.  Evidence for this 
is clearest in the testimonies of Loyalists who cared for the children of deceased Patriot 
soldiers.  Of course, at the time they reported these actions, they were using them to show 
good character as exculpatory evidence against their sins as Loyalists—certainly self-
motivated claims.  Still, people vouched for them. 
 Some South Carolinians moved towards a more comprehensive solution to the 
problem of orphans in the years after the war, founding the Camden Orphan Society in 
1786.  Camden, in the interior of South Carolina, was hard struck by the civil war.  Two 
battles were fought in Camden, and the town endured countless raids.  A visitor to the 
town in 1784 remarked that the war damage was so extensive that it was “evident Proof[] 
of… [British] wanton Barbarity & Desolation” because troops had “burnt the Court 
House, Gaol, & the greatest Part of the best Houses.  They cut down all the Fruit Trees; 
& destroyed all the Furniture, which they could not carry away.”114   
Joseph Kershaw, one of the founders of the Camden Orphan Society, was a 
prominent figure in pre-Revolutionary Camden who ran and owned local mills as well as 
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serving as a mercantile agent for Ancrum, Lance and Loocock.  He also owned an 
extensive plantation.  All of this made him one of the most respected figures of the 
backcountry amongst Lowcountry denizens.  During the war, he committed to the Patriot 
side early, joining Drayton and Hart on a tour of the backcountry in 1775 designed to 
discourage Loyalists and muster more committed support from Patriot sympathizers.  He 
ended the Revolution as a prisoner of war and was finally exchanged by the British in 
time to become a member of the Jacksonborough Assembly.  He was, in all ways, an 
important and respected citizen.115 
 The inaugural meeting of the Camden Orphan Society was held on Independence 
Day 1786.  In so doing, the organizers linked the Orphan Society to the spirit of the 
Revolution.  But, while the care of poor orphans had always been a problem for colonial 
societies, the Revolution brought home to these men exactly how fragile the system for 
dealing with such unfortunates could be.  The Society wished to provide funds for 
“suitable buildings for the reception of poor Orphans, or other children in distress, within 
the State.”  Historians have stressed the role of the society in providing education for poor 
children, especially since Joseph Kershaw had also chaired a committee before the war 
that recommended the state pay teachers in order to provide tuition-free education for 
poor students.  For me, Kershaw’s founding of the Camden Orphan Society on 
Independence Day also suggests he saw proper care of the detritus of the late war (the 
orphans) as part of an effort to avoid a future war.   One nervous rule regulating the 
behavior of members at meetings is more evidence that South Carolinians were 
concerned with social disruption.  In between rules about paying dues on time, and not 
coming to the meeting drunk, the society ordered that “all disputes, whether upon a 
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matter of Religion, Government, or of a private nature, shall be banished from this 
Society; and every member who shall persist in such disputes, after being admonished by 
the president, shall be subject to a fine at the discretion of the Society.”  Healthy debate 
about matters of government is part of a healthy democracy, which South Carolinians 
claimed to be building (however limited their vision in fact was).  Outlawing discussion 
on government suggests a stronger nervousness about the possibility of discord among 
the members.  The possibility of civil war was not far enough away from the mental 
world of South Carolinians who had just lived through one to allow them ease.  Members 
continued to relate their endeavors to protect orphans to their endeavors to build a stable 
republic, as the annual meetings continued on Independence Day for more than two 
decades.116 
 The Camden Orphan Society did not manage to actually erect an orphanage or 
begin paying school fees for several years.  By 1794, they paid for James Bowler’s 
children to attend a local school.  Later, they joined forces with the Mount Sion Society 
to support free education for promising young white men without the means to pay 
tuition.  Despite their relatively modest achievements, the Society is interesting as an 
example of how the war shaped post-war philanthropic efforts.  Charlestonians also 
formed an orphan society in the post-war years.  The city council first explored the idea 
in 1786, hoping to find a way to take in Revolutionary orphans.  These leaders had in 
mind Bethesda, the orphanage George Whitefield founded near Savannah.  In a short four 
years, they managed to raise funds to build an orphanage.  One historian argues that 
locals saw the Charleston Orphan House as “a patriotic act rather than a charitable one,” 
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for the chance to shape poor white children to take their place in society turned “a social 
problem into a political opportunity.”117 
 Other young men needed help in creating good places for themselves in a growing 
nation, even if they still had parents.  Late eighteenth-century philanthropists encouraged 
wider access to education.  Thomas Jefferson propounded a system of mass, publicly 
supported education available to all bright young male students.  Such a system would 
allow democracy to flourish, as citizens would be educated and able to judge the 
country’s interest rationally. The new Republic called for an educated citizenry.  These 
schools should be within a reasonable distance for all children, so as to ensure access to 
youths from rural areas.  In his Elementary School Act, Thomas Jefferson proposed such 
universal education “to avail the commonwealth of those talents and virtues which nature 
has sown as liberally among the poor as rich, and which are lost to their country by the 
want of means for their cultivation.”118   
South Carolinians were interested in joining this movement to expand education.  
Aedanus Burke, in his role as an advocate for the backcountry, felt that South Carolina 
should open a university so that the “spreading of knowledge & learning thro’ the Land 
wd. have this good effect, the Youth in our Back country wd. become valuable useful 
men; instead of being, as they are at present, brought up deer-hunters & horse thieves, for 
want of Education.”119  Backcountry stability would be well served by education.  Since 
the backcountry provided a steady source of Loyalist militiamen during the Revolution, 
 
117 Sept. 10, 1794, July 4, 1798, Camden Orphan Society, Camden Records 1786-1812, SCL.  Susan L. 
King, ed., History and Records of the Charleston Orphan House 1790-1860 (Easley, S.C., 1984), Barbara 
L. Bellows, Benevolence among Slaveholders: Assisting the Poor in Charleston, 1670-1860 (Baton Rouge, 
La., 1993) 121-23. 
118 Thomas Jefferson, Elementary Education Act, 1817. ME 17:440, Eyler Robert Coates, Jr., ed., “Thomas 
Jefferson on Politics & Government,” (1995-2001), Thomas Jefferson Digital Archive, Electronic Text 
Center, http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeff1370.htm, Accessed March 16, 2007. 
119 Burke to Middleton, July 6, 1782, Barnwell, "Middleton Corr. Oct. 1925," 204. 
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an emphasis on giving backcountry men a better source of income might serve the greater 
cause of post-war stability.  Rachel Klein argues that South Carolinians were advocates 
of free education for the lower classes because the experience of the Regulator movement 
taught them that the only way to reduce crime was to find ways for the backcountry 
population to work hard at legitimate goals.120  This seems true but incomplete.  In the 
wake of the Revolution, South Carolina leaders also concluded that educating people to 
support themselves would further the stability of society.  Men with little investment in 
society, and little ability to provide for themselves legitimately, were far more likely to 
turn to crime.  Plundering, while a nice way of life for individuals, was hard on society. 
 Philanthropic Charlestonians were also fans of education for the poor.  One 
historian who closely studied Charlestonians’ attitudes towards philanthropy adroitly 
points out “however attached Charleston’s elite were to the forms of a patriarchal society 
in their relations with women, children, and slaves, in their dealings with white laborers 
they adopted the competing liberal mode of demanding that workers act as free 
agents.”121  White men, even in a very hierarchal society, flattened class divisions in the 
interest of promoting white harmony in the face of intense divisions between white, 
slave, and Native Americans.  As such, they needed schooling to allow most white men 
to take their places as free adults. 
 Schools in the interior would also answer the needs of a rapidly increasing 
population.  South Carolina’s backcountry population grew rapidly in the decades after 
the Revolution.  Between 1790 and 1800 alone, the backcountry saw an increase of some 
 
120 Klein, Unification of a Slave State 240. 
121 Bellows, Benevolence among Slaveholders 16. 
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42,000 white residents.122  For all of these reasons, the region needed schools.  By August 
of 1783, a general assembly committee finalized a bill to give the Trustees of a proposed 
school in Ninety Six District 180 acres of land to sell and use the proceeds to fund the 
school in the then-growing town of Ninety Six.  (The town was quickly eclipsed in the 
decade after the Revolution, and the decision to make Columbia, farther to the east, the 
new state capital finalized the end of growth for Ninety Six.  Columbia, not Ninety Six, 
eventually became the site of a new college.)  This land was Loyalist property 
confiscated under the 1782 Confiscation Act and held by the Commissioners of Forfeited 
Estates.123  Other states also turned to Loyalist property to fund education.  The 
University of Pennsylvania benefited from forty-five sizable estates granted outright to 
the university, and others in which the university got partial shares.124 
During the early part of the Revolution, forward-thinking Charlestonians and 
backcountry residents founded the Mount Sion Society to build a school in the interior, 
near today’s Winnsboro, South Carolina, in Fairfield County.  Colonel John Winn and his 
brother General Richard Winn were both founders and substantial financial contributors.  
Richard Winn donated the land on which a later incarnation of the school was built.  (The 
school eventually became Mount Sion College.)  Prominent Charlestonians also joined 
the organizing efforts, including members of the Pinckney, Huger, Rutledge, and 
Moultrie families.  By 1780, the school hired a teacher and began classes.  The British 
invasion unsurprisingly ended classes at the school, and the school facility was “broke up 
 
122 Edgar, South Carolina  259. 
123 General Assembly Committee Reports, 1776, 1778, 1782-1785, Oversize 1783, Box 27, Series 165005. 
Act. No. 1195, “An Act to Vest One Hundred and Eighty Acres of Land, Late the Property of James 
Holmes, in Certain Persons, in Trust, for the Benefit of a Public School,” Cooper and McCord, eds., 
Statutes of S.C.  1: 574-75. Tim Lockley, Southern Charities Project (2002-), 
http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/SouthernCharitiesProject/state_southcarolina.htm.  Accessed March 14, 
2007. 
124 Ousterhout, State Divided  290. 
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by the enemy” but the building was at least standing at the end of the war.  In the summer 
of 1783 the Winnsboro members worked to restart the school with a fundraising 
campaign across the state, including revising their own dues structure.  In 1784 they hired 
a teacher and repaired the school building in order to reopen as Mount Sion College.  Life 
at the Mount Sion school was to be comfortable for its boarders, despite its being a 
charity school.  Not only did a “sober Matron” take charge of making sure the “little 
Masters…wash[ed], comb[ed] their heads, and dress[ed] neatly” every day, but they were 
provided with waiters at meal times and their diet was strictly regulated to include 
enough meat and “plenty of vegetables when to be had.”125 
 Religion was another way to control societal conflict, especially the backcountry.  
Before the Revolution, the backcountry was largely unchurched.  While scattered 
settlements had Presbyterian congregations, most inhabitants were not strongly attached 
to any church.  Further, the Anglican church, while strong in the Lowcountry, did not 
well serve members in the interior.  Yet churches are often a strong contributor to social 
stability, even in a world where religious denominations compete.  While the true 
groundswell of religious conversion would sweep the backcountry in the early nineteenth 
century, several denominations did move to establish more permanent religious 
institutions across South Carolina in the wake of the Revolution.  In all these cases, 
building a religious community is a profound investment in social trust and in your 
 
125 Minutes of the Mount Sion Society 1783-1784, SCL, Jack Allen Meyer, The Mount Sion Society of 
Charleston and Winnsboro, South Carolina, 1777-1825 (Winnsboro, S.C., 1978) 1-12, 44-45 (Rules and 
Directions for the Steward of Mount Sion School 1785).  Klein, Unification of a Slave State 239-41. 
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community.  After the chaotic civil war, this investment in community was especially 
important to South Carolinians.126 
 To build a church is to express optimism for the future, and South Carolinians 
were willing to do it in concert with former Loyalists.  Episcopalian members of St. 
Mark’s Parish who lived in the High Hills of the Santee agitated for a church closer to 
home before the Revolution, but did not construct a larger building until 1788, when 
General Thomas Sumter (a Revolutionary hero) donated the land for a new, beautiful 
church with a half-hipped roof and twelve large windows.  (Thomas Sumter was 
generous to local churches, as he also donated land for High Hills Baptist Church, where 
Richard Furman first preached.)  Thomas Sumter sat on the vestry committee that 
authorized the expenditures for a new church along with several other Revolutionary 
heroes.  Benjamin Waring, for instance, was a captain under Francis Marion.  Yet among 
the prominent and committed Patriots, one vestry member was a former Loyalist.  
William Rees, a prominent Loyalist from the backcountry, has already been mentioned in 
this chapter.  He was one of the Loyalists whipped and warned off by the crowd in the 
spring of 1784.  The General Assembly removed him from the confiscation list in 1784, 
and despite the hickory stripes he received at the hands of the crowd, he continued living 
in South Carolina.  Rees suspected, correctly, that he could recreate a comfortable life of 
public honor.  Despite his 1784 beating, by 1788 he was on the vestry of the church.  
 
126 For more on the unchurched nature of the eighteenth-century interior, and the wave of religious 
enthusiam and affiliation in the early nineteenth century, see Christine Leigh Heyrman, Southern Cross: 
The Beginnings of the Bible Belt (New York, 1997). 
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Further, he held an expensive subscription pew near the minister, and in front of most of 
the congregation.  (Of course, the best pew belonged to General Thomas Sumter.)127 
 Padgett’s Creek Baptist Church, in Union County in the interior, was formed in 
1784.  Two of the rules of the fellowship regulated conduct during war.  These articles of 
faith were ones that every member of the church had to subscribe to in order to be a 
member in good standing.  Padgett’s Creek members, having recently lived through a 
war, believed that religious commitment entailed pacifism.  The tenth article of faith 
opened fellowship to “any Minister, or Church of Separate order, that doth not tolerate 
war.”  At some later point, the congregation crossed out the requirement that members 
must not tolerate war.   Intense exposure to civil war heightened these men’s hostility to 
war itself.  The eighth article of faith regulated how members were to behave in times of 
war.  “As to war, we do not hold it right to be forward or active in any such Cases, but if 
our Members are Drafted Sho’d go & answer their draft with that spirit of meekness as 
becomes Christians & return in the same.”  Unlike the Society of Friends, their pacifism 
was not absolute.  But, even in war, men of conscience should fight in a Christian spirit.  
Reading between the lines, these men did not believe many of their neighbors had fought 
the Revolution in a Christian manner.  These rules suggest lingering concerns about how 
community members might treat each other in moments of conflict.  More interestingly, 
however, it suggests that by 1784, backcountry religious organizers contemplated 
allowing people who had chosen different sides in the war to join together in fellowship, 
and thereby worried more about how to control conflict than eliminate it.128 
 
127 Church of the Holy Cross Vestry Minutes (including a pew chart), SCDAH. Edgar and Bailey, eds., 
Directory S.C. House Rep. 2: 698-99. 
128 Padgett’s Creek Baptist Church, Book I, Nov. 22, 1784-July 15, 1837, SCL microfilm, WPA Transcript. 
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 Even Independence Day itself helped knit South Carolinians together and caused 
them to focus on what they wanted for their future, not what they had been in the past.  
David Waldstreicher argues that celebrations such as Independence Day helped create a 
sense of unified American nationalism across state boundaries as celebrants read about 
similar celebrations in other American areas, and imagined themselves and their 
celebrations as part of a greater tapestry.  Independence Day helped bridge the great 
problem of American continuation: regional differences were very real, and Americans 
were bound by a shared government and war, not a pre-existing national identity.  The 
great trick of the early national period was to hold together the nation until genuine 
national identity and emotive ties were strong enough to do the job that good intentions 
would never be enough to guarantee.129   
South Carolinians were performing two imaginative projects through their 
Independence Day celebrations: imagining themselves as part of a unified nation, and 
imagining themselves as having been part of a unified war effort.  Waldstreicher sees 
conflict as an inherent part of celebratory rites, but the conflict between Loyalists and 
Patriots was best left unspoken.  While political displays in South Carolina were marked 
by open jockeying for power between Federalists and Anti-Federalists, silence was the 
order of the day on the presence of former Loyalists in the audience.  Moves to paint 
individuals with the appellation Tory, however politically advantageous, risked 
reminding South Carolinians of things best forgotten.  In the next chapter, we will see 
 
129 In this, as in the rest of this work, I follow John Murrin’s argument that framers of the Constitution 
understood that the republic rested on a very flimsy base, as there was no shared national identity strong 
enough to support a nation.  Instead, they created a constitution hoping that it would keep the nation 
together long enough for national identity to grow.  In this analogy, the constitution was the roof of the 
country, that depended on national identity (the walls) to hold up the roof.  The founders put up the roof 
hoping they could manage to keep the house from collapsing while they worked on putting up the walls.  
Murrin, "A Roof without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity." 
 401 
how this silence persisted well into the nineteenth century.  For our current purposes, 
however, we will see how the war was discussed in order to create a sense of unity. 
July Fourth celebrations began during the war, when they were ways of signaling 
unity with the war effort.  In Charleston and other port cities, revelers threatened 
suspected Tories with property violence, including breaking unlit windows.  If city 
dwellers would not participate, crowds were willing to compel at least the appearance of 
unity on Independence Day.  In 1777, when Charleston was far removed from actual 
fighting, independence celebrations were a chance for locals to show their commitment to 
the Patriot cause.  By extension, those who did not participate in the public rituals of 
celebration were suspected of disloyalty, not just disinterest. 
 During British occupation, Independence Day was obviously not celebrated.  The 
rites usually used during such celebrations were renewed in late 1782 when the British 
finally withdrew from the city.  South Carolinians, especially Charlestonians, have never 
needed lessons in how to put on a public spectacle.  In the wake of the announcement of 
the final peace treaty, Charlestonians threw a grand party.  During the day, the now rested 
and fed South Carolina Continental Line marched proudly with “the colours planted in 
front of the center of the line” from the State House to Col. Moultrie’s house (the much-
vaunted hero of Sullivan’s Island) with “a general volley of musquetry from the whole 
line,” “drums beating,” and general “huzzas” of  “God save the state.”  The ritual forms 
were those they had always used to celebrate military victories, now used to celebrate 
American independence.  Instead of God save the King, it was now God save the state 
(not God save America).   The governor came out for general greetings and conversation 
with the citizens, and there was “a general and splendid illumination,” just like 
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Independence Day and Palmetto Day celebrations.  Having wished for the preservation of 
the state of South Carolina during the day, citizens retired to their homes to “drink 
Prosperity and Union to the Thirteen States.”  The next day, General Greene reviewed the 
troops and hosted a banquet.130 
 The first post war Independence Day went smoothly, with no discussion of 
Loyalists.  Unfortunately, as we saw earlier, such celebrations still opened up 
confrontations in Charleston between the crowd and former Loyalists.  Trouble continued 
in 1784.  These examples further persuaded many that in the interests of harmony, 
Independence Day must present a vision of South Carolina unity during the Revolution. 
Conclusion 
South Carolinians were conflicted in dealing with Loyalists in the wake of the 
Revolution.  As the war ended, almost all were enraged with those who had been on the 
opposite side of the war.  For most people, it was difficult to empathize much with 
Loyalists, as the pains of war were still fresh.  Even men who would later publicly battle 
for an end to confiscation at first wanted nothing more than to hurt Loyalists.  As South 
Carolinians looked around at ruined property and desolate landscapes, trauma 
overflowed. 
And yet South Carolinians found their way to widespread support for some 
Loyalist returnees. How did they overcome anger and come to reconciliation?  Time 
 
130 South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser, April 26, 1783. 
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helped.  While in 1783, and in the immediate wake of legislative clemency, there was 
widespread frustration, more and more Loyalists reappeared after 1784, slipping quietly 
into communities across the state with little or no comment.  When men had time to 
rebuild, they also were more willing to allow those former Loyalists they deemed useful 
and trustworthy to return. 
Two South Carolinians joined a small but outspoken chorus of American leaders 
who used public persuasion to try to ameliorate the confiscation laws.  Aedanus Burke 
and Christopher Gadsden both opposed confiscation for legal, moral, political, and 
economic reasons.  Each wrote at length to try to make the case to their peers that 
confiscation was a policy that was unwise, and would ultimately hurt the United States.  
In speaking out, they provided cover for other, more moderate, leaders to lift confiscation 
for many Loyalists, while still supporting the idea of permanent exclusion for those the 
populace refused to readmit. 
While mobs greeted a few hated Loyalists, for the most part South Carolina 
Loyalists who had not murdered anyone were readmitted quietly.  Public discussion of 
Loyalists was much harsher than the reality of treatment, and served as an escape valve 
for Tory hatred.  Reading South Carolina newspapers, one might think that South 
Carolinians whipped and chased out Loyalists all the time, but in fact they did not.  The 
rhetoric served to vent negative feelings in nonviolent ways. 
All of this is not to say that South Carolinians were not nervous about the 
possibility of on-going civil war.  They moved to build new social institutions, such as 
schools and orphan societies, and expand other social institutions like churches.  Partly, 
the Revolution unleashed new social energy to build a more perfect society (the 
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Revolution was the heyday of eighteenth-century millennialism), but South Carolinians 
also were motivated by the desire to make sure their society was stable enough to 
incorporate former Loyalists while avoiding ongoing armed conflict. 
South Carolinians had fought a bloody civil war in the American Revolution in 
which Loyalist and Patriot alike had committed depredations.  Despite this unpromising 
beginning, South Carolinians had incorporated most former Loyalists back into the 
political, economic, and social fabric of the state through adroit but often unplanned use 





(MIS) REMEMBERING THE REVOLUTION: COMMEMORATIVE 
CULTURE AND THE TORY LEGACY 
 During the war, Tories helped to unify the Patriot colonists behind the war effort, 
both in fact and in propaganda.  After the war ended, public culture, both in official 
pronouncements and in commemorative culture, worked to dispel wartime hostilities by 
avoiding mention of the Tories.  Independence Day celebrations in the 1780s avoided 
mentioning the Tories and focused on the British as the enemy, in large part because 
Independence Day itself became a moment for open conflict between former Tories and 
Patriots, rather than a healing moment.  Almanacs produced for the local market also 
avoided commemorating local battles, choosing safety in the battle of Trenton and 
Princeton, rather than the potential shoals of Camden and Kings Mountain.  This strategy 
was only so successful, as evidenced by the street brawls in Charleston on July 4, 1783, 
and continued fighting in the streets in 1784.  Nonetheless, officials reinvigorated their 
efforts to leave Tories out of the official commemorative speeches in an effort to avoid 
such future incidents.  South Carolinians practiced the philosophy “hear no evil, speak no 
evil” in their public pronouncements about the recent Revolutionary past in the 1780s.  
Public discourse focused “us versus them” where the “them” was only the British, and 
the “us” was all Americans.  Members of the audience knew better, of course, but it was 
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politer and safer not to say so.  However, what happened as the Revolution became less 
an open scar and more a memory?  How did South Carolinians remember the 
Revolution?1 
 This chapter considers the legacy of the American Revolution as civil conflict in 
the public culture of early national and antebellum South Carolina.  I argue that while 
their eighteenth-century forbearers were wary of anything that might fuel disunity among 
South Carolinians, antebellum South Carolinians came to revel in the brutality of their 
Revolutionary past as one more testament to the virility of Southern manhood and the 
Southern Republic.  For them, ritual invocations of battle served to unify, not to divide.  
While Tories could be and were mentioned in public discourse, it was not imagined that 
those Tories could have anything to do with the antebellum state.   Then, I show that 
Loyalist ancestry continued to be an issue for South Carolinians who were actually 
descended from Loyalists.  Educated, elite South Carolinians who shared the misfortune 
of having Loyalist ancestors often had very thin skins, convinced that their peers looked 
down on them for their tainted past.  A surprising number found refuge in the growing 
historical preservation movement, finding a release for their different histories in a 
unified filiopietism of the Revolution.   
Finally, I conclude with the work of William Gilmore Simms, the talented 
prominent novelist of mid-nineteenth-century Charleston.  Simms helped to shape South 
Carolinians’ perception of civil conflict in the American Revolution for both antebellum 
Southerners and twentieth-century historians.  Simms, a prolific novelist, wrote a series 
of Revolutionary war romances set in his beloved South Carolina.  These novels, set in 
 
1 While in previous chapters, I choose to use the term Loyalists, in this final chapter I will often use the 
term Tory.  I am making a distinction here between actual persons, who are Loyalists, and their public 
image after the Revolution, in which Tories became increasingly stock figures.   
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both the Lowcountry and the backcountry, portray the American Revolution in South 
Carolina as a brutal conflict with many local Tories.  Simms deals with the casual 
destruction and violence between civilians in the Revolution, but he convinced 
generations of readers that Tories were uniquely culpable for the plundering, murder, and 
terrorrizing of civilians that he frankly acknowledges as part of the Revolution.  Simms 
helped shape a perception of the American Revolution in the South that has enjoyed 
remarkable staying power, culminating in the popular movie The Patriot, loosely based 
on Simms’s novel The Partisan. 
Overall, this chapter argues that South Carolinians managed their public memory 
of the Revolution in ways that stifled urges to relive Revolutionary civil conflict, 
guaranteeing that lingering animosities were not given a chance to smolder and burn.  
Only when the Revolutionary conflict could seem like a grand adventure, not the crucible 
of a generation, and only when the Revolutionary losers were so well re-incorporated into 
the body politic that most people had forgotten their Loyalist heritage, could the reality of 
Toryism remerge into public discussion.  Even then, Tories could only operate at the 
level of stock figures.  
This chapter deals with public memory, by which I mean memorializing activities 
with official sanction.  The broader public sphere, including emotional networks and the 
circulation of individual wartime memories in company, is generally not the stuff of this 
chapter.  Certainly such “tall-tales” existed, and influenced the culture into which 
younger generations were socialized.  One visitor recalled that around 1800, he visited 
Charleston and heard “frightful tales of woe” as he circulated, many of which focused on 
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“pillage, fire, & sword.”  He further noted, “the name of Cornwallis, is seldom mentioned 
without a hearty curse.”  Yet much of this was left out of more official days.2 
Public Commemorative Culture: Toryism in Independence Day Celebrations and 
Battle Commemorations 
Americans were acutely attuned to the importance of collective memory.  As the 
first generation of a new, independent American Republic (the first Republic of the 
modern world) they were concerned with ensuring the continuation of their experiment in 
human liberty.  Shared public commemorative culture was vital in reminding adults of 
the rightness of their novel experiment in the midst of routine political disagreement.  It 
was also crucial in educating youth and inculcating them with an unquenchable fire for 
American liberty and national probity.  Americans took the work of public 
commemoration seriously.3 
As we have seen in Chapter Five, public commemoration of American 
independence began during the Revolution.  Throughout the 1770s and 1780s, public 
 
2 Charles Caleb Cotton as quoted by Travers, Celebrating the Fourth  38. 
3 For a full discussion of the importance of public commemoration in the new Republic, see David 
Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776-1820 (Chapel 
Hill, N.C., 1997), Len Travers, Celebrating the Fourth: Independence Day and the Rites of Nationalism in 
the Early Republic (Amherst, Mass., 1997), and Sarah J. Purcell, Sealed with Blood: War, Sacrifice, and 
Memory in Revolutionary America (Philadelphia, 2002).  Waldstreicher makes the important point that 
conflict within efforts to remember helped to make the festive culture more important and central to 
American national myth-making efforts.  Further, he is right that “relentless politicization gave nationalist 
rituals their most important meanings.  Conflict [rather than consensus] produced ‘the nation’ as contestants 
tried to claim true American nationality and the legacy of the Revolution.”  Waldstreicher, Midst of 
Perpetual Fetes 9.  However, issues of sectional identity or party politics did not fundamentally change the 
imperatives of dealing with the history of armed civil conflict within South Carolina.  Another interesting 
take on early national festive culture is Simon P. Newman, Parades and the Politics of the Street: Festive 
Culture in the Early American Republic (Philadelphia, 1997), although I find it less helpful for this work. 
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revolutionary commemorative celebrations worked to inspire unity among the local 
population.  Loyalism was rarely mentioned.  Public oratory focused on the contributions 
of the citizens to the war effort against the British.  Civil conflict was ignored or 
downplayed as much as credulity allowed.  The riots of 1783 convinced governmental 
leaders that too much public attention to the problem of Toryism was a bad idea.  And, 
with the historic fear of mobocracy, South Carolina leaders trembled to allow 
unrestrained festivities, choosing instead to try to control them through public restrictions 
and sponsored public festivals.4 
 But what happened after the new American Constitution?  This is important 
considering that in 1784 the majority of Loyalists named in the Confiscation Act were 
pardoned and released from confiscation.  While amerced persons continued to petition, 
the General Assembly was firmly on the side of clemency by the middle of the decade. 
Imagining Unity, Avoiding Open Conflict: Independence Day Celebrations in South 
Carolina 
By the 1790s, public celebrations became as much about current political 
struggles as past glories.  Rapidly growing partisanship was reflected in the celebrations 
 
4 For a history of the fear of mob rule in America, see Paul A. Gilje, The Road to Mobocracy: Popular 
Disorder in New York City, 1763-1834 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1987).  For an example of a carefully planned 
festival, see the dinner for dignitaries outlined in the published ode to the festivities for July 4, 1783.  July 
5, 1783, South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser.  Governor Benjamin Guerard prohibited the use 
of illuminations for most festivities.  Certainly the risk of fire was a major cause of this prohibition, but so 
was a general fear of unrest.  The Governor also cracked down on liquor consumption before such large 
gatherings came together.  March 14, 1784, South Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser. 
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of Independence Day.5  Despite festivals’ popularity, they became vehicles for working 
out present political tension as much as reifying the recent heroic past.  In particular, such 
celebrations became part of a growing movement of divided politicking, whereby 
Federalists and anti-Federalists mustered supporters and gained positive publicity for 
their positions and candidates through these celebrations, which associated new political 
issues for the Republic with the upright, patriotic dutifulness of the Revolution.  Less 
positively, this obvious disunity affected the way ordinary people felt about participating 
in these celebrations, depressing turnout in many cities. At the same time, Independence 
Day was solidified into the new festive culture of the nation as one of the few holidays 
guaranteed to attract working class people.  Unlike religious holidays, Independence Day 
was guaranteed as a day of rest and leisure for white working class people.6   
For much of South Carolina, however, the presence of slaves, who by definition 
could not become part of the liberty-loving citizenry, muted the celebration of 
Independence Day and shaped its expression. As Len Travers has pointed out, 
Charlestonians saw nothing wrong with using slave labor to serve festive meals in honor 
of Independence Day, although visiting Northerner Edward Hooker was horrified by the 
“incongruity” of slaves serving “an independence dinner.”  Charleston also had a free 
black population who were equally excluded from celebrating Independence (of any 
kind).  In 1799, a public advertisement for July Fourth festivities warned “No admittance 
for people of Color.”   Despite this public denial of the reality of slavery, South 
 
5 In this section, I concentrate on Independence Day rites, but South Carolinians also celebrated Palmetto 
Day—the festival commemorating the Battle of Sullivan’s Island (1776), where Patriots managed to hold 
Fort Moultrie early in the war.  Palmetto Day celebrations also changed over the years, but I concentrated 
more on Independence Day as it was more popular across the state in early years.  Palmetto Day, especially 
in the beginning, was a local holiday touting the important of Charlestonians in the war effort.  It also 
immortalized a moment long before the worst of the armed civil conflict, and therefore the silence on the 
subject of civil conflict is more understandable without recourse to fragile conscience. 
6 Travers, Celebrating the Fourth , Waldstreicher, Midst of Perpetual Fetes . 
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Carolinians did moderate their celebrations in an effort to avoid inciting slave revolt.  
Charleston history suggested that slaves did indeed see the ripe connections between calls 
for white liberty and their own enslaved state.  During the 1765 Stamp Act controversy, 
enslaved Charlestonians took note of the angry white crowds who shouted ‘“Liberty! 
Liberty and stamp’d paper!’” in the streets outside of the homes of stamp officers.  
Shortly after this demonstration, some enterprising slaves milled in the streets shouting 
“Liberty” just as the whites had done earlier.  Predictably, whites panicked.7   
The 1791 San Domingo insurrection did nothing to calm white nerves either.  It 
certainly served as the foremost example of what revolutionary ideas might create in 
slave societies, as slaves claimed the mantle of French Revolutionary ideas of the 
equality of man.  Practically, French refugees poured into Charleston with their slaves, 
bringing news of the insurrection not only to unnerved white South Carolinians, but also 
to their enslaved African Americans.  French emancipation of these rebellious slaves in 
the following years also reminded and worried white South Carolinians that their slaves 
might also associate liberté, egalité and fraternité with their own situation, and demand 
freedom.8  
 
7 Travers, Celebrating the Fourth  145.  Waldstreicher, Midst of Perpetual Fetes 314.  Frey, Water from the 
Rock  51. 
8 The classic work on French-inspired Revolutionary activity in the Caribbean is C. L. R. James, The Black 
Jacobins; Toussaint L'ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution, 2d ed. (New York, 1963).  More 
recently, a marvelous new work on the rebellions, seeing it in the context of the greater Caribbean, and 
incorporating trends that move away from what might still be termed the great man school of history 
(which James is a part of) is Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution & Slave Emancipation in the 
French Caribbean, 1787-1804 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2004).  In the last generation, more historians have 
insisted on and paid attention to the links between African Americans in the North American colonies.  
Julius Scott showed how African Americans communicated across these colonies in his doctoral 
dissertation.  Julius Sherrard Scott, "The Common Wind: Currents of Afro-American Communication in 
the Era of the Haitian Revolution" (Ph.D., Duke University, 1986).  More recently, Marcus Rediker and 
Peter Linebaugh have reestablished transatlantic links in communication for insurrections and protest 
movements in the early modern era.  Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, The Many-Headed Hydra: 
Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston, 2000). 
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 There was evidence that slaves did indeed associate Independence Day with the 
hypocrisy of their own enslaved state.  Arson was a convenient weapon of slave 
resistance, both on a small level and as the beginning of wider insurrection.  For instance, 
the insurrectionaries in New York in 1741 began their broader attack on the city with a 
pre-planned burning of the fort, intended to heighten chaos and panic at the moment the 
Spanish were supposed to arrive in the city.9  Whites across the colonies were afraid of 
arson in slave revolt, and Charleston herself had seen suspicious arsons.  One irritated 
Charleston newspaper writer pointed out that it was suspicious that one particular fire had 
broken out in three different parts of the city, all in business districts, seemingly 
simultaneously.  He was convinced that this was therefore the ‘“work of incendiaries,’” 
and South Carolinians knew that those incendiaries were almost certainly slaves.  Given 
the widespread fear of slave arson, white South Carolinians no doubt got the message 
from several arson attempts committed on or near Independence Day.  On July 5, 1798, 
someone or some group set fire to a nice house in the main district, and authorities, after 
determining that the blaze was deliberately set, arrested two black women for the crime.  
At the trial the next day, the court established that one woman was the property of the 
house owner, and the other was a ‘”French’” slave, brought from Saint Domingo.  On 
Independence Day in 1819 and 1820, arsonists struck again, trying to destroy Charleston 
neighborhoods.  One fire was extinguished thanks to a letter from a slave who apparently 
betrayed fellow conspirators.10   
 
9 Here I am following Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh’s analysis of the 1741 insurrection.  While the 
link to the Spanish is somewhat speculative, if convincing, the arson attempt was documented as part of the 
trial.  Marcus and Peter Linebaugh Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and 
the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston, 2000). Jill Lepore also has written on the subject 
of the 1741 New York conspiracy, with somewhat different conclusions. Jill Lepore, New York Burning: 
Liberty, Slavery, and Conspiracy in Eighteenth-Century Manhattan (New York, 2005). 
10 Travers, Celebrating the Fourth  148. 
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Slave controls were always tight, but South Carolinians were especially careful to 
make Independence Day a whites-only celebration.  In some Northern cities, including 
Boston and Philadelphia, blacks were briefly permitted to join in public celebrations of 
the holiday.11 
For a people already so hesitant about publicly celebrating Independence Day, lest 
it inspire dreaded slave insurrection, South Carolinians had an additional potential 
problem.  The legacy of civil conflict between whites was not one of which sane South 
Carolinians wanted to remind slaves. South Carolinians had long suppressed open 
political conflict between whites in an effort to avoid encouraging slave rebellion.  This 
urge to hide conflict between whites (and to keep everybody happy enough to present a 
united front) also encouraged South Carolinians to limit their discussion of Loyalism and 
the civil war of the Revolution.  Two separate fears of potential slave insurrection, that of 
the rhetoric of liberty stirring up a passion for uprising, and that of civil conflict between 
whites creating an obvious opportunity that enslaved blacks might then seize to revolt, 
met in South Carolina’s Independence Day commemorations, virtually guaranteeing that 
South Carolinians would say as little as possible about the Tory past.  South Carolinians 
were already moving towards their vaunted nineteenth-century culture of  “the harmony 
we were famous for.”12 
Independence Day celebrations in Charleston were constrained by one sizable 
practical problem as well—heat.  South Carolina gets very hot by July, and parades were 
usually scheduled early in the morning to avoid excessive fatigue.  Unpaved streets 
 
11 Travers, Celebrating the Fourth  150. 
 12Travers, Celebrating the Fourth .  Robert M. Weir, ""The Harmony We Were Famous For": An 
Interpretation of Pre-Revolutionary South Carolina Politics," The William and Mary Quarterly 3d. ser., 26, 
no. 4 (1969): 473-501. 
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guaranteed that those watching the festive marches would be forced to breathe copious 
dust.  It is likely that already-stifling churches were filled far beyond their normal 
capacity for celebratory orations, with those attendant discomforts.  In 1809, one orator 
passed out during his speech.  One might opine that Independence Day was a holiday 
better designed for Northern audiences, who might find the summer entertainment 
refreshing.13 
With this background, we can begin to understand why Independence Day 
celebrations said so little for so long about the Tory past.  Public oratory was one of the 
most important aspects of early Independence Day celebrations, and the only popular 
aspect of the celebrations that was encouraged by the elites.  (As we saw in Chapter Five, 
Charleston elites worked hard to eliminate the public drinking, marching, and fireworks 
celebrations that were a central part of the way ordinary people participated in the 
Independence Day and Palmetto Day celebrations.  By the 1790s, Charleston elites had 
managed to assert a great deal of control over these unwanted festivities.)  Such orations 
were also the way the elite were able to massage the messages of Independence Day for 
themselves, ordinary whites, and enslaved African Americans.  In addition, orations 
provide one of the best records of these celebrations, as they were reprinted in 
newspapers and in publications. 
David Ramsay was an important orator and public figure in early national South 
Carolina.  He was a prominent Charleston doctor (although not a South Carolina native) 
and wrote several histories of South Carolina, including a long history of the Revolution 
in that state, and a general history of the American Revolution.  Ramsay was concerned 
with the future of the American experiment and sought to use his writing and speaking to 
 
13 Travers, Celebrating the Fourth 62-65. 
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shape a unified America.  His entire body of work articulated a view of South 
Carolinians’ unity against the British during the Revolution.  In his 1794 Independence 
Day oration in Charleston, Ramsay emphasized the unity of patriotic South Carolinians 
against the despotic British foe.   In Ramsay’s public memory, South Carolinians’ 
prosecution of the war was noted for “our countrymen[‘s] … magnanimity…” in the 
“eight years war.”  But the magnanimity that Ramsay publicly praised was directed 
towards the British, not to any Loyalists.  He did concede the brutality of the war, but 
strictly in terms of British brutality against colonial armies, militias, and civilians.  Of 
Great Britain he said, “obdurate and inhuman in her efforts to reclaim us, there was no 
affliction we did not endure—no barbarity which she did not exercise. … Husks and 
offals would have attested British mercy to conquered rebels.”14   
Ramsay used his bully pulpit to convince South Carolinians that the Revolution 
had opposed well-behaved South Carolinians who strictly observed the niceties of 
honorable wartime conduct against British troops (and no locals) who broke all the rules 
of war.  Brutality was acknowledged only to be filed away as committed strictly by an 
“other” who no longer existed in the new state.  It was a nice fantasy.  In a multi-hour 
oration, Ramsay mentioned civil conflict in the Revolution once.  Despite the sensitivity 
of the subject, perhaps it was the elephant in the room, mentioned only because its 
crushing weight needed some escape valve.  Ramsay acknowledged internal division 
 
14David Ramsay, An Oration, Delivered on the Anniversary of American Independence, July 4, 1794, in 
Saint Michael's Church, to the Inhabitants of Charleston, South Carolina (London, 1795) 3, 24.  Ramsay 
also wrote a two-volume history of South Carolina’s Revolution, which largely reprinted speeches and 
Revolutionary letters.  He was one of the earliest South Carolina historians of the Revolution, first 
publishing his history in 1785.  Craig A. Newton, "Three Patterns of Local History: South Carolina 
Historians, 1779-1830," South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine 65 (1964): 145-57, 145-46.  
David Ramsay and Charles Colcock Jones, The History of the American Revolution (Philadelphia, 1789). 
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briefly in order to portray it as further proof of British infamy in the prosecution of the 
war:     
There was a time when the heart of the patriot sunk within him and when 
Britain hoped to regain, by our division, what we had rescued from her by 
unanimity.  She exulted with fiend-like ecstasy at the scenes of anarchy 
and civil war, which the embarrassed finances, and feeble powers of the 
confederacy too awfully portended. [emphasis added]15 
 
In this imagining of South Carolina’s Revolutionary conduct, civil conflict was absent 
before British perfidy stirred up “division” which was due to “embarrassed finances” and 
“feeble [state] powers” rather than genuine attachment to Britain and noble feeling, or 
hatred between white residents of South Carolina.  Civil conflict simply emphasized 
Britain’s “fiend-like ecstasy,” which was stirred by “scenes of anarchy” that would be 
repulsive to normal men and women of honor.  In fact both local Loyalists and Patriots of 
the backcountry often seemed to positively enjoy the cycle of revenge that the Revolution 
opened up.  Despite the acknowledgment of South Carolina’s not-so-distant past of 
committed Loyalism and civil warfare, Ramsay painted a picture of largely united South 
Carolinians against a brutal British foe who showed none of the finer feelings of 
enlightened man.   
 Rhetorical tricks are nice, but sometimes reality intrudes, even in the mind of the 
writer.  Given the public nature of this oration, and the fact that it was only twelve years 
after the end of fighting, there were undoubtedly former Loyalists in the audience.  Rising 
political partisanship seemed especially unfortunate in a region that had known such 
violent division.  And, once again, political partisanship was restrained in South Carolina 
due to the ever-present fear of slave revolt.  Nonetheless, the 1790s were marked by 
 
15 Ramsay, 1794 Independence Day Oration  24. 
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rising political factionalism.  Federalists dominated Charleston, while the backcountry 
was more favorable to the anti-Federalist persuasion.  Aedanus Burke, who was 
sympathetic to the backcountry and hostile to the Lowcountry elite, reported that 
backcountry people ‘“had a coffin painted black, which, borne in funeral procession, was 
solemnly buried, as an emblem of the dissolution and interment of publick liberty’” after 
the ratification of the Constitution.16  While Loyalists had come from both regions, and 
Loyalists from both regions had received legislative clemency, it was nonetheless true 
that Loyalism, and especially civil war, was associated with the backcountry in the minds 
of South Carolinians.  Factionalism between the regions, while customary in South 
Carolina politics, was nonetheless unnerving, and in the context of the recent civil 
conflict especially unwelcome.   
Ramsay and other leaders were nervous about whether a fragile society might be 
undone by political disagreements between Federalists and Democratic-Republicans.   
Early Americans generally felt threatened by the rise of party politics, despite evidence 
that such politics actually made the polity stronger.  Predisposed to a distaste for 
factionalism, South Carolinians were especially concerned about the rise of faction in a 
state that depended on white unity in the face of a restive, sizable slave population.  
Therefore, in his oration Ramsay cautioned South Carolinians that the “nation of 
freemen…pay no unhallowed devotion at the alter of faction.”  Further, his oration ended 
with a plea that Americans: 
while celebrating the acquisition of our common inheritance, meet like a band of 
brothers; and, forgetting the circumstance of occasional division, let us present to 
the world the noble spectacle of a nation of freemen—pure in patriotism—with 
 
16 Edgar, South Carolina  252. 
 418 
but one mind, and one soul, IN DEVOTION TO OUR COUNTRY.” [emphasis in 
italics mine]17 
 
Undoubtedly, partisan tension between Federalists and Democratic Republicans was 
uppermost in his mind when composing these lines, but it is likely that he also meant to 
include the Loyalist past as one more “circumstance of occasional division.”  The 
important lesson in all cases was for South Carolinians to refuse to allow division to tear 
them apart.  This warning also served as a coded warning that South Carolinians must not 
allow the wartime divisions to stop them from “meet[ing] like a band of brothers.” 
Ramsay could not afford to recognize divisions that still had the potential to act like 
pathogens in the fragile body politic, but in dancing around these facts he had to create a 
narrative that could work to acknowledge the reality of wartime hurts without unsettling 
the new state. 
 I have focused on Ramsay both because he is the most forthright of the 1790s 
Independence Day orators in recognizing the brutality of the war in South Carolina 
(convenient for my purposes, of course), and because Dr. Ramsay was the most learned 
and historically thoughtful of the orators, if not the most powerful of speaker.18  He had, 
after all, written several histories of the war, whereas other speakers were chosen because 
they served as Attorney General or were prominent members of the Society of the 
Cincinnati.  Still, other speakers in the 1790s also made comments that might have struck 
some members of the audience as recognizing the fratricidal nature of the late war, 
despite the general retreat into patriotic platitudes.  William Smith noted in 1796 that 
 
17 Ramsay, 1794 Independence Day Oration 32. 
18 Henry Laurens was so convinced of David Ramsay’s intellectual acumen that he chose him as a son-in-
law, when he had carefully discouraged other suitors for his daughter Martha’s hand.  Laurens had 
carefully educated Martha, and he only wished to see her married to a man of superior intellectual ability 
(who could appreciate Martha, and by extension, Henry Laurens himself.) 
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while all states suffered “miseries,” South Carolina citizens “partook of more than their 
portion of the common distress; they indeed drank to the very dregs of the bitter cup of 
calamity.”  Such “bitter calamity” might include the usual recitation of the horrors of war, 
taken straight from biblical language, that orators were so fond of invoking.  Yet the next 
paragraph referred to wartime activities that indeed took place in South Carolina during 
the war.  “All the horrors that could be perpetrated by the destructive sword of the enemy, 
the desolating torch of the incendiary, or the infernal tomahawk of the savage, were 
heaped on the wretched inhabitants of this devoted state.”  Arson was not only a strategy 
in general in the Revolution, but was especially used in South Carolina.  British and 
Patriot officials sometimes engaged in deliberate, planned arson, such as the destruction 
of Georgetown towards the end of the war.   Backcountry militias routinely used arson of 
crops and houses as a method of discipline.  And the British and the Loyalists received all 
the popular blame for inciting Native American warfare in 1775 and 1776.19   
Should anyone in the Charleston audience not believe that the backcountry was 
included in Smith’s thoughts, he cleared up any misgivings by reminding his listeners 
that the “sable mantle” of the encroaching British spread over the “western confines” of 
the state.  He further recognized the brutality of the war through the seemingly safe 
strategy of speaking of the honor of Patriot women.  Patriot women, in contrast to 
Loyalist women, never had “[t]heir hands…polluted by the torch of the incendiary, or the 
dagger of the assassin; their arms were never stained by the blood of their enemies.”  
 
19 William Smith, An Oration, Delivered in St. Philip's Church, before the Inhabitants of Charleston, 
South-Carolina, on the Fourth of July, 1796, in Commemoration of American Independence (Charleston, 
1796) 4-5.  My thoughts on the use of arson as a routine tool of war during the Revolution, a practice 
technically known as pyromunkcy, was stimulated by Benjamin Carp’s recent work on arson as a military 
tool and a propaganda instrument. Benjamin L. Carp, "The Night the Yankees Burned Broadway: The New 
York City Fire of 1776," Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 4, no. 2 (2006): 471-511. 
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Patriot women showed their virtue as natural women by avoiding the unwomanly 
excesses of the undisciplined warrior.  Presumably, in contrast, Loyalist women did 
pollute their hands as arsonists (although it was men, not women, who used arson as a 
calculated tool), or assassinate Patriot men (although spying was far more likely).  Only 
through these safe rhetorical outlets could bad wartime behavior be acknowledged on 
Independence Day.  By way of contrast, Thomas Tucker avoided the subject entirely in 
1795, and Henry William Desaussure was so distracted by his paeans to Greene and 
Washington that he could barely even be brought to notice any Southern battles.  The 
closest he got to controversial subjects was to praise the victory at King’s Mountain.20 
 Independence Day orations continued to serve as events to shape current political 
disputes as well as to celebrate the past. The War of 1812 provided a new wartime 
experience to influence South Carolinians’ views of their Revolutionary past.  Few 
Americans actually fought in the war or were personally affected by it, especially in 
comparison to the Revolution.  Further, the South was united in its support for America 
in the War of 1812.  (It was New Englanders who experienced bitter, if unarmed, 
divisions related to the war.)   Charlestonians used Independence Day to encourage unity 
in the face of the new British aggression, and accordingly downplayed anything that 
smacked of citizen discord, including “party feeling.”  With the conclusion of the war, 
the Federalists were eclipsed, further dampening open conflict during such rites.  
Paradoxically, the cathartic climax of the Battle of New Orleans also reinvigorated 
 
20 Smith, 1796 Independence Day Oration  5, 8.  Thomas Tudor Tucker, An Oration Delivered in St. 
Michael's Church, before the Inhabitants of Charleston, South-Carolina, on the 4th of July, 1795; in 
Commemoration of American Independence (Charleston, S.C., 1795).  Henry William Desaussure, An 
Oration, Prepared, to Be Delivered in St. Phillip's Church, before the Inhabitants of Charleston, South-
Carolina, on the Fourth of July, 1798. In Commemoration of American Independence (Charleston, S.C., 
1798) 
 421 
discussions of military heroism, as jubilant Americans celebrated their military victories 
in both wars against the British.  (Of course, such orations usually ignored painful and 
humiliating losses, such as the burning of the new federal capital.)21  
The War of 1812 served to downplay the divisions of the civil population during 
the Revolution in South Carolina.  Jonathan Maxcy, the President of South Carolina 
College (now the University of South Carolina) made Columbia’s Independence Day 
speech in 1819.  By this time, Columbia was the inland capital of the state, and was 
continuing to grow in wealth and influence.  Maxcy’s oration focused on promoting the 
great stature of South Carolina among the states in the Union.  “Among the States who 
had the honour to furnish prominent persons for the public service, South Carolina holds 
a distinguished rank.”   He reminded the crowds of “her illustrious Laurens and 
Pinckney,” two popular South Carolina Revolutionary figures.  By 1819 the linkage of 
the backcountry and Lowcountry elite was complete, and audiences in Columbia were as 
likely to thrill to the exploits of Lowcountry Patriots like Laurens as to the exploits of 
Patrick Calhoun.  Maxcy also traced a course for the new country to follow in achieving 
greatness.  In his imagining, improved transportation that took advantage of the 
“majestick rivers which roll their waters though every part of our country” and the 
construction of public roads would allow the natural evolution of the United States into a 
more powerful country.  In these ways his speech took the usual paths, emphasizing 
political and social themes common to such oratory.22   
 
21 Travers, Celebrating the Fourth 197-98. 
22 Jonathan Maxcy, A Discourse, Delivered in the Chapel of the South-Carolina College, July 4th, A.D. 
1819, at the Request of the Inhabitants of Columbia (Columbia, S.C., 1819) 10,  South Caroliniana Library, 
Books Division.  For a lengthy and persuasive discussion of the long process of knitting together the 
Lowcountry and backcountry through the consolidation of their respective elites, see Klein, Unification of a 
Slave State . 
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South Carolinians celebrated the militia just as other Americans.  In the 
eighteenth century, most Americans saw the Revolution as a people’s war, and celebrated 
the military contributions of everyday men over the Continental Army.  It was not until 
1818 that Continental soldiers were offered pensions for their service.  Such pensions 
were not offered until Americans began to see the Continentals as crucial to the winning 
of the war.23 
 On the heels of yet another humiliating war, Maxcy reflected on the nature of war 
itself.  
War even in its mildest form, is a most tremendous scourge.  On the ocean, its 
evils are chiefly limited to the combatants.  On the land its course is marked with 
ten fold horrors.  The aged, the helpless; the fond mother and her weeping infant; 
fields stript of their verdure; cities ascending in flames; the labours of art and of 
science suspended; depravity stalking abroad, and opening her mouth against the 
heavens; wide wasting pestilence, famine and death; all the monuments of skill 
and of glory overturned, and defaced; and the temples of the living God 
prophaned and polluted; the riches and toils and glory of ages, leveled in the dust 
and buried in ruin; all these, the usual attendants of war, pourtray its horrors, and 
announce it the most terrifick scourge with which heaven punishes the guilty 
nations.24 
 
South Carolina had been spared the ravages of the War of 1812, and few in the audience 
were warriors in that conflict.  Instead, Maxcy’s words seem a combination of 
generalized pieties and allusions to the horrid nature of war that would have been familiar 
to the older members of his audience.   For those South Carolinians who had experienced 
the “tremendous scourge” of war, they knew all too well “the usual attendants of war”.  
While most of the passage reiterates the usual platitudes against war by those with little 
experience (“the fond mother and her weeping infant”, the “cities ascending in flames” 
 
23 John Phillips Resch, Suffering Soldiers: Revolutionary War Veterans, Moral Sentiment, and Political 
Culture in the Early Republic (Amherst, Mass., 1999), especially 1-5. 
24 Maxcy, 1819 Independence Day Discourse  6. 
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all taken out of classical literature, and especially the King James Bible, as much as 
nineteenth-century realities), certain lines echoed the realities of war in the South 
Carolina backcountry.  Burning crop fields was popular with Native Americans, white 
American Patriots and Loyalists, and British regular troops.  Fields were indeed “stript of 
their verdure,” or at least their corn.  Plunder and requisitioning (more or less the same 
thing) were everyday wartime activities.   
More interestingly, Maxcy also warned that war led to “the temples of the living 
God prophaned and polluted.”    As Walter Edgar has emphasized, at least one high-
ranking British officer operating in the South Carolina backcountry targeted churches as 
“sedition shops.”25  No doubt Maxcy intended his speech more to emphasize America’s 
unique promise in the world and the wisdom of avoiding foreign entanglements that 
might yet again lead Americans into war, but his invocation of the horrors of war no 
doubt had more concrete associations for some of his audience.  His oration did not 
shrink from linking war to Independence Day, of which 1790s orators were more 
cautious.  In this, we can see the influence of the new interest in American military 
exploits in the wake of America’s ‘Second War of Independence.’ 
 In general, Independence Day orations, with their emphasis on current political 
dilemmas, and their desire for general uplift, were unlikely to be the place South 
Carolinians began to publicly address their divided past.  The role of Independence Day, 
especially in a slave society, was very much to create white consensus, or at least the 
illusion of such.  Acknowledging the civil war of the American Revolution could only 
undermine this effort. 
 
25 Walter Edgar, Partisans & Redcoats: The Southern Campaign That Turned the Tide of the American 
Revolution (New York, 2001) 62-63.  The officer in question is James Wemyss, who destroyed several 
Presbyterian churches as “sedition shops.” 
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“the best feelings and greatest harmony pervaded the assemblage:” Battlefield 
Commemorations at Backcountry Battles26  
 In the first quarter century after the Revolution, Independence Day was the main 
way that South Carolinians publicly celebrated their war.  As the past grew more 
comfortably distant, and the landscape came to have dominant connotations besides the 
blood of war, South Carolinians (and other Americans) came to commemorate specific 
battles as well as general days of American Independence.  In Charleston and the rest of 
the Lowcountry, Palmetto Day became an important public celebration.  Palmetto Day 
celebrates the defense at Fort Moultrie and is celebrated a scant week before 
Independence Day.  For Lowcountry South Carolinians, it began to supplant 
Independence Day as the major celebration of the Revolution.  In so doing, Lowcountry 
people put the Lowcountry at the figurative center of the Revolutionary celebration.  
More importantly, Palmetto Day served to address military honor as a crucial part of 
Revolutionary remembrance.  A battle commemoration replaced a general political 
commemoration as the foremost place in public culture to celebrate the American 
Revolution.  Palmetto Day was also a fortunate choice because it celebrated the moment 
of glorious defense before the fall and occupation of Charleston.  This meant that 
Palmetto Day celebrated a moment before civil conflict in most of South Carolina.  The 
elevation of Palmetto Day allowed Lowcountry South Carolinians to extol a moment 
when South Carolinians were mostly united against the British foe in valiantly and 
heroically defending their homeland. 
 
26 Proceedings of a Celebration of Huck's Defeat, at Brattonsville, York District, South Carolina, July 12, 
1839,  (Brattonsville, S.C., 1839) 1. 
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 Palmetto Day was also celebrated in the interior, but with less enthusiasm.  While 
planters in the antebellum interior could imagine themselves among the troops valiantly 
defending Charleston (and their forbearers had certainly been there), they were even 
more excited by ways to imagine themselves as offering specific contributions to 
America’s success in the Revolution.  Since backcountry South Carolina in fact did not 
lack for historic Revolutionary battles, it was perhaps only a matter of time until some 
South Carolinians would begin to publicly celebrate these battles. 
With the exception of Palmetto Day, which became more a festival than a 
battlefield commemoration, South Carolinians shied away from too much explicit 
commemoration of the Revolution in the first three decades.  South Carolinians did not 
reenact specific battles, choosing instead to honor the Revolution in general, rather than 
specific engagements.  Local almanacs included only a few specific Revolutionary 
battles, and very few of them were local battles.  For example, the “Carolina and Georgia 
Almanack” included Tarleton’s defeat, but also the Battle of Trenton and of Bunker Hill.  
Specifically militia battles were not honored, such as Kings Mountain and the Battle of 
Huck’s Defeat.  The only other local battle mentioned was the battle at Camden, which 
was a humiliating defeat for the Americans.27 
 
 
27 The Carolina and Georgia Almanack or Ephemeris for the Year of Our Lord 1783, Being the Third after 
Leap-Year, and the Seventh of American Independence (Charlestown, 1783). Representative almanacs 
include The South Carolina and Georgia Almanack or Ephemeris for the Year of Our Lord 1783, Being the 
Third after Leap-Year, and the Seventh of American Independence,  (Charlestown, S.C., 1783), South 
Carolina and Georgia Almanack,  (Charleston, S.C., 1784), The Carolina and Georgia Almanack or 
Astronomical Diary,  (Charleston, S.C., 1787), South Carolina and Georgia Almanack,  (Charleston, S.C., 
1793), The Palladium of Knowledge, or the Carolina and Georgia Almanac,  (Charleston, S.C., 1796), and 
The Mirror or Carolina and Georgia Almanac,  (Charleston, S.C., 1804).  All of these can be found in the 
Book Division of the South Caroliniana Library. 
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Compared to the ideological ease of Palmetto Day, the backcountry battles 
offered large problems, but also certain potential advantages. The advantage is that 
Palmetto Day, while celebrating a one-day victory, largely commemorates a moment of 
defeat.  In contrast, several backcountry battles were clear military victories for the 
Patriots (some of the only victories of the entire war); and it is always nicer to celebrate 
victory than defeat.  The problem is that many of the most famous backcountry battles 
included both Patriot and Loyalist militia troops.  The backcountry battles are a record of 
violence, brutality, war crimes, and strong divisions between armed locals.  How could 
South Carolinians write and speak the history of civil war in such a way as to maintain 
the peace? 
Nineteenth-century South Carolinians recognized the divided loyalties of their 
citizens in their battle-specific commemorations, although they did not dwell on these 
differences.   Instead, they recognized divided loyalties as one more obstacle that their 
ancestors had to overcome in order to win the Revolution. In order to show specifically 
how South Carolinians handled battlefield commemorations, I want to consider 
commemorative activity at two particular backcountry battles that both took place in what 
is today York County, South Carolina: the battle of Huck’s Defeat (also known as 
Brattonsville or the battle of Williamson’s Plantation) and King’s Mountain.  I chose 
these two battles because they were both Patriot victories against Loyalist troops, where 
probable majorities of the combatants were denizens of the Carolina and Georgia 
backcountry.28  Further, these two battles both have an early history of commemorative 
 
28 For more specific discussion of these two battles, refer back to Chapter One, or see Gordon, South 
Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History . 
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activity, and some of the celebrations were captured in local newspapers and in 
publications circulated statewide. 
I will turn first to the battle of Huck’s Defeat.  Col. Beatty’s oration at an 1839 
commemoration of the battle stands as a particularly useful case of trends in 
commemoration.  The Battle of Huck’s Defeat was one of the more vicious in the 
Revolution.  (As I showed in Chapter One, that is a high standard, in a manner of 
speaking.)  Huck, a Loyalist commander originally from Pennsylvania, was one of the 
most hated officers in South Carolina, accused of numerous wartime atrocities. Huck and 
his troops descended on the homes of two prominent Patriot leaders in the New 
Acquisition District.  Both men were commanders under militia General Thomas Sumter.  
As in so many other cases in the militia civil war, the Loyalist militia approached 
intending to try to get intelligence on Sumter’s position, and to harass local Patriot 
families in an effort to discourage them and smoke out their heads of household.  All of 
this was part of a strategic battle for control of the hearts and minds, as well as the 
byways, of York County.   
Loyalist troops managed to surprise the Bratton family on their homestead.  The 
young men were taken prisoner in the family’s corncrib and told to prepare for execution 
at the break of dawn.  Martha Bratton and her younger children were imprisoned in the 
upstairs and guarded throughout the night by troops.  Legend has it that Mrs. Bratton was 
threatened with death by one of the Loyalists.  On the nearby Williamson plantation, 
several members of that family were also placed under guard. 
Stories differ on who carried word to Sumter’s camp, but a messenger did get 
through to Williamson and Bratton, alerting them to their families’ peril.  They led a 
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detachment of their forces in a fast ride back to their plantations, and surprised the 
Loyalist forces just before dawn.  The engagement was, notably, a complete victory for 
the Patriots.  Captain Huck was killed in the first round of fire, and only about 50 men 
from the Loyalist group managed to escape.  The Bratton family was freed, and area 
Patriots took heart in the victory. 
This, then, was a battle that York County residents wanted to remember.  Much of 
the impetus for the first large commemoration actually came from the Bratton family, 
whose nineteenth-century members saw this as an ideal way to burnish their family’s 
reputation.  Dr. John Bratton, one of the sons of William and Martha Bratton, 
spearheaded the 1839 commemorative celebration.  He also still owned the battlefield, 
and chose to open his land to the public for the ceremony.  Proving once again that there 
is no such thing as a free lunch, some fifteen hundred people, including four aged 
Revolutionary soldiers, turned out to stifle in the South Carolina summer heat while 
hearing hours of high-flying oratory, watching a procession of badly trained militia, and 
enjoying lengthy toasts in return for the bribe of Dr. Bratton’s luncheon.29 
In burnishing the contributions of the militia, the speaker went beyond 
recognizing the presence of Loyalist forces as well as Patriot forces to celebrating the 
negative contributions of the Loyalists.  While many South Carolinians “joined the 
standard of the enemy, and committed frequently the most horrid and revolting deeds,” 
the orator claimed that “the inhabitants of York District, to their imperishable honor were 
never paroled as prisoners, nor took protection as British subjects—preferring rather exile 
and resistance, than lame submission and a dishonorable peace.”  In a single phrase, the 
celebrants made their own local experiences more honorable than most of the state, 
 
29 Celebration of Huck's Defeat,   
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acknowledging Loyalism only to emphatically write it out of local history.  Similarly, 
during the toasting John Carrol, a local soldier credited with shooting Captain Huck, was 
feted for being “a whig from the first, a whig to the last, he didn’t believe in the tories, 
and he made the tories believe in him.” It is true that a majority of the fighters from the 
York area were Patriots, but the area and surrounding counties certainly produced 
fighters for both sides, making this a rhetorical sleight-of-hand to transfer guilt 
elsewhere.30   
With the guilt for Loyalist acts safely transferred, celebrants could revel in the 
brutality and blood of the Revolution.  With great overstatement, the speaker told the 
crowd “the waters of the spring below us, that now gush forth so clear and transparent, 
were on that occasion completely crimsoned with the blood of tories and British 
soldiery.”31  The commemorators showed a certain blood lust that was perhaps the single 
best indicator that they no longer feared, or even saw, their own tortured past of repeated 
civil conflict. 
The commemoration did recognize the division of South Carolinians at the battle.  
Col. Beatty argued that the fact that “many of her own citizens joined the standards of the 
enemy” simply made his “forefathers” more “…like David of old, with a sling and a 
stone, against the Goliath of British might.”  In creating his image of David vs. Goliath, 
Beatty lamented the difficulties attendant on America “with a small population thinly 
scattered over extensive territory, and even that population divided and arranged on 
opposite sides.”  He also played up South Carolina’s importance in the Revolutionary 
war.  For him, South Carolina’s internal division meant they suffered more than other 
 
30 Celebration of Huck's Defeat,  5. 
31 Celebration of Huck's Defeat,  4. 
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Americans in order to birth the new nation, and should therefore come in for 
disproportionately greater praise.  “South Carolina suffered much in the revolutionary 
struggle.  She had not only to contend with this formidable foreign foe; but many of her 
own citizens joined the standard of the enemy, and committed frequently the most horrid 
and revolting deeds.”32   
The 1839 commemoration of Huck’s Defeat is the only one I have found evidence 
for in the nineteenth century.  In part, this is because it was a more local battle, without 
the high stakes of major backcountry battles for control of the country.  It is certainly no 
accident that this celebration took place at the instigation of a descendant trying to 
burnish his family’s reputation.  In comparison, Carolinians on both sides knew King’s 
Mountain was a turning point from the beginning.  Cornwallis was upset when he heard 
of Ferguson’s loss, and both General Greene and local Loyalists recognized that the 
Patriot victory would dry up recruits for the British side.  One local Loyalist despaired 
that other Ninety-Six Loyalists were “so totally disheartened by the defeat of Ferguson” 
that in the entire area now “we could with difficulty assemble one hundred, and even 
those. . . would not have made the smallest resistance if they had been attacked.”33 
King’s Mountain attracted commemorative activity by 1815.  The local York 
community organized a celebration to lay a memorial marker dedicated to four local 
heroes.  No oratory was published, but the marker remains together, next to a newer one 
laid in 1914 that repeats the wording on the earlier plaque.  This earlier, local 
 
32 Celebration of Huck's Defeat,  2. 
33 Huck’s Defeat was celebrated repeatedly in the twentieth century, and is now celebrated almost yearly.  
The first time it was celebrated again was in 1919  D. H. Hill, Col. William Hill and the Campaign of 1780 
(1919).   Pancake, Destructive War . 
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commemoration paved the way for a much larger and much more ambitious 1855 
celebration.34 
 The 1839 commemoration of Huck’s Defeat carried no clear political overtones 
for antebellum America.  Rather, it spoke to a more general sense of undivided patriotic 
fervor and Revolutionary virtue, just as countless other celebrations across the United 
States did.  By the 1850s, however, battlefield commemorative culture fulfilled much 
more specific political aims.  As tensions between the Southern states and the Northern 
states increased, the American Revolutionary memory took on a new cast.  South 
Carolinians began to imagine their forefathers as the original defenders of Southern 
national independence, as much as the creators of an American independent polity.  
When York County, South Carolina residents first began planning a “celebration” of the 
battle of King’s Mountain for the seventy-fifth anniversary, they invoked the “reunion of 
the states on the ever-memorable spot” as desirable because “we meet as children of the 
same family, as joint possessors of the same heritage of fame.”35   
Who were these children of the same family who the Kings Mountain committee 
chose to invite to join in the planning and celebration?  They were South Carolinians, 
especially from the surrounding districts of Chester, Union, Spartanburg and Lancaster, 
and North Carolinians, Virginians, Tennesseans, and Kentuckians.  On the practical side, 
these states represented areas from where men who fought in the battle of Kings 
Mountain hailed.  The organizers intended to “especially [invite] the descendants of those 
who took part in the battle.”  On a deeper level, the imagined understanding of Kings 
 
34 See Figure 1 at the end of this chapter. 
35 John S. Preston, Celebration of the Battle of King's Mountain (Yorkville, S.C., 1855) 2. 
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Mountain as a Southern battle for America made it imperative that it becomes a shared 
experience of Southerners as well as a memorial for South Carolinians.36   
It was not solely a Southern affair.  In order to illustrate the importance of their 
festivities, and to press their claims for the importance of Kings Mountain to the nation, 
they did invite “distinguished gentlemen from all parts of the Union,” including George 
Bancroft as guest speaker.  (Bancroft, however, was a Southern sympathizer, a point that 
became clear in his speech.)37 
An air of martial romanticism pervaded the celebration.  Various volunteer militia 
companies enthusiastically paraded along the route.  Some of the troops recited “the 
concluding chapters of ‘Horse-shoe Robinson’, in which are described, in the attractive 
garb of romance, the thrilling incidents of the battle” while others listened to “the 
inspiriting strains of martial music.”  The day was not without its hazards.  There was an 
animated reenactment of the battle, marred by an accident in which one soldier managed 
to “severely shatter[] his right arm” when he discharged his weapon too early.  He was 
carried off the field for an immediate amputation.  In addition, “his face was shockingly 
burned, and fears were entertained that his eye-sight would be entirely lost.”  This event 
provided a bit of excitement for the afternoon but also was an unintentional reminder of 
the very real hazards of war that a generation who had largely not seen military service 
 
36 Preston, King's Mountain 4.  Given Kings Mountain’s location on the North Carolina/South Carolina 
border, the York organizers had to invite representatives from North Carolina (or at least Mecklenburg 
County).  However, there was no requirement that they include states representing the Over Mountain Men 
(Tennessee and Kentucky) and certainly no requirement that they invite Virginia representatives.  Should 
there be any doubt that this felicity among Southern states was a product of a particular historic epoch, one 
need only consult the Yorkville Enquirer’s story on the Kings Mountain Monument Association’s 
installation festivities in the early twentieth century.  At that commemoration, the North Carolina and South 
Carolina senators used the occasion to take public potshots at each other’s states.  South Carolina’s senator 
“jumped on the North Carolinians with both feet for their notorious tendencies to try to claim everything in 
the way of historical achievement.”  The Yorkville Enquirer snickered at the North Carolina D.A.R.’s who 
“seemed horrified at the way [the South Carolina senator] treated the sacred Revolutionary history and 
traditions of their state.” 
37 Preston, King's Mountain 4. 
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had forgotten.  It was also an eerie preview of what South Carolinians would experience 
in a few short years.  The reenactment served to connect South Carolinians with their past 
in a concrete way.  It is not surprising that a battle commemoration would involve a 
reenactment, although using live ammunition turned out to be a poor decision.38 
The commemoration featured two orators, both of whom spoke at great length as 
befitted a nineteenth-century speech. Both orators dwelt with great interest on the 
military nature of the conflict, and dwelt on the brutality of the battle.  Both orators also 
recognized the nature of civil warfare that was epitomized in the battle at Kings 
Mountain.  In fact, they dwelled on scenes of violent Tories.  However, no one mentioned 
that descendants of the Tories might also be present that day. 
George Bancroft, the famous historian and promoter of history as a support of 
American nationalism, was the keynote speaker.  Bancroft himself was descended from 
Loyalists, yet he had fundamental disdain for the Loyalists, which he expressed in his 
speech.  For him, Kings Mountain was a singular turning point because it “struck dismay 
into the tories…check[ing] the concerted system of house-burning and domestic carnage 
which was filling Carolina with the deadliest horrors of civil war.”  A local orator was 
even less restrained, describing Loyalists as “myrmidons” who “ravished” wives and 
daughters, hanged sons, and butchered pregnant women.  His affections, like those of the 
Carolinians, were to celebrate the frontier men of legend, who turned out valiantly 
despite listening for “the echo of the Indian’s war-whoop” that might threaten their 
families.  Another orator believed that the “mountain hunter” was so accurate at Kings 
Mountain that he “sent a death messenger in every bullet.”39   
 
38 Preston, King's Mountain 4, 26-27, 36-37. 
39 Preston, King's Mountain  49, 56, 79-80. 
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Bancroft specifically endorsed the view that Kings Mountain was a singular 
example of Southern bravery in the face of overwhelming odds.  “All honor must be 
awarded to the south, since she was left to herself in the hour of her utmost distress.”  
Southerners in the audience wondered if once again they would be left alone to defend 
themselves against such distress.  Bancroft played up regional hostilities by emphasizing 
that the South had honored the Revolutionary contributions of the North, but not vice 
versa.  The toasts also picked up this theme.  Among the toasts was one honoring York 
for her steady Patriot leanings and calling on her to “never shrink from that principle of 
magnanimous independence” which presumably she could teach other Southerners.  Yet 
another toast was offered to “Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina: Firmly united 
in the days of 1780, may they ever be found, side by side, battling in defense of their 
constitutional rights and liberties against a common foe.”  Again, speakers used the Kings 
Mountain celebration to invoke another coming struggle for Southern independence 
against aggression.  Should the point have been too subtle for some in the audience, a 
congratulatory letter from Missouri spelled it out.  A Missourian asserted, “we have a 
similar foe to encounter in Kansas.” He said that the border ruffians were the inheritors of 
the Patriot forces at Kings Mountain, fighting “single handed and alone” just as the 
Patriots had.40 
Revolutionary virtue could serve to call and inspire less aware South Carolinians 
to the defense of Southern liberty again.  In between toasting famous Revolutionary 
leaders such as Washington, De Kalb, Marion, Sumter and Pickens, celebrants toasted 
John C. Calhoun.41 
 
40 D. R. Atchinson, Platte City, Mo., Sept. 12, 1855. Preston, King's Mountain  34, 76, 88.   
41 Preston 34. 
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And yet, there were lessons there for them that they chose to ignore.  In relishing 
the bloodiness of the Revolution, one cannot help wishing they had considered that war is 
bloody.  A local orator imagined his grandfather asking, “why have we marred the face of 
this fair, new land with a cruel and bloody civil war?”  However, the orator celebrated 
such brutality, reveling in an imagined connection with mountain men who “turn[ed] 
aside for nothing, save now and then to shoot a tory, as a bear hunter shoots a snake, 
merely to kill the vermin.”  Battlefield commemoration was another way for South 
Carolinians to talk themselves into another civil war.42 
What about open discussions of Loyalism?  Adjoining Chester County bragged 
that their district had been “filled…with whigs, and now with their descendants.”  Chester 
County had plenty of Tories too, but in memory they claimed to have been solidly Whig.  
York toasted itself at the commemoration as “that portion of South Carolina which 
scorned British protection in 1780.”  There was certainly recognition (with a certain gory 
enthusiasm) of the centrality of Tories in the battle of King’s Mountain.  The published 
narrative of the celebration noted that George Bancroft directed the battle recreation 
“hard-by the spreading branches of the venerable tree from which the baker’s dozen of 
traitor tories were hung.”  The violence of the battle was enthusiastically celebrated.  
After the formal toasting, the crowd examined a rifle and sword used in the battle by a 
Chester County native.43 
Tories themselves were painted in colorful but subhuman terms.  The Loyalists of 
this celebration were stock figures.  The celebrated Over Mountain men were imbued in 
this tale with a casual attitude towards hunting Tories. 
 
42 Preston, King's Mountain 46, 51. 
43 Preston, King's Mountain 16, 28, 34-35. 
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Swiftly, but with stern determination, they kept the track, turning aside for 
nothing, save now and then to shoot a tory, as a bear hunter shoots a snake, 
merely to kill the vermin, or to keep his rifle from rusting; or, if they found a 
rascal skulking around their march, they stretched him up with a grape vine, 
practicing for subsequent necessities. 
 
In glorifying the heroism and sturdiness of their ancestors, the speaker turned to 
the mountaineers as the best exemplar of a lost Southern manhood.  The Tories, on the 
other hand, were the lowest of the low. 44 
In conclusion, Tories remerged in public commemoration after the Revolutionary 
generation had long passed, and at a time when their grandchildren were taking their 
place in public life.  Public discussion reemerged in the context of a new aggressiveness 
about the South’s military contributions to the war.  Such contributions were touted not 
for themselves, but for the assertion of Southern honor in the face of growing sectional 
conflict.  The exploits of the Revolution served to call a new generation of Southerners to 
arm for battle to preserve Southern free white liberties. 
“stigma…to the rising generation”: Loyalist Descendants and the Pain of Lingering 
Social Disability45 
 Robert Cunningham was the son of Patrick Cunningham.  Patrick was the 
younger brother of another Robert Cunningham, and a cousin of John Cunningham.  
Patrick was a Loyalist with his brother in the Snow Campaign of 1775-1776, where he 
 
44 Preston, King's Mountain 51. 
45 William Blake complained that his placement on the amercement list would inflict stigma on his 
children.  While he was the only one to complain of this possibility to the General Assembly, it raises a fair 
question.  What was the experience for the children and grandchildren of Loyalists as they grew to 
adulthood and tried to take their place in South Carolina society?  No. 5 William Blake (on Amercement), 
Free Conference Comm. Meeting, SCDAH. 
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raised a militia force and attacked a Patriot encampment, spilling the first South Carolina 
blood of the Revolution.  He did maintain his neutrality after that until the fall of 
Charleston, when he commanded the Little River Loyalist regiment throughout the rest of 
the war.  He applied for leave to stay in South Carolina and was denied, leaving for 
Florida.  After the mass clemency of 1784, he returned in 1785 and appealed to the 
General Assembly, who removed him from the confiscation list, but left him subject to 
both amercement and a seven-year restriction on voting.46   
Family tradition held Patrick was so proud he vowed to avoid voting not only for 
the statutory period, but an additional seven years after that.  (If South Carolina would 
not let him vote, he would not vote in earnest.)  Yet, after the new constitution restored 
all Loyalist voting rights in 1790, his neighbors sent Patrick to the Tenth General 
Assembly (1792-1794).   His young son must have been so proud of that achievement, 
and the warm endorsement from his locality that it implied.  Unfortunately, family 
tradition also held that: 
The jealousy of the members from the Lower Country, particularly directed 
against him as a Cunningham, and shown most palpably in their efforts to keep 
him in the background, by pointedly passing him over in all committees, etc., so 
disgusted him with its paltriness, that he peremptorily refused to yield to the 
earnest entreaties of his constituents to allow himself to be again put forward.47 
 
Perhaps Patrick Cunningham was beginning what was to be a family legacy of 
oversensitivity.  Perhaps this reflects a lingering distrust between the backcountry and the 
Lowcountry.  But more likely, this indicates that while Patrick Cunningham met the test 
of citizenship—acceptance into his local community and attention to the demands of 
neighborliness that citizenship was still only local.  He had the legal privileges of 
 
46 Edgar and Bailey, eds., Directory S.C. House Rep.  4:139-40. 
47 Appendix on Cunningham family in George Atkinson Ward, The Journal and Letters of Samuel Curwen, 
an American in England, from 1775 to 1783, 3rd. ed. (New York, 1845) 618-38. 
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citizenship, but that did not require the General Assembly to grant him trust.  Members 
who were well aware of his wartime history knew that he was a Loyalist from start to 
finish.  In addition, the family recognized that while Ninety-Six residents drew 
distinctions within the Cunningham family, people from other areas focused on the 
association of the family name with William “Bloody Bill” Cunningham, the hated 
Loyalist.48 
 Patrick Cunningham was not the only Loyalist to later overcome voting and 
office-holding restrictions and find himself elected to a position of trust and honor.  
Philip Barton Key of Maryland (uncle of poet Francis Scott Key) left Maryland in the 
wake of his Loyalist military activities, even filing a claim in Britain in 1785.  Yet he 
returned to Maryland and opened a successful law practice, regaining his former wealth 
despite never overturning the confiscation of his property.  He was elected to the United 
States House of Representatives in 1806, despite a campaign against him on the grounds 
of his past Loyalism.  With self-satisfaction, he reflected that he “returned to my country 
like a prodigal to his father, felt as an American should feel, was received and forgiven, 
of which the most convincing proof is my election.”49 
 
48 John Belton O'Neall, Biographical Sketches of the Bench and Bar of South Carolina (Charleston, S.C., 
1859) 395-96.  Judge O’Neall was a contemporary of Robert Cunningham.  Interestingly, this was not the 
only time he interfered in public judgments on the Cunningham family.  William Gilmore Simms suspected 
him of helping write part of the Appendix on the Cunningham family published by Samuel Curwen, but 
supplied by Ann Pamela and Robert Cunningham.  William Gilmore Simms to Benjamin Franklin Perry, 
Woodlands, Oct. 30, 1846, Mary C. Simms Oliphant, Alfred Taylor Odell, and T. C. Duncan Eaves, eds., 
The Letters of William Gilmore Simms, 5 vols. (Columbia, S.C., 1952-) 2:202.  John Belton O’Neall, 
Appleton’s Encyclopedia, Virtual American Biographies, http://famousamericans.net/johnbeltononeall/, 
Accessed March 14, 2007. 
49 M. Christopher New, Maryland Loyalists in the American Revolution (Centreville, Md., 1996) xi, 121-
22.  Francis Scott Key’s father was a Patriot during the Revolution, so his own actions can’t be compared to 
the Loyalist children and grandchildren later in this chapter.  Nonetheless, it strikes me as very much a 
story of the American Revolution that our national anthem was written by a man who had both Patriots and 
Loyalists in his family. 
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Robert Cunningham himself was born in 1786, just after his father returned to 
South Carolina.  Growing up in the 1790s and 1800s, he came of age in a time when 
Loyalists were integrated back into the community and little was said about them 
publicly.  Yet he grew up with a very thin skin on the subject, indicative that he and his 
family were acutely aware that they did come under increased scrutiny.  He became a 
lawyer, and studied under John C. Calhoun, becoming friends in the process.  At the 
outbreak of the War of 1812, he rushed to volunteer, “burning with the desire to wipe out 
forever the popular stigma” of his family’s association with Bloody Bill.  He organized a 
militia unit, and served honorably during the war.  As a war hero, he was elected to the 
General Assembly in 1820 for the district of Laurens.  Stories differ on what happened 
next.  A family supporter claimed he heard whispers against another man with the name 
Cunningham, and stood up to defend that man against charges of Tory descent, admitting 
in a “manly avowal” that he was of the Tory Cunningham family.  Other accounts 
suggest that he was the person being discussed, and that fellow legislators suggested he 
could not be trusted despite his own military service because of his Tory ancestry.  In any 
case, accounts all agree on what happened next.  He quit politics in disgust, and refused 
to ever hold another public office.50 
In South Carolina’s 1830 nullification controversy, he was a Unionist.  While 
admirers attributed his insistence on union to his war service, it is certainly tempting to 
suspect that as someone smeared with disloyalty and disunity his whole life, he clung to 
 
50 Calhoun arranged for him to study law under a Connecticut attorney, among his many kindnesses over 
the years.  At the time, he recommended him as a young man “of an excellent character, and of very 
respectable connections.”  So presumably, in 1810 the Cunninghams were considered “respectable.”  
Calhoun to Benjamin Tallmade, Laurens, S.C., April 18, 1810, Robert Lee Meriwether, William Edwin 
Hemphill, and Clyde Norman Wilson, eds., The Papers of John C. Calhoun, 28 vols. (Columbia, S.C., 
1959-) 27: 288-89.  O'Neall, Biographical Sketches 397-99.  David Moltke-Hansen, "Why History 
Mattered: The Background of Ann Pamela Cunningham's Interest in the Preservation of Mt. Vernon," 
Furman Studies 26 (1980): 35. 
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national unity for himself.  But in the heat of rapidly dissolving social ties, Col. William 
Campbell Preston made an impassioned oratorical push for nullification.  Standing in the 
courthouse at Columbia, he bandied about the opprobriuous epithet Tory repeatedly, and 
in such a way that suggested he intended to target Robert Cunningham, or at least that 
was very much the way Robert took it.  Aggravated beyond belief, and ever sensitive, 
Cunningham tried to challenge him to a duel (but mutual friends intervened.)51   
Other Cunninghams were sensitive.  His son John Cunningham complained to 
John C. Calhoun after the publication of accounts of his ancestors’ war behavior of his 
“peculiar” position in his own neighborhood of Abbeville.  He reflected on his difficulties 
when my “family in this State has against it many strong prejudices associated with the 
[American] Revolution,” and concluded that those reservations were likely to stand in his 
way in trying for political position.  As an ambitious young man, he asked Calhoun, a 
family friend, whether he should leave for Memphis or New Orleans, where he could 
make a name for himself without the constant quiet resentment of Toryhood.  In addition, 
he asked Calhoun for a letter of character recommendation that he could take with him 
west.52 
Even in private life, Robert Cunningham felt people continued to talk about his 
Tory heritage suspiciously.  In an effort to clear the air, he set out to find and publish 
 
51 The South Carolina Nullification Crisis precipitated the national crisis.  Local nullifiers wanted to call a 
convention to nullify the hated ‘Tariff of Abominations’ that raised many import duties 30% to 50%.  
Unionists were not in favor of the tariff, but argued that the Nullifiers were rash and would be better served 
by trying to repeal the tariff, not nullify.  South Carolina went through a political war for control of the 
General Assembly, and friends and relatives were increasingly hostile to each other.  Both sides argued that 
they were the true inheritors of Revolutionary virtue.. William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The 
Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New York, 1965), Edgar, South Carolina 330-37, 
Lacy K. Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism: The South Carolina Upcountry, 1800-1860 (New York, 
1988) 127-40.  O'Neall, Biographical Sketches 399-400. 
52 John Cunningham to John C. Calhoun, Abbeville Court House, Oct. 15, 1846, Meriwether, Hemphill, 
and Wilson, eds., Calhoun Papers  23:492-94.  Calhoun did provide John with a letter of introduction to a 
former Louisiana governor.  Calhoun to Alexander Mouton, Nov. 8, 1846, Meriwether, Hemphill, and 
Wilson, eds., Calhoun Papers 23: 532. 
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historical proof clearing his ancestors, and thereby removing the Tory stain for his 
family.  He resented the widespread nineteenth-century characterization of Loyalists as 
brutal men bent on committing atrocities for blood sport—men who were lacking in some 
crucial features of humanity and civilization—in other words, archetypal “others.”  In his 
apologia, he hoped to place his ancestors’ acknowledged Loyalism in a better light. 
Involving his invalid daughter Ann Pamela Cunningham in the project, he hoped to give 
her something to do besides mope.  As she explored, she became convinced her Loyalist 
ancestors should be seen as principled, and that historians had been too hasty to condemn 
Loyalists as unprincipled men looking for personal spoils, given that plenty of Patriots 
were also motivated primarily by the possibility for plunder, and Loyalists were often 
motivated by loftier goals.  In 1845, Ann Pamela Cunningham published a defense of 
Patrick, Robert, and William Cunningham in an appendix to a compilation of New 
England Loyalist papers first published in London.  (An important point: she published 
anonymously.)  She hoped to show that they had followed true convictions selflesslyand 
had behaved decently, while many Patriots had simply sought self-advancement. She also 
tried to rescue William Cunningham from his appellation “Bloody Bill.”  At one point, 
she argued that William was warped by persecution, which “speedily changed a kind and 
affectionate tempered man into a vengeful and unsparing partisan.”  Much to her dismay, 
her efforts did not receive the kind of positive affirmation and acceptance she was hoping 
for.53 
Her publication attracted the furious notice of William Gilmore Simms, a 
Charleston novelist, historian, and prominent Southern intellectual.  And unfortunately, 
 
53 Moltke-Hansen, "Why History Mattered," 36-38.  Ward, The Journal and Letters of Samuel Curwen, an 
American in England, from 1775 to 1783 638-48. 
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her father was a far less sensitive individual than his daughter.  When she was a 
schoolgirl, she was so difficult to live with that her roommate, Anna Maria Calhoun 
(John C. Calhoun’s daughter), changed roommates within the first month.  Simms 
recognized that loyalties could be complicated, but otherwise he completely rejected the 
Cunninghams’ argument.  He attacked the Cunningham history in five articles in the 
Southern Literary Messenger in 1846, three dealing with the Revolution in South 
Carolina and Patrick and Robert Cunningham, and two devoted to demolishing any effort 
to say anything good about William Cunningham.  While he did attribute good wartime 
behavior to Robert and Patrick Cunningham, he viciously demolished Ann Pamela 
Cunningham’s attempts to redeem William.  He was not only livid that the author (as he 
did not know her identity) would not “leave at rest a memory, which nothing but a 
diseased and mistaken judgment could have wished to summon,” but enraged that in her 
defense she impugned Patriot heroes, and made one John Caldwell the devil of her piece.  
Perhaps this was a poor idea from many angles, as Caldwell was John C. Calhoun’s uncle 
(and the man for whom he was named) as well as an honored Patriot figure.  Simms was 
attuned to the Caldwell family’s feelings, but gave little thought to the feelings of 
Loyalist descendants.  He did not suspect the real authoress, but he did believe whoever 
wrote the piece could only be a person with “a blind and stubborn attachment, whether of 
kindred or sympathy.”  In that he was right, but he later had to backtrack.  He demolished 
Ann Pamela’s argument paragraph by paragraph, and the only good thing he could find to 
say about William was he was a “bold, bad man.”54 
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Simms, "The Civil Warfare in the Carolinas and Georgia, During the Revolution, Part Ii," Southern 
Literary Messenger 12, no. 6 (1846): 321-36, William Gilmore Simms, "The Civil Warfare in the Carolinas 
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The entire exchange started a volley of responses, and Simms suspected the 
impetus came from northerners.  His friend James Henry Hammond was much more 
perceptive, warning him two months after the final attack ran that “you were very severe 
on the ‘Cunningham Family’ & it strikes me that this answer does not probably come 
from the North, but from much nearer home.”  Hammond did not know who the author 
was, but he did reflect that the “Cunninghams here are extremely sensitive and always on 
the qui vive for insults on their ancestry.”  Here we see what many others probably 
thought: while everyone was aware of their ancestry, nobody dwelt on it the way the 
family did.  Yet I suspect the Cunninghams became so sensitive because they were 
acutely aware of having “Bloody Bill” hanging over their head.  It was easy for outsiders 
who didn’t have to live under that cloud to dismiss them as overly sensitive, just as it 
always is easier for the person with privilege of any kind.55 
Hammond was right to suspect the family had a hand in the whole thing.  Ann 
Pamela Cunningham became very upset, and eventually Simms became aware of her 
identity.  He was taken aback, and without denying his own position, he apologized to her 
and her circle of friends for giving “pain to such a creature so delicately constituted.”  He 
also suspected she hadn’t written it, and kept looking for a man behind the scenes.  (He 
was wrong.)  Ann Pamela’s brother John hot-headedly tried to challenge Simms to a duel, 
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but the parties were able to avoid it while saving face.  John later tried to dissociate 
himself from the defense, indicating to Simms that he felt “regret” over the publication.  
He was probably embarrassed by anything that reminded people once again that he was a 
Loyalist descendant.56 
Ann Pamela and Robert were harder to please.  Simms protested he had treated 
Patrick’s and Robert’s cases with “great forbearance & respect,” both out of historical 
accuracy and out of respect for Robert Cunningham and his “connection with the Union 
Party in 1832.”  But Simms drew a sharp line between those men and William 
Cunningham, warning that “no member” of the family should “attempt[] to justify and 
defend such a person.”  While he felt the family were not “identified with his infamy & 
name” (obviously, the Cunningham family vociferously disagreed), they ran the risk that 
trying to defend William would “only incur the danger, in the vulgar mind” of connecting 
the names.  “Any farther attempt to do so will greatly endanger their own position.”   He 
pushed his friend Perry to try to convince the family to back off, and thanked him several 
months later for putting “them right on the necessity of insisting upon a total separation 
from Bill, whom they would in vain try to rescue from public odium.”57 
Robert Cunningham reacted to the embarrassment by trying to involve his friend 
John C. Calhoun.  He implored him for a letter of character reference for his family, 
telling him what he knew of his ancestors.  Calhoun was the son of Patrick Calhoun, a 
Patriot commander in the Revolution, putting his own ancestry beyond dispute.  Calhoun 
responded generously, reminding any future reader of the “kind & friendly personal 
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relations” between them.  On Robert, John and Patrick Cunningham’s wartime service 
and character, Calhoun reflected that while his own family was “opposed to the side they 
took in the great struggle,” they never said “aught against either of them calculated to 
impeach their humanity, or conduct, as individuals, in relation to the Whigs.”  Instead, 
Patrick Calhoun spoke “favorably” of Patrick Cunningham, and Calhoun’s uncle John 
Caldwell (the one Ann Pamela had just maligned) spoke well of Robert Cunningham.  
Even as a personal friend, John C. Calhoun was unwilling to say anything in favor of 
William Cunningham, although he reminded his friend that William was “as I have 
always understood, remotely connected with you.”  On William, he was moved to say 
“that I never heard my parents, or any of my relations speak of him, but in terms of the 
severest reprobation for his unhumanity & cruelty.”  Calhoun went on to express anger 
that Ann Pamela (and he knew it was her) had tried to defend William by working to 
“impeach the character of those who became victims of the cruelty of the former.”  He 
also went on for a paragraph defending his own kinsman John Caldwell.58 
Two lessons seem apparent from this episode.  One, Ann Pamela Cunningham 
and her father should have left well enough alone.  In trying to clear their name from the 
stigma they perceived, they instead reminded people of their ancestry without convincing 
anyone of their cause.  While many agreed that their father and grandfather were 
honorable Loyalists, their connection to William Cunningham was impossible to shake.  
Perhaps this is why Ann Pamela actually changed the spelling of the family name in later 
years, turning Cuningham into Cunningham.59  Two, while this is evidence that there was 
 
58 John Caldwell was murdered by William Cunningham’s Loyalist forces in November of 1781.  Robert 
Cunningham to Calhoun, Nov. 19, 1846, Calhoun to Robert Cunningham, Meriwether, Hemphill, and 
Wilson, eds., Calhoun Papers 23: 543, 549-50. 
59 I use “her” spelling throughout this work. 
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some lingering hostility to Loyalist families in South Carolina, it is also the only case I 
can find of such trauma.  Even this lasting stigma did not stop the Cunninghams from 
acquiring wealth and political office. 
Thankfully for America, Ann Pamela Cunningham finally found a more effective 
outlet for her burning desire to clear her family name.  She turned from trying to burnish 
Loyalist history to burnishing Patriot history, and succeeded marvelously.  After her 
public humiliation as a writer, she aided another female historian in compiling materials 
on female Patriots in the Revolution, leading to a three-volume history.  In 1853, she 
anonymously published “An Appeal to the Ladies of the South” in the Charleston 
Mercury and then other Southern newspapers.  Signing herself “a southern matron,” she 
started a sectional appeal to raise money to purchase Mount Vernon, the homestead of 
George Washington, for eternal preservation.  Mount Vernon was already a popular 
tourist attraction, but the Washington family was tired of non-paying tour groups 
picnicking on their lawn.  In financial trouble and sick of the trouble, John Washington 
tried to sell the property several times to Congress and/or the Virginia state government.60 
Ann Pamela and other Southerners were afraid that a Northerner might buy the 
property.  In her appeal, she wondered if “sacred” Mount Vernon might become “the seat 
of manufactures and manufacturers?  Noise and smoke, and the busy hum of men, 
destroying all sanctity and repose around the tomb[?]”  Despite the intention of saving 
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Mount Vernon for the South, within a year Northern women also wanted to raise money 
for the project.  Ann Pamela welcomed the money and effort, and strove to rise above 
sectional politics, but her own mother sniffed, “Let it be all South.”  Perhaps this had 
something to do with the fact that her own mother’s family was tied to Washington’s by 
marriage, whereas Ann Pamela thrilled to link herself to a more positive American 
history.  This granddaughter of Tories found herself surrounded by women chosen for 
their distinguished Revolutionary ancestry.  In 1858, the Mount Vernon Ladies Society 
was able to purchase the property, with Ann Pamela Cunningham as the head.  She 
continued to run the organization well past the Civil War, putting the property on a solid 
financial foundation and ensuring the continuity of the group.  She truly found her 
personal outlet in historical preservation work, and wiped out any perceived stain on her 
character from her Tory ancestry by firmly associating herself with the man considered 
the deity of the Revolution. 
Today, there is a South Carolina chapter of the Daughters of the American 
Revolution named for her, seemingly oblivious to the fact that she was the granddaughter 
of Tories.  She did manage to put her ancestry behind her through the medium of historic 
preservation of the Patriot past.61 
Historic preservation was a surprisingly popular outlet for Loyalists and their 
descendants.  In Massachusetts, several Loyalist returnees (men who fled by 1776 and 
came back in the 1780s) were early members of historical societies, including the 
Massachusetts Historical Society and the American Antiquarian Society.  William Paine, 
one such Loyalist, even became the vice-president of the American Antiquarian Society 
and spoke on their behalf at a patriotic occasion in 1815.  In South Carolina, Ann Pamela 
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Cunningham was not the only grandchild of Loyalists to turn to historic preservation.  
Frederick Augustus Porcher was the grandson of Philip Porcher of Charleston.  Porcher 
had been a Whig, even lending the state 14,000 pounds for the war effort.  He also served 
on the Committee of Ninety Nine in 1774.  But after the fall of Charleston, he took a 
British commission, which led to his inclusion on the confiscation list.  As we saw in 
Chapter Four, he petitioned the General Assembly and was included in the mass 
clemency restoration in 1784, although he was still subject to amercement.  (Today the 
Philip Porcher home in Charleston is a very pleasant bed and breakfast, with no mention 
in the guidebooks of Porcher’s status as a post-1780 Loyalist.)62    
His grandson Frederick had an academic temperament.  Despite inheriting a 
sizable plantation, he never was a very good planter and became a professor at the 
College of Charleston.  Trained at Yale, he pursued history as an avocation and wrote 
several pieces on the Lowcountry, including Revolutionary history.  He was well aware 
that his grandfather had been punished for Loyalist activity.  In his memoir, he openly 
catalogued the fact that his grandfather “had been amerced by the Jacksonboro 
Convention.”  Both out of personal interest in history and a desire to associate himself 
with the Whig Revolutionary past, he founded the South Carolina Historical Society in 
1856 to “collect, preserve and publish such historical matter…as should seem desirable.” 
In so doing, he founded an institution that collected extensive materials on the Patriot 
cause, highlighting its virtues and guaranteeing future generations would know of South 
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Carolina’s past.  Like Ann Pamela Cunningham, in addition to founding the organization, 
he served as president for a long stretch, gaining personal honor as well as family honor 
through his pursuit of historic preservation.63 
While there were lingering whispers about some Loyalist clans, the paucity of 
such evidence suggests that Loyalist children and grandchildren were remarkably well 
integrated into South Carolina society.  Porcher’s memoirs indicate no sense of social 
stigma.  Instead, he remembered looking down on a local Methodist family, who were 
distant kinsmen.  His father and a Marion relative formed a local library together.  In the 
Porcher experience, Loyalism was a very brief stigma that was not handed down to later 
generations.  Yet in two cases, Loyalist grandchildren became prominent and influential 
historic preservationists, chiefly memorializing a Whiggish view of the Revolution.  
Temperament clearly played a role, but I find it telling that both of these nineteenth-
century famous South Carolina preservationists had a Loyalist in the closet.64 
William Gilmore Simms and the Romance of Carolinian Civil War: Novelization 
Affixed a Permanent Place for Civil Conflict in Popular Memory 
William Gilmore Simms is one of the reasons that Americans, including 
American historians, have been so enthralled with the brutality of the American 
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Revolution in the South.  For better and for worse, William Gilmore Simms has been the 
primary shaper of the memory of the Revolution in South Carolina for more than a 
century.  He has had a wide influence despite being read relatively infrequently in the 
twentieth century.  Historians read his novels, and his distinctive voice, coupled with 
exhaustive research, has immortalized Revolutionary civil conflict as the central story of 
the Revolution in the South. 
Simms saw himself as both a historian and a novelist, and wrote extensively in 
both forms.  In both, he showed a strong focus on South Carolina’s Revolutionary war 
experience, especially in the Lowcountry he knew and loved.  As a biographer, he wrote 
about Francis Marion and Nathanael Greene, two of the most famous and influential 
military leaders.  In his work on Francis Marion, he had the perfect entrée to examine 
partisan warfare, a prominent feature of the South Carolina experience, and an enduring 
fascination in his novels.  Influenced by James Fenimore Cooper and Sir Walter Scott, he 
aimed to disseminate historical understanding to a wide audience through use of detail-
oriented romances.  In his seven romances of the Revolution, he traced the course of the 
war from the reduction of Charleston to the years immediately following the 
Revolution.65 
For all of his work, he engaged in extensive historical research.  For The Partisan 
(his most famous novel), he conducted extensive interviews with veterans who served 
under Marion.  He also read Marion’s letters, General Horry’s collection of letters from 
other officers, and toured battlefields.  Growing up in a culture steeped in oral traditions 
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of the war, he also had a maternal grandmother who raised him on her favorite subject, 
the Revolution.  He later remembered her emphasis on “Patriot heroism and Tory 
depravity” and it shaped his thinking.  He began informally interviewing war veterans at 
the tender age of thirteen. All of that research paid off, as later historians have established 
that his novels are accurate in most details (if woefully inaccurate about race relations).66 
Simms hoped his novels would teach Southerners about their Revolutionary past, 
but he also hoped that he could educate Northerners about the South’s crucial role in the 
Revolution.  Unfortunately, South Carolina’s civil conflict could easily give rise to the 
belief that South Carolinians were not dedicated to the war, a misimpression to which his 
novels might contribute.  When Lorenzo Sabine published his famous work on Loyalists, 
he pushed the idea that South Carolina had more Tory support than any other region, and 
more inflammatorily, that South Carolina owed her independence to the efforts of New 
England soldiers, not her own men.  Sabine further suggested that Charleston, Simms’ 
beloved hometown, had surrendered without even trying to defend the city.  Outraged but 
smart, Simms planned a Northern lecture tour to address these issues.  Frustratingly, the 
tour failed miserably.  But in his defense, he was careful to recognize that South Carolina 
did produce a large number of Tories, and he was sympathetic to some.67 
Throughout his work, Simms portrayed the brutality and violence of the American 
Revolution in the Carolinas.  Rather than shrinking from the nature of the warfare as 
brutal and internecine, Simms romanticized and celebrated it.  Partly due to the inherent 
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flattening tendencies of the romance form, his Loyalists are almost always from the lower 
classes.  When they come from the upper class, they are looking for personal profit and 
advancement.  His novelistic history judges Tories harshly, although one recent writer 
has argued that in comparison to the ‘straight’ histories of the Revolution of the time, 
Simms offered more nuance.68 
At least his books are full of Tories!  With his focus on civil conflict, he dwelt on 
partisan warfare as experienced by all classes of society.  During the war, General 
Nathanael Greene commented again and again on the fury of hostility during the war, 
once sighing that “the Whigs and the Torrys…pursue each other with as much relentless 
fury as beasts of prey.”  The Whig hero of Mellichampe echoed him.  “It is a strife 
between brothers, all of whom have learned to hate as I do, and to seek to destroy with an 
appetite of far greater anxiety.  The terms between Whig and Tory, now, are death only.  
No quarter is demanded—none is given.”  A party in Woodcraft wanders by the evidence 
of all this hatred: a field where “no coffin or shroud enwrapped the forms of those who 
had cast themselves off.”69 
In Simms’ novels, the Tories are portrayed as committing all the depredations that 
were in fact committed by both sides.  Simms spares no effort in portraying those 
Loyalists as the scum of the earth.  He is perhaps most clear about this in his novels The 
Partisan and The Forayers.  He describes one militia group of Loyalists as a “troop of 
banditti” who comported themselves as follows: 
Banding together in small squads, the dissolute and the wicked among the 
citizens, native and adopted, thus availed themselves of the distractions of 
the war to revenge themselves upon old enemies, destroy the property they 
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could not appropriate, and, with the sword and the rope, punish  [the 
Patriot family]. ...to such a degree were the atrocities of these wretches 
carried, that men were dragged from the arms of their wives at midnight, 
and suffered for their love of country in the sight of wife and children, by 
dying in the rope, and from their own roof-trees.70 [emphasis added] 
 
The Tories themselves were “chiefly the desperadoes and outcasts,” including 
people who had been “notorious for…petty larcenies.”  They were motivated by “a 
profligate lust for plunder” to participate in “that saturnalia of crime.”  In novel after 
novel, Simms argues that Tories were primarily motivated by greed.  In Woodcraft, 
Google steals a gold watch, and carries intelligence for profit, not conviction.  McKewn, 
the dastardly British officer, is busy stealing slaves for personal profit.  In The Forayers, 
one character contemplated the breeding of “monsters” during civil war.  An outlaw 
joined the British cause because “the right side with him…is that which promises most 
plunder.”  And Hell-Fire Dick led a band of deserters who robbed and killed Whig and 
Tory alike.71 
Yet sometimes Simms saw a more nuanced view.  Mellichampe created a 
character modeled on the real life Colonel Thomas “Burnfoot” Brown, who became a 
Loyalist leader after being ruthlessly tortured.  He condemned the increase of brutality on 
both sides, and acknowledged that “to burn in wantonness, and to murder in cold blood, 
and by the cruelest tortures, were the familiar achievements of the time.”  However 
vicious the war might have been at times, Simms played it up for all it was worth, thereby 
immortalizing a view of the Revolution obsessed with violent atrocities.  In that way, 
Simms happily played into the hands of the propagandists of the Revolution.  As a 
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member of the grandchildren’s generation, Simms was influenced by living testimony 
filtered through rapidly changing (and ossifying) memory.  Patriots who lived through the 
events could better separate the reality of partisan warfare with rules from the atrocity 
rhetoric that suffused the culture.  With the passage of time, and constant rhetorical 
reminders of atrocity tales, veterans and civilians alike came to understand their past as 
being more like the tall tales they were used to hearing.  Simms, who grew up on such 
tales, found confirmation of it in his adult interviews.72 
Perhaps the best example of this is in his most famous novel, The Partisan (1835), 
a thinly veiled retelling of Francis Marion’s adventures.  Major Singleton does not 
commit atrocities.  But he is aware of them, including those of Frampton, the revenge-
seeking Patriot whose wife was murdered by Loyalists.  The Partisan is also clear about 
the consequences of growing civil conflict—the disappearance of any position of 
neutrality.  Colonel Walton gave his parole, and tries to stay neutral.  He was upset to 
realize Singleton was unwilling to trust him, and protested he was not a Tory.  
Singleton’s reply?  “I have little faith in neutrals.  He who is not for me, is against me.”73 
What is most important about The Partisan is that it, along with Simms’ other 
Revolutionary romances, fixed a view of the Revolution in South Carolina as a romantic, 
brutal, violent, internecine conflict in the minds of future South Carolinians.  His 
blending of fact, atrocity rhetoric, proslavery apologia, and imagined Tories became the 
view of the Revolution.  At the same time as South Carolinians were reveling in 
commemorating backcountry battles as an example of Southern unity and heroism in the 
face of outside threats to their way of life, Simms reveled in the brutality of war as a sign 
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of masculine Southern honor in his novels.  By so doing, he ensured that the late 
antebellum view of the American Revolution, formulated to answer specific needs of a 
polity dissolving into sectional war, would become the view for more than a century.  
Simms influenced other novelists, and the South Carolina Revolutionary fighting 
continued to be an almost irresistible topic of novelists throughout the twentieth century.  
In 2003, two Southern writers published novels based on the backcountry fighting, and 
despite widely varying literary quality, the novels agree on the brutality and civil war of 
the Revolution.  The Partisan continues to reverberate through the psyche of many 
Americans today, further shaping future views of the Revolution—the novel is the source 
for the adapted screenplay The Patriot (2000).74 
In The Patriot, Mel Gibson plays a loosely disguised version of Francis Marion, 
with bits of Thomas Sumter, Andrew Pickens, and Daniel Morgan thrown in for good 
measure.  (Some sources suggest this was done to avoid unsavory aspects of Marion’s 
life.)  In the movie, the Tories are capable of incredible brutality at the hands of their 
British masters, including burning alive a town of Patriot-identified civilians.  The movie 
paints Banastre Tarleton, renamed Tavington for the movie, as a wicked persecutor of 
Patriots and murderer of young, defenseless boys. 
Now Americans imagine the Revolution in the South as a brutal civil war 
characterized by revenge killings.  Yet this is an inaccurate, misleading picture of the 
war.  It is, however, the legacy of William Gilmore Simms. 
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Conclusion 
 South Carolinians actually dealt with the task of managing historical memory of 
civil conflict rather well.  While some Loyalists certainly had thin skins, they were 
reincorporated at every level of society.   Historical memory focused on topics unlikely to 
upset the apple cart, and rightly so.  While a startlingly high number of Loyalist 
descendants turned to controlling historical memory so as to write themselves into the 
larger patriotic history of America (Bancroft, Porcher, and Cunningham in this chapter), 
peace pervaded South Carolina in part because they handled memory so skillfully.  When 
discussions of Toryism and Tory wartime brutality emerged again into the public arena 
though battle commemorations and William Gilmore Simms’ novels, such discussions 
were firmly anchored in efforts to motivate South Carolinians to choose unity—this time 









 Part of what makes it hard to recover the history of reconciliation after the civil 
war of the Revolution is what makes it worth doing, namely, the success of the enterprise.  
South Carolinians, despite a brutal civil war, were able to reincorporate many defeated 
Loyalists so successfully that their children and grandchildren went on to found 
prominent Revolutionary war preservation efforts, have political careers, and make plenty 
of money.  Loyalist ancestry was no bar to full social and civil engagement in later years.  
Around the world, people know that the American national anthem is very difficult to 
sing, but not that the stirring paean to the American flag was written by the nephew of a 
pardoned Loyalist (although the son of a Patriot). 
 South Carolina’s Revolution was nasty and brutal.  Since each side relied on local 
militia support for numerous engagements, it was almost inevitable that battle tactics 
would sink to those Americans had long used against Native Americans.  The militia’s 
preferred military tactics, and the new political uses of the militia in the Revolution as a 
tool of political enforcement, combined to ensure militias fought viciously, and followed 
the logic of escalating retribution.  As guerilla warfare and the manpower provided by 
trained militias became increasingly important, more than one hundred engagements 
were fought in South Carolina, inluding some of the most spectacular American victories 
of the war.  The battles of Kings Mountain and Cowpens were both fought by Loyalist 
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and Patriot militias, for instance.  South Carolinians eagerly participated in whipping up 
atrocity rhetoric, spreading increasingly preposterous tales around.  Atrocity rhetoric was 
a major recruiting tool, but also a practical teaching tool, showing men how to fight the 
war under the rules of retribution. 
 Understandably, after such a brutal civil war, in which friends and relatives had 
taken opposing sides and undermined each other’s position, victorious South Carolina 
Patriots were enraged and ready for payback.  Yet, while most hated the idea of Loyalists, 
they were willing even at an early period to protect some and forgive others.  The 
Jacksonborough Assembly and Governor Rutledge passed a series of acts regulating the 
return of Loyalists in 1782.  While the Confiscation Act banished almost 400 men, and 
stripped them and their families of all their property, the Assembly was in fact merciful.  
South Carolina gave Loyalists several chances to return to Patriot allegiance before 
lowering the boom of confiscation.   Each act was designed to balance punishment and 
reward, offering Loyalists a carrot and a stick to encourage them to seek reintegration.  
Despite Patriot anger, the General Assembly dramatically whittled their list of potential 
confiscees, and created a lesser punishment for those men who they felt needed some 
public punishment, but not banishment.  Prominent legislators protected their own friends 
and kin.  Clearly many Loyalists were untouched by the Confiscation Act, as the 
Assembly reiterated that Loyalism disqualified men from voting or holding office for 
several years after the Revolution. 
 While some 4,000 white Loyalists did leave Charleston in British transports, 
many more stayed, whether or not they were subject to confiscation.  Loyalists subject to 
confiscation overwhelmingly chose to petition the General Assembly for clemency, 
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drawing on a long Anglo-American history of petition that recognized the duty of 
legislatures to consider such petitions.  Between 1783 and 1784, 70% of the Loyalists 
named on the Confiscation Act submitted petitions to the Assembly.  Petitioners carefully 
assembled packages with individual petitions and supporting petitions attesting to their 
honorable character, good neighborliness, and upright wartime conduct, and lobbied their 
former Patriot neighbors to sign these petitions. 
 Buried under the deluge, the Assembly took two years to consider and debate 
clemency for Loyalists.  Legislators formed committees to consider petitions from each 
district, using local members to decide whether local communities truly supported each 
Loyalist.  At every step of the war, local support was crucial in determining each 
Loyalist’s fate, and local support, as evidenced by supporting petitions, character 
witnesses in hearings, and local legislative approval, made the difference between 
removal from confiscation and continued banishment. 
 At the same time, South Carolinians were forced to consider, and define, what 
citizenship truly meant to them in order to defend Loyalist banishment.  While legal 
definitions of citizenship in a new republic depended on volitional allegiance (the idea 
that citizenship was voluntary and changeable), Americans certainly did not believe that 
one could change citizenship at any time (during a war) without notice.  Practically, 
Loyalist petitions and the way legislators and ordinary South Carolinians questioned and 
supported Loyalists shows that whatever the legal definition of citizenship, South 
Carolinians understood citizenship to be based on evidence of honorable conduct and 
neighborliness.  Citizenship was a lived reality of proper behavior within a web of social 
obligation—the willingness to participate in credit networks, aid each other, and 
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demonstrate these conditions over time.  South Carolinians struggled to reconcile their 
image of Loyalists as pitiless, cruel persecutors with their image of most petitioners they 
knew.  Again and again, they testified that petitioners were men of long residence in 
South Carolina, who had lived near them and been accounted trustworthy and upstanding. 
 In 1784, the General Assembly revised the Confiscation Act, readmitting half of 
the Loyalists to the state, while amercing their estates.  While this restoration act largely 
completed legislative reconciliation, later assemblies continued to readmit a few 
individuals.  In addition, the Assembly continued to hear petitions from amercees, and 
slowly readmitted at least some of those taxes through complicated, individual means.  
Further, even men who could not persuade the Assembly to readmit them were able to 
reclaim at least some of their South Carolina property through their wives and minor 
children, who were increasingly given a 1/3 share.  Overall, the majority of South 
Carolina Loyalists were successful in regaining their former lives. 
 All of this happened despite unrelenting opposition to a few Loyalists.  South 
Carolinians carried on a heated discussion of what to do with Loyalists in newspapers and 
public pamphlets.  Prominent legislators such as Aedanus Burke and Christopher 
Gadsden attacked confiscation as an unwise and unjust policy that would ultimately hurt 
South Carolinians as much as Loyalists.  Others enjoyed reading about the trials and 
tribulations of Loyalists in South Carolina and other colonies, but such discussions, 
however vitriolic, served as a safety valve releasing the pressure of anti-Tory enthusiasm.  
By ‘talking it out,’ South Carolinians saved themselves from enacting their rage more 
violently.  Certainly, there were attacks on a few particularly hated Loyalists, such as 
Matthew Love and James Cooke.  But however violent those attacks were, they took 
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pressure off the rest of the Loyalists, and gave disgruntled Patriots an outlet for their rage.  
(Of course, they probably also scared some former Loyalists into avoiding too much self-
assertion in the critical early years, which helped the process of reconciliation.) 
 By the 1790s, anti-Loyalist feeling had calmed, and many former Loyalists were 
living in South Carolina (even in the backcountry).  South Carolinians adroitly managed 
public uses of historical memory to ensure they did not rehash Revolutionary conflicts.  
Loyalist children and grandchildren were incorporated at every level of society—so much 
so that Ann Pamela Cunningham, the granddaughter of a Loyalist militia leader, briefly 
roomed with John C. Calhoun’s daughter at an exclusive boarding school for girls.  By 
the time the South faced civil war again, South Carolinians were so secure in their 
memories of the American Revolution that they invoked their Revolutionary past as a 
beacon of unity against outside foes. 
 What made South Carolina able to reconcile after civil war, when so many 
societies do not accomplish this goal?  I certainly cannot suggest any hard and fast rule.  
But I do want to make an observation.  Today, national and international peace and 
reconciliation movements (and scholars) often recommend, or at least base their models 
on, official national action in the cause of reconciliation.  The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa is a now classic example.  Success depends on two things: 
one, that each side feels they have gotten a fair hearing, and two, that the full legitimacy 
of the highest national government stands behind official reconciliation. 
 South Carolina was successful with a different model.  First, while Loyalists did 
get the chance to speak for themselves, nobody ever encouraged them to unburden 
themselves freely.  (I in no way want to suggest this model is especially applicable to 
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South Africa’s case, where the moral claims are different.)  The losers had to swallow 
their rage and disappointment as a precondition to reintegration, and those Loyalists who 
were not willing to do so didn’t submit a petition.  Second, and perhaps more generally 
relevant, South Carolina, through ad hoc means, evolved a system of reconciliation that 
used state government legitimacy to cover the process of localized reconciliation.  The 
state legislature gave their imprimatur to decisions made locally.  Further, those decisions 
arose from negotiations between Loyalist and Patriot neighbors.  This suggests that a top-
down approach is not always required or even helpful.  While state or national (or 
international) government does need to give an official seal of approval to reintegrating 
activities, South Carolina’s reconciliation process worked because it gave local Patriots a 
stake in reconciliation.  Locals got to decide who stayed and who went, and this process 
put the onus of appeal on those former enemies seeking reintegration. 
 This local process worked for a second reason as well.  What government can 
provide, and the South Carolina General Assembly did provide, might be better termed 
legal reintegration or legal status regularization.  The actual process of reconciliation 
depended on a discussion of character, where each individual was judged by his actions.  
In South Carolina, the two went together, as the government extended legal reintegration 
to those individuals who were able to achieve reconciliation.  Reconciliation works best 
when everyone buys into the process, and for people to buy in, they need to feel that they 
have control over the decision.  Top down reconciliation doesn’t work, but bottom up 
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